- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

additional triggers for DocTor?
by nusenu 06 Jun '15

06 Jun '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi Damian, does DocTor's design allow for triggers that alert if a certain amount of relays signed up within one day or within a week (instead of within one hour)? Another trigger could be the last_restarted timestamp. If that makes sense I would file feature requests on trac and provide some possible thresholds. Example of an event that would trigger then (2015-04-01): https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-April/037384.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVcdCSAAoJEFv7XvVCELh0l5IP/R0NeXImuchqastZcg4T4PK7 Qy5VmFrWBdG9AOnypxIMgzVF5/M+hKjRgbbAp9/VrRXqpbFCgnChnQvqyJcW1nB0 AYGfqEUfavTBthbtTfq6g43BLBZke0olBMVFlKHaAYTidXMabrY0OlZ3QjdHt1Sx DovQ/zGVX263VR1YZimXom1xokCDm7J51vPURjx9BLrBQ2zdEGvOWWwdT+w1CiaK iH4I0AGUPZfLxxLU7rCorFAIV2AyKTT97EN9lQlD3TtPmoDiZdhPthR2MRKVruEP 3Kt76VDMRPro6oKo2d3sk5UFuyh0Hg+yqJhTJhjdZ0w/ZQtbIjlkHbnfSqgthEPL fi2XKQrX1BSfbQpsig70FRFHgKEQVzplXLlca9o1sn52GrwdY8fzNLc0p8xZiFSc xoognuyER4IgLP10c2QsYSoCx50yfpYOxDZIEFVIelDDKGIqVQzR/rGRwBfXBcn/ 598SPhka+h0BK/NudG/k5qRlsdWpQdygeAfDBUUO6AxHaIH2P96Pe1CfxNkoMGX4 TWZ2+pTXye6wdiFhdhDYGPuCtmOgI5GQ5alHEvsk3s7/n0YitRRNHNiNe3SGw7UN hX6HQuWmxD5J/D1fcj5gC/gJZxkeluTRO6iOP1AoNAqP9XGgQeT7uwhL+FzT65V5 GlMIH20AeBn2FWIesaxf =Ia4Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-dev] onionoo: bug in family set detection?
by saitosean＠ymail.com 06 Jun '15

