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3581 discussions

Help with rebasing arma's n23-5 tor branch to current master
by Karsten Loesing 30 Jul '13

30 Jul '13

Dear tor-devs, is anyone here up for a coding task that could help us research performance improvements of the N23 design more? The situation is that we already have a branch (n23-5 in arma's public repository), but it's based on 0.2.4.3-alpha-dev and needs to be rebased to current master. In theory, it's as simple as the following steps: $ git clone https://git.torproject.org/tor.git $ cd tor/ $ git remote add arma https://git.torproject.org/arma/tor.git $ git fetch arma $ git checkout -b n23-5 arma/n23-5 $ git fetch origin $ git rebase origin/master (clean up the mess) $ git add $ git commit $ git rebase --continue (back to clean-up-the-mess step until git is happy) $ git push public n23-5 Bonus points if you make sure the branch compiles with gcc warnings enabled, appeases make check-spaces, and runs peacefully in a private Chutney network. Unfortunately, the n23-5 branch touches a few places in the tor code that have been refactored in current master, including Andrea's connection/channel rewrite. It might be necessary to dive into the channel thing in order to get this rebase right. Once we have a refactored n23-5 branch, I'll try to simulate it in Shadow. For a tiny bit of context, this is for our sponsor F item 13: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorF/Year3 I'm asking here, because the usual suspects are already overloaded with other stuff. As usual, I guess. Thanks, Karsten

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TorPylle: a Python/Scapy TOR protocol implementation
by pierre.lalet＠cea.fr 30 Jul '13

30 Jul '13

Hi all, To test the Tor program, I though an independent implementation might help. I started writing TorPylle with that in mind. The purpose is NOT to implement a secure or robust implementation that could be an alternative to Tor. It relies on Scapy (http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/) and is supposed to be used more or less the same way. The code is here : https://github.com/cea-sec/TorPylle and includes an example file. This is an early development stage. Comments, fixes and questions welcome ! Pierre

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Descriptor Monitors
by Damian Johnson 30 Jul '13

30 Jul '13

Hi all. Over this last weekend I started taking advantage of stem's shiny new remote descriptor fetching module [1] to implement some simple monitors... * Descriptor Checker Hourly task that downloads the server descriptors, extrainfo descriptors, and consensus to check for malformed content. In the case of the consensus this downloads from each of the authorities to also ensure that they're all reachable... https://gitweb.torproject.org/atagar/tor-utils.git/blob/HEAD:/descriptor_ch… * Sybil Checker Replacement for the consensusTracker.py I've been running for the last few years [2]. This checks for sudden influxes of new relays, such as the trotsky relays from 2010 [3]... https://gitweb.torproject.org/atagar/tor-utils.git/blob/HEAD:/sybil_checker… Cheers! -Damian [1] https://stem.torproject.org/api/descriptor/remote.html [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/atagar/tor-utils.git/blob/e537044:/consensusT… [3] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays#trotsky

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RFC: obfsproxyssh
by Yawning Angel 29 Jul '13

