- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Tor bandwidth measurements document format
by juga 06 May '18

06 May '18

Hi, after teor's revision, second version pasted below. Changes can be seen: in https://github.com/juga0/torspec/commits/bandwidth-file-spec Best, juga ================================================================= Tor Bandwidth Measurements Document Format juga teor 1. Scope and preliminaries This document describes the format of Tor's bandwidth measurements document, version 1.0.0 and later. Since Tor version 0.2.4.12-alpha the directory authorities use the bandwidth measurements document called "V3BandwidthsFile" and produced by Torflow [1] (format described in README.spec.txt [2]). The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 1.2. Acknowledgements The original bandwidth measurement scanner (Torflow) and format was created by mike. Teor suggested to write this specification while contributing on pastly's new bandwidth scanner implementation. This specification was revised after feedback from: XXX 1.3 Outline The bandwidth measurements mentioned in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of "Tor directory protocol" (dir-spec.txt) [3] are obtained by bandwidth authorities, which generate a file storing information on relays' measured bandwidth capacities. 1.4. Format Versions 1.0.0 - The legacy fallback bandwidth measurements document format 1.1.0 - Adds key_value lines to the header, format version, optional ones and section separator. 2. Format details Bandwidth measurements MUST contain the following sections: - Header (exactly once) - Relays measurements (zero or more times) 2.1. Definitions The following nonterminals are defined in dir-spec.txt, sections 1.2., 2.1.1., 2.1.3.: Int SP (space) NL (newline) Keyword ArgumentChar fingerprint (hexdigest) nickname Nonterminals defined in "Tor Directory List Format" (dir-list-spec.txt), section 2.2.1.: version_number We define the following nonterminals: value ::= ArgumentChar+ key_value ::= Keyword "=" value line ::= ArgumentChar* NL timestamp ::= Int bandwidth ::= Int relay_line ::= key_value (SP key_value)* NL 2.2. Header format Some header lines MUST appear in specific positions, as documented below. All other lines can appear in any order. There MUST NOT be multiple key_value header lines with the same key. It consists of: timestamp NL [At start, exactly once.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the file was created. "version=" version_number NL [In second position, zero or one time.] The specification document format version. It uses semantic versioning [5]. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. Version 1.0.0 documents do not contain this line, and the version_number is considered to be "1.0.0". "software=" value NL [Zero or one time.] The name of the software that created the document. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. Version 1.0.0 documents do not contain this line, and the software is considered to be "torflow". "software_version=" value NL [Zero or one time.] The version of the software that created the document. The version may be a version_number, a git commit, or some other version scheme. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. "scanner_started=" timestamp NL [Zero or one time.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the scanner that generates the measurements document started. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. "earliest_measurement=" timestamp NL [Zero or one time.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the first relay measurement was obtained. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. key_value NL [Zero or more times.] Future format versions may include additional key_value header lines. Additional header lines will be accompanied by a minor version increment. Implementations MAY add additional header lines as needed. This specification SHOULD be updated to avoid conflicting meanings for the same header keys. Parsers MUST NOT rely on the order of these additional lines. Additional header lines MUST NOT use any keywords specified in the relay measurements format. If a header line does not conform to this format, the line SHOULD be ignored by parsers. NL [Zero or one time.] The header ends. This line has been added in version 1.1.0 of this specification. For version 1.0.0 documents, the header ends when the first relay measurement line is found conforming to the next section. 