- tor-onions - lists.torproject.org

(No Subject)
by MikeQ 06 Sep '19

06 Sep '19

Sent from ProtonMail mobile

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Doubts about onion v3 services
by Elige TuMooc 06 Sep '19

06 Sep '19

As far as I know (if there is any error, please tell me), the onion v3 services allow the master keys -public and secret (or private)- ed25519, generated in the directory stipulated in "HiddenServiceDir" to be stored offline (on a pendrive, for example), because the secret key is used "only" to generate derived keys, which are what the service actually uses. As far as I can read in the corresponding protocol, the derivations of the master keys (which can be stored offline) are: "blinded signing keys and descriptor signing keys (and their credentials), and their corresponding descriptor encryption keys" ( https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt#n529) Assuming the above is correct,I have some doubts: 1. The keys and other elements derived from the public and private master keys (like “blinded signing keys”) are generated by the operator, according to the protocol. Will Tor incorporate any software/tools that make this procedure easier for the user? 2. If the operator does not generate the derived elements, and only modifies the torrc file to add "HiddenServiceDir" and "HiddenServicePort", will the onion service work, or will the lack of the derived elements not work? 3. As far as I understand, currently the option to save offline the master keys is not available. Does this mean that derived elements, such as "blinded signing keys" are not used yet? To what extent is the v3 protocol implemented? 4. V3 encrypts the onion service descriptor sent to the "HSDir" node to prevent these nodes from collecting onion addresses. But is this currently happening, even if the operator does not generate the derived keys using the master key pair? I apologize for any write errors (English is not my mother tongue).

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Presentation on Onion Networking at the BCS
by Alec Muffett 23 Jul '19

23 Jul '19

Last week I was delighted to be invited to the British Computer Society "OpenSource Specialist Group", where I presented: "Why & How you should start using Onion Networking" Now available for viewing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pebRZyg_bh8 (caution: it starts a bit loud, check your volume) There are a few nits in it where I misspoke or wasn't entirely sure — some stuff I need to read-up on, plus it turns out that thinking on your feet is hard — but I think it's mostly okay. - alec -- http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm

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EOTK Updates: Ubuntu18LTS, Site Config, and *V3 ONIONS*
by Alec Muffett 04 Jul '19

04 Jul '19

Thread at: https://twitter.com/AlecMuffett/status/1146909965589843971 -- http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm

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.onion service unavailable at times
by Dylan Holand 01 Jul '19

01 Jul '19

I have a dedicated server with a few onoin-services on it. One of the URL's have some traffic to it, and this URL is not reachable a few times every day. Sometimes 5 minutes, sometimes 15 minutes.. While it's not available, the other onions is working fine, and they all have the same settings. I'm running tor 0.3.5.8-1.el7 Here's a portion of journalctl output which might give a hint of what this could be. These kind of errors show up a lot, and only for the one .onion that has some traffic to it: Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Couldn't relaunch rendezvous circuit to '[scrubbed]'. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Couldn't relaunch rendezvous circuit to '[scrubbed]'. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx. Tor[19172]: Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point [scrubbed] for service xxx The server load and the tor process are not under heavy load when this is happening, so it's not a ddos attack or similar.. Any help whatsoever would be highly appreciated as I've been trying to find a solution for this for days!

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error with setting up thttpd
by BobLEEt 16 Jun '19

16 Jun '19

Could i have help with setting up an onion website? I have downloaded thttpd, following a tutorial and what tor recommends. This is what i have done so far in the terminal on ubuntu: "~$ sudo wget http://www.acme.com/software/thttpd/thttpd-2.25b.tar.gz ~$ tar -zxvf thttpd-2.25b.tar.gz ~$ cd thttpd-2.25b/ ~/thttpd-2.25b$ sudo apt-get install gcc" But when I do ":~/thttpd-2.25b$ CC=arm-linux-gcc ./configure --host=arm-linux --prefix=~/root_mkfs/usr/local" it comes up with an error message saying: "creating cache ./config.cache checking host system type... arm-unknown-linux-gnu checking target system type... arm-unknown-linux-gnu checking build system type... arm-unknown-linux-gnu checking for gcc... arm-linux-gcc checking whether the C compiler (arm-linux-gcc ) works... no configure: error: installation or configuration problem: C compiler cannot create executables." Please help with creating this website as I am not sure of the issue Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Multiple onions services. One url.
by Jason S. Evans 11 Jun '19

11 Jun '19

Hi all, I'm wondering, what happens one someone creates an onion service with one hostname and private key at two or more locations? Does the Tor network have a way of ignoring the all but one, or is there some form of chaos as to where traffic actually goes? Thanks.

