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Re: [tor-relays] Any IP allocations available out there?
by Paul Templeton 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

Thanx niftybunny, It's more political than anything. With the constant changes in policy driving censorship I feel that having a strong presence is important. At the moment there are 50 nodes in Australia with the fastest running at 357Kbs and only two exit nodes - fastest is 100Kbs. Its a reflection on the state of politics and the level of service that is provided by ISP's. Yes I could run more nodes in VMs around the world but at this stage I would like to investigate a strong presence here in AU. Regards, Paul ----- Original Message ----- From: "niftybunny" <abuse(a)to-surf-and-protect.net> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2017 10:41:12 AM Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Any IP allocations available out there? The smallest block you can advertise with your own AD is a /24 as far as I know. Getting a IPv4 /24 is …. expensive and hard to get. If you are not incredible rich and very tech savvy and a hardcore Tor supporter: Forget it. Get yourself a few virtual servers. niftybunny “For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens 'as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone'” --David Cameron, 2015 On 24. Aug 2017, at 02:29, Paul Templeton < paul(a)coffswifi.net > wrote: Thanx to all here on the list for input to earlier posts. Helped a lot. Question I have is there anywhere where you can get a block of IP address or lease as I'm in the process of getting a 10/10Mb SHDSL service(No flaming data cap :-)) here in AU but I want an IP range that abuse questions can be forwarded to me. The service provider doesn't provide ARIN registration but said if I have my own block I can update the BG and manage it my self. Regards, Paul PS - the best price I can do at the moment is $550pm - *SIGH* - but worth it. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Unable to compile Tor
by Alan 23 Aug '17

23 Aug '17

Up until now i've relied on updating Tor using yum update but the version on the repos is currently 0.2.9.10 . Arm reports this as unrecommended, so compiling from source looks to be the only option. I pulled down 0.3.0.10, untarred and ran ./configure && make I get these errors-- ---------------------------- In file included from src/common/tortls.c:52:0: src/common/tortls.h:140:15: error: conflicting types for SSL_SESSION_get_master_key STATIC size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, ^ In file included from src/common/tortls.c:40:0: /usr/local/include/openssl/ssl.h:1725:15: note: previous declaration of SSL_SESSION_get_master_key was here __owur size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *ssl, ^ src/common/tortls.c: In function find_cipher_by_id: src/common/tortls.c:1331:21: warning: unused variable c [-Wunused-variable] const SSL_CIPHER *c; ^ src/common/tortls.c: In function tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers: src/common/tortls.c:1508:20: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type ciphers = session->ciphers; ^ src/common/tortls.c: At top level: src/common/tortls.c:2402:1: error: conflicting types for SSL_get_client_random SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) ^ In file included from src/common/tortls.c:40:0: /usr/local/include/openssl/ssl.h:1721:15: note: previous declaration of SSL_get_client_random was here __owur size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, ^ In file included from src/common/tortls.c:27:0: src/common/tortls.c: In function SSL_get_client_random: src/common/tortls.c:2407:15: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type tor_assert(s->s3); ^ src/common/compat.h:196:51: note: in definition of macro PREDICT_UNLIKELY #define PREDICT_UNLIKELY(exp) __builtin_expect(!!(exp), 0) ^ src/common/tortls.c:2407:3: note: in expansion of macro tor_assert tor_assert(s->s3); ^ src/common/tortls.c:2408:16: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len); ^ src/common/tortls.c: At top level: src/common/tortls.c:2415:1: error: conflicting types for SSL_get_server_random SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) ^ In file included from src/common/tortls.c:40:0: /usr/local/include/openssl/ssl.h:1723:15: note: previous declaration of SSL_get_server_random was here __owur size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, ^ In file included from src/common/tortls.c:27:0: src/common/tortls.c: In function SSL_get_server_random: src/common/tortls.c:2420:15: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type tor_assert(s->s3); ^ src/common/compat.h:196:51: note: in definition of macro PREDICT_UNLIKELY #define PREDICT_UNLIKELY(exp) __builtin_expect(!!(exp), 0) ^ src/common/tortls.c:2420:3: note: in expansion of macro tor_assert tor_assert(s->s3); ^ src/common/tortls.c:2421:16: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len); ^ src/common/tortls.c: In function SSL_SESSION_get_master_key: src/common/tortls.c:2432:13: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type return s->master_key_length; ^ In file included from src/common/tortls.c:27:0: src/common/tortls.c:2433:30: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length); ^ src/common/compat.h:196:51: note: in definition of macro PREDICT_UNLIKELY #define PREDICT_UNLIKELY(exp) __builtin_expect(!!(exp), 0) ^ src/common/tortls.c:2433:3: note: in expansion of macro tor_assert tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length); ^ src/common/tortls.c:2435:16: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type memcpy(out, s->master_key, len); ^ make[1]: *** [src/common/tortls.o] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory `/root/tor-0.3.0.10' make: *** [all] Error 2 ---------------------------- I'm running on Centos 7 Alan

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Bandwidth Question
by Torix 23 Aug '17