2.3. Relay measurements format It consists of zero or more relay_line with the measurement results of relays in arbitrary order. There can be at most one relay_line per relay identity (fingerprint). There MUST NOT be multiple key_value pairs with the same key in the same relay_line. Each relay_line MUST include the following key_value in arbitrary order: "node_id=" fingerprint [Exactly once.] The fingerprint of the relay being measured. "bw=" bandwidth [Exactly once.] The measured bandwidth of this relay. Tor accepts zero bandwidths, but they trigger bugs in older Tor implementations. Therefore, implementations SHOULD NOT produce zero bandwidths. Instead, they SHOULD use one as their minimum bandwidth. Multiple measurements can be aggregated using an averaging scheme, such as a mean, median, or decaying average. Torflow scales bandwidths to kilobytes per second. Other implementations SHOULD use kilobytes per second for their initial bandwidth scaling. If different implementations or configurations are used in votes for the same network, their measurements MAY need further scaling. See Appendix B for information about scaling, and one possible scaling method. key_value [Zero or more times.] Future format versions may include additional key_value pairs on a relay_line. Additional key_value pairs will be accompanied by a minor version increment. Implementations MAY add additional relay key_value pairs as needed. This specification SHOULD be updated to avoid conflicting meanings for the same relay keys. Parsers MUST NOT rely on the order of these additional key_value pairs. Additional key_value pairs MUST NOT use any keywords specified in the header format. If a relay line does not conform to this format, the line SHOULD be ignored by parsers. 2.4. Implementation notes 2.4.1. Simple Bandwidth Scanner Every relay measurement in sbws version 0.1.0 consists of: "node_id=" fingerprint SP As above. "bw=" bandwidth SP As above. "nick=" nickname SP [Exactly once.] The relay nickname. "rtt=" Int SP [Exactly once.] The Round Trip Time in milliseconds to obtain 1 byte of data. "time=" timestamp NL [Exactly once.] The Unix Epoch time in seconds when the last measurement was performed. 2.4.2. Torflow Torflow relay lines include node_id and bw, and other key_value pairs [2]. References: 1. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git 2. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/tree/NetworkScanners/BwAuthority/… 3. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt 4. https://metrics.torproject.org/onionoo.html#details 5. https://semver.org/ A. Sample data The following has not been obtained from any real measurement. A.1. Generated by Torflow This an example version 1.0.0 document: 1523911758 node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 bw=760 nick=Test measured_at=1523911725 updated_at=1523911725 pid_error=4.11374090719 pid_error_sum=4.11374090719 pid_bw=57136645 pid_delta=2.12168374577 circ_fail=0.2 scanner=/filepath node_id=$96C15995F30895689291F455587BD94CA427B6FC bw=189 nick=Test2 measured_at=1523911623 updated_at=1523911623 pid_error=3.96703337994 pid_error_sum=3.96703337994 pid_bw=47422125 pid_delta=2.65469736988 circ_fail=0.0 scanner=/filepath A.2. Generated by sbws version 0.1.0 1523911758 version=1.1.0 software=sbws software_version=0.1.0 scanner_started=1523911756 earliest_measurement=1523911757 node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 bw=760 nick=Test rtt=380 time=1523911725 node_id=$96C15995F30895689291F455587BD94CA427B6FC bw=189 nick=Test2 rtt=378 time=1523911623 B. Scaling bandwidths B.1. Scaling requirements Tor accepts zero bandwidths, but they trigger bugs in older Tor implementations. Therefore, scaling methods SHOULD perform the following checks: * If the total bandwidth is zero, all relays should be given equal bandwidths. * If the scaled bandwidth is zero, it should be rounded up to one. Initial experiments indicate that scaling may not be needed for torflow and sbws, because their measured bandwidths are similar enough already. B.2. A linear scaling method If scaling is required, here is a simple linear bandwith scaling method, which ensures that all bandwidth votes contain approximately the same total bandwidth: 1. Calculate the relay quota by dividing the total measured bandwidth in all votes, by the number of relays with measured bandwidth votes. In the public tor network, this is approximately 7500 as of April 2018. The quota should be a consensus parameter, so it can be adjusted for all scanners on the network. 2. Calculate a vote quota by multiplying the relay quota by the number of relays this bandwidth authority has measured bandwidths for. 3. Calculate a scaling factor by dividing the vote quota by the total unscaled measured bandwidth in this bandwidth authority's upcoming vote. 4. Multiply each unscaled measured bandwidth by the scaling factor. Now, the total scaled bandwidth in the upcoming vote is approximately equal to the quota. B.3. Quota changes If all scanners are using scaling, the quota can be gradually reduced or increased as needed. Smaller quotas decrease the size of uncompressed consensuses, and may decrease the size of consensus diffs and compressed consensuses. But if the relay quota is too small, some relays may be over- or under-weighted.

