- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Fwd: Orbot v15.0.1 beta 3 and NetCipher update
by Nathan Freitas 27 Jun '15

27 Jun '15

----- Original message ----- From: Nathan of Guardian <nathan(a)guardianproject.info> To: guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org Subject: Orbot v15.0.1 beta 3 and NetCipher update Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 10:19:49 -0400 *** Orbot v15.0.1 beta 3 released *** From: https://dev.guardianproject.info/news/233 See our previous news update (https://dev.guardianproject.info/news/231) for the more data or review the changelog here: https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git/tree/CHANGELOG?id=e00f830ecadbca1b0… We've pushed the release to our Google Play beta channel (https://play.google.com/apps/testing/org.torproject.android) and our /release folder here. APK: https://guardianproject.info/releases/Orbot-v15.0.1-beta-3.apk PGP Sig: https://guardianproject.info/releases/Orbot-v15.0.1-beta-3.apk.asc You can also use FDroid to subscribe to our nightlies repo here (please uninstall any other version of Orbot first): https://dev.guardianproject.info/debug/org.torproject.android/fdroid/repo *** NetCipher library updated (v1.2) *** We've also updated our NetCipher library to support the update Intent API in Orbot that supports background starting, improved status messages via broadcasts and more. NetCipher also includes clearer code for support HttpUrlConnection proxying, TLS socket hardening, and has been re-organized a bit for clarity. https://github.com/guardianproject/NetCipher The sample app shows how to use these classes: https://github.com/guardianproject/NetCipher/tree/master/sample -- Nathan of Guardian nathan(a)guardianproject.info

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update obfs4proxy in deb.torproject.org
by s7r 24 Jun '15

24 Jun '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi, An update is needed in http:// deb.torproject.org/torproject.org obfs4proxy main to version 0.0.5 (we currently have 0.0.4). armel and amrhf packages for obfs4proxy would be nice too, for mobiles/tablets/raspberrys etc. Also, why do we have tor-experimental-0.2.6.x-$dist_codename and tor-nightly-0.2.6.x-$dist_codename - any difference between them? I know 'nightly master' is for latest alpha dev release, but what's the experimental used for? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVhzu8AAoJEIN/pSyBJlsRIXgH/1v01c0oArU6E/xyzfi4DLN6 6bLK9emfzTAimtwgIQfH1POL+GR3xqpLl5TURN0wGEdI1Sm1vBK6wg0/mnsjNJAD +yulRlfJlbjLn+H2TJ1XFsKNQudIRpstdjQ0hyrA4SmOV3V42rk6taQSdM/b+zwG 2v54+P05Th/bbq63UDKoLjbzal/sMUe+2l1lYxO1BbxiXL9JkGU5qCTnG8uM+yXK IEXCdDlZpEdmov6ueP3PdiCrhS9v5HsZ7TIGKqVuuie6Kf1yrxIgBP5rlKsdJgqI V1bnHyhs1zvME+Klw+DF8Axqb1PqPY/dV5WoIo+s++H3+phA1TSmG46ebj5WG6E= =R2Kk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-dev] The future of GetTor
by Adam Pritchard 24 Jun '15

24 Jun '15

> > I'm currently the maintainer of GetTor [1], and together with Nima and > Sukhbir we have been talking about the future of it. If this conversation moves elsewhere, I would really like to be kept in the loop. I'm the primary maintainer of Psiphon's email auto-responder, which was initially modeled on Tor's approach. Psiphon is, obviously, also extremely interested in robust ways of making our tools available in censoring regions. (So, Satori, etc., are also interesting.) Relatedly... When doing Logjam, etc., testing on our responder I found testssl.sh[1] to be a handy tool. Used like so: ./testssl.sh --mx torproject.org CheckTLS[2] is also good for actually doing email send and receive tests. We're currently struggling a bit with just how hardcore we can be in securing our server communications. Right now Postfix is configured[3] to only connect out using TLS and only accept incoming TLS connections from servers with a verifiable cert. That seems reasonable, except... we're getting complaints that Chinese mail services don't meet those criteria, and Chinese users can't/won't/don't use Gmail/Hotmail/Yahoo. ...As an example of the sort of shared hurdles we might encounter. [1]: https://testssl.sh/ [2]: https://www.checktls.com/ [3]: https://bitbucket.org/psiphon/psiphon-circumvention-system/src/2d052db9597d… -- Adam Pritchard Psiphon Inc.

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small patch to allow gcc -fno-common for better ASAN coverage
by starlight.2015q2＠binnacle.cx 24 Jun '15

24 Jun '15

Per https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/Flags one benefits from compiling with -fno-common when -fsanitize=address is active The attached patch converts the single common variable to a global/extern variable. Seems a good idea to me. Have run this with no issues, but more ASAN coverage is better than less.

