- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Introducing Stade: Mobile P2P messaging using embedded Tor v3 Onion Services and PQC
by Eren 14 Sep '26

14 Sep '26

Hi tor-dev team, We are developing an open-source, serverless mobile messaging application called Stade. Our primary architectural goal is achieving zero metadata exposure without relying on centralized coordination servers or third-party queue relays. To accomplish this, Stade operates directly peer-to-peer over embedded Tor v3 Onion Services, complemented by a post-quantum cryptographic handshake (ML-KEM/Kyber) to ensure long-term forward secrecy against quantum threats. What we are running on Android: Each device runs an embedded Tor daemon to publish an ephemeral/persistent v3 Onion Service. Direct P2P rendezvous and transport occur entirely within the Tor network using onion addresses as cryptographically verifiable identities. No intermediate directories, central rendezvous servers, or clearinghouses. Why we are reaching out: Maintaining persistent, low-latency v3 onion services on mobile operating systems poses concrete engineering challenges—specifically regarding OS background task throttling, battery consumption, and rapid circuit reconstruction across mobile network handovers. We would love to share our operational findings with the Tor mobile ecosystem, gather feedback on best practices for mobile Tor lifecycle management, and explore opportunities to test or contribute back to Tor's mobile integration tooling. Repository: https://github <https://github/>.com/Stade-App/stade Spec: https://stade <https://stade/>.dev Thanks for your continuous work on keeping the open internet private. Looking forward to any technical feedback or collaboration opportunities. Best regards, Eren Stade Head Developer

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Upcoming C-tor security release - 0.4.9.12
by David Goulet 10 Sep '26

10 Sep '26

Greetings everyone! Next Tuesday, September 8th, we will do a C-tor release (0.4.9.12) containing fixes for a set of high severity issues. And then, as a heads up, C-tor will likely enter a release cadence every 2-3 weeks for the foreseeable coming month(s) as we continue to fix more and more security issues we received from this new reality that we happen to all be in where LLMs are in an echo chamber stuck in a tight loop over our C code ;). Cheers! David -- NeD2Y6SX2RdikJfl0oSgWfrO+dQkz9M114CVJBuzW3w=

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Proposal: Rust-pt development
by pryty26 04 Sep '26

04 Sep '26

Proposal: rust-pt - A Rust Framework for Tor Pluggable Transports Dear Tor Project team, anti-censorship-team and other community contributors I have developed recently a new library which is called rust-pt. It is a Rust-based framework for Tor Pluggable Transports. I anticipate everyone knows rust, it's a modern, powerful, fast and safe programming language. And Pt requires performance and safety. That's why, Rust would be an important language for Pt developing. Now I have developed the rust-pt for 3 month, ExtOrPort ConfigParsing, Errors, Macros and Log system is ready. Of course, I'm still actively developing. The code is already published in: https://gitlab.torproject.org/pryty26/rust-pt and https://codeberg.org/pryty26/rust-pt I believe that both community and Tor team, would like to have a Rust-Based Pt library. But currently, there is not a official Pt library for Rust. And most of the community framework, is not well maintained. (ptrs last update is on 2024) I was wondering if anti-censorship team would like to review. If there is any possible, I would like to kindly assign all code ownership to the team. Of course, anyone interested in helping with development is more than welcome. Best regards, pryty26 Sent by pryty26 Sent with [Proton Mail](https://pr.tn/ref/YFS2568X) secure email.

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Timeline and considerations of JPEG XL support in Tor Browser Bundle
by mib 31 Aug '26

31 Aug '26

Hello everyone. Apologies if this is the wrong list to post to! If that's the case, please direct me elsewhere. Firefox and Chrome recently announced their intent to (finally) support JPEG XL. Given the Tor browser bundle is based on Firefox, I'm curious when support would land? Any security considerations beyond Firefox's own, the whole reason for the half-decade delay? Will JXL be enabled by default or is support within TBB "mandatory" now that all major browsers have committed to support it before end of year? I know for sure I'll be serving JPEG XL where possible and downgrading to JPEG transcodes when not, but given that wide-spread adoption isn't even close to guaranteed and any decent system would just transcode, is adoption urgent or should TBB wait to see it get properly battle-tested? Not often a new image format lands in browsers. 🙂 Kind regards, — mib