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Bandwidth Scanning Meeting Notes 3 May 2018
by Matt Traudt 03 May '18

03 May '18

Next meeting is 10 May 2018 at 1200 UTC for 30 minutes... maybe. While we should find a standard time, next week is a special case for pastly and teor. Notes are https://pad.riseup.net/p/ioYq89yZSx1t and copy/pasted below. --------------------------------------------------------------------- This pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ioYq89yZSx1t Meetbot log: http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2018/tor-meeting.2018-05-03-09.29.html Last week https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013108.html Next Milestone: 1st Status Update: May 25th All Milestones: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/gsoc ######################## Updates pastly: - Make significant strides towards the switch to HTTP/S - sbws launches Tor for itself - started tagging and icrementing and signing versions teor: - reviewed the bandwidth format spec - feedback on tor bwfile tests and bug fixes - feedback on sbws / tor launching - the sbws vs torflow averages in the testnet are stable and consistent - fixed a buffer read-past-the-end when the file can't be read in the bwfile parsing code juga: Last week: * sbws: * Worked on "Add what to include in a source distribution" (issues/132) * Discussed with pastly about "Include file where to write ``generate`` results in the config?" * Created "Fix version, prepare for future release" (issues/131): pastly started to tag versions, what is needed for packaging/distributing sbws (whatever the method will be) * Worked on "Include software and sofware_version headers" (issues/96), waiting to finish the spec so that we don't keep switch format * Worked on "Add useful information in sbws header lines" (issues/119): PR 130 waiting to finish spec * spec: * Worked with teor on the new version sent to @tor-dev * little-tor: * Worked on "Allow additional header lines" (#25960): also waiting for the specs * Started to write tests for the previous and "Create unit test for dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths" (#25947) Next week: * spec: wait for comments and change according to it * little-tor: * continue with #25960 (when spec ready) * finish #25947, tests for current code, additional header lines and possible refactor * sbws: work on 96, 119 when spec is ready ######################## Discussions -------------- sbws logo offer?? Is this something we care about? Decision: not really, but ux might like the help -------------- Meeting time 0930 UTC is terribly early for pastly, but he can do it in the name of collab. 1130 UTC would actually be easier for teor, but that's about as late as they can go For juga both times are fine ^ Decision: from 12:00 to 12:30 UTC Decision: 1200 UTC and only 30m long next week -------------- Bandwidth spec Bugfixes and incremental improvements, or a rewrite? Should i create a new version, include the changes or wait for more comments? Decision: make minor changes if there is time -------------- Bandwidth file parsing code in Tor unit tests are ok bugfixes are ok What this mean? ^ we can always do tests and bugfixes If we implement the format, we might have to change it -------------- Bandwidth file generation If we implement the format, we might have to change it pastly thinks he/we can easily handle whatever crazy thing you all come up with for the Tor side of code as long as it follows the general idea of one-line-per-relay, simple integers, and maybe a header with some metadata juga thinks there is not crazy thing, and parsing strings in python is way easier than c :)

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connectivity failure for top 100 relays
by dawuud 02 May '18

02 May '18

Out of 9900 possible two hop tor circuits among the top 100 tor relays only 935 circuit builds have succeeded. This is way worse than the last time I sent a report 6 months ago during the Montreal tor dev meeting. Here's the scanner I use: https://github.com/david415/tor_partition_scanner (I was planning on improving this testing methodology in collaboration with Katharina Kohls but was unable to travel to Bochum University because of visa limitations. It was either go to tor-dev meeting or Bochum but not both.) Here's the gist of my simple testing methodology: https://gist.github.com/david415/9875821652018431dd6d6c4407bb90c0#file-dete… Here's exactly how I performed the scan to get those results: wget https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/consensuses/2018-… ./helpers/query_fingerprints_from_consensus_file.py 2018-03-1 3-01-00-00-consensus > top100.relays detect_partitions.py --tor-control tcp:127.0.0.1:9051 --log-dir ./ --status-log ./status_log \ --relay-list top100.relays --secret secretTorEmpireOfRelays --partitions 1 --this-partition 0 \ --build-duration .25 --circuit-timeout 60 --log-chunk-size 1000 --max-concurrency 100 echo "select first_hop, second_hop from scan_log where status = 'failure';" | sqlite3 scan1.db | wc -l 8942 echo "select first_hop, second_hop from scan_log where status = 'timeout';" | sqlite3 scan1.db | wc -l 23 echo "select first_hop, second_hop from scan_log where status = 'success';" | sqlite3 scan1.db | wc -l 935