06 Jun '15

I ran some tests to investigate said onionoo bug. My test case is simply as follows: Get the set of all running relays from onionoo (ignore non-running relays for the sake of convenience) For each relay (relay A) in the set, and for each relay (relay B) in relay A’s family, check to see whether relay A is included in relay B’s family. If not, there is no bidirectionality. The results (Number of running relays = 6774): Number of bidirectional pairs: 5911 Number of non-bidirectional pairs: 532 Number of pairs where either relay has not family list at all: 49 Sean From: tor-dev-request(a)lists.torproject.org Sent: ‎Wednesday‎, ‎June‎ ‎3‎, ‎2015 ‎9‎:‎00‎ ‎PM To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org Send tor-dev mailing list submissions to tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to tor-dev-request(a)lists.torproject.org You can reach the person managing the list at tor-dev-owner(a)lists.torproject.org When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of tor-dev digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: onionoo: bug in family set detection? (teor) 2. Re: onionoo: bug in family set detection? (nusenu) 3. Re: onionoo: bug in family set detection? (l.m) 4. Researching Tor: Quantifying anonymity against a global passive adversary (Florian R?chel) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 07:11:48 +1000 From: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-dev] onionoo: bug in family set detection? Message-ID: <9BC4820F-A4E9-4168-BFCF-0E292524B4DB(a)gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 16:52:00 +0000 From: nusenu <nusenu(a)openmailbox.org> > > teor: > > MyFamily requires bidirectional declarations to be effective. > > I'm aware of that fact ;) > > > In this case: OnionOO appears to correctly implement the > > bidirectional MyFamily logic > > Apparently it doesn't. > > Since onionoo says there is a bidirectional "connection" (family) between > 5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42594 => > 0C77421C890D16B6D201283A2244F43DF5BC89DD > > but there is none.. (as explained in my last email) > > Compass does *not* say that there is a bidirectional connection > between those relays.. onionoo says there is one even though I can't > see it, do you see it? I'm sorry, I must have got the onionoo and Compass results mixed up somehow. In Compass, I see that: 5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42594 has no family. In Globe/Atlas (based on onionoo), I see that: 5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42594 has a very large family. So my criticism of Compass actually applies to onionoo. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 832 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20150603/c42651ce…> ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 21:58:52 +0000 From: nusenu <nusenu(a)openmailbox.org> To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-dev] onionoo: bug in family set detection? Message-ID: <556E271C.20501(a)openmailbox.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16276 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVbiccAAoJEFv7XvVCELh0/rUP/i7Q/cZwYaklkvHAaqmsDffK x8J77/21/5ppN1kyPd8jI7M8ktOC+1uqhV4mlf5CyidKR+2kAhhPYjfX57xQ1sbv OJwDq33EbQiTk/ed3DLQdQpbrt7fqaAzZi3+q2NIKMx2/GFRs6Sxnp7D9b69TEt3 WgW2sEuAuexl//HU01dKxPXp6+5EiW6UBz0eUJcTz4WUf/+CltRBg4sbBXImls3w J5mLqMNwyrRT/StTZB5oSMHsOfxQGgGGJppT0l91onQLzpM1A38ZtgN2zs5tD6T9 OSl7hwhUJHaWR3mg9vDywXO0CQ8tTadfZLGtDU0q5H88vU00jTRW1XA7bKLxtLqY INu9APIjnOhaatVTRGhJMMvP/Vuk6OE/L9n2FBw5FAPxmJ3Tn0+NwElamYizq7o8 AMNpWcfjHxAiH7R9PEuhwYyNktlBz3Swm4uNFvSGPaJsm99lxJLmd7ko9qrxd5Cm WcmQvPpfXN9Ym5iTWlMpu17MLmBGb2YgshFv+fTViCY1JwaEqAlTP+5/m2XmnM2x 8CZgNHjL1C7QWffx6AQYqcoAP183ClR3MD9poan7LMYfaqxXIbLceCzMOKeu9Ptt KPAdPAvACngB9kz43oQeJanE/nmjW90j/hr5oPezL57ayJEvpRiT+cmkkRTT2RvB Aj2Q3IqrXhOzTJkR+N94 =pTF3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 19:47:33 -0400 From: "l.m" <ter.one.leeboi(a)hush.com> To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-dev] onionoo: bug in family set detection? Message-ID: <20150602234733.2D552E04C1(a)smtp.hushmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Hello, DirAuth's can cache multiple versions of the descriptor and serve what appears to be the newest in a given consensus interval. This coupled with routers publishing descriptors at least every 18 hours, but potentially sooner. What you describe doesn't appear to be a bug in Onionoo because a consensus exists for which the family is declared as you describe in the last known good descriptor. At the moment you describe Atlas doesn't show: [1] last published 2015-06-02 17:44:27 (and [2] may still have entered hibernate) [2] last published 2015-06-02 09:40:45 (and [1] may not be running, or have a last known good descriptor at DirAuths) This doesn't take into account the possibility of a router hibernating (info not always available) at times between consensus taken or valid. A router can be running but unavailable due to accounting. This looks like a result of cached descriptors or router accounting. The data provided to Onionoo from metrics-lib appears accurate as far as network status. At least that's how it looks from a preliminary glance at the data and spec--although please do your own verification. --leeroy -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20150602/35e00c6f…> ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 13:38:05 +0200 From: Florian R?chel <florian.ruechel.tor(a)inexplicity.de> To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-dev] Researching Tor: Quantifying anonymity against a global passive adversary Message-ID: <556EE71D.5030507(a)inexplicity.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Hi there, I am currently writing my Master's thesis about Mix networks & Tor (was on list previously). I am currently at a point, where I'd like to practially quantify anonymity. That is, given a pcap, I want to anaylze how successful an adversary can determine whether a specific client talked to a specific service. Since I run all of this in a simulation (using Shadow), I have access to ground truth and can determine the traffic, network size, etc. arbitrarily. The idea behind all of this is to integrate a Mix relay on each Tor node and to watch how the adversarys success behaves. However, I have a hard time finding material on such attacks, i.e. papers that closely examine this scenario (and perhaps have conducted some simulation and/or measurements themselves, beyond simple theory). The thing is that this is only part of the research and I'd really prefer if I could build this upon work of others instead of starting from scratch. Do any of you know of such papers or corresponding research? Regards, Florian ------------------------------ Subject: Digest Footer _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev ------------------------------ End of tor-dev Digest, Vol 53, Issue 6 **************************************

