- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

BandwidthRate minimal values (was: Re: [tor-relays] Report on the FOSDEM relays meetup)
by nusenu 13 May '18

13 May '18

(from tor-relays) >> Content-wise, there were some pretty fruitful discussion, but we spent quite a bit >> of time on questions that recurr at other meetups too: >> >> - What's the most useful thing I can bring to the network? >> (TL;DR: Ideally, fast relays (if possible exits); if you can't contribute >> more than 1MB/s, make it a bridge) > > I like 1MByte/s (8MBit/s) as the "limit" between relay vs. bridge, currently we mention > 16MBit/s and 2MBit/s in the documentation: > > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HowDoIDecide > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide#RelayRequiremen… > > I'll go ahead and make 8 MBit/s the lower limit (and keep "It is recommended that a relay have at least 16 MBit/s (Mbps)") > unless there are strong opinions against it. Hi, to have all places consistent, are you open to increase the minimal values in the tor man page for relays to 8 MBit/s (and bridges to 1 MBit/s) or other greater than the current values? currently it says: BandwidthRate N [...] If you want to run a relay in the public network, this needs to be at the very least 75 KBytes for a relay (that is, 600 kbits) or 50 KBytes for a bridge (400 kbits) but of course, more is better; we recommend at least 250 KBytes (2 mbits) if possible. If you are open to it I'll submit a patch via trac. -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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Proposal #291 (two guards) IRC meeting Wed Apr 18, 17:00 UTC
by Mike Perry 09 May '18

09 May '18

Heyo. We're going to have a meeting to discuss Proposal 291. See this thread: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013053.html The meeting will be at 17:00 UTC, on Wednesday, April 18th, in #tor-meeting on irc.oftc.net. (That's 10:00 left coast, 12:00 middle coast, 13:00 right coast, and 19:00 in several socialist paradises that strangely do not have public water fountains.) https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?iso=20180415T1700 Things we need to decide: 1. Do we abandon Tor's path restrictions? 2. Do we use two guards? At the end of this meeting, we should commit to one or both of these things long-term. (Surprise twist: we're already doing #2!) Each of these choices is a nuanced thing. And just picking one or the other doesn't solve everything. I think it's best to think of them as a commitment to a plan over some timescale, based on the information we have available today. People who mos def should attend: George Kadianakis, Roger, Nick, Me People who probably maybe should attend: Aaron Johnson, Isis (and others concerned about guard fingerprinting), You? -- Mike Perry

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Tor Messenger recent IRC re-topic.
by Beard CryptoWorld 07 May '18

07 May '18

Hello Everyone, We briefly talked about this idea of taking over Tor Messenger, a long with our own ideas and were asked to mail in some Documentation/Roadmaps. I'm asking in what form would you guys like to see this in? Basically: Would you like us to add a .txt as an attachment in a follow up email? Or would it be better to host the files on our site, and allow people to read without subject to downloading anything? Thank you, ~ Beard | https://twitter.com/beardlyness

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Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Tor bandwidth measurements document format
by juga 06 May '18