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Tor Terminology + torspec
by Iain Learmonth 02 May '18

02 May '18

Hi All, Looking at the recent work on the Tor bandwidth measurements document format, I've noticed there are a few places where language can be ambiguous [0]. This morning, I noticed more ambiguity in some metrics tools [1]. We could do with a glossary. The problem though is not the lack of a glossary, but that we have at least 3 [2][3][4]. I've just been discussing this with juga in IRC. For the Metrics glossary, I think (but please correct me if I'm wrong) that the Metrics team would be happy to have our glossary's definitions match up with torspec. I also think it would be cool if we only add new terms to the Metrics glossary if they have a corresponding term in torspec's glossary. Would the torspec maintainers be happy to review and merge patches for new terms to facilitate that? The community glossary is perhaps more broad than the Metrics or torspec glossaries, and so having all those terms in torspec would probably not be a useful thing to do. Would it be agreeable with the community team that terms that are already defined in torspec should not be overloaded and that new terms shouldn't be defined in torspec if they would have conflicting meanings with terms defined in the community glossary? If you have other ideas, then please do also suggest them. Thanks, Iain. [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-May/013145.html [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-May/015132.html [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/glossary.txt [3] https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html [4] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/community/glossary

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onion v2 deprecation plan?
by nusenu 30 Apr '18

30 Apr '18

Hi, even though you are probably years away from deprecating onion v2 services it is certainly good to have a clear plan. I'm asking because the sooner onion v2 are deprecated the sooner some people can stop worrying about malicious HSDirs. thanks, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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TBB + Privoxy
by procmem 30 Apr '18

30 Apr '18

Hi. We are trying to get Tor Browser to work with privoxy to allow users to optionally connect to other networks including I2P, Zeronet... Here's what we tried: * Disabling network.proxy.no_proxies_on * Setting network.proxy.http_port to 8118 (privoxy’s port number) network.proxy.http 127.0.0.1 network.proxy.http_port 8118 network.proxy.ssl 127.0.0.1 network.proxy.ssl_port 8118 * We know a transition to unix sockets for localhost comms is planned but not currently enforced. We have workarounds for that. Can someone please tell me what's missing? NB This is a separate copy of Tor Browser to prevent fingerprinting problems with normal surfing in general. [0] https://forums.whonix.org/t/i2p-integration/4981

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Closing old Trac Milestones
by teor 30 Apr '18

30 Apr '18

Hi, Tor's trac has a lot of milestones. Sometimes users select the wrong one, because there are so many. I've just closed some old milestones from 5+ years ago: Deliverable-Sep2010 Deliverable-December2010 Deliverable-Mar2011 Deliverable-May2011 Deliverable-Nov2011 Vidalia: 0.2.15 Vidalia: 0.3.x (Assuming they were no longer relevant, and belonged to Core Tor.) Here is a list of milestones we could close, sorted by team: HTTPSE Cr 2013.4.2x HTTPS-E 3.3 HTTPS-E 3.2.1 HTTPS-E 3.2.2 HTTPS-E 3.2.3 HTTPS-E 4.0dev8 HTTPS-E 4.0dev9 HTTPS-E 4.0dev15 Website Donations Enhancement Chronos: phase one Chronos: phase two TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable Torbutton: 1.2.5 Torbutton: 1.3 Torbutton: 1.4 ExoneraTor 1.0.0 Metrics 1.0.0 Metrics 2.0.0 Onionoo 1.14.0 ttdnsd: 0.8 Source: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/roadmap If any of the milestones on this list belong to you, and you'll never put any more tickets in them, please close them. (Or let me know, and I can close them.) Tickets in closed milestones will still appear in searches. We can always re-open a milestone if we decide we want to put more tickets in it. T -- teor PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: [tor-dev] Standardizing the 'onion service' name
by Paul Syverson 26 Apr '18