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How bad is not having 'enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128' really? (OpenBSD)
by nusenu 23 Jun '15

23 Jun '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi, since enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 is disabled by default on OpenBSD due to compiler bugs [1] I wanted to ask how bad is it (in relay context) to ignore the usual tor log entry: > We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, > but with a version of OpenSSL that apparently lacks accelerated > support for the NIST P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with > such support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option when > configuring it) would make ECDH much faster. Tor's changelog "highly recommends" it [2]. Can this be "translated" to something like "the relay's bandwidth usage and usefulness will be reduced" "latency will be higher" "security will be degraded due to fallback to DH-1024" ? thanks, nusenu [1] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.os.openbsd.misc/218944 [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/plain/ReleaseNotes?id=tor-0.2.5.10 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJViDmDAAoJEFv7XvVCELh0Fi0QAKF0/7eVWgL5gExyGcCugz66 9CJOaNGVdeqb8LDxH/KEW4xC+MLhqMQ/+dL7iVOZIOtCM6i4vTpD3u4ZVnFhcGfx luyX78TqXDW3riV3izBWYScYxQdeHGv3XFXQlbGi7WQYfRt0AdorchmP2xuxD7Cg zGZFk4Bggj3qnW1sd/G3JvJL0bUi7iBKrQwPTDlnK3YSGbTYpU6lS3dQqbHqNYin yrwtlNSCi9DFjbQm5g4yjvaawnmOuxf8dlm54Ltjdn2cIHsXaPqQ6kXICiukrJhE ZLfTnPBd3yngyoq9xe7bW9P4mNVkTNmAU3VqGgEq1gSUJQObXkzOKAz63z9WAqQl GBvZFtwkbdBM4pjfWaG5FjDRc+awXxP/8K/d2vF2r6KAwkbh9Fw2uhjC6yu5c6hB KtQaovd+we+Ag4vDdE6lbQPLiCbPBiFdB6qYjkWbVflYcrsYQPoCgwjaodbV7I/Y 8Kb3Lx2C8+HFLtktEh19tOk34iKVliQk7FjE2FoiKkWryRYtY5KUAfFS8hOCfBqr 2XYtWGqQ9eh14RqvBu7CuN1cKCc0EQLcr6BF9uvd6EYtKZsa5rQC+y9Bbbd65MwB qU7lLckEkG+qwzgvuyOBvGwN8JmMmTBQASsdalAUscQFbPq7wySp9tz21pu8mOje NRRdnL1/3X9KcCMLMCVk =Oa2Z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-dev] The future of GetTor
by teor 23 Jun '15

23 Jun '15

> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 19:37:07 -0300 > From: ilv <ilv(a)riseup.net> > To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org > > > … > >> Is it possible to submit an app to the app stores (I am thinking Apple's restrictions, here) that would bootstrap a Tor Browser download over the Tor network? >> >> For example: >> 1. Download app >> 2. The app has various CDN links (or a way of getting them) and a some predefined bridges >> 3. The app tries the CDN links and bridges in order of reliability / expense >> 4. If the links or bridges fail, the user gets advice on how to find new, uncensored links or bridges and input them. >> 5. App downloads and verifies Tor Browser using the CDN or the Tor network >> >> In most cases, the user experience would be one-click: >> 1. Open the app >> 2. See a recommended option highlighted out of a list of working options >> 3. click download >> 4. see a progress bar >> 5. Get a verified Tor Browser >> > > Yes, the use experience that you mention is what we're looking for. > About using the Tor network... I'm not sure about it. It's like using > Tor to download Tor? Still, I'll write it down as an option. People can use the Tor network to download Tor Browser, with the aid of a bootstrapping program. (Which can be much simpler than Tor Browser itself - see below.) If people can't use the Tor network to download a file, then it's unlikely that Tor Browser will work for them. My reasoning went something like this: 1. If we can put Tor Browser in an App Store, people won't need to use an app that downloads Tor Browser 2. If an App Store doesn't allow Tor Browser, then people need an app that will download Tor Browser 3. Perhaps the App Store will allow an app that can download Tor Browser over the Tor network (this could be as simple as tor, torify, and wget executables, and a GUI frontend) teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

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The future of GetTor
by ilv 23 Jun '15