06 May '18

Hi, after teor's revision, second version pasted below. Changes can be seen: in https://github.com/juga0/torspec/commits/bandwidth-file-spec Best, juga ================================================================= Tor Bandwidth Measurements Document Format juga teor 1. Scope and preliminaries This document describes the format of Tor's bandwidth measurements document, version 1.0.0 and later. Since Tor version 0.2.4.12-alpha the directory authorities use the bandwidth measurements document called "V3BandwidthsFile" and produced by Torflow [1] (format described in README.spec.txt [2]). The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 1.2. Acknowledgements The original bandwidth measurement scanner (Torflow) and format was created by mike. Teor suggested to write this specification while contributing on pastly's new bandwidth scanner implementation. This specification was revised after feedback from: XXX 1.3 Outline The bandwidth measurements mentioned in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of "Tor directory protocol" (dir-spec.txt) [3] are obtained by bandwidth authorities, which generate a file storing information on relays' measured bandwidth capacities. 1.4. Format Versions 1.0.0 - The legacy fallback bandwidth measurements document format 1.1.0 - Adds key_value lines to the header, format version, optional ones and section separator. 2. Format details Bandwidth measurements MUST contain the following sections: - Header (exactly once) - Relays measurements (zero or more times) 2.1. Definitions The following nonterminals are defined in dir-spec.txt, sections 1.2., 2.1.1., 2.1.3.: Int SP (space) NL (newline) Keyword ArgumentChar fingerprint (hexdigest) nickname Nonterminals defined in "Tor Directory List Format" (dir-list-spec.txt), section 2.2.1.: version_number We define the following nonterminals: value ::= ArgumentChar+ key_value ::= Keyword "=" value line ::= ArgumentChar* NL timestamp ::= Int bandwidth ::= Int relay_line ::= key_value (SP key_value)* NL 2.2. Header format Some header lines MUST appear in specific positions, as documented below. All other lines can appear in any order. There MUST NOT be multiple key_value header lines with the same key. It consists of: timestamp NL [At start, exactly once.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the file was created. "version=" version_number NL [In second position, zero or one time.] The specification document format version. It uses semantic versioning [5]. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. Version 1.0.0 documents do not contain this line, and the version_number is considered to be "1.0.0". "software=" value NL [Zero or one time.] The name of the software that created the document. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. Version 1.0.0 documents do not contain this line, and the software is considered to be "torflow". "software_version=" value NL [Zero or one time.] The version of the software that created the document. The version may be a version_number, a git commit, or some other version scheme. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. "scanner_started=" timestamp NL [Zero or one time.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the scanner that generates the measurements document started. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. "earliest_measurement=" timestamp NL [Zero or one time.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the first relay measurement was obtained. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. key_value NL [Zero or more times.] Future format versions may include additional key_value header lines. Additional header lines will be accompanied by a minor version increment. Implementations MAY add additional header lines as needed. This specification SHOULD be updated to avoid conflicting meanings for the same header keys. Parsers MUST NOT rely on the order of these additional lines. Additional header lines MUST NOT use any keywords specified in the relay measurements format. If a header line does not conform to this format, the line SHOULD be ignored by parsers. NL [Zero or one time.] The header ends. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. For version 1.0.0 documents, the header ends when the first relay measurement line is found conforming to the next section. 