29 Jul '13

Hello, I have been talking about this in #tor-dev for a while (and pestering people with questions regarding some of the more nuanced aspects of writing a pluggable transport, thanks to nickm, mikeperry and asn for their help), and finally have what I would consider a pre-alpha for the PT implementation. obfsproxyssh is a pluggable transport that uses the ssh wire protocol to hide tor traffic. It uses libssh2 and interacts with a real sshd located on the bridge side. Behaviorally it is identical to a user sshing to a host, authenticating with a RSA public/private key pair and opening a direct-tcp channel to the ORPort of the bridge. It is more aimed at non-technical users (because anyone with an account on a bridge can create a tunnel of their own using existing ssh clients), and thus can be configured entirely through the torrc. It still needs a bit of work before it is ready for deployment but the code is at the point where I can use it for casual web browsing, so if people are interested, I have put a snapshot online at http://www.schwanenlied.me/yawning/obfsproxyssh-20130627.tar.gz Note that it is still at the "I got it working today" state, so some parts may be a bit rough around the edges, and more than likely a few really dumb bugs lurk unseen. Things that still need to be done (in rough order of priority): * It needs to scrub IP addresses in logs. * I need to compare libssh2's KEX phase with popular ssh clients (For the initial "production" release more than likely Putty). It currently also sends a rather distinctive banner since I'm not sure which client(s) it will end up mimicking. * I need to come up with a solution for server side sshd logs. What I will probably end up doing is writing a patch for OpenSSH to disable logging for select users. * In a peculiar oversight, OpenSSH doesn't have a way to disable reverse ssh tunnels (Eg: "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:6969" allows clients to listen on that port). Not a big deal if Tor starts up before any clients connect, but I'll probably end up writing another patch for this. * Someone needs to test it on Windows. All of my external dependencies are known to work, so the porting effort should be minimal (Famous last words). * The code needs to scrub the private key as soon as a connection succeeds in authenticating instead of holding onto it. Probably not a big deal since anyone that can look at the PT's heap can also look at the bridge line in the torrc. Nice to haves: * Write real Makefiles instead of using CMake (I was lazy). src/CMakeLists.txt currently needs to be edited for anyone compiling it. * It currently uses unencrypted RSA keys. libssh2 supports ssh-agent (on all of the relevant platforms) so key management can be handled that way. I do not think there is currently a mechanism for Tor to query the user for a passphrase and pass it to the PT, but if one gets added, support it would also be easy from my end. * The code does not handle IPv6 since it uses SOCKS 4 instead of 5. When Tor gets a way to pass arguments to PTs that are > 510 bytes, I will change this. * libssh2 needs a few improvements going forward (In particular it does not support ECDSA at all). * Code for the bridge side that makes the tunnel speak the manged PT server transport protocol would be nice (For rate limiting). * libssh2_helpers.c should go away one day. Not sure why the libssh2 maintainers haven't merged the patch that I based the code in there on. Things that need to be done on the Tor side of things: * 0.2.4-14-alpha does not have the PT argument parsing code, so this requires a build out of git to function. * The code currently in Git fails to parse bridge lines with arguments that can't be passed via SOCKS 5 (size restriction). The PT tarball has a crude patch that removes the check, but the config file parser needs to be changed. * The Tor code currently in Git likes to forget PT arguments. asn was kind enough to provide me with a patch that appears to fix this (though the PT has a workaround for when it encounters this situation), but moving forward a formal fix would be ideal. * All the PT related cleverness in the world won't do much vs active probing if there is an ORport exposed on the bridge. Tor should be able to handle "ORPort 127.0.0.1:6969" (It may currently work, I'm not sure. There should be a way to disable the reachability check if only to reduce log spam). Open questions: * Is this useful? * Is it worth biting the bullet and rewriting this to use Twisted Conch instead of being a C app? * Would it be simpler to write a wrapper around existing ssh clients? (Probably not.) * How should people handle distributing bridge information? * How to handle the private key to a given bridge getting compromised? (Correctly configured, all that someone who obtains the key would be able to do is talk to the OR port so it's not a security thing, but it opens the bridge to being blocked). * Does Tor tunneled over SSH look distinctive? No effort is made to change the traffic signature, though this can be added if needed. The tarball contains a more detailed README explaining how to set it up and how it works. obfsproxyssh_client.c has a more in-depth TODO list as a large comment near the top of the file. Comments and feedback will be appreciated. Regards, -- Yawning Angel

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how much havoc can a compromised baseband do to a Guardian ROM device?
by Eugen Leitl 29 Jul '13

29 Jul '13

Anyone knows whether a Nexus 4 baseband processor has r/w access to system memory? The firmware doesn't seem to be loaded at boot, so I presume it's entirely out of reach/ reversing?

