tor-relays

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36 participants
4815 discussions

Two research groups studying onion services and running relays
by Roger Dingledine 10 Aug '17

10 Aug '17

Hi relay operators! I want to let you know about two upcoming research projects by academic research groups. The tl;dr is that they're running relays to do certain measurements, and so far as we can tell the proposed methodology is safe enough and worthwhile enough, but we invite you (and everybody) to evaluate it too. If you didn't already know about the Tor Research Safety Board, now you do: https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard.html https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-heart-pets-and-privacy-research-commun… The board's goal is to help researchers do better and safer research, that is, to *minimize privacy risks while fostering a better understanding of the Tor network and its users*. The board has been low-profile so far because it's just starting up, but now that we've handled six cases, I've put the details of some of these cases up on the safety board page: https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard.html#examples (Some of the cases are still anonymized because their paper is not yet finished or submitted or accepted.) In particular, check out cases 2017-02 and 2017-03. They have each put up a web page explaining their research project and why it's safe, and listing which relays are associated with the research. http://tor.ccs.neu.edu/ https://onionpop.github.io/ Let us know if you have any questions. --Roger

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60 new neu.edu relays in 16 minutes
by nusenu 10 Aug '17

10 Aug '17

Hello privacy(a)ccs.neu.edu, DocTor and OrNetRadar detected that someone added 60 tor relays [1] with your email address in the contact info field on 2017-08-08 between 15:45 and 16:01 UTC. [1] https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetRadar/2017/08/08/a7.html Since tor relay contact information is not authenticated I was wondering if these are in fact your relays? (I guess they are) You obviously don't have to answer but if you want to I'm curious: Are these just temporary relays and part of your research or are they here to stay to increase the capacity of the tor network for more than just a few weeks or months? I assume you are not planing to run them for a longer period of time (>6months), but if you do you: Please consider network diversity when adding that amount of tor relay capacity. All your relays are operated in AS "Online S.a.s" - which is already the second biggest AS in terms of tor network capacity. +-----------------------------+-------------+ | AS Name | CW Fraction | +-----------------------------+-------------+ | OVH SAS | 15.95 | | Online S.a.s. | 13.41 | | Hetzner Online GmbH | 7.74 | | Digital Ocean, Inc. | 6.65 | | myLoc managed IT AG | 2.63 | +-----------------------------+-------------+ Also the country (FR) is not ideal from a diversity point of view. thanks for running relays, nusenu Note: There is nothing wrong with adding 60 tor relays, especially with proper MyFamily configuration as you did. -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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alternating consensus weight
by Toralf Förster 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

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Tor exit nodes attacking SSH?
by Steven Chamberlain 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

Hi, I often run my SSH sessions via Tor using tsocks. But today I see: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY! Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)! It is also possible that a host key has just been changed. The fingerprint for the RSA key sent by the remote host is e7:0e:73:a5:88:23:67:9c:01:87:3c:61:96:f6:e8:0a. Further investigation shows that this happens for any destination IP address, even where there's no SSH service running: $ tsocks ssh -vC root(a)8.8.8.8 OpenSSH_6.7p1 Debian-5+deb8u3, OpenSSL 1.0.1t 3 May 2016 debug1: Reading configuration data /home/steven/.ssh/config debug1: Reading configuration data /etc/ssh/ssh_config debug1: /etc/ssh/ssh_config line 19: Applying options for * debug1: Connecting to 8.8.8.8 [8.8.8.8] port 22. debug1: Connection established. debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_rsa type 1 debug1: key_load_public: No such file or directory debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_rsa-cert type -1 debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_dsa type 2 debug1: key_load_public: No such file or directory debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_dsa-cert type -1 debug1: key_load_public: No such file or directory debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_ecdsa type -1 debug1: key_load_public: No such file or directory debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_ecdsa-cert type -1 debug1: key_load_public: No such file or directory debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_ed25519 type -1 debug1: key_load_public: No such file or directory debug1: identity file /home/steven/.ssh/id_ed25519-cert type -1 debug1: Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0 debug1: Local version string SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.7p1 Debian-5+deb8u3 debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version dropbear_2015.67 debug1: no match: dropbear_2015.67 debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received debug1: kex: server->client aes128-ctr hmac-sha2-256 zlib(a)openssh.com debug1: kex: client->server aes128-ctr hmac-sha2-256 zlib(a)openssh.com debug1: sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT debug1: expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY debug1: Server host key: RSA e7:0e:73:a5:88:23:67:9c:01:87:3c:61:96:f6:e8:0a The authenticity of host '8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8)' can't be established. RSA key fingerprint is e7:0e:73:a5:88:23:67:9c:01:87:3c:61:96:f6:e8:0a. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? : I could be wrong, but I think this "dropbear" service is most likely something malicious, running on one or more Tor exit nodes, attempting to collect passwords of people logging in this way. If a user ignored the error (or trusts the fingerprint without verifying), their password, and further activity on the shell could all be captured by the attacker. Since Tor makes my client connections anonymous, and the dropbear is seen even for hosts that don't provide an SSH service, makes me think this attack is indiscriminate, not targetted only at me or my servers. The first time you connect to some machine, be careful to verify the fingerprint through independent means. Pay attention to notices like this of changed key fingerprints. And if you haven't already, disable PasswordAuthentication to something that cannot be intercepted (like authorization of private RSA/ECDSA keys). Regards, -- Steven Chamberlain steven(a)pyro.eu.org