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(no subject)
by Peter Jones 31 May '19

31 May '19

how do i start surfing the web

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Re: [tor-onions] [tor-relays] Onion v2 HSDir Support (ref: v3 prop224) [was: fishy fingerprint patterns]
by grarpamp 04 Jan '19

04 Jan '19

On 1/4/19, V <various> wrote: > "crypto" "security" "sofware dev" "support" fud re v2 "Hey, here's v2, it uses older crypto and mechanics that are not as robust etc as v3... However v2 offers useful features for many users, and those features are not yet available in a newer design (volunteers to create some designs welcomed). As such, v2 received a last and final major formal update, and a backport from v3 concepts, was crafted into a more maintainable modular form, and has now been set out for community maintenance (maintainers welcomed). v3 has been set as default. Users will need to explicitly configure older versions as needed. Volunteer relay operators offer v2 HSDir flag to support users. Here is a table that fully compares and contrasts v2 vs v3 so that users may choose which best suits their needs... And here are roadmaps for v3 and vN ..." "Please remember before going for a walk... you could trip up your own laces, your shoes could fall apart, you could be mugged, it could even rain, thus walk at your own risk, or stay inside, or just have fun." This isn't hard, everyone happy.

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Re: [tor-onions] [tor-relays] Onion v2 HSDir Support (ref: v3 prop224) [was: fishy fingerprint patterns]
by grarpamp 04 Jan '19