23 Aug '17

Dear List, I run a middle node at home. I jacked up my bandwidth from 300/500 KB to 500/700 KB a fortnight ago, and my usage has more than doubled. I run it on Verizon FIOS at home; I'm looking at about 650-750 G/month estimate now from vnstat. I read that Verizon starts to take notice if I get to a TB/month, so I am asking for advice on easing this back if necessary. I can limit the daily bandwidth - or can I just ease down the bandwidth? Clearly each time I increased the bandwidth I got more connexions; would they drop off if I went back to my old bandwidth? I'm a little unclear how long it would take other relays to attach to other middle relays once they have found mine. The more general question behind this is: is it better to have a higher bandwidth for a limited time each day or a lower bandwidth up all day? Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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outdated key files in ./keys ?
by Toralf Förster 23 Aug '17

23 Aug '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I do wonder if I do still need all of these files at my exit relay with verion 0.3.1.5-alpha ? $> ls keys/ ed25519_master_id_public_key ed25519_signing_secret_key secret_onion_key_ntor ed25519_master_id_secret_key secret_id_key secret_onion_key_ntor.old ed25519_signing_cert secret_onion_key secret_onion_key.old - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iI0EAREIADUWIQQaN2+ZSp0CbxPiTc/E6s3eAHbpTgUCWZdBBxccdG9yYWxmLmZv ZXJzdGVyQGdteC5kZQAKCRDE6s3eAHbpTiqVAP0VYBto7mkqOnSirkklCU/EiiV0 CV06fXxqH8KDzW3wAwD+P/O6+gs/LEPLhP7OFo9XbgzyO2zrElusqDhPU/kSzCw= =nzsU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Does fallback directory traffic go over the ORPort?
by tor 23 Aug '17

23 Aug '17

In another thread, Roger said: > Note that most clients use the ORPort for fetching directory stuff, and > that's heading towards "all clients" as people upgrade and stop using weird > configurations. I'm curious about the 100+ fallback directory mirrors. Does fallback directory traffic go over the ORPort too? Is it safe to disable the DirPort on fallback relays?

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blocking >1 connections per ip address onto Tor DirPort
by Toralf Förster 23 Aug '17

23 Aug '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I do have the following iptables rule here : # Tor # dirport=80 orport=443 $IPT -A INPUT -p tcp --destination-port $dirport --match conntrack --ctstate NEW --match connlimit --connlimit-above 1 --connlimit-mask 32 -j DROP $IPT -A INPUT -p tcp --destination-port $orport --match conntrack --ctstate NEW --match connlimit --connlimit-above 1 --connlimit-mask 32 -j DROP which seems to work fine. An $> ip6tables -nvL gives 14110 746K DROP tcp -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:80 ctstate NEW #conn src/32 > 1 230K 14M DROP tcp -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:443 ctstate NEW #conn src/32 > 1 after few days so I do just like to ask here if the rules above are fine or if I overllooked something ? - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iI0EAREIADUWIQQaN2+ZSp0CbxPiTc/E6s3eAHbpTgUCWZM4sxccdG9yYWxmLmZv ZXJzdGVyQGdteC5kZQAKCRDE6s3eAHbpTqnGAQCPr7gkpaxRD3spzKp49l53A2H0 YOzXrw8G8vR8BtHZPQD+NE4Zhf7Y0w0JtKqy6E5bSowikeSJsKSDur8zxO+kf8E= =UPak -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] New Here
by Paul Templeton 21 Aug '17

21 Aug '17

Another odd thin is atlas will say its down for say three hours but there are up to 1900 connections thumping away from other relays. The node has been running longer but I restarted thinking something was wrong. LOL But like I said its not a problem - I'm wait to see if the VM provider has an issue and at 5 euros per month I'll run others in other country's for that money. Shame its to expensive to run one here in OZ. *SIGH* ----- Original Message ----- From: "Keepyourprivacy" <keepyourprivacy(a)protonmail.ch> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 12:18:03 AM Subject: Re: [tor-relays] New Here That's strange. Usually you shouldn't see more traffic than advertised. Atlas is saying: Bandwidth rate: 300 KiB/s Bandwidth burst: 500 KiB/s Observed bandwidth: 638.69 KiB/s Strange thing is, that the observed bandwidth is higher than your the one you are advertising. Maybe someone else can say something about this. The "spikes" can come from the measurments, but usually the aren't that big that you should see such a high spikes. The only thing i saw is, that you are using RelayBandwidthRate instead of just BandwidthRate in your config file. Don't know if this makes any difference? -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [tor-relays] New Here Local Time: 11 August 2017 4:10 PM UTC Time: 11 August 2017 2:10 PM From: paul(a)coffswifi.net To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org nickname: coffswifi Provider 1&1 torrc: RunAsDaemon 1 Address 82.223.27.82 Nickname coffswifi RelayBandwidthRate 300 KBytes RelayBandwidthBurst 500 KBytes ContactInfo Paul <paul AT coffswifi dot net> DirPort 9030 ExitRelay 1 I'm running the default exit policy... From: "Keepyourprivacy" <keepyourprivacy(a)protonmail.ch> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 12:03:20 AM Subject: Re: [tor-relays] New Here Thanks for running an exit! Mind sharing your torrc configuration? Maybe something is wrong in there... Which provider are you using? Tor relay nickname would be helpful too <blockquote> -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [tor-relays] New Here Local Time: 11 August 2017 3:50 PM UTC Time: 11 August 2017 1:50 PM From: paul(a)coffswifi.net To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Hi all, Have been running a mirror for a couple of years and haven"t had much time to dedicate to and exit node but have finally committed to it. Found a provider that doesn"t seem to have a cap on data and it will cost me about five euros a month. Question I have is two fold. First I find that atlas.torproject.org sometime says the node is down but its running and connected. Secondly how dose the bandwidth throttling work. I have set it to 300kbits with 500kbit burst but I can see the in/out traffic staying over 1mb for large periods of time and bursting to 7/8mb. Its not a problem just curios. Regards, Paul torproject.coffswifi.net _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays </blockquote> _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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significant rise in fail2ban alerts for ssh abuse
by Dirk 21 Aug '17