26 Apr '18

Thanks teor for spelling things out in moderate detail and Steph for commenting. My tl;dr is to basically concur with everything they both said: The further from user-facing and the more embedded down in the codebase, variables, code comments, controller commands, etc. the less important to spend effort eliminating such vestiges from existing text. Going forward, certainly any code comments and e.g. any commands that won't break things should use current terminology. aloha, Paul On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 11:07:27AM -0400, Stephanie A. Whited wrote: > Hi! > > Thanks for adding me to the thread. > > > On 4/26/18 3:34 AM, teor wrote: > > Hi All, > > > > There seems to be some confusion in this thread about the > > current state of the hidden service to onion service name transition. > > > > So I'm going to describe the state of things as they are, then try to > > describe what would need to be done. > > > > I'd also appreciate feedback from Steph and others on our priorities for > > transitioning to the onion service name. I think we have been prioritising > > user-facing text. (The blog, website, Tor Browser, metrics, etc.) > Yes, user, funder, and press facing text has consistently been using > onion services at least since I've been on board. When I first joined, > the message to me was that this was changed a couple years prior but > changeover had been slow. I realize now a lot of folks didn't get that > message. > > We have already, with the help of Kat, updated hidden to onion services > where possible on the website. I think the exception to this is older > blog posts. > > I realize it is not as easy to change some of the other elements, like > the directory protocol, but I think it's important to make what changes > are possible. I think it'd have a very positive impact to see these > through. > > Being aligned will help us build trust with the press, new users, etc. > There are several reasons the name changed, if it is helpful to share > more about that lmk. > > > > > Is this a sensible way of prioritising things? > > > > On 26 Apr 2018, at 16:42, Paul Syverson <paul.syverson(a)nrl.navy.mil > > <mailto:paul.syverson@nrl.navy.mil>> wrote: > > > >>> Have OnionService aliases for controller commands, events, > > > > These are current called "hidden service" or an abbreviation. > > > > Tor could add an alias mechanism for controller commands, events, > > and fields, and use it to do the rename: > > > > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25922 > > <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25922#ticket> > > > > I don't think they are as high a priority as the torrc options and man > > page. > > > >>> descriptor > >>> fields > > > > These are currently called "hidden service", or an abbreviation. > > > > Descriptor fields are part of the directory specification and > > implementation, and they are highly technical. So I'm not sure we gain > > much from aliasing them or renaming them. > > > > Similar arguments might apply to other codebases: > > * Onionoo > > * stem > > * consensus health > > * Tor (network daemon) > > > > But the following user-facing applications should add documentation or > > change names, if they haven't already: > > * Relay Search / metrics website > > * uses HSDir for relay search, because that's what it's called in the > > directory protocol > > * uses "onion service" for statistics > > * Tor Browser > > * uses "onion site" > > * the Tor website > > * new tor blog posts > Website and new posts are covered. > > > >>> and anything else referencing 'HS' or 'HiddenService'. > > > > We considered adding OnionService* torrc option aliases for every > > HiddenService* option in 0.2.9. But we deferred that change because we > > ran out of time. > > > > All we need to do is add some new entries in the alias table, then do a > > search and replace in the tor man page: > > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17343 > > > >>> Speaking of which, how do we plan to replace abbreviations? Having an > >>> 'OSFETCH' or 'OS_CREATED' event doesn't exactly have the same ring as > >>> their HS counterparts. ;P > > > > That's a good question. > > > > OS conflicts with "operating