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4810 discussions

Re: Tor relays source IPs spoofed to mass-scan port 22?
by mpalmer＠hezmatt.org 07 Nov '24

07 Nov '24

On Thu, Nov 07, 2024 at 07:53:04AM +0000, George Hartley wrote: > > but the packets are injected into the Internet from another location entirely. > > On that note, most data-centers nowadays have routers do SRC IP checks, and do not allow the traffic through if it doesn't match that interfaces assigned address.. it would probably more useful to somehow find the company which allows this traffic, and make them update their routers. The words "somehow" and "make" are doing an awful lot of work there. > Also, even if you spoof the IP, shouldn't the MAC address still be the one of the server from which the packets originated (unless it's spoofed too)? MAC addresses are link-local addresses, and as such are never seen outside of the broadcast domain (ie the local LAN) they're used on. - Matt

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Tor relays source IPs spoofed to mass-scan port 22?
by Pierre Bourdon 06 Nov '24

06 Nov '24

Hi relay ops, A few hours ago I received a forwarded abuse report from Hetzner for one of my machines running a Tor relay (not exit). Some random ISP was claiming I was sending SSH connections to them, and at first I couldn't find any corroborating evidence in my own network logs and I was ready to dismiss it. But then I noticed that there is in fact something weird: all 4 of my machines running Tor relays are seeing *return* TCP traffic (RSTs or SYN-ACKs) from port 22 from various machines all over the world, at a very low rate. Kind of like someone spoofing source IPs to send SYNs everywhere. I can't figure out at all whether that's actually what's happening and what the intent would be though. Some tcpdumps showing random RSTs coming back to my machines running relays (with no traffic being initiated by said machines beforehand): 04:19:14.705034 IP 198.30.233.69.22 > 172.105.199.155.39998: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 171173954, win 0, length 0 04:20:15.135733 IP 124.198.33.196.22 > 172.105.199.155.23506: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 1985822135, win 0, length 0 04:21:30.222739 IP 223.29.149.158.22 > 172.105.199.155.27507: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 3614869158, win 0, length 0 04:14:25.286063 IP 45.187.212.68.22 > 195.201.9.37.59639: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 41396686, win 0, length 0 04:14:25.291455 IP 107.152.7.33.22 > 195.201.9.37.39793: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 1391844539, win 0, length 0 04:14:25.322255 IP 107.91.78.158.22 > 195.201.9.37.48900: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 1434896088, win 65535, length 0 04:12:39.470366 IP 121.150.242.252.22 > 77.109.152.87.57627: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 2452733863, win 0, length 0 04:13:05.549920 IP 46.188.201.102.22 > 77.109.152.87.9999: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 3253922544, win 0, length 0 04:14:33.027326 IP 1.1.195.62.22 > 77.109.152.87.52448: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 351972505, win 0, length 0 By any chance, any other relay ops seeing the same thing, or am I just going crazy? (it does kind of sound insane...) Any speculation as to the reason for this? Best, -- Pierre Bourdon <delroth(a)gmail.com> Software Engineer @ Zürich, Switzerland https://delroth.net/

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Inquiry about a possible DDoS case
by Jose A 06 Nov '24

06 Nov '24

Hello everyone. I have received a communication from my ISP regarding the IP where I have a Middle Relay and a Bridge, informing me that this IP is being used for a DDoS attack. I have checked the servers and everything is correct; there are no strange processes running. I have run various tools and everything seems to be in order. Therefore, has anyone encountered a similar case? Or even better, could someone be using Tor to carry out DDoS attacks? I am a bit puzzled by this situation. Thanks for your time King regards JAC -- Sent with https://mailfence.com Secure and private email

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Re: Tor relays source IPs spoofed to mass-scan port 22?
by Carlo P. 06 Nov '24

