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3594 discussions

Tor Summer of Privacy
by Damian Johnson 06 Apr '15

06 Apr '15

Do you want to make Tor even better, and get paid in the process? If you are a student, we have good news for you: the Tor Project is pleased to announce our first Summer of Privacy! https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/TorSoP Thanks to Google, over the last eight years Tor has mentored 53 students over summers. This year the program was trimmed back to make room for new organizations. So, rather than wait another year we're starting a program of our own! The Tor Summer of Privacy is a pilot program for students that want to collaborate and develop privacy tools. So why apply? * You will work with a world-class team of anonymity experts and developers on an anonymity network that is already protecting millions of people daily. * We only write free (open source) software. The tools you make won't be locked down or rot on a shelf. * Your work could contribute to academic publications. Tor development raises many interesting research questions. * You can work your own hours in your own locations. As long as you get the job done, we don't care about the process. * ... oh, and of course there's also the $5,500 stipend for the summer. :P We are looking for great coders who are self-motivated and able to work independently. The deadline for applications is April 17th, 2015 which is right around the corner, so don't be shy - apply!

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multi-instance tor with a single torrc
by Nusenu 03 Apr '15

03 Apr '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi Pascal, (OpenBSD tor package maintainer) (splitting this part off to tor-dev, since it is not suited well for tor-relays I guess) For the interested reader this discussion started here [1]. Pascal Stumpf: >> Multi-instance support isn't something that's provided by >> OpenBSD's rc.d(8) subsystem, and I doubt it ever will be. Too >> much complexity for something that's more of a crutch to work >> around few applications' limitations than something universally >> needed and useful. > >> I think the real solution would be to talk to upstream about >> improving MP scalability. Even if it's just something as >> primitive as forking a child for every ORPort directive in >> /etc/tor/torrc, it would be much easier than having to keep track >> of a bazillion individually started tor instances, all with their >> own configuration files. I guess this (forking one tor instance per ORPort line) sounds a lot simpler than it actually would be. How do you handle ControlPort, HS, DataDir, ExitPolicy and basically any other config option, ... but since I need a solution in the near future I'll probably just go with multiple services on OpenBSD. thanks, Nusenu [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2015-April/006741.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVHuIaAAoJEFv7XvVCELh03H0QAKpg05vfOS/DTJ6Qhl7TfQV/ pKiAHjVfbWOfBD4vfqMHX0H054l7WfRUUiSz6gZ9DRGwXj7uDXh59kjsNa2ipMvK 4YYvDXjUIh3UBZdDnjLrkRPI5Lws1PuCi6wvnFX+e/weWiWQ18N/2HALaluhyldI 3aiDWA3k0ZnZVkuLLpbkxvbol8HS0upMTkwWlba/QXdWflK3it6sydkIi8EMhMx4 cEfTRCvWjxxU5YguIQ7/NpNFpKvRCtUEoCKBLjXuUGKTvawQ+Xu+XJQeSqE/yOqO Z1lTSQqH4i7JjBGEMxXQP/U7B3gELxv2tRcpfImGQZArLim41VPTVXse2+dPhb4d 0Knl19yYxtd4gjtoMbnv3GEPNgj2xnBr8e2MEYDsRY+rGYFnHEtnPvmJmC5p/vtX NAcuReFLd+y3j2PuB0XJHlGYOLtzvtaXJdiqV6oq42Mu0VHpiGfbTfKi2k8ZMUTw PfLQjx9z3dQ6GleC1mGHdMeJ7bJ7Wk2dJ7dicLF0veY5/Gc7gkYtWibsLXggTwrQ K0IqXnGJ8fWM41ZO4hhpmkkywhXodLzlWlXCxgxDUBsuFci/mVvtfu6ylxh+LCqG y5TxIk1T4/i+atx7jvuMLgrZGf02YgFyCf15Swj+VoDxx8GAxJl9nEQx0jD5d+Zl 206/+0QAI5hksaedorvj =qUCf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Summary of meek's costs, March 2015
by David Fifield 03 Apr '15