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[GSoC '13] Status report - Searchable metrics archive
by Kostas Jakeliunas 29 Jul '13

29 Jul '13

Hi everyone, Some clean-ish working code is finally available online [1] (the old PoC code has been moved to [2]); I'll be adding more soon, but this part does what it's supposed to do, i.e.: - archival data import (download, mapping to ORM via Stem, efficiently avoiding re-import of existing data via Stem's persistence path, etc.); what's left for this part is a nice and simple rsync+cron setup to be able to continuously download and import new data (via Metrics archive's 'recent') - data models and Stem <-> ORM <-> database mapping for descriptors, consensuses and network statuses contained in consensuses - models can be easily queried by sqlalchemy's ORM; Karsten suggested that an additional 'query layer' / internal API is not needed until there's actual need for it (i.e., my plan was to provide an additional query API abstracted from ORM (which is itself built on top of database/SQL/python classes), and to build a backend on top of it, as a neat client of that API as it were; I had some simple and ugly PoC's that are now pushed out of priority queue until needed (if ever)) - one example of how this querying (directly atop the ORM) works is provided: a simple (very partial) Onionoo protocol implementation for /summary and /details, including ?search, ?limit and ?offset. Querying takes place over all NetworkStatuses. This is new in the sense that it uses the ORM directly. If there is a need to formulate SQL queries more directly, we'll do that as well. During the Tor developer meetings in Munich, we tried talking over the existing & proposed parts of the system with Karsten. I will be focusing on making sure the Onionoo-like backend (which is being extended) is stable and efficient. I'm still looking into database optimization (with Karsten's advice); an efficient backend for the majority of all archival data available would be a great deliverable in itself, and hopefully we can achieve at least that. I might do well to try and document the database iterations and development, as a lot of thinking now resides in a kind of 'black box' of DB spec, which does not produce code. The large Postgres datasets are residing on a server I'm managing; I'm working on exposing the Onionoo-like API for public queries; doing some simple higher-level benchmarking (simulating multiple clients requesting different data at once, etc.) now. I might need to move the datasets to yet another server (again), but maybe not; it's easy to blame things on limited CPU/memory resources. :) Kostas. [1]: https://github.com/wfn/torsearch [2]: https://github.com/wfn/torsearch-poc

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IRC meeting to discuss sponsor F progress on Wed July 31, 18:00 to 19:00 UTC in #tor-dev
by Karsten Loesing 28 Jul '13

28 Jul '13

Hi all, I'd like to schedule an IRC meeting to discuss what progress we made on sponsor F deliverables in July. Suggested time and place are: Wed July 31, 18:00 to 19:00 UTC in #tor-dev That's in 8 days from today. The time in other timezones is: 11:00 in San Francisco 14:00 in Boston 20:00 in Berlin 21:00 in Athens 23:30 in New Delhi People who should attend are: Roger, Nick, Andrea, George, David, Ximin, Sathya, Nathan, Matt, Colin, Linus, Andrew, Tom, and anyone else who wants to attend. If your name is on that list and the suggested date or time doesn't work for you, please let me know, either here or in private mail. An alternative date would be: Fri August 2, 18:00 to 19:00 UTC in #tor-dev I'm going to send out another reminder in two days from now that will contain the definite date. Thanks, Karsten

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Status report - HTTP pluggable transport
by Chang Lan 27 Jul '13