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Technical inquiry about tor-ptmgr of Arti
by pryty 05 Jul '26

05 Jul '26

Dear list, I'm writing a technical inquiry about tor-ptmgr. Although the issue #666 ( https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/666 ) said that: " Some people would like to use pluggable transports in a context other than inside a Tor process for making Channels. Right now, ptmgr contemplates this but does not actually provide an API for it.", I saw that: ```rust #[tokio::main] asyncfnmain() ->Result<()> { tracing_subscriber::fmt::init(); letcommon_params=PtCommonParameters::builder() .state_location("/tmp/arti-pt".into()) .build() .unwrap(); letclient_params=PtClientParameters::builder() .transports(vec!["obfs4".parse().unwrap()]) .build() .unwrap(); letmutpt= PluggableClientTransport::new("./obfs4proxy".into(), vec![], common_params, client_params); pt.launch(PreferredRuntime::current()?).await?; loop { info!("message: {:?}", pt.next_message().await?); } } ``` at .crates\tor-ptmgr\examples\run-pt.rs which seems like it should actually work without tor. Does this example already intended a public API for using pluggable transports independently of Tor? If yes, why this issue is still open. I'd appreciate any clarification. Thank you. pryty26 pryty017(a)proton.me Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail/home) secure email.

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[Proposal for Arti] Add REALITY as an optional pluggable transport for Arti
by pryty 01 Jul '26

01 Jul '26

Hi, dear developers and tor-dev I have been following the development of Arti closely and would like to suggest a new and modern feature: Adding support for the REALITY protocol as a optional new PT protocol in Arti. I suggest REALITY as a new optional protocol, since REALITY unlike traditional PTs which rely on traffic obfuscation or domain fronting, REALITY borrows real TLS sessions from existing websites, which could be very useful for Tor users, who needs to bypass DPI. Additionally, I would be willing to work on this new feature, if it's acceptable to you. However, in my opinion, it could be implemented as an new PT plugin via tor-ptmgr, with corresponding configuration changes in arti-client. I look forward to your feedback. Best regards,pryty26 --- Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail/home) secure email. (pryty017(a)proton.me)

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Re: Selene: Tor-based p2p chat with RSA-8192 + AES-256
by Dharma Mati 18 Jun '26

18 Jun '26

Dear list, Paul suggested I share my reply to his question with the list. Here it is. Hello Paul, Thank you for reaching out — and thank you for your work on onion routing. I genuinely mean that. Without what you and your colleagues built, Selene wouldn't exist. You asked what makes Selene different from the other messaging tools that use onion addresses. I think there are a few things that make it stand out. It has native OBFS4 and WebTunnel bridge support with a built-in manager, so if Tor is blocked, Selene can still connect without requiring the user to configure system-wide bridges. You can also modify the listening ports so it doesn't conflict with other Tor instances running on the same machine. And you can request a new Tor circuit or generate a new onion address(http/chat), which gives users control over their privacy and connectivity. On top of Tor's transport, Selene adds its own application-layer encryption — RSA for messages and AES-256 for files. So even if someone were to compromise the Tor hidden service connection, the data itself remains encrypted with Selene's own keys. Furthermore @techmetx11 suggested on the list that I should consider moving to X25519 for key exchange instead of RSA. I'm genuinely open to that and will likely explore adding it as an option alongside RSA. Selene gives you two ways to connect. You can share .contact files with people you already know for private, contact-based chat. Or you can connect anonymously by sharing an onion address directly, without exchanging contact details — which is useful for ephemeral or one-off conversations where you don't want to establish a persistent contact relationship. I appreciate you taking the time to ask. With respect, Alamahant

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Selene: Tor-based p2p chat with RSA-8192 + AES-256 (not a browser)
by Dharma Mati 18 Jun '26