03 Apr '15

Here's the summary of meek's CDN fees for March 2015. Earlier reports: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007429.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007576.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007716.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007916.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-January/008082.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-February/008235.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-March/008427.html App Engine + Amazon + Azure = total by month February 2014 $0.09 + -- + -- = $0.09 March 2014 $0.00 + -- + -- = $0.00 April 2014 $0.73 + -- + -- = $0.73 May 2014 $0.69 + -- + -- = $0.69 June 2014 $0.65 + -- + -- = $0.65 July 2014 $0.56 + $0.00 + -- = $0.56 August 2014 $1.56 + $3.10 + -- = $4.66 September 2014 $4.02 + $4.59 + $0.00 = $8.61 October 2014 $40.85 + $130.29 + $0.00 = $171.14 November 2014 $224.67 + $362.60 + $0.00 = $587.27 December 2014 $326.81 + $417.31 + $0.00 = $744.12 January 2015 $464.37 + $669.02 + $0.00 = $1133.39 February 2015 $650.53 + $604.83 + $0.00 = $1255.36 March 2015 $690.29 + $815.68 + $0.00 = $1505.97 -- total by CDN $2405.82 + $3007.42 + $0.00 = $5413.24 grand total The number of simultaneous users was up again in March, reaching 2000 simultaneous users some days. The fluctuation between weekdays and weekends was greater than we've seen before. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-transport.html?graph=userst… We moved something over 9 TB in March. We're getting close to where CDNs start offering price breaks :/ == App Engine a.k.a. meek-google == At the end of February, I tried tweaking some performance parameters to try and reduce instance hours. It seems like it worked, as instance hours were down 31% as bandwidth was up 29%. Here is how the Google costs broke down: 5316 GB $637.93 2173 instance hours $108.64 Compared to the previous month: 4114 GB $492.71 3226 instance hours $157.82 https://globe.torproject.org/#/bridge/88F745840F47CE0C6A4FE61D827950B06F9E4… == Amazon a.k.a. meek-amazon == meek-amazon was up quite a bit compared to the previous month. Requests were up 6% and bandwidth was up a whopping 42%. The big increases were in the Asia Pacific (Singapore) region and EU (Ireland) region. I think we're going to go ahead with removing meek-amazon from Tor Browser. This will take a little bit of work--I'd like there to be a blog post that explains how to set up your own Amazon instance if meek-amazon is currently working for you. I also would like to try and work out any performance issues with meek-azure in order to use it as a replacement. Weirdly, there were over 24,000 plain HTTP requests from the US East region. That is strange because meek is HTTPS-only. The number of HTTP requests is still small compared to the 44,000,000 HTTPS requests received from the same region, but it's far above other regions, which have at most a few dozen HTTP requests. Asia Pacific (Singapore) 171M requests $205.57 1433 GB $195.60 Asia Pacific (Sydney) 156K requests $0.20 1 GB $0.17 Asia Pacific (Tokyo) 10M requests $12.05 70 GB $9.07 EU (Ireland) 158M requests $190.03 1486 GB $118.34 South America (Sao Paulo) 3M requests $6.70 17 GB $4.03 US East (Northern Virginia) 44M requests $44.00 378 GB $29.92 -- total 386M requests $458.55 3385 GB $357.13 https://globe.torproject.org/#/bridge/3FD131B74D9A96190B1EE5D31E91757FADA1A… == Azure a.k.a. meek-azure == https://onionoo.torproject.org/bandwidth?fingerprint=AA033EEB61601B2B7312D8… Estimated bandwidth use this month: 2015-03 737 GB Compared to last month: 2015-02 614 GB https://globe.torproject.org/#/bridge/AA033EEB61601B2B7312D89B62AAA23DC3ED8… David Fifield

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Tor hangs at startup
by spriver 01 Apr '15