2.3. Relay measurements format It consists of zero or more relay_line with the measurement results of relays in arbitrary order. There can be at most one relay_line per relay identity (fingerprint). There MUST NOT be multiple key_value pairs with the same key in the same relay_line. Each relay_line MUST include the following key_value in arbitrary order: "node_id=" fingerprint [Exactly once.] The fingerprint of the relay being measured. "bw=" bandwidth [Exactly once.] The measured bandwidth of this relay. Tor accepts zero bandwidths, but they trigger bugs in older Tor implementations. Therefore, implementations SHOULD NOT produce zero bandwidths. Instead, they SHOULD use one as their minimum bandwidth. Multiple measurements can be aggregated using an averaging scheme, such as a mean, median, or decaying average. Torflow scales bandwidths to kilobytes per second. Other implementations SHOULD use kilobytes per second for their initial bandwidth scaling. If different implementations or configurations are used in votes for the same network, their measurements MAY need further scaling. See Appendix B for information about scaling, and one possible scaling method. key_value [Zero or more times.] Future format versions may include additional key_value pairs on a relay_line. Additional key_value pairs will be accompanied by a minor version increment. Implementations MAY add additional relay key_value pairs as needed. This specification SHOULD be updated to avoid conflicting meanings for the same relay keys. Parsers MUST NOT rely on the order of these additional key_value pairs. Additional key_value pairs MUST NOT use any keywords specified in the header format. If a relay line does not conform to this format, the line SHOULD be ignored by parsers. 2.4. Implementation notes 2.4.1. Simple Bandwidth Scanner Every relay measurement in sbws version 0.1.0 consists of: "node_id=" fingerprint SP As above. "bw=" bandwidth SP As above. "nick=" nickname SP [Exactly once.] The relay nickname. "rtt=" Int SP [Exactly once.] The Round Trip Time in milliseconds to obtain 1 byte of data. "time=" timestamp NL [Exactly once.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the last measurement was performed. 2.4.2. Torflow Torflow relay lines include node_id and bw, and other key_value pairs [2]. References: 1. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git 2. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/tree/NetworkScanners/BwAuthority/… 3. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt 4. https://metrics.torproject.org/onionoo.html#details 5. https://semver.org/ A. Sample data The following has not been obtained from any real measurement. A.1. Generated by Torflow This an example version 1.0.0 document: 1523911758 node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 bw=760 nick=Test measured_at=1523911725 updated_at=1523911725 pid_error=4.11374090719 pid_error_sum=4.11374090719 pid_bw=57136645 pid_delta=2.12168374577 circ_fail=0.2 scanner=/filepath node_id=$96C15995F30895689291F455587BD94CA427B6FC bw=189 nick=Test2 measured_at=1523911623 updated_at=1523911623 pid_error=3.96703337994 pid_error_sum=3.96703337994 pid_bw=47422125 pid_delta=2.65469736988 circ_fail=0.0 scanner=/filepath A.2. Generated by sbws version 0.1.0 1523911758 version=1.1.0 software=sbws software_version=0.1.0 scanner_started=1523911756 earliest_measurement=1523911757 node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 bw=760 nick=Test rtt=380 time=1523911725 node_id=$96C15995F30895689291F455587BD94CA427B6FC bw=189 nick=Test2 rtt=378 time=1523911623 B. Scaling bandwidths B.1. Scaling requirements Tor accepts zero bandwidths, but they trigger bugs in older Tor implementations. Therefore, scaling methods SHOULD perform the following checks: * If the total bandwidth is zero, all relays should be given equal bandwidths. * If the scaled bandwidth is zero, it should be rounded up to one. Initial experiments indicate that scaling may not be needed for torflow and sbws, because their measured bandwidths are similar enough already. B.2. A linear scaling method If scaling is required, here is a simple linear bandwith scaling method, which ensures that all bandwidth votes contain approximately the same total bandwidth: 1. Calculate the relay quota by dividing the total measured bandwidth in all votes, by the number of relays with measured bandwidth votes. In the public tor network, this is approximately 7500 as of April 2018. The quota should be a consensus parameter, so it can be adjusted for all scanners on the network. 2. Calculate a vote quota by multiplying the relay quota by the number of relays this bandwidth authority has measured bandwidths for. 3. Calculate a scaling factor by dividing the vote quota by the total unscaled measured bandwidth in this bandwidth authority's upcoming vote. 4. Multiply each unscaled measured bandwidth by the scaling factor. Now, the total scaled bandwidth in the upcoming vote is approximately equal to the quota. B.3. Quota changes If all scanners are using scaling, the quota can be gradually reduced or increased as needed. Smaller quotas decrease the size of uncompressed consensuses, and may decrease the size of consensus diffs and compressed consensuses. But if the relay quota is too small, some relays may be over- or under-weighted.