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1st status report for OnioNS
by OnioNS Dev 05 Jun '15

05 Jun '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 For this first status update on my SoP project (the Onion Name System), I'd like to give a quick run-down of where the project currently is. I would consider OnioNS ahead of schedule as I made significant progress on it for the paper before the SoP program officially began. The following features are in place: *Client-side:* * A reliable Stem script that intercepts a .tor domain and sends it to the OnioNS client. It sets Tor to leave streams unattached, then auto-attaches non .tor streams, and rewrites .tor to .onion before attaching. Thank you arma! * Reliable IPC communication over a localhost TCP socket between the Stem script and the OnioNS client. The IPC syntax is simple enough to support telnet or other tools. * Ability to specify the IP of a name server (essentially a Mirror, but the name server isn't mirroring anything since the Synchronization protocol isn't there yet). * JSON communication over a Tor circuit (SOCKS username "OnioNS") to a name server. * The ability to verify the signature and proof-of-work of a Record. *HS-side:* * The capability to create and validate (through scrypt proof-of-work) a Record. * Prompts to allow a user to specify the domain name and subdomain-destinations that they want for their hidden service. * The printout in JSON of a Record, which one can copy and send over email or IRC until I get the upload protocols in place. *Server-side:* * JSON communication to make life easy. * TCP server for receiving a .tor domain and returning a Record. * Support for multiple Records. * The ability to accept and cache a new Record. * Construction of a Merkle tree and RSA-signing of the root. * Ability to find a Record in the Merkle tree, or to find a subtree that proves a domain's non-existence. *General:* * A hidden service for this project. * Reliance on Botan rather than OpenSSL. The difference is night and day. Thank you Yawning! * A Record for example.tor and several others for testing and illustrative purposes. * Clean and organized code. The style is similar to Chromium with the exception that I put three spaces between each method. I enforce the style with clang-format. * A basic but functional manpage. * Support for Clang and GCC, with Clang being the preferred compiler for development and GCC is used when packaging. * Packaging into a PPA on Launchpad for Ubuntu 14.04 and beyond, so "tor-onions" can be installed and updated through apt-get. I also support Debian 8+ but do not currently package for it. * Packaging for x86, amd64, and armhf, so I'm supporting Pis/BBB/Odroid as well. * Many labeled tickets on Github to improve workflow. * Signed git tagging. As you can imagine, this constitutes the bulk of the essential functionality. The remainder is primarily networking and server-side protocols, such as the Quorum, the Synchronization and Broadcast (upload) protocols, various algorithms, and so on. Those are next. I'm temporarily in a remote location and the Internet here is slow and quite spotty, so the project's hidden service is down and I haven't tested the latest commits over the network. However, once I have the Internet figured out I'll post a prototype here that everyone can test if they like. It's a centralized DNS at the moment, so spreading it out is next on the list. - - Jesse V. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVcJMiAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yAPAAH/3uFvSXRwpq8QfE7o///Cc5a 5w3NwTP06pp1+AQ8RNUhmt17z3eHYOJJpP6zP4uwEzwAnNbUAs/8GiGdDOUj5Se3 kCUPh8/0s+yHWb02ctVhOYE32CouUVQHnswtuDRjz9KPO9Z3yG2d16TUINOurfKf tigUlgrRaW5pOIm0CQ2z4epi7FFKwdPjdTpsdbZURZTwybCiS4vgfN08iaIRZ/3M 9tz1tfQZH303yTQwubdYf9l99XJlxBtFBFjJlJzCze7iOEVD+j0fHRKk6OM/wouD kjKrarEQQACQhUzNssAr2/Yv/odYvshJYSLe/7/eoGH7zkKof0rbcBQPyLUpZoU= =B+Hz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Deadline Approaching: The Global Technology Management Conference 2015 - USA
by Jackie Blanco 04 Jun '15

