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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-reports] Help desk report for November 2014
by David Fifield 06 Dec '14

06 Dec '14

On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 09:41:58AM -0600, Colin C. wrote: > Hi everyone, > > Here is the help desk chart for November 2014: > > | ar | en | es | fa | fr | zh | Total | (Rejected) > ----------+------+------+------+------+------+------+-------+----------- > boklm | | | | | 7 | | 7 | > harmony | | 113 | | 38 | | | 151 | 33 > jason | | 271 | | | | 76 | 347 | 38 > lunar | | 36 | | | 28 | | 64 | 22 > mttp | | 140 | | | | | 140 | 1 > noel | | 2 | 56 | | | | 58 | > phoul | | 185 | | | | | 185 | 39 > sherief | 6 | 277 | | | | | 283 | 45 > vmon | | | | 2 | | | 2 | > ----------+------+------+------+------+------+------+-------+----------- > Total | 6 | 1024 | 56 | 40 | 35 | 76 | 1237 | 182 > (Open) | 1 | 40 | 1 | 14 | 4 | 4 | 64 | > > That's almost 41 tickets resolved each day on average. > > See also the attached charts for the amount of incoming tickets each > day and for the past twelve months. > > Top answer templates used by the support team for this month: > > usage | article > -------+----------------------------------------------------------------- > 67 | Get your own bridges. > 36 | Get TB's Tor Log. > 33 | Exclude Tor Browser from an Antivirus/Firewall/AntiMalware > 30 | Tor Browser doesn't work (Windows) > 13 | Redirect to Guardian Project's support > 11 | How to get bridges and use Tor in mainland China > 11 | Please try meek > 10 | [debug] Tor Browser 4.0 is crashing on Windows > 9 | Can't connect to my favorite onion site! > 8 | Unsupported language > 7 | Redirect to Tails support > 7 | Suggest the tor-talk mailing list > 6 | Tor-related error window from browser. > 5 | How to use bridges > 5 | Set Country > 4 | TBB no Flash/Java other plugins (Replied to from https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-reports/2014-December/000711.html.) Colin, is it possible to see what's in the answer templates? At the 2014 dev meeting, a note in the support session (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2014SummerDevMee…) said "Lunar wants to take the RT articles out of the RT DB, put them on a public web page, allow others to review them." Does anything like that exist? David Fifield

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Summary of meek's costs, November 2014
by David Fifield 05 Dec '14

05 Dec '14

Here's the summary of meek's CDN fees for November 2014. Earlier reports: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-August/007429.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007576.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007716.html If you're just tuning in, meek is a pluggable transport introduced a few months ago. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek. App Engine + Amazon + Azure = total by month February 2014 $0.09 + -- + -- = $0.09 March 2014 $0.00 + -- + -- = $0.00 April 2014 $0.73 + -- + -- = $0.73 May 2014 $0.69 + -- + -- = $0.69 June 2014 $0.65 + -- + -- = $0.65 July 2014 $0.56 + $0.00 + -- = $0.56 August 2014 $1.56 + $3.10 + -- = $4.66 September 2014 $4.02 + $4.59 + $0.00 = $8.61 October 2014 $40.85 + $130.29 + $0.00 = $171.14 November 2014 $224.65 + $362.60 + $0.00 = $587.25 -- total by CDN $273.80 + $500.58 + $0.00 = $774.38 grand total Average usage (by count of simultaneous users) was about 3.04× greater in November than in the October (750 users per day versus 247). See the attached userstats-bridge-transport-meek-2014-09-01-2014-11-30.png. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-transport.html?graph=userst… The number of users was 3.04× according to Tor Metrics, but the cost for meek-google was 5.50× and meek-amazon was 2.78×. A possible explanation is that in addition to gaining more users, each user is also using more bandwidth. App Engine bandwidth was up 4.76× compared to last month and Amazon bandwidth was up only 2.65×. == App Engine a.k.a. meek-google == Google is migrating App Engine accounts to their new "Cloud Platform." Because I had to create a new Cloud Platform account, I got a free trial credit of $300. For technical reasons (relating to the Cloud Platform migration) I couldn't apply the credit until November 11. Up to then, we had been charged $75.70 for the month. The remaining $148.95 was paid by the credit. After this one, I have another $500 credit, which should get us into the new year. Here is how the costs broke down: 1375 GB $165.10 1191 instance hours $59.55 The attached meek-google-costs-2014-12-01.png shows the breakdown of costs between bandwidth and instance hours for the last few months. The attached meek-google-2014-12-01.png shows B/s for the month. There's a nice visible daily and weekly cycle. == Amazon a.k.a. meek-amazon == The Amazon bill breaks down in a complicated way by region. Asia Pacific (Singapore) 76M requests $91.43 500 GB $75.34 Asia Pacific (Sydney) 245K requests $0.01 1 GB $0.25 Asia Pacific (Tokyo) 27M requests $33.05 160 GB $26.23 EU (Ireland) 50M requests $58.34 490 GB $51.78 South America (Sao Paulo) 450K requests $0.00 3 GB $0.06 US East (Northern Virginia) 13M requests $13.12 115 GB $12.99 -- total 167M requests $195.95 1269 GB $166.65 == Azure a.k.a. meek-azure == Azure is still on a free grant for a year. Unfortunately I don't see a way to find out what it would be costing or even get a report of monthly bandwidth usage. The attached meek-azure-2014-12-01.png shows GB/hour for the last seven days of the month. David Fifield