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Bandwidth Scanning Meeting Notes 3 May 2018
by Matt Traudt 03 May '18

03 May '18

Next meeting is 10 May 2018 at 1200 UTC for 30 minutes... maybe. While we should find a standard time, next week is a special case for pastly and teor. Notes are https://pad.riseup.net/p/ioYq89yZSx1t and copy/pasted below. --------------------------------------------------------------------- This pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ioYq89yZSx1t Meetbot log: http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2018/tor-meeting.2018-05-03-09.29.html Last week https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013108.html Next Milestone: 1st Status Update: May 25th All Milestones: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/gsoc ######################## Updates pastly: - Make significant strides towards the switch to HTTP/S - sbws launches Tor for itself - started tagging and icrementing and signing versions teor: - reviewed the bandwidth format spec - feedback on tor bwfile tests and bug fixes - feedback on sbws / tor launching - the sbws vs torflow averages in the testnet are stable and consistent - fixed a buffer read-past-the-end when the file can't be read in the bwfile parsing code juga: Last week: * sbws: * Worked on "Add what to include in a source distribution" (issues/132) * Discussed with pastly about "Include file where to write ``generate`` results in the config?" * Created "Fix version, prepare for future release" (issues/131): pastly started to tag versions, what is needed for packaging/distributing sbws (whatever the method will be) * Worked on "Include software and sofware_version headers" (issues/96), waiting to finish the spec so that we don't keep switch format * Worked on "Add useful information in sbws header lines" (issues/119): PR 130 waiting to finish spec * spec: * Worked with teor on the new version sent to @tor-dev * little-tor: * Worked on "Allow additional header lines" (#25960): also waiting for the specs * Started to write tests for the previous and "Create unit test for dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths" (#25947) Next week: * spec: wait for comments and change according to it * little-tor: * continue with #25960 (when spec ready) * finish #25947, tests for current code, additional header lines and possible refactor * sbws: work on 96, 119 when spec is ready ######################## Discussions -------------- sbws logo offer?? Is this something we care about? Decision: not really, but ux might like the help -------------- Meeting time 0930 UTC is terribly early for pastly, but he can do it in the name of collab. 1130 UTC would actually be easier for teor, but that's about as late as they can go For juga both times are fine ^ Decision: from 12:00 to 12:30 UTC Decision: 1200 UTC and only 30m long next week -------------- Bandwidth spec Bugfixes and incremental improvements, or a rewrite? Should i create a new version, include the changes or wait for more comments? Decision: make minor changes if there is time -------------- Bandwidth file parsing code in Tor unit tests are ok bugfixes are ok What this mean? ^ we can always do tests and bugfixes If we implement the format, we might have to change it -------------- Bandwidth file generation If we implement the format, we might have to change it pastly thinks he/we can easily handle whatever crazy thing you all come up with for the Tor side of code as long as it follows the general idea of one-line-per-relay, simple integers, and maybe a header with some metadata juga thinks there is not crazy thing, and parsing strings in python is way easier than c :)

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connectivity failure for top 100 relays
by dawuud 02 May '18

02 May '18

Out of 9900 possible two hop tor circuits among the top 100 tor relays only 935 circuit builds have succeeded. This is way worse than the last time I sent a report 6 months ago during the Montreal tor dev meeting. Here's the scanner I use: https://github.com/david415/tor_partition_scanner (I was planning on improving this testing methodology in collaboration with Katharina Kohls but was unable to travel to Bochum University because of visa limitations. It was either go to tor-dev meeting or Bochum but not both.) Here's the gist of my simple testing methodology: https://gist.github.com/david415/9875821652018431dd6d6c4407bb90c0#file-dete… Here's exactly how I performed the scan to get those results: wget https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/consensuses/2018-… ./helpers/query_fingerprints_from_consensus_file.py 2018-03-1 3-01-00-00-consensus > top100.relays detect_partitions.py --tor-control tcp:127.0.0.1:9051 --log-dir ./ --status-log ./status_log \ --relay-list top100.relays --secret secretTorEmpireOfRelays --partitions 1 --this-partition 0 \ --build-duration .25 --circuit-timeout 60 --log-chunk-size 1000 --max-concurrency 100 echo "select first_hop, second_hop from scan_log where status = 'failure';" | sqlite3 scan1.db | wc -l 8942 echo "select first_hop, second_hop from scan_log where status = 'timeout';" | sqlite3 scan1.db | wc -l 23 echo "select first_hop, second_hop from scan_log where status = 'success';" | sqlite3 scan1.db | wc -l 935