01 Apr '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, the Tor software has a odd behaviour on my Debian machine; it hangs when I start it via "service start tor" on my Debian (Wheezy 3.2.0-4-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 3.2.65-1+deb7u2) with Tor (0.2.4.26-1): service tor start [ ok ] Starting tor daemon... And then nothing happens anymore, I have to kill the dialog with ^C. As I figured out Tor starts correctly in the background (the logfile tells me so) and also opens my ORport and Dirport (netstat told me). Is this a bug or a behaviour that is supposed to be that way? Cheers, spriver -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJVHEYUAAoJEMkUf8VoejgP1GYP+wWnfllpVIC942S6PvHW9lx0 wPp6aHYBFL46Fg/r2pO8+rz7L1E1M72V0lYiqkiuzRs7IW2DYgfBVMpTz5+EoPk4 vGf+vPnyDR5hmVEM4sJbtfawb7CsK6dps/4sU6QuxfPCQE8IEII4JxbP8krobrcL 7nQAr8PPwVnuwbZGf9eqHNN4fZUnmZv8bPTtwpPB7ie8lOMzeJVCiEMU8NXKIe3K 9Wui7vatgNvTqldrHLI0DJZRJJ86V/+Q4aSJ6hvH0C7JuB+tO7sOLlplIKLxYkb5 eXFzBUhqESslsGc07k8wVhytaYSEhsG3Y0xh18gcA2rZF3kf6zi4roK2wWECyV+/ 7WsVQhQ0zJm2CUbprYKCAMqBHGm2fKdRLo+OyXQCzfO/Gn75NX2aWZBaAjZ3Ppt5 IMTdQh9UZzEPnrogjLVRwq8JvQBKNgMVe72zstMvnGtqevJuvu8bY/2EjAoK9085 UBiJyaOM8VoCf0CeEgiXijzf3dtzL6FSA78kQFlb1KWNm20PJxWaZ4YqK1vWHP/o vHWz8w0252WaM1WF1raQFqVuMz4z5QFrjMOeGxkDoq2kDVaYDfwifQntzgspqOgG CJzefHrob3cAEDPoFlPiod8k/RxHg9e1nJnLYORCbCuh5pqGL95NCA6f6/zE7xxb eeu7eDN823KTBbwriyrU =RZWR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PT-themed stuffed animals: huggable transports
by David Fifield 01 Apr '15

01 Apr '15

In an effort to improve pluggable transports' visual identity, we should introduce a line of stuffed animals. The only rule that the the animal's name has to be made out of the transport name. The meek meerkat! [1] The obfs blobfish! [2] The FTE eft! [3] The flash proxy banded quail (Philortyx fasciatus)! [4] The ScrambleSuit bumblebee (Bombus centralis)! [5] Call now, operators are standing by. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meerkat [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blobfish [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eft [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philortyx_fasciatus [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombus_centralis

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Raptor
by Liste 01 Apr '15

01 Apr '15

Some people say to track tor users there is a tool named raptor. It uses the packet data recognition to track via AS the data streams between tor hosts. Can be a good idea to split, merge, change the packet order, the data streams etc... to obfuscate the traffic with an algotithm to create false data recostruction? Example: Alice --->node-> node -> node --> Bob1 ----> False/EndOfStream ^ ^v ^v ^v ^v | \------- node <- node <- node <-- node ---------/ If a complex network is created and some random data and connection are added to negotiate the data obfuscation, is very difficult to track a single data stream or packet. When the data arrival, send some data (same payload size)to a random loop circuit. What do you think?