18 Jun '26

Hello tor-dev,I'm the developer of Selene — a Tor-based peer-to-peer chat and file sharing application.What Selene is:- A chat app where each instance generates its own onion address- Peers share addresses with each other directly (no public discovery)- Files are shared as HTTP servers between confirmed contacts only- Built-in OBFS4 and WebTunnel bridge supportWhat Selene is NOT:- A Tor browser. You cannot browse .onion sites.- A gateway to the darknet. There is no public discovery of anything.- A general-purpose anonymity tool. It's just for private chat between people who already know each other.Encryption — and this matters:On top of Tor's end-to-end anonymity (everything stays inside the Tor network, never leaving it), Selene adds its own application-layer encryption:- Messages: RSA encryption (user-configurable up to 8192 bits)- Files: AES-256 encryptionSo even if someone were to compromise the Tor hidden service connection, the data itself remains encrypted with Selene's own keys. Defense in depth.Why I built it:I needed a p2p chat app that doesn't require opening ports on routers or corporate firewalls. Privacy and encryption came after solving that core need.Current availability:- Flathub: https://flathub.org/en/apps/io.github.alamahant.Selene- Arch Linux AUR: https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/selene-p2p- Gentoo overlay: https://github.com/alamahant/alamahant-overlay/tree/master/net-p2p/selene- GitHub: https://github.com/alamahant/SeleneWhat I'm asking:I'm not requesting formal endorsement. I would simply appreciate it if someone on the team could take a look. If you find it useful, consideration for inclusion in the Tor Browser User Manual or community resources would mean a lot.I'm posting here at Gus's suggestion after reaching out to frontdesk.Thank you for Tor — I couldn't have built this without it.With respect,Alamahant

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Re: Using hidden service key with TLS client authentication
by Paul Syverson 16 Jun '26

16 Jun '26

Hi techmetx11, (Attempted resend since send from my Navy mail appearently failed to reach tor-dev. Apologies if you got this twice. -PFS) I don't know if this fits what you need. But we have used the onion address as subdomain to put it into TLS certificates in the case where there is an associated domain name. E.g. Mullvad has a TLS certificate with the following SANs o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiadonion.mullvad.net o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiadonion.www.mullvad.n… We've used this in a couple of ways, for self-authenticating traditional addresses and for sauteed onions. See e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.03168 and https://www.sauteed-onions.org/ Happy to talk more if asked about recent work on associating onion addresses with atproto handles as alternative/additional meaningful address. In case it helps for your use case, note that you don't need to keep the service accessible at the registered domain address. It only has to be available during issuance (depending on the means of verification used). You can also just get a certificate for an onion address. Issuance via ACME is still not available last I checked despite the efforts of Q Misell and others. Last I checked (some time ago) you can get a DV cert issued manually from HARICA or an EV cert from DigiCert. The syverSAN technique OTOH works fine with Let's Encrypt issuance. Hope that helps. Si sanus es, sanus sum, Paul > > On 6/8/26, 4:32 AM, "techmetx11 via tor-dev" wrote: > > > Hi tor-dev mailing list, > > > Is there a way to capsulate a Tor hidden service Ed25519 private key > inside a TLS EE certificate and use it in TLS? > > > I wanted to use this specifically for XMPP's server-to-server TLS > connections, which uses mTLS to prove if the client connecting is who > they say they are. Currently with XMPP Tor server-to-server connections, > we have to use dialback (telling the server to connect back to the > client to authenticate its identity, > https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0220.html <https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0220.html>) to prove it, which is a > legacy and insecure form of server-to-server authentication > > > If this is possible, then it would get rid of a reason to keep dialback > around and less roundtrip for the server authentication. > > > Kind regards, > > > techmetx11 > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list -- tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-dev@lists.torproject.org> > To unsubscribe send an email to tor-dev-leave(a)lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-dev-leave@lists.torproject.org> > > >

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Using hidden service key with TLS client authentication
by techmetx11 10 Jun '26

10 Jun '26

Hi tor-dev mailing list, Is there a way to capsulate a Tor hidden service Ed25519 private key inside a TLS EE certificate and use it in TLS? I wanted to use this specifically for XMPP's server-to-server TLS connections, which uses mTLS to prove if the client connecting is who they say they are. Currently with XMPP Tor server-to-server connections, we have to use dialback (telling the server to connect back to the client to authenticate its identity, https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0220.html) to prove it, which is a legacy and insecure form of server-to-server authentication If this is possible, then it would get rid of a reason to keep dialback around and less roundtrip for the server authentication. Kind regards, techmetx11

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