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obfs4proxy for FreeBSD and OpenBSD
by George 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

We just did a blog post on obfs4proxy for FreeBSD and OpenBSD on the TDP blog: https://torbsd.github.io/blog.html#welcome-obfs4 Feedback welcome, offline or via GitHub. In the near future, we'll submit to the respective ports systems. g -- 5F77 765E 40D6 5340 A0F5 3401 4997 FF11 A86F 44E2

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Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Your TOR relay
by Dennis Emory Hannon 08 Aug '17

08 Aug '17

No attitude or hurt feelings. What's different from my servers compared to others? Probably nothing at all..this is just a hobby of mine. One would think if I wanted to collect information I would just run an exit node myself since I have the resources. For those that want an alternative no logging DNS: 172.98.193.42 162.248.241.94 For those that don't, No worries at all, we'll be here if you change your mind. :D Cheers! -Dennis https://www.linkedin.com/in/dennis-hannon-52236019/ +1 (585) 735-5996

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Tor 0.3.0.10 not listed as a recommended version
by Ralph Seichter 08 Aug '17

08 Aug '17

Hello, after updating to Tor 0.3.0.10, I see the following warning on my nodes: This version of Tor (0.3.0.10) is newer than any recommended version in its series, according to the directory authorities. Could one of the devs please update the relevant data? Thanks. -Ralph

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ORSN DNS servers vs OpenNic
by Chuck McAndrew 08 Aug '17

08 Aug '17

What are the best DNS servers to use for Privacy? I have been using OpenNic Project servers which don't do logging, but recently found out about the Open Root Server Network (ORSN) and have been considering using them as well. Does anyone have any thoughts, positive or negative, about either of these? Are there better public DNS servers to use? Thanks Chuck -- *The Right-To-Know Law provides that most e-mail communications, to or from Lebanon Public Libraries employees regarding the business of the library, are government records available to the public upon request. Therefore, this e-mail communication may be subject to public disclosure. *

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Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Your TOR relay
by Dennis Emory Hannon 08 Aug '17

08 Aug '17

Tom, That's a completely false statement. Some folks would rather choose an alternate root caching server as opposed to their ISP's DNS. In fact, no logging and anonymity is the sole intention of the servers mentioned. You're crying wolf here. If you don't want to use it, don't. Simple as that. I'm a software engineer for a financial intuition here. I have nothing to gain. It actually COSTS me money to run. -Dennis

2 1

Go home GeoIP, you're drunk.
by Ralph Seichter 07 Aug '17

07 Aug '17

I moved a Tor relay to new hardware, keeping the keys. Both old and new server are located in Germany and provided by the same hosting company. After the latest Atlas update, I was surprised to see that the IPv4 address is listed as belonging to an AS in Ukraine. A little more digging returned Guangzhou, China, as the supposed location based on the server's IPv6 address. Is there anything I can/should do about this (I doubt it)? Will this affect my Tor node consensus weight? As it is not an exit node, I am hoping it won't matter much. -Ralph

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