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0.2.7 triage [almost there!]
by Isabela 01 Apr '15

01 Apr '15

Hello there! we are almost done with the triage of 0.2.7 - we have a good chunk of tickets organized into 2 groups at the spreadsheet. Now what I would like to ask people from today till our next IRC meeting (Core Tor meeting on Wednesday) is shape group 1 to be our final list. What that means? Review what is in there and what is not in there. We have added an extra column for you to have a chance to nominate things out of group 1 or to be added to group 1 (things from group 2). We are also asking that folks try to balance nominations always towards having more negative ones than positive ones (we don't want group 1 to end up with 200 tickets again :)) https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1H_kAcQQ-NpGpKWG9RlF3w-NhruKKE9EZJcR… Thanks for playing it! See ya on Wednesday) Isabela

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What's going on with websocket user numbers?
by David Fifield 31 Mar '15

31 Mar '15

I noticed there's a big increase in reported users of the websocket transport in the past few weeks, from about 5 to over 50. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-transport.html?graph=userst… "websocket" is the transport name that flash proxy uses. I checked the bridge for flash proxy, and it doesn't seem to be used notably more often in the last weeks than before. https://globe.torproject.org/#/bridge/9DD7D759971D03E70F0181B4E6D5F7735E7BF… There are other bridges out there that also support the websocket transport. I don't know who's running them. I appended a list at the end of this message. It comes from grepping for "websocket" in https://onionoo.torproject.org/details?type=bridge&fields=nickname,hashed_f… Most of them seem to be related; namely, there are a lot with these characteristics: 80 <= ORPort <= 105 platform = Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux transports = ["websocket","fte","obfs3","scramblesuit"] Morlock-sounding nicknames: ashrak, bashaak, delmac, gonach... The only bridges not belonging to this set are C3L (ORPort = 8118), giygas (my bridge), and nerds (ORPort = 9052, platform = Tor 0.2.5.11 on Linux"). It's possible that the new websocket users are using one of these other bridges. It's also possible, since the bridges run more than one transport, that the users are actually using some other transport, and they are mistakenly being counted for websocket: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-September/007483.html A lot of them have last_restarted of 2015-03-14 or 2014-03-25, which fall roughly where the user increase is on the metrics graphs. Maybe they were recently rebooted with support for the websocket transport. David Fifield {"nickname":"ashrak","hashed_fingerprint":"F1C465D38F18091F6FED9CAC924DA50F2813C0AE","or_addresses":["10.219.160.68:80"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["websocket","fte","obfs3","scramblesuit"]}, {"nickname":"bashaak1","hashed_fingerprint":"196FC9A50B1F3828730C11C4E1DD5B55F979F548","or_addresses":["10.152.136.2:80"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"bashaak2","hashed_fingerprint":"F76FB49B6B1CC1BB23618A20A2D6E8B1509BF7BC","or_addresses":["10.128.21.28:81"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"benna2","hashed_fingerprint":"3665A4A74A6554CA03122AFBC9C3C6C5AD2F9BC6","or_addresses":["10.35.205.157:83"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"C3L","hashed_fingerprint":"E1F69F3CE3107F740646127527F8B21BA8BCDFC4","or_addresses":["10.226.202.166:8118","[fd9f:2e19:3bcf::73:c310]:8118"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","obfs4","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"delmac1","hashed_fingerprint":"16EBD0A3DAD2833FDA9323F89ED9B2EFF484D748","or_addresses":["10.223.29.80:84"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"delmac2","hashed_fingerprint":"5B300273F583602780746191ADF17AC96190CC92","or_addresses":["10.12.236.225:85"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"giygas","hashed_fingerprint":"9DD7D759971D03E70F0181B4E6D5F7735E7BFDED","or_addresses":["10.233.17.187:9001","[fd9f:2e19:3bcf::df:d557]:9001"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.5.10 