04 Jan '19

On 1/4/19, teor <teor(a)riseup.net> wrote: >> Node operators (tor-relays) would continue offering >> v2 HSDir support module until such time as the reasons >> for choosing v2 by those above are supported in v3 or vN. > > It's not just about feature parity. Right. Feature parity is nice and excellent goal, till then, and with *no* plan for same on horizon table, it's about outright removal and killing of long standing features instead of rightly letting users choose from among all features to suit their needs. Killing ".<node>.exit" in URI's raised some questions, and using MAPADDRESS was the nearly functionally equivalent alternative existing / provided. All good. Killing v2... whose 80-bit addressing just so happens to enable appending to an RFC4193 /48 to create a 128-bit IPv6 space allocation with its inherent UDP all provided by way of Onioncat and OnionVPN over v2 onions and v2 HSDir nodes... would rip out accessibility to ***entire classes of transport protocols*** that users, and their applications, around the world, need to function properly, and can and do use. With the main arguments revolving that users are too stupid to select which of v2 or v3 best suits their needs, that v2's benefits have no acceptable tradeoffs for them, etc. That argument should be rejected. As should others... > Maintaining a reasonable level of security for v2 onion services > requires a lot of paid and volunteer time. We need to find bad > relays, and block them on directory authorities. Not really. v2 onion in it's current form has been more or less coded, done and operational for ~20 years, minus occaisional bug and enhancement phases. People have already explained in recent threads how, after the default out of the box mode for all *new* users is changed to v3 onions, those with need to use v2 onions can and will happily explicitly choose v2 and it's tradeoffs, manually in configs, to support their needs. Those tradeoffs should be documented onsite and in v2 man sections. Tor could even make some future release flag, complain about, and not load any current v2 config it detecs, directing them to such handholding docs until they specify "V2YesMommyImABigKidNow=true". As far as money goes, the Tor Project takes in $4.2 Million a year. Some of it's people are taking over $178k a piece, with at least 7 of them receiving over $100k, and the true volunteers eschewing all. Those numbers don't include all the slush, side and decentral funding either. Where's the 210 coders and others receiving $10k stipends for half the budget? Where's the open budget and mechanism? People do inquire this from time to time. People can start another Subject to comparatively analyse Tor Project alongside other opensource network overlays and cryptographic comms projects, and even other opensource projects in general. Even start Subjects where other projects could include, remove, or improve on whatever strategy Tor did to reach $4.2M. There's no lack of funds in Tor Project. > If we spend a lot of time blocking relays, we can't spend that > time on improving other areas of the tor network. Let's define this "blocking" as being of v2 HSDir scraping, not of all the other forms of bad relays. Community volunteers run the public opensource automated scrape detection and reporting tools. The weekly config change volunteer DA's execute based on that is trivial effort. With a bit of logic it's even automateable. Yet as above, v2 users do and will soon *explicitly* choose and accept those tradeoffs. So that's a non argument too. > v2 onion services also add a significant amount of load to the > Tor network. They use older, inefficient crypto, and they are No. v2 is not some new network tax that just came alone, it's the first mass version and the entire base of onionland. Load is a ratio. v2 used to carry 100% of the load since then, and still carries over 90%. Some crypto is HW accel, some not, in both v2 and v3. And if that was a metric'd and studied issue, even other 80-bit algos could be chosen in some long term v2 support release. > often targeted by scanners. No again. Let's define what "scanners" might mean... Land of v2 and v3 are equally web spidered 24x365, it's HTML, no one can stop that. Known v3 onions are portscanned just as much as v2 onions are. If "scanning" means "searching for key collisions by generating offline", both v2 and v3 are reasonably collision proof to make that nearly moot. And "scanners" testing generated key lists for HSDir resolve or TCP connect on the live network will learn in one day that there is absolutely zero hope there. So that's all moot. For separate topic of v2 HSDir "scraping" see above. > If we spend a lot of network resources on v2 onion services, > then we can't use those resources for more efficient, user-focused > traffic. No. Users have reasons to use, and do and will continue to select and use v2, even if they have to fork tor. v2 is "used" by "users" and is thus "user-focused" traffic by definition. > So there are many engineering tradeoffs here. Where? Draw up a list of what needs to be done to make 80-bit v2 support and engineering better. Work to minimize the diffs between v2 and v3, update whatever algos and protocols in v2 needs addressed, modularize and make v2 pluggable (and vN for that matter), call for extended maintainers, etc. > Hopefully, we'll have feature parity on v3 very soon. And then > apps will migrate from v2 to v3 (or dual-stack). IPv6 (with inherent UDP) parity for v3 onions (or vN) would be awesome :-) There have even been a good number of threads over time where people have suggested ideas on ways to make that happen. Look them up and start from there. However parity is not there yet, so no such apps and users that need to use v2 for it will migrate there, until then. They will continue to select and use v2 as appropriate. > It's best if we transition slowly, in a planned manner. But we do > need to transition in the next few years. Otherwise, we might have > to transition quickly due to network or crypto breaks. And that's > not a good experience for anyone. If's already been decided to make v3 the new default. And certainly not unreasonable to make v2 require explict new config to utilize, the placing of a flag to satiate those benevolents having such concerns for users. However killing v2 is not really a good option until something comes along that provides equivalent of 128-bit IPv6 onion transport (inherently brings UDP), which is today offered by 80-bit v2 onions HSDir and Onioncat. > We try not to have conversations across multiple lists, because > it's confusing. It's hard to follow threads, the conversations > get split up, and the subjects get mangled. Inclusion, informing and information is important. Don't create confusion by bloating and destroying valuable Subject header space with stupid list tags, colossal mistake there made by so many admins and instead of teaching requestors why it's bad. Use a good MUA that does proper email threading. Trim superfluous entries from To and Cc. Don't top post, don't block quote, don't send HTML, etc... Put at least some work into all your comms all the time, that way any occaisional missed or overridden elements have minimal effect on the ongoing aggregate sum. Don't be a lazy September fuck. > Let's use tor-relays for further discussion. Draft a proposal for what aspects might go where. Maybe tor-relays for v2 HSDir support and their CPU specific bits of the subject. Yet the overall topic and conversation is much larger. Until it gets figured out, sorted into whatever workbins, what goes where... some inclusion and crossing now and then is in fact efficient, useful, and won't blow up the world :)

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