27 Jul '13

Hi Steven, I deeply apologize for not replying to your emails in the last few weeks. On July 2, I had a bad car accident, and since then I was staying in hospital after a surgery till July 27. I should have let you know earlier to get things less messed up. Sorry again about this. Now I finally get back and will be online for the rest of period. Anyway, I managed to keep up the schedule. Echoing George's request, I wrote a design specification [https://github.com/changlan/http-transport/blob/master/design.md] based on Steven's document. In brief, I apply the BOSH technique to transfer bidirectional-streams over HTTP, which is the skeleton of the design. To disguise Tor's content patterns, we should make the traffic indistinguishable from random bits. Since there is an assumption that user and bridge share a cryptographically secure secret, I simply encrypt the data under AES-128 counter mode. To achieve scanning resistance, the user should send a secure message MAC(IP | Port | Timestamp, K) to the bridge. If the message gets verified on the bridge's side, the user gets accepted. Otherwise, the bridge will refuse to respond the user (or behave like a normal HTTP server). (I am not a crypto guy, so the scheme above may have flaws. Any review?) And finally the traffic should be able to pass through proxies. I guess proxies will not cache POST response; am I correct? That's it. There are some optional components that I am not sure whether to implement or not, such as packet-size obfuscation, Format-Transforming Encryption, etc. I think packet-size obfuscation is necessary, but I would rather put it in a TODO list for now. One thing that is still arguable is that whether the traffic pattern of BOSH is safe enough. In other words, how to evaluate whether the traffic pattern revealed in this HTTP transport is common in other applications (XMPP for example). I have implemented the transport within the pyobfsproxy framework as well as unit tests.[https://github.com/changlan/obfsproxy] Currently scanning resistance and content encryption are not enabled [https://github.com/changlan/obfsproxy/commit/5b5e8b543919c5b3cda756b3a9e7f4…], but the BOSH technique is applied. Tests and code reviews are welcome! Thanks. Best wishes, Chang On Tuesday, July 23, 2013 at 5:27 PM, Steven Murdoch wrote: > Hi Chang, > > On July 29, I will be submitting the Google Summer of Code progress report. Unless I hear from you before this date, I'm afraid I cannot recommend the project continue and Google rules would not allow you to restart at a later stage. I'd rather this not happen, so please do get back in touch. > > Best wishes, > Steven > > >

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Idea regarding active probing and follow-up of SSL connections to TOR bridges
by Lag Inimaineb 27 Jul '13

27 Jul '13

Hi, I've just watched https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwMr8Xl7JMQ (old, I know), and found it very interesting. Also, before going any further, I'd like to stress that I'm new to tor-dev and while I've googled my question, I haven't been able to come up with anything, so apologies in advance if this is already solved. Anyway, one of the main topics discussed in that talk was the problem of preventing the blockage of TOR bridges by oppressors. While many "fixes" were mentioned, none of them actually solve the problem of the bridge being probed, by following-up on previously captured SSL sessions (as China does). I was thinking - perhaps instead of making the discovery of the actual bridge addresses "hard", why not setup bridges in places where other *legitimate* SSL connections are also made? What I mean is, maybe we should try and get big sites that cannot be legitimately (in the eyes of the oppressor, of course) blocked (social media, comic sites, whatever), to run a TOR bridge *on the same port* as their regular HTTPS traffic (443), in a way that someone recording the traffic cannot distinguish (in advance, that is) whether a certain SSL connection to that site is a legitimate web browsing session, or a TOR session. That way, even if an address on the internet "speaks" the TOR protocol, it cannot be automatically blocked. Even if this address is known to host a TOR bridge, this might help plausible deniability for people unwilling to disclose that they've been using TOR. I understand this is probably very difficult, for several reasons, but I will try to address some of these. First off - there's the technical issue of binding to port 443 locally on the web servers without disrupting the currently running local client. I see several possible ways around this - a simple one could be local proxying of the SSL connection from the TOR bridge software to the locally running web server, in a way that when the bridge gets an SSL connection that isn't "speaking" the TOR protocol, it will be handed over to the web server. I admit, it's kinda messy, but TBH there are probably more efficient and "cleaner" ways to do this than what I've suggested. Also, long running connections with heavy data usage to a web server address are probably suspicious, but even if these were to be blocked, it would be on a per-client basis, and would also just mean a QoS issue for users but not DoS. Lastly, there's the question of why would a large site agree to this. I still don't have a good answer for this, but maybe you do... (PR, perhaps?) Anyway, I'd like to hear what you think. Maybe this isn't an issue anymore, or maybe you've found a different solution, or mine doesn't work, or you've already implemented it, etc. :) laginimaineb.

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[GSOC 2013] Steganography Browser Extension Status Report
by Hareesan 27 Jul '13

27 Jul '13

Hi, My work plan for last week was to update the locale information and to finish file uploading parts of extension. For now testing purpose, when a file is being selected the byte format will be popped. With this, the locale information has being updated. With this, I have started working on adding public key encryption algorithms to the add on. This task has being planned to be finished before mid term evaluation and for next two weeks, my plan is to start working on image steganography libraries. -- Hareesan

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