04 Jun '15

The Global Technology Management Conference (GTMC2015) Bemidji State University, Minnesota, USA July 15 - 17, 2015 http://sdiwc.net/conferences/gtmc2015/ [1] You are invited to participate in The Global Technology Management Conference (GTMC2015) that will be held at Bemidji State University, Minnesota, USA on July 15 - 17, 2015. The event will be held over three days, with presentations delivered by researchers from the international community, including presentations from keynote speakers and state-of-the-art lectures. The proceedings will be published in SDIWC Digital Library. The conference welcome papers on the following (but not limited to) research topics: *Information Technology -Information and Data Management -Information Content Security -The Management of IT Investments -Computational Intelligence -Data Management in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Networks -Information Management -Enterprise Architecture Management -The Management of "Green" IT -Ubiquitous Computing, Services and Applications -Web Services Security -Information Ethics -Quality of Service, Scalability and Performance -Information Security and Cryptography -Data Stream Processing in Mobile/Sensor Networks *Computer Science -Biometrics Technologies -Computer Forensics -Computer Security -Data Mining -Distributed and Parallel Applications -Wireless Communications -Cloud Computing -Access Control -Network Security -Digital Signal and Image Processing -Multimedia Computing -Computer Animation -Computer Architecture -Artificial Intelligence -Information Retrieval -Natural Language Processing *Business, and Technology In Education -Educational Technology -Computer-aided Systems -Mobile Computing -Education In Computational Science -Mobile Learning -Business Intelligence and Web Services -E-commerce Business Models -Future Development of E-Business -E- Learning -E-Government -Debugging Tools and Learning -E-Business Applications and Software *Manufacturing Systems -Design and Manufacturing -Intelligent Processing of Materials -Human-Machine Interface -Computer-Aided Design, Manufacturing, and Engineering -Modeling and Design -Design and Green Manufacturing -Automation -Networks Design, Protocols and Management *Engineering Technology -Bioinformatics & Biomedical Imaging -Robotics and Atomization Engineering -Globalization of Engineering -Applications of AI Techniques in Design and Manufacturing -Industrial Engineering -Biomedical Signal Processing -Robotics and Mobile Machines -Computer Architecture for Intelligent Machines All submitted papers will be reviewed by a minimum of two reviewers. The published proceedings will be indexed in ResearchBib, ProQuest, and Google Scholar Databases, in addition they will be submitted for POSSIBLE inclusion within the INSPEC, EI, DBLP, Microsoft Academic Research, and ResearchGate. IMPORTANT DATES =============== Submission Deadline: Open from now until June 15, 2015 Notification of Acceptance: 4 weeks from the submission date Camera Ready Submission: Open from now until July 05, 2015 Registration Deadline: Open from now until July 05, 2015 Conference Dates: July 15 - 17, 2015 Drop us an email at gtmc15(a)sdiwc.net Links: ------ [1] http://sdiwc.net/conferences/gtmc2015/

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Dumb or-ctl-filter tricks (Was: [tor-talk] SOCKS proxy to sit between user and Tor?)
by Yawning Angel 04 Jun '15