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Tor Terminology + torspec
by Iain Learmonth 02 May '18

02 May '18

Hi All, Looking at the recent work on the Tor bandwidth measurements document format, I've noticed there are a few places where language can be ambiguous [0]. This morning, I noticed more ambiguity in some metrics tools [1]. We could do with a glossary. The problem though is not the lack of a glossary, but that we have at least 3 [2][3][4]. I've just been discussing this with juga in IRC. For the Metrics glossary, I think (but please correct me if I'm wrong) that the Metrics team would be happy to have our glossary's definitions match up with torspec. I also think it would be cool if we only add new terms to the Metrics glossary if they have a corresponding term in torspec's glossary. Would the torspec maintainers be happy to review and merge patches for new terms to facilitate that? The community glossary is perhaps more broad than the Metrics or torspec glossaries, and so having all those terms in torspec would probably not be a useful thing to do. Would it be agreeable with the community team that terms that are already defined in torspec should not be overloaded and that new terms shouldn't be defined in torspec if they would have conflicting meanings with terms defined in the community glossary? If you have other ideas, then please do also suggest them. Thanks, Iain. [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-May/013145.html [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-May/015132.html [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/glossary.txt [3] https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html [4] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/community/glossary

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onion v2 deprecation plan?
by nusenu 30 Apr '18

30 Apr '18

Hi, even though you are probably years away from deprecating onion v2 services it is certainly good to have a clear plan. I'm asking because the sooner onion v2 are deprecated the sooner some people can stop worrying about malicious HSDirs. thanks, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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TBB + Privoxy
by procmem 30 Apr '18

30 Apr '18

Hi. We are trying to get Tor Browser to work with privoxy to allow users to optionally connect to other networks including I2P, Zeronet... Here's what we tried: * Disabling network.proxy.no_proxies_on * Setting network.proxy.http_port to 8118 (privoxy’s port number) network.proxy.http 127.0.0.1 network.proxy.http_port 8118 network.proxy.ssl 127.0.0.1 network.proxy.ssl_port 8118 * We know a transition to unix sockets for localhost comms is planned but not currently enforced. We have workarounds for that. Can someone please tell me what's missing? NB This is a separate copy of Tor Browser to prevent fingerprinting problems with normal surfing in general. [0] https://forums.whonix.org/t/i2p-integration/4981

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Closing old Trac Milestones
by teor 30 Apr '18

30 Apr '18

Hi, Tor's trac has a lot of milestones. Sometimes users select the wrong one, because there are so many. I've just closed some old milestones from 5+ years ago: Deliverable-Sep2010 Deliverable-December2010 Deliverable-Mar2011 Deliverable-May2011 Deliverable-Nov2011 Vidalia: 0.2.15 Vidalia: 0.3.x (Assuming they were no longer relevant, and belonged to Core Tor.) Here is a list of milestones we could close, sorted by team: HTTPSE Cr 2013.4.2x HTTPS-E 3.3 HTTPS-E 3.2.1 HTTPS-E 3.2.2 HTTPS-E 3.2.3 HTTPS-E 4.0dev8 HTTPS-E 4.0dev9 HTTPS-E 4.0dev15 Website Donations Enhancement Chronos: phase one Chronos: phase two TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable Torbutton: 1.2.5 Torbutton: 1.3 Torbutton: 1.4 ExoneraTor 1.0.0 Metrics 1.0.0 Metrics 2.0.0 Onionoo 1.14.0 ttdnsd: 0.8 Source: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/roadmap If any of the milestones on this list belong to you, and you'll never put any more tickets in them, please close them. (Or let me know, and I can close them.) Tickets in closed milestones will still appear in searches. We can always re-open a milestone if we decide we want to put more tickets in it. T -- teor PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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