on Linux","transports":["websocket","obfs3_websocket"]}, {"nickname":"gonach1","hashed_fingerprint":"F532D7DC394BAE539D530EB9EC5BA22450A7910D","or_addresses":["10.231.241.32:86"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"gonach2","hashed_fingerprint":"6C1259CE071500804AC2E67673EA57045D44004B","or_addresses":["10.7.64.152:87"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"hoktar","hashed_fingerprint":"86D33A3BA7A04A1D8C1D4C44AEC5BF1FC163815C","or_addresses":["10.230.24.16:80"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["websocket","fte","obfs3","scramblesuit"]}, {"nickname":"intar1","hashed_fingerprint":"98FC0DADB4EF313BAB18C4F8F5B29186CEC1EFEE","or_addresses":["10.142.253.194:90"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"intar2","hashed_fingerprint":"22A42B97C35A6CABCB837E308E302321DEE8860B","or_addresses":["10.227.197.14:91"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"kalma","hashed_fingerprint":"D923FB993A480E27023814CB22FA568B418C3561","or_addresses":["10.86.149.238:443"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["websocket","obfs3","scramblesuit"]}, {"nickname":"krantu","hashed_fingerprint":"121385AFAC02851932A40635235D16A9A47390BE","or_addresses":["10.58.14.110:82"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","fte","websocket"]}, {"nickname":"kreeshak","hashed_fingerprint":"94A4DCD9C31958710A8208233E2FA8A58F90DD08","or_addresses":["10.85.219.97:81"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","fte","websocket"]}, {"nickname":"krelnok","hashed_fingerprint":"D1B0B1FDE5FF1047C5636BEAB06E22F3505D0895","or_addresses":["10.101.210.202:83"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","fte","websocket"]}, {"nickname":"lantia","hashed_fingerprint":"6173C626355BA51DFE93F515F792CDC7B36652F4","or_addresses":["10.74.170.126:80"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","fte","websocket"]}, {"nickname":"linvris1","hashed_fingerprint":"2DE8ED06644EAD67A4351F73CF94ED4819604AB3","or_addresses":["10.90.170.20:92"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"linvris2","hashed_fingerprint":"FFC371256605279169C8F740378EB88C542940E1","or_addresses":["10.15.182.141:93"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"naquadah1","hashed_fingerprint":"6D83B4CAF9807CB2C4C8C6C04EDDE27496E47525","or_addresses":["10.184.185.130:94"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"naquadah2","hashed_fingerprint":"9577348174583345AFF8FB2CD5C1DAAC3042F0BB","or_addresses":["10.99.253.237:95"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"nerds","hashed_fingerprint":"EE2AFFBF783BEA2D24904240A48DEDA2D5372FC8","or_addresses":["10.104.45.191:9052"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.5.11 on Linux","transports":["websocket","fte","obfs3","scramblesuit"]}, {"nickname":"orak1","hashed_fingerprint":"2E3494ABC70A4AF8AD301569C40D620C565A235A","or_addresses":["10.88.122.255:96"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"paiboun","hashed_fingerprint":"D416D28AB1C24C215D40CEB70BE36F2779E8B4A2","or_addresses":["10.54.177.10:105"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"piratepartei","hashed_fingerprint":"319F4D05D76537AADD499D5B48B4425DDFEF66C7","or_addresses":["10.133.182.221:80"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","fte","websocket"]}, {"nickname":"shaltek2","hashed_fingerprint":"09C6AD6382A5C0AB268D0AEA25284E4AC0E5E4AC","or_addresses":["10.83.36.70:99"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"tauri1","hashed_fingerprint":"5B27B16BFF449E60C6084D1ED2A082AF8C459531","or_addresses":["10.16.110.176:102"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"tauri2","hashed_fingerprint":"B694A8E4E60E4CA6BF173D973731DA0B7D425999","or_addresses":["10.73.213.191:103"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]}, {"nickname":"teltac1","hashed_fingerprint":"3EAA792F08B6D99031BBC3BCEB2C4BA58C5FAA41","or_addresses":["10.210.205.232:104"],"platform":"Tor 0.2.7.0-alpha-dev on Linux","transports":["obfs3","scramblesuit","websocket","fte"]},

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maintenance status of atlas or globe
by Nusenu 31 Mar '15