04 Jun '15

Hello, I just pushed a fairly large update to or-ctl-filter, that lets you do lots of interesting things, most of them probably unsafe. In particular or-ctl-filter now ships with a SOCKS5 client/server implementation and a stub control port implementation. A picture is worth a thousand words: https://raw.github.com/Yawning/or-ctl-filter/screenshots/or-ctl-filter-tor-… What it does: * Filters the control port exposed to Tor Browser for things that (IMO) the browser has no business knowing just in terms of attack surface. In particular this intentionally breaks the circuit display feature as part of 4.5.x. * Allows easy integration of Tor Browser with a system tor service (NB: I run a system tor service with the Tor Browser circuit lifespan patch, if you do not, you will get behavior that is different from other users. You have been warned.) * Supports transparently redirecting ".i2p" requests to an I2P instance. Tor does not need to be running for this. * Enforces isolation to attempt to guard the local I2P web server and management interface from cross protocol trickery, evil Javascript and whatnot. * Supports running without Tor or I2P at all, essentially changing Tor Browser into Firefox with a bunch of patches. Limitations: * NEWNYM does not affect I2P tunnels. * "New Tor Circuit For This Site" does not affect I2P tunnels either. * Only cookie authentication is supported because I'm lazy, and it is the superior authentication method. * Launching Tor/I2P is not or-ctl-filter's problem and will never be part of the feature set. I have systemd for that. Warning(s): * Very alpha. It is entirely possible that I screwed up enforcing isolation. You can hard disable access to locally hosted i2p services like the management console in the config file. It is still probably 3 million times better than using privoxy/random sketch addons to do something like this because I actually do look at circuit isolation from Tor Browser and propagate it to Tor (or enforce it as best as I can otherwise). * If you enable logging, it will happily splatter destinations, authentication credentials, and everything else to the log, because it is a debugging feature, so don't. * If you enable the option named "UnsafeAllowDirect" and disable Tor, it will happily connect directly to the internet, destroying your anonymity. * Untested on Windows. Should work, don't care if it doesn't. Patches will sit in my INBOX forever; ignored, and unloved, just like the operating system they target. The same goes for OSX.[0] Code: https://github.com/Yawning/or-ctl-filter/tree/master -- Yawning Angel [0]: Honestly, I'll merge trivial things, but I won't bust out my windows box to test/debug this, and I don't have an OSX box.

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Summary of meek's costs, May 2015
by David Fifield 04 Jun '15