system", so we could use: > > * Onion > > * OnSrv > > * no abbreviations > > Or any other colour you want to paint the bikeshed. > > > > To avoid an endless discussion, let's leave the decision to > > the people who write, review, and merge the code. > > > >>> Adjust all our docs to be consistent about the name. > >> > >> Right, anything v3 should be consistently calling these 'onion > >> services'. Variable names, etc. particularly those still in use in > >> code shared with v2, don't need to be changed. It is OK if such > >> vestiges of older usage remain in abbreviations, as long as the > >> description of them, e.g., in any new Tor proposal, describes them > >> with appropriately current terminology. > > > > torrc options, the tor man page, and the v3 onion service code > > mainly use "hidden service", and sometimes use "onion service". > > > > I don't see much value in changing the code. > > > > If we decide there is value in changing the torrc options and man page, > > we need to allocate a few days of work on the roadmap to make it > > happen. > > > >>> Renaming takes work. Lesson I learned from Nyx is that it works best > >>> if you draw a line in the sand and stand by it. With Nyx, version 2.0 > >>> is called Nyx (you won't find any docs saying otherwise) and version > >>> 1.x is the legacy 'arm' project. > >>> > >>> If I was in your shoes I'd opt for the same. Either prioritize the > >>> aliases and be firm that v3 are 'Onion Services' or abort the rename. > >>> Otherwise this will live in a confusing dual-named limbo land > >>> indefinitely. ;P > >> > >> I'm prettty sure that v3 being 'onion services' has been the official > >> Tor Project position since at least half a year. We wouldn't be > >> aborting the rename, because 'abort' would imply it is not > >> complete. Anything now not using the current name is not part of an > >> incomplete process, it is simply wrong and outdated. Steph correct me > >> if I am wrong about that. > >> > >> So I think you've answered your own question. Nothing in v3 should be > >> called 'hidden services'. > Right. In our communications, all are onion services, there are just > different versions and configurations possible. > > If I've missed something I can respond to more specifically in this > thread, please lmk. > -Steph > > > > That's not the current state of the tor network daemon v3 onion service > > code, specs, options, and man page. They use a mix of terminology > > (see above). > > > >> And anything new in code and documentation > >> should be called 'onion services'. If you want to think of v2 and > >> earlier as 'hidden services' for purposes of understanding legacy > >> component and variable names, e.g., HSDir that's fine. And as such, > >> variable names, etc. in code that continues to be used for both v2 and > >> v3 can can persist. But again, any new specs, documentation, etc. > >> should call them 'onion services'. > > > > We have gradually been using onion services in new documentation and > > specs, since "single onion services". But we haven't changed existing > > code and documentation. > > > >> This acceptance of existing v2 documentation calling them 'hidden > >> services' while refusing this for anything v3 is a little misleading > >> about when and why the naming transition happened, but its close > >> enough to serve as your line in the sand if you feel one is needed. > >> I actually argued the value of essentially such a line-in-the-sand > >> position to Steph a while ago. This doesn't preclude also calling v2 > >> and earlier 'onion services'. Indeed, it's not just OK but preferable, > >> for the above mentioned reasons. > > > > It looks like we are doing a gradual transition. I think we prioritised > > the things that are seen by the most users (Tor Browser, statistics, > > blog, website). > > > > We did not take a line in the sand position in the past, but we could > > adopt one for the remaining changes. We could decide on a particular > > Tor release (and releases of other codebases). But we need to schedule > > the work on the relevant roadmaps. > > > > And maybe there are some obscure technical things (code, comments, > > descriptor fields) that just aren't worth changing. > > > > T >