31 Mar '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi, is globe or atlas actively maintained? Does it make sense to create trac entries? (I just want to avoid doing worthless things.) thanks, Nusenu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVFqYBAAoJEFv7XvVCELh0u1QQAKSai+lYibASpYdqUFnfka7E APq5zGYnkR1I9KGTR8aL9+Z/dlEzl2fCCztwyfFZPYFudh/qzPtSPDUInLvDE/za 3X25hbCHwyW9Q7jQKAYWYuYWACE1S4F62e6TFzoT20gga1EhldBO+FqL943D7DuV 4FPT6lkWuPtZKF5X3gb0tkS6d48o5NYSp3RhFsowX2Y3SfdoRnTa86QbQ+2k9g7K R2W6f53c6jxwUU8MC4W3Tqc2JykojFbZADvwi8QxJ+4KlxWimG6PDshuJoY+sdsX R0n5o0L986uAn9CA5K5s/ANLkl9cYgt/oxptsY4HWSFKAh6xjdQBSYt5qjXI+KxL d1PDPdGXjolePsjUv/md+hnoRVjo4FCjx+5aQw23QhGaCi9Np0E87rF2xuUNmszs y9F/niXvNJMp1OIhVDeTinLm18lkOVCoGz/UkHdbiBj5md/5GTfql3zp2Nssku30 O+hUOEuvTJ0mousMglFeWRiO2UiliU55qTEbIUV5o4YVCK4uWA11v06so6dI4FNh bRwqUTsnzU/PqLdvgDUP3fiZXizVoxQB+KMzwnmroV+QmL+cnAR7ac8hU/PfPH/F nC/lONV5ZiXnmBZXvHTnIUBeHRwtQi48rDWtNLnSQmRN3i8jwP1NiUmuyKXZgA2a 6+cGVMKBA+Xy2sBciw9y =2YsQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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#14997: canonical path to tor alpha debian repo
by Nusenu 30 Mar '15

30 Mar '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi Erinn, it would be great if there was a canonical path to tor alpha releases (like the RPM repo provides) so people that choose to use alpha releases would not have to change their apt sources.list as soon as a new major tor version is released. What do you think about #14997? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14997 I guess this would not be big effort - simply creating a subfolder for the alpha builds would do it? thanks, Nusenu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVGTW8AAoJEFv7XvVCELh0zmIP/2Whg3TTSFVXTmvV4dz0oJaq 5caVsMJcKqeNXSxhg5hs4oVVpJco5wSdMrFkz384svFNGvhbnEsPxVy24tLjUw0O EUUzw6MQ4nbL4sEV9AjjVDKTcvPPM9l4jTfLb5/l49j6X9TNmW/DLJ3qm3/KHlM/ ny3Jzm9fXIu37WjkBfGJf5FDspLNKSOVkLj2tSXe/DURZ86caRH+HJkWD6cu4A+L QtfgZgFrmSS1oLwXsvt8PB5b7Hf7uoQlNoAJiS1WneEYlREZA1B9Jj/hdjtbUbaE pS46bFGghl6l8JVkaheHauCkc5sCXQegRQ4b4280ENmGqNcWyVQiIHwJ0q1xiI5G 88oMniG3SAELvsTBWd9idH2gkvst82qtHpq8kpA0Vk1TvbL1M6gI9YECf7f2VeMi w2zZSCgeCmI509GEsG53PiR2uj+7VGPSbSTeUlLXBOx9u0Qlt8UHhSwR58LJrp7C 79RzJxoXbJKWhPmNjIbcr2xX4TYyIqtmPvq6NCq3DpF73X/XrNPE9hF2t1PHPbR5 3rhgt4NyU65Oj8T79CHn1u7Lgd2VGaYf3hVnAHd+M1R270APhGu30Qur+Y6ta/54 3m0Ai81QRdxXZSJbRGZiAUhEh+bq1MMrj/aFZtBaVzT0tT5pDcdnIzAKeLPSbsRT UkiJp34p8BB6FoFel1uc =Znzj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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