23 Jun '15

Hi people, I'm currently the maintainer of GetTor [1], and together with Nima and Sukhbir we have been talking about the future of it. First, let me present you what is (roughly) the current status of GetTor: * We send links to download Tor Browser, along with its signature file. These files are stored on Dropbox. I will be working on integrate new cloud/hosting services during Summer of Privacy. * We send these links via email. I will be working on new modules to send links via chat (XMPP) and Twitter (DM) during Summer of Privacy. * We send links to download the English (US) package of Tor Browser. I will be working on support for more locales during Summer of Privacy. That is what we have now. Is not much, but it works (more info in [1]). So, what about it? Software evolves, and we think it might be the time of GetTor to go beyond its current design. Moreover, we have received valid concerns that emails could be tampered and users could get malicious versions of Tor Browser (although we have no evidence that this is happening). Right now, when you get the Tor Browser via this method is up to you to verify its integrity. With this in mind, we have been discussing about the idea of having a signed and verified distributor app (desktop), available on official channels (OSX app store, Google Chrome store, etc), which could ease the process of downloading and verifying the integrity of Tor Browser. In other words, a user should be able to download and make sure it has the right file with just a few clicks. However, we have different thoughts on how this should work: * Option 1: GetTor should work as a backend and have an API. The distributor (and even other apps) would send queries to this API asking for links. The problem with this is that if Tor Project's website is blocked, is quite possible that the API would be blocked too (e.g. gettor.torproject.org) * Option 2: The distributor is in charge of presenting various alternatives to the user and getting the files directly from the cloud/hosting services. So, the purpose of this email is to get feedback from the community, and my specific questions to you people are the following: 1) What do you think of the distributor idea? It is something you or others would want? 2) In case we develop the distributor, should the email autoresponder remain? 3) If you agree on developing the distributor, what option you think would fit better? (please suggest better options) I would really love to hear your comments about this idea, my work at Summer of Privacy might change depending on this discussion, so please feel free to express your feelings about it :) Thanks for your time! [1] https://www.torproject.org/projects/gettor.html.en [2] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/GetTor --ilv

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draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-exit-00.xml
by Christian Grothoff 22 Jun '15

22 Jun '15

Dear all, Following https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-names/ and the separation of .onion in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-appelbaum-dnsop-onion-tld-01 to satisfy the IETF's desire to have lots of documents, I've now split off ".exit" as well to create draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-exit-00 I've attached the current draft to this e-mail and would appreciate any feedback you may have. Also, if you feel that this is the wrong move entirely (i.e. because you don't want to reserve .exit), please do let me know ASAP and then I won't submit the draft. Happy hacking! Christian

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2nd status report for OnioNS
by OnioNS Dev 21 Jun '15

21 Jun '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello everyone, Work on the Onion Name System (OnioNS) continues. As stated in the previous status report, my primary focus now is separating the server components. In the last release, a single name server handled everything, making it a centralized system. I have made significant progress in seperating roles such that one machine acts as an authority while another machine returns Records and digital signatures to clients. This reduces the loads and responsibilities and is the key step towards creating a true distributed system. During implementation, I decided the scrap the Snapshot data structure and its protocol. A Snapshot is basically a server-side short-term cache of Records that is then flushed out periodically. The issue is that in the event that two HSs claim the same name within a short time period of each other and transmit their Records to two different Quorum nodes, when the Snapshots are flushed out it's non-trivial to decide which one took precedence. Snapshots were originally intended to save networking costs and reduce the risk of timing attacks, but in the end I realized that it didn't actually reduce networking costs, and timing attacks are an acceptable risk given Tor's design and threat model. So instead, servers can now subscribe to other servers for network events. If server B is subscribed to server A, when a Record is transmitted from a HS through a Tor circuit to server A, it sends the Record to B immediately. Thus all Quorum nodes will subscribe to all other Quorum nodes, and Mirrors can subscribe to one or more Quorum nodes, and Mirrors can subscribe to other Mirrors. This allows new information to propagate across the network immediately. This simplifies some of the protocols and fixes a significant problem. I have also made significant progress on logging events to file, rather than to std::cout. I am also planning on loading networking information from a file, simulating a Quorum, maintaining a debug package, and launching the software with the Tor Browser. I have made progress on all of these and have listed them in a milestone, scheduled to be included in the next major release: https://github.com/Jesse-V/OnioNS/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+milestone%3… See you at PETS! - - Jesse V. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJVhhTEAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yAIdMH/AlUiqCFsQCESe1I6tUzYfHO 4DLTZGVInSC1AMjhdO4RBLuO/MZuZgGAzsitI65KEOkYBAFd7TGOu8DMDbfU9tdt d9yRVshqP/LSd9b9/WmmVZTq0zazkZDOBYELcrXBw3ic4tu+HdJ5E3yl/Fm2bE5C eu0gVbBipvbj332cypqf6J2xpP5gQN5pdSLh+AHRqgMN1K9huTw/yq2/Kgu2ZmhX 8AoMerNmkQ9Wj+tUcyW+Ab9+SFUrkeYUxPp60WVXXciD311uUhKTKknGjRDgBNZw YSI/2RrHkW2342XfvaiI7qbgfnSKQx5yko9KxV2ab1JSpzgocgutWRjwSZFIt/M= =rqna -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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txtorcon suports "tor:" endpoint
by meejah 20 Jun '15

20 Jun '15

I (finally!) merged David Stainton's "tor:" endpoint parser to txtorcon's master. This means two things: txtorcon now depends on txsocksx and you can do "client-type" things directly with endpoints, such as connecting to txtorcon's homepage: ep = clientFromString("tor:timaq4ygg2iegci7.onion:80") ep.connect(...) If anyone has strong feelings about txsocksx, I could be convinced to make the dependency optional (so you'd only get the "tor:" endpoint parser etc. if you happened to have installed txsocksx). Let me know! Note that the last released version of txsocksx doesn't work with Twisted 15.0.0+ but there is a fix on master which does... -- meejah

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