21 Aug '17

Dear all, we receive a significant rise of ssh login abuse mails which reach us and unfortunately our providers. By significant I mean an amount that starts flooding our abuse inbox. All abuse emails are structured the same way and point to Fail2Ban as originator. Do we have just bad luck and someone uses our severs to brute force all of SSH out there OR is there a new Fail2Ban or Linux distribution release which fosters or enables this fail2ban abuse mails be default ? As far as I know the functionality of Fail2Ban is old. If there would be a Linux distribution which enables this I would like to talk to the maintainer and let him know that he at least tries to read the correct abuse entry from ripe instead of bothering our provider as well. For a limited time we will now reject port 22. But really do not like this solution. I would rather like to find out the source of this rise in numbers. best regards Dirk Example 1 ---- Dear Sir/Madam, We have detected abuse from the IP address 1.1.1.x, which according to a whois lookup is on your network. We would appreciate if you would investigate and take action as appropriate. Log lines are given below, but please ask if you require any further information. (If you are not the correct person to contact about this please accept our apologies - your e-mail address was extracted from the whois record by an automated process. This mail was generated by Fail2Ban.) Note: Local timezone is +0300 (MSK) Aug 6 08:35:23 srv sshd[3534]: Invalid user admin from 1.1.1.x Aug 6 08:35:25 srv sshd[3534]: Failed password for invalid user admin from 1.1.1.x port 50789 ssh2 Aug 6 08:35:25 srv sshd[3534]: Connection closed by 1.1.1.x [preauth] Aug 6 12:26:03 srv sshd[28169]: Invalid user admin from 1.1.1.x Aug 6 12:26:05 srv sshd[28169]: Failed password for invalid user admin from 1.1.1.x port 35677 ssh2 Aug 6 12:26:06 srv sshd[28169]: Connection closed by 1.1.1.x [preauth] Example 2 ---- Dear Sir/Madam, We have detected abuse from the IP address 1.1.1.x, which according to a whois lookup is on your network. We would appreciate if you would investigate and take action as appropriate. Log lines are given below, but please ask if you require any further information. (If you are not the correct person to contact about this please accept our apologies - your e-mail address was extracted from the whois record by an automated process. This mail was generated by Fail2Ban.) Note: Local timezone is +0200 (CEST) Aug 7 17:41:14 vps3xxx sshd[32746]: Invalid user admin from 1.1.1.x Aug 7 17:41:14 vps3xxx sshd[32746]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=1.1.1.x Aug 7 17:41:16 vps3xxx sshd[32746]: Failed password for invalid user admin from 1.1.1.x port 60497 ssh2 Aug 7 17:41:16 vps3xxx sshd[32746]: Connection closed by 1.1.1.x port 60497 [preauth]

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End of Life Relays
by nusenu 19 Aug '17

19 Aug '17

Hello relay operator, Please note that recently (2017-08-01) a few tor releases reached end of life and are no longer maintained (no security and bugfixes) [1]. Please consider upgrading to a supported release if you are affected. To find out whether you are running an end of life tor release you can search for your relay nickname on [2] or on https://atlas.torproject.org. As of 2017-08-19 still >9% of the tor network run on end of life releases. thanks for running tor relays, nusenu [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTor… [2] https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/eolrelays -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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bwauth in testing
by Tom Ritter 18 Aug '17

18 Aug '17

After suffering the loss of maatuska's bwauth several months ago, we have re-provisioned it thanks to the gracious help from https://coldhak.ca/ It has completed an initial scan of the network[0] and is reporting its data here: http://198.51.75.50/bwauth/bwscan.V3BandwidthsFile This week I intend to flesh out the remaining aspects of the bwauth (debug logging, alerting to detect downtime, get a proper domain name, ssl cert, etc) as well as do some sanity checking on its output. If all goes well, I'll submit it to maatuska for inclusion at the end of the week. But I wanted to announce it here, both to give an update, and let the community take a look at its output and see if anything looks fishy. The bwauths themselves tend to disagree, partly because of the eb and flow of network speeds and partly because they are designed to (they all measure from different network vantage points) - but they ideally are in some sort of rough agreement. -tom [0] "Measured 99.7% of all tor nodes (99.6% of previous consensus bw)."

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