04 Jun '15

Here's the summary of meek's CDN fees for May 2015. App Engine + Amazon + Azure = total by month February 2014 $0.09 + -- + -- = $0.09 March 2014 $0.00 + -- + -- = $0.00 April 2014 $0.73 + -- + -- = $0.73 May 2014 $0.69 + -- + -- = $0.69 June 2014 $0.65 + -- + -- = $0.65 July 2014 $0.56 + $0.00 + -- = $0.56 August 2014 $1.56 + $3.10 + -- = $4.66 September 2014 $4.02 + $4.59 + $0.00 = $8.61 October 2014 $40.85 + $130.29 + $0.00 = $171.14 November 2014 $224.67 + $362.60 + $0.00 = $587.27 December 2014 $326.81 + $417.31 + $0.00 = $744.12 January 2015 $464.37 + $669.02 + $0.00 = $1133.39 February 2015 $650.53 + $604.83 + $0.00 = $1255.36 March 2015 $690.29 + $815.68 + $0.00 = $1505.97 April 2015 $886.43 + $785.37 + $0.00 = $1671.80 May 2015 $871.64 + $896.39 + $0.00 = $1768.03 -- total by CDN $4163.89 + $4689.18 + $0.00 = $8853.07 grand total The number of users stayed in the range of 3000 to 4000. There are a few days of missing data. I think the big increase to 6000+ users on the day before the gap is a bad measurement. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-transport.html?graph=userst… On May 22 I asked the operator of the meek-google bridge to rate-limit the bridge to 1.5 MB/s in an attempt to limit costs. Since then we further limited it to 1.1 MB/s. It pains me to do that, but I need to find a way to make the operation of this transport sustainable. I estimated the rates to keep us under the $500/month credit we have from Google. I may also rate-limit meek-amazon too. If you want to set up your own bridge and CDN instance without rate limiting, I can help you do that if you email me. Here are some docs to look at: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek#Howtorunameek-server… https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek#GoogleAppEngine https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek#AmazonCloudFront https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek#MicrosoftAzure == App Engine a.k.a. meek-google == Total bandwidth was down, probably because of the new rate limiting. Oddly, instance hours were way up, perhaps for the same reason. The rate limiting happens at the bridge, so it's possible that it's wasting resources at the App Engine level. Here is how the Google costs broke down: 5359 GB $643.07 4571 instance hours $228.57 Compared to the previous month: 6304 GB $756.59 2597 instance hours $129.84 In the graph you can really see the impact of limiting bandwidth. Interestingly, the number of users did not decrease. It's just going slower for them :( https://globe.torproject.org/#/bridge/88F745840F47CE0C6A4FE61D827950B06F9E4… == Amazon a.k.a. meek-amazon == Requests were up about 13% and bandwidth was up about 15%. Asia Pacific (Singapore) 132M requests $158.86 973 GB $129.18 Asia Pacific (Sydney) 633K requests $0.79 4 GB $0.58 Asia Pacific (Tokyo) 47M requests $57.04 331 GB $43.14 EU (Ireland) 184M requests $221.61 1847 GB $147.56 South America (Sao Paulo) 7M requests $17.04 49 GB $11.73 US East (Northern Virginia) 68M requests $68.57 509 GB $40.27 -- total 441M requests $523.91 3715 GB $372.46 https://globe.torproject.org/#/bridge/3FD131B74D9A96190B1EE5D31E91757FADA1A… == Azure a.k.a. meek-azure == meek-azure increased about 30% again this month. You should only count on it working for another 3 months. https://onionoo.torproject.org/bandwidth?fingerprint=AA033EEB61601B2B7312D8… Estimated bandwidth use this month: 2015-05 2592 GB Compared to last month: 2015-04 1982 GB https://globe.torproject.org/#/bridge/AA033EEB61601B2B7312D89B62AAA23DC3ED8… David Fifield Earlier reports in this series: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007429.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007576.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007716.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007916.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-January/008082.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-February/008235.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-March/008427.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-April/008596.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-May/008767.html

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Researching Tor: Quantifying anonymity against a global passive adversary
by Florian Rüchel 04 Jun '15

04 Jun '15

Hi there, I am currently writing my Master's thesis about Mix networks & Tor (was on list previously). I am currently at a point, where I'd like to practially quantify anonymity. That is, given a pcap, I want to anaylze how successful an adversary can determine whether a specific client talked to a specific service. Since I run all of this in a simulation (using Shadow), I have access to ground truth and can determine the traffic, network size, etc. arbitrarily. The idea behind all of this is to integrate a Mix relay on each Tor node and to watch how the adversarys success behaves. However, I have a hard time finding material on such attacks, i.e. papers that closely examine this scenario (and perhaps have conducted some simulation and/or measurements themselves, beyond simple theory). The thing is that this is only part of the research and I'd really prefer if I could build this upon work of others instead of starting from scratch. Do any of you know of such papers or corresponding research? Regards, Florian

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onionoo: bug in family set detection?
by nusenu 03 Jun '15