06 Nov '24

Meanwhile 3* OVH abuse report (twice the same, once for 2nd IP), Virtarix, ServaRICA - all from the same watchdogcyberdefence folks. I have replied to all above ISPs, no suspensions so far. Just received a suspension note without ANY explanation from AvenaCloud - opened a support ticket with them... On November 5, 2024 at 5:51 PM, mick <mbm(a)rlogin.net> wrote: On Tue, 5 Nov 2024 10:32:40 +0200 "Dimitris T. via tor-relays" allegedly wrote: > another abuse report from hetzner (by the same watchdogcyberdefence) > a few hours ago. no reply from hetzner yet to previous ticket. > > this time, alleged attacked /20 subnet from watchdogcyberdefence was > firewalled since 30/10/2024, just to confirm new false abuse > reports..., and they confirmed (=their report, shows traffic from our > ip on 3/11/2024).... And I have received a new "abuse" report from Hetzner raised by the same bozos at watchdogcyberdefence, but this time purportedly aimed at FTP port 21. I've told Hetzner they are welcome to monitor traffic coming out of my node to reassure themselves that this is nonsense. Mick --------------------------------------------------------------------- Mick Morgan gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B 72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312 blog: baldric.net --------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave(a)lists.torproject.org -- Sent with https://mailfence.com Secure and private email

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Fwd: [Abuse #KMLTFQPGVQ] Abusive use of your service vps-3e661acc.vps.ovh.net
by Keifer Bly 05 Nov '24