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sbws meeting notes 26 April 2018
by Matt Traudt 26 Apr '18

26 Apr '18

Next meeting is 3 May 2018 at 0930 UTC. http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2018/tor-meeting.2018-04-26-09.59.html https://pad.riseup.net/p/6292yqhUOuHC (copy/pasted below) Simple Bandwidth Scanner Meeting 25 April 2018 ============================================== This pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/6292yqhUOuHC Previous week's notes: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013084.html Witty quote - Unknown Updates =========================================== pastly: last 7 days: - sbws is now open source https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner https://sbws.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ - fix some bad bugs in 'sbws cleanup' command while writing tests for it - integrate with Travis CI and automatically test against python 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 - integrate with Read the Docs - gather intel on the environments our users will be running sbws in https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/wiki/Information-regarding-sbws's-target-user-base - did some research regarding library support for various distros. incomplete - remvoe filelock dependency - brainstorm what I think a switch to http(s) should look like https://sbws.readthedocs.io/en/latest/proposals/001-switchtohttp.html next 7 days: - start implementing the switch to http(s) - verify sbws works with library versions that aren't the absolute newest misc notes section (not udpates) juga's tor tickets: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&cc=%7Ejuga juga: Not sure which week was (since we changed from Monday to Thursday): - review, comment on debug option not being used #85 - add logging conf to log to file/system #87 - review Periodically test reachability of helpers #93 - create issue Include file where to write ``generate`` results in the config #91 suggest having options both in config and cli and cli overriding conf - report about problem with init and helpers #95 - create issue about adding software to header #96 - review using kilobytes #97, #98 Past week: - fix conf issues locally and in testnet after "megacommit" - more changes on the spec, after new teor review https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/4/commits/54ef4d4355d2b475466bf1… - create improve deployability #99 - create issue Debian package #101 - Work on issue software and sofware_version in v3bw files #112 - create issue Include coverage in travis #117 - create issue Include travis and coverage badges in README enhancement #118 Next week: - debug what tor does to solve https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/4/#issuecomment-384555243 - review the software/version ticket according to results from previous (https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/issues/96) - review spec according to results from previous - add a default output file for generate that can be overriden by cli args (https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/issues/91) - improve deployability, this should also help to update instances running in testnet (https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/issues/99) - update version sbws running in testnet Things to communicate: - i put as date of sbws release 1.0.0 (milestone 1) 1st May, but i'd postpone to later so that we've more time testing and fixing last details - teor, can i make public the list of tasks you've proposed for SoP?, any place you would propose? - pastly: It's fine to close issues/PRs you think aren't apropiate for any reasons, but please say so before closing (#111, #87) - i stop attending net-team meetings until we need to disscuss something there that we don't discuss in this meeting List of tasks for 3 months proposed by T. (19th Apr) - implement features we wanted in torflow in sbws instead (1 week) - bwauth code needs to be smarter about failed circuits https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16559 - assign the 10-second client timeout as the time for failed circuits? - at least publish failure rates https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7281 - Understand how accurate the bandwidth authority estimates are https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7177 - integration tests (1 week) - a practice transition in the test network (1 week, but split up) - set up torflow - set up sbws - compare and switch - work little-t tor needs (3 weeks) - report version of bwscanners in votes https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3723 - stop relays reporting zero observed bandwidths https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24250 - relays should regularly do a larger bandwidth self-test https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22453 - bandwidth testing circuits should use guards sometimes https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19009 - report bandwidth more often on test networks https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17036 - report bandwidth less often on large, public relays https,//trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24104 - non-essential tickets like https,//github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/77 and https,//github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/48 (2 weeks) - if time and motivation - Have sbws client launch tor itself https,//github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/77 - Evaluate using [not threads, but twisted instead (probably)] https,//github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/48 teor: last week: * made my test dirauth a trust pastly's and juga's dirauths * monitored the average bandwidth on the testnet using this script: https://pad.riseup.net/p/tor-vote-bw-average * opened a ticket for getting similar features into consensus-health: https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/issues/120 this week: * busy with deadlines * eventually try to set up sbws on the testnet Discussion ========================================= ### Topic: Switch to HTTP(S) ### (Proposed) Topic: SoP - specific topics on this? pastly: where can I find your proposed schedule again? juga: mail pastly: finally found it - personally i'm not sure on how to organize the tasks we've said i'll do for SoP, since that's in a month. Either i do now other stuff not included there (doing so so far), or i start with those tasks and then update to others during SoP

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Standardizing the 'onion service' name
by Damian Johnson 26 Apr '18

26 Apr '18

Hi all, teor suggested engaging the list with #25918 so here we go! Ticket #25918 has a couple goals... 1. Provide a tracking ticket for the rename effort. 2. Come to a consensus on if we should move forward with "onion service" or revert back to "hidden service". The limbo we've been in for months is confusing for our users and we should standardize on a name. Here's the ticket... ======================================== A recent post on tor-dev@ just got me thinking about the roadblocks we have for v2 deprecation. There's a couple I don't believe we're following in trac so lets fix that. For me the biggest is its name. Renaming takes work, and we attempted to rename hidden services in v3 without investing the time to make it happen. We should either fix that or revert to to the old name. To move forward we need to... Have OnionService aliases for controller commands, events, descriptor fields, and anything else referencing 'HS' or 'HiddenService'. Speaking of which, how do we plan to replace abbreviations? Having an 'OSFETCH' or 'OS_CREATED' event doesn't exactly have the same ring as their HS counterparts. ;P Adjust all our docs to be consistent about the name. Renaming takes work. Lesson I learned from Nyx is that it works best if you draw a line in the sand and stand by it. With Nyx, version 2.0 is called Nyx (you won't find any docs saying otherwise) and version 1.x is the legacy 'arm' project. If I was in your shoes I'd opt for the same. Either prioritize the aliases and be firm that v3 are 'Onion Services' or abort the rename. Otherwise this will live in a confusing dual-named limbo land indefinitely. ;P Cheers! -Damian PS. Stem and Nyx have stuck with the old name ("hidden services") and will continue to do so until tor's standardized this.

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