03 Jun '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi, by comparing different methodologies of "parsing" myfamily data I stumbled upon differences between onionoo and compass. After manual review I assume there is a bug in onionoo (or onionoo has a different opinion on what families actually are) Example: According to onionoo, torpidsDEevanzo [1] is part of a family with 38 members. It lists torpidsFRonline [2] as one of its members, that implies that torpidsFRonline lists torpidsDEevanzo as one of its members as well, but torpidsDEevanzo does _not_ list torpidsFRonline (according to onionoo data). grep 'fingerprint":"0C77421C890D16B6D201283A2' details.json|grep 5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42594 (no result) Is this a bug? thanks [1] https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42… [2] https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/0C77421C890D16B6D201283A2244F43DF5BC8… -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVbLCAAAoJEFv7XvVCELh0bxkP/1Ep/fhLMhHGIgYnVzEj+xyJ Sb4gqUBuwLckcXLAYGoKZkIeHNS4TFLBidKxuP54bvSLgqPgpsy+OzLiaUk8AYyP Ea2tTmDqcjWy2v/cpP43M3Vh+TpPBTMenNajKwe9Moz63pMpo0V9HLnBjCwBN+Mh 1vGFJw/ov4wmQO3J5OOEABdVt8RTmqCWJBVbz1NmKWNEpxa5sbPS+6tNEvBLbsaL XmtoPcdyAl+14QQk1GSq4Px49K4MFEcRuCN2r1bzRv2WaPgRmFUtrK9JCDwwLlV5 aSrBU7S2M5gn6KowkEZllniZ7n5Ze3SiifqJEPm3hyIUXczveR02LHk++lEXneQE pqxDX6PPnVIt7lm1JW5Svr82boYTC1LQ9xHyF9LStBfYvgWSD5TrDeNaIe8+mka3 OrJ6r0hxMB1IRUaxouI/IGMZLmwj2lqifBeaNccsz876oJ2W6SZu6JPVvNstf7lc TnesBplpAprekofUb3DaGeM80Pa/NmuRjga5F+H6HLH3qE8AxeGKzSQDKYLuRlaM GdZY/bMN/6JGhoHCvYIT8NMNGMYfMPE7UWiHtX+1dezIwyYtwnHxiAcRl/e73TuI cmtzvIiKA9Z1sM2FX8mhaRi6r6TOBdvovSTkKtxkXHk2qT1Sf/oPtvlGtzTlrVp7 uFFgl0Sg++eiHAd1VG58 =D6Qh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-dev] onionoo: bug in family set detection?
by teor 03 Jun '15

03 Jun '15

Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 16:52:00 +0000 From: nusenu <nusenu(a)openmailbox.org> > > teor: > > MyFamily requires bidirectional declarations to be effective. > > I'm aware of that fact ;) > > > In this case: OnionOO appears to correctly implement the > > bidirectional MyFamily logic > > Apparently it doesn't. > > Since onionoo says there is a bidirectional "connection" (family) between > 5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42594 => > 0C77421C890D16B6D201283A2244F43DF5BC89DD > > but there is none.. (as explained in my last email) > > Compass does *not* say that there is a bidirectional connection > between those relays.. onionoo says there is one even though I can't > see it, do you see it? I'm sorry, I must have got the onionoo and Compass results mixed up somehow. In Compass, I see that: 5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42594 has no family. In Globe/Atlas (based on onionoo), I see that: 5510FC1736B16D46D3F2DDA5011995C478D42594 has a very large family. So my criticism of Compass actually applies to onionoo. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

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OS X OpenSSL/Tor Build Instructions
by teor 03 Jun '15

03 Jun '15

As noted recently, OS X comes with OpenSSL 0.9.8 by default, which is too old to build Tor. During the Tor patch workshop today, rl1987 and Yawning were testing the OpenSSL and Tor builds on OS X. I've put the OS X build steps they used on the Tor Wiki, along with the alternative method of obtaining OpenSSL and/or Tor via MacPorts: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/MacBuild If you're building Tor on OS X, please try these instructions, fix any mistakes, and add missing steps or other alternatives. In particular, HomeBrew instructions for OpenSSL and Tor would be really helpful for some users. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

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