05 Nov '24

Just got this note, I run a middle relay on ovh. Why would this suddenly happen? Thanks. Relay is usdeserveprivacy --Keifer ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: <ticket+KMLTFQPGVQ.ca83(a)abuse.ovh.net> Date: Sat, Nov 2, 2024, 9:07 PM Subject: [Abuse #KMLTFQPGVQ] Abusive use of your service vps-3e661acc.vps.ovh.net To: <keifer.bly(a)gmail.com> Hello, An abusive behaviour (Intrusion) originating from your VPS vps-3e661acc[.]vps[.]ovh[.]net has been reported to or noticed by our Abuse Team. Technical details showing the aforementioned problem follow : -- start of the technical details -- <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"></head> <body><pre> Greetings Fellow Sys Ad/s I hope this message finds you well. I'm reaching out to you today regarding a matter of potential concern involving one or more IP addresses associated with your system Our network security logs have recently detected unusual activity originating from these IP addresses. While we understand that such incidents can sometimes occur innocently, it's crucial to investigate and address them promptly to ensure the security of all networks involved To assist you in understanding the situation, we have provided the relevant log data below, with timestamps adjusted to our GMT &#43;8 timezone: DateTime Action AttackClass SourceIP Srcport Protocol DestinationIP DestPort 0 01-Nov-2024 05:07:55 DENIED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 44959 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]97 22 1 01-Nov-2024 05:24:37 DENIED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 58734 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]98 22 2 01-Nov-2024 08:48:23 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 8551 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 3 01-Nov-2024 08:53:27 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 2419 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]169 22 4 01-Nov-2024 08:58:05 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 5917 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 5 01-Nov-2024 08:59:24 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 56858 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 6 01-Nov-2024 09:04:23 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 32161 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]169 22 7 01-Nov-2024 09:17:30 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 33472 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 8 01-Nov-2024 09:18:02 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 11282 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 9 01-Nov-2024 09:19:00 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 3727 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 10 01-Nov-2024 09:20:31 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 4388 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]169 22 11 01-Nov-2024 09:25:57 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 6898 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]165 22 12 01-Nov-2024 09:32:06 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 18202 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 13 01-Nov-2024 09:39:40 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 51142 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 14 01-Nov-2024 09:45:32 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 46914 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 15 01-Nov-2024 10:40:48 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 60991 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 16 01-Nov-2024 10:42:58 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 42833 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 17 01-Nov-2024 10:47:13 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 38382 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 18 01-Nov-2024 10:47:23 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 30596 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 19 01-Nov-2024 10:47:46 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 56767 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 20 01-Nov-2024 10:52:10 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 8983 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 21 01-Nov-2024 10:55:04 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 55684 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 22 01-Nov-2024 10:57:43 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 37003 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 23 01-Nov-2024 10:58:43 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 10524 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 24 01-Nov-2024 11:01:06 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 6384 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 25 01-Nov-2024 11:03:46 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 6779 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 26 01-Nov-2024 11:06:05 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 23062 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 27 01-Nov-2024 11:58:01 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 33174 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 28 01-Nov-2024 11:58:05 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 29422 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 29 01-Nov-2024 11:58:26 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 53504 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 30 01-Nov-2024 12:00:03 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 5898 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 31 01-Nov-2024 12:00:20 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 38324 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 32 01-Nov-2024 12:00:30 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 6362 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 33 01-Nov-2024 12:03:11 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 38581 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 34 01-Nov-2024 12:05:37 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 43932 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 35 01-Nov-2024 12:07:27 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 5141 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 36 01-Nov-2024 12:08:42 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 56161 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 37 01-Nov-2024 12:12:26 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 6269 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 38 01-Nov-2024 12:14:33 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 164 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 39 01-Nov-2024 12:15:48 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 25787 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 40 01-Nov-2024 12:16:39 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 9188 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 41 01-Nov-2024 12:16:58 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 32317 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 42 01-Nov-2024 12:22:28 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 21955 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 43 01-Nov-2024 12:29:50 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 33563 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 44 01-Nov-2024 12:32:18 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 48519 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 45 01-Nov-2024 12:33:24 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 42914 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 46 01-Nov-2024 12:34:07 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 11296 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 47 01-Nov-2024 12:36:43 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 6522 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 48 01-Nov-2024 12:37:55 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 57962 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 49 01-Nov-2024 12:37:56 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 53189 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 50 01-Nov-2024 12:39:29 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 7411 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 51 01-Nov-2024 12:41:51 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 27413 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 52 01-Nov-2024 12:44:00 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 355 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]181 22 53 01-Nov-2024 12:50:35 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 28953 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 54 01-Nov-2024 12:50:53 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 46927 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 55 01-Nov-2024 12:52:00 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 45122 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 56 01-Nov-2024 12:55:04 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 4184 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]181 22 57 01-Nov-2024 12:55:15 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 33245 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]185 22 58 01-Nov-2024 12:57:38 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 50897 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 59 01-Nov-2024 12:58:58 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 35903 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 60 01-Nov-2024 12:59:35 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 16158 TCP 192[.]168[.]200[.]216 22 61 01-Nov-2024 13:01:40 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 18404 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]181 22 62 01-Nov-2024 13:04:12 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 32885 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]181 22 63 01-Nov-2024 13:05:50 BLOCKED 51[.]68[.]197[.]220 6316 TCP 202[.]91[.]161[.]132 22 We believe that by working together to resolve this matter swiftly, we can help safeguard the integrity of our networks and prevent any further issues. If you require any additional information or support from our end to facilitate your investigation, please don't hesitate to reach out. Your prompt attention to this matter would be greatly appreciated. We value your expertise and cooperation in resolving this situation effectively. Thank you for your time and consideration. For any corrections/updates, kindly email email-removed@provider [.]com</pre></body></html> -- end of the technical details -- Your should investigate and fix this problem, as it constitutes a violation to our terms of service. Please answer to this e-mail indicating which measures you've taken to stop the abusive behaviour. Cordially, The OVHcloud Trust & Safety team.

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Raspberry Pi 4
by Keifer Bly 05 Nov '24

05 Nov '24

Hi, So I am wondering, is a Raspberry Pi 4 a recommended device to run a tor relay on? In terms of traffic load, etc? Thanks. --Keifer

6 7

Please check if your relay has fallen out of the consensus
by Roger Dingledine 02 Nov '24

02 Nov '24

Hi folks! We're hunting down a mystery where two of our big university relays are having troubles reaching the Tor directory authorities: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/issues/86 Can you check to see if your relay is in a similar situation? In particular, the situation to look for is "Tor process is still running fine from your perspective, but, relay-search (https://atlas.torproject.org/) says you are no longer running." If your relay is in this situation, the next step is to check your Tor logs, try to rule out other issues like firewall rules on your side, and then (if you're able) to start exploring traceroutes to the directory authority IP addresses vs other addresses. If you need more direct help, we can help you debug or answer other questions on #tor-relays on IRC. Thanks, --Roger

5 7

"When you pay peanuts, you get monkeys"
by mick 01 Nov '24

01 Nov '24

Hi there. I found the title of the above blog post highly ironic. I run a Tor relay (middle and guard node). You appear to be sending automated "abuse" reports to other ISPS as a result of what is obviously (well obvious to anyone who studies the network traffic properly) spoofed source address connections to SSH port 22 on random servers around the net. These "abuse" reports cause the ISP hosting the /real/ address of the spoofed server to do one of two things. Either they just pass the report on to the server admin for investigation, or they simply shut down the srevr in question and lock the account of the operator. In either case the perfectly innocent Tor server admin is highly inconvenienced and the bad actor(s) doing the spoofing scans get the Tor relay addresses blacklisted. This is detrimental to the health of the Tor network. Please look carefully at your automated abuse reporting system and add some intelligence to it - preferably by getting a properly skilled network administrator to look at the traffic /before/ firing off a spurious report. (Oh and BTW, SSH scanning at scale is so much part of the background noise on the 'net that I am astounded that you should pay much attention to it at all. I don't.) Best Mick --------------------------------------------------------------------- Mick Morgan gpg fingerprint: FC23 3338 F664 5E66 876B 72C0 0A1F E60B 5BAD D312 blog: baldric.net ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: [tor-relays] Tor relays source IPs spoofed to mass-scan port 22?
by Carlo P. 31 Oct '24

31 Oct '24

Just received today two abuse tickets... On October 31, 2024 at 9:29 AM, Pierre Bourdon <delroth(a)gmail.com> wrote: On Tue, Oct 29, 2024, 03:33 Pierre Bourdon <delroth(a)gmail.com> wrote: By any chance, any other relay ops seeing the same thing, or am I just going crazy? (it does kind of sound insane...) Any speculation as to the reason for this? My own write-up and explanation (and speculation) is available at https://delroth.net/posts/spoofed-mass-scan-abuse/ as a reference. I've had a few people email me saying they had the same scare moment after getting an abuse report and they ended up finding my article, so I'd like to think it's already helped a bit! I also received an email today from Hetzner's legal team saying that they have read my article (props on them, I didn't send it to them myself!). They are monitoring the situation on their side and emphasized that they do not usually take action on this kind of reports they have recently been forwarding to Tor relay operators. So at least for others hosting relays at Hetzner I don't think it's worth worrying too much. For other hosting providers, your mileage may vary. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays -- Sent with https://mailfence.com Secure and private email

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[tor-project] Reminder: mailman 3 upgrade imminent (TPA-RFC-71)
by Antoine Beaupré 29 Oct '24

29 Oct '24

Hi, As mentioned in early October, we're in the process of upgrading our main mail server, which includes upgrading to the shiny new Mailman 3 platform. We have, right now, a prototype mailman 3 server available at: https://lists-01.torproject.org/ It's hidden behind the usual "trivial" authentication (ask us on IRC if you don't remember what it is), but should otherwise work normally. I'm going to start by migrating the TPA mailing list and we'll be testing this for a couple of days, but, next week, I'll start migrating the other mailing lists (including this one!). If people want to jump in front of that train early and be part of the beta testers, then by all means I'm happy to have your mailing list be part of the early adopters. Be warned that Mailman 3 is a significant upgrade from Mailman 2. There are some great things (like unified authentication), and some less great things (like a more complex design and "shinier" web interface that might not be everyone's taste). As a reminder, we're doing this upgrade a little rushed because the main mail server is now unsupported for security upgrades. See the details of the proposal here: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/wikis/policy/tpa-rfc-71-emerge… ... with the milestone tracking actual work issues in: https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/tpa/-/milestones/16 (Sorry for cross-posting this, but this seems like it warrants wider distribution. As a rule of thumb, I selected mailing lists with public archives that had posts in October 2024, removing duplicates like anti-censorship-team and -alerts. I also suspect many of those mailing lists will refuse my message because I'm not subscribed, but I will have tried. :)) Phew! a. -- Antoine Beaupré torproject.org system administration _______________________________________________ tor-project mailing list tor-project(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-project

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