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Pluggable transports meeting tomorrow (16:00UTC Wednesday 3rd of December 2014)
by Yawning Angel 03 Dec '14

03 Dec '14

Hello! just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC. Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network. Thanks for your attention! -- Yawning Angel

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Re: [tor-dev] Feedback on obfuscating hidden-service statistics
by George Kadianakis 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

"A. Johnson" <aaron.m.johnson(a)nrl.navy.mil> writes: > Hello all, > > <snip> > >> We put in some simple obfuscations in order to not reveal too >> sensitive data: we multiplied actual values with a random number in >> [0.9, 1.1] before including those obfuscated values in extra-info >> descriptors. Maybe there's something smarter we could do? Or is this >> okay? > > I actually think that additive rather than multiplicative noise > (i.e. randomness) makes sense here. Let’s suppose that you would like > to obscure any individual connection that contains C cells or fewer > (obscuring extremely and unusually large connections seems hopeless > but unnecessary). That is, you don’t want the (distribution of) the RP > cellcount from any relay to change by much whether or not C cells are > removed The standard differential privacy approach would be to *add* > noise from the Laplace distribution Lab(\epsilon/C), where \epsilon > controls how much the statistics *distribution* can multiplicatively > differ. I’m not saying that we need to add noise exactly from that > distribution (maybe we weaken the guarantee slightly to get better > accuracy), but the same idea applies. This would apply the same to > both large and small relays. You *want* to learn roughly how much RP > traffic each relay has - you just want to obscure the exact number > within some tolerance. > Hello Aaron, I posted an initial draft of the proposal here: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007863.html Any feedback would be awesome. Specifically, I would be interested in undertanding the concept of additive noise a bit better. As you can see the proposal draft is still using multiplicative noise, and if you think that additive is better we should change it. Unfortunately, I couldn't find any good resources on the Internet explaining the difference between additive and multiplicative noise. Could you expand a bit on what you said above? Or link to a paper that explains more? Or link to some other system that is doing additive noise (or even better its implementation)? Thanks!

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Is PublishServerDescriptor needed to collect metrics?
by David Fifield 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

If a bridge has PublishServerDescriptor 0 does that prevent it from counting in metrics? If so, what's the right setting to enable metrics (0|1|v3|bridge,...)? Is there a way to send metrics data without also ending up in BridgeDB? David Fifield

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New documentation for Tor Metrics website
by Karsten Loesing 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

Dear list, writing documentation is hard work. I'm sure you already knew that, but let me re-assure you that I now believe it, too. At least until I forget it again and carelessly start documenting something else that looks tiny and friendly and trivial to document. Anyway, I spent the last day (felt like half a week) on rewriting the relevant text for the Tor Metrics website, and I wrote a short glossary of terms I didn't want to explain over and over. Would people on this list mind reviewing my text and suggesting improvements? For reference, the old text and real graphs, tables, etc. are still available here: https://metrics.torproject.org/ The new text with sample graphs and the glossary are here, conveniently packaged into a single HTML page: https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/metrics.html I'd be happy for any suggestions here or off-list, either as comments, patches, or edited HTML files. Whatever works best for you works for me. I'll update the .html file whenever I include suggestions. I hope to put the new text on the real Tor Metrics next week. Thanks in advance, much appreciated! In fact, I'm pretty sure that all future visitors of Tor Metrics will appreciate your efforts. All the best, Karsten

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Re: [tor-dev] tor-dev Digest, Vol 47, Issue 3
by teor 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

Hi Tom, Can you please describe the bug? Is it in the Tor Trac with a bug number? In general, if you start in the tor directory of a source distribution: (I'll use gitweb links, but you can use git and clone a local copy) tor/src/or https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or Contains the tor onion routing-specific source code Your bug is likely to be here tor/src/common https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/common Contains the common facilities used by the tor/src/or code Your bug is also likely to be here tor/src/ext tor/src/trunnel tor/src/win32 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src Contain external libraries and platform-specific source Your bug is probably not here, or in any of the other directories teor pgp 0xABFED1AC hkp://pgp.mit.edu/ https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 http://0bin.net/paste/Mu92kPyphK0bqmbA#Zvt3gzMrSCAwDN6GKsUk7Q8G-eG+Y+BLpe7w… > Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 07:05:45 +0530 > From: Tom Mody <bug29195(a)gmail.com> > Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Help regarding Development > > hi list , > I am having troubles on bug solving , im new to it and i want to know where > to search in code for a particular bug ,, > please help ?? > >> On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 10:22 PM, rl1987 <rl1987(a)sdf.lonestar.org> wrote: >> >> 1. Read doc/HACKING. >> 2. Browse "Easy tickets" page [1] and see if you can solve any of them. >> >> [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status= >> accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status= >> new&status=reopened&order=priority&keywords=~easy&col= >> id&col=summary&col=component&col=status&col=type&col= >> priority&col=milestone&report=30 >> >> 2014-11-14 03:53, Tom Mody ra??: >> >>> I would like to contribute to Tor ,, >>> >>> I'm not getting where to start .... >>> >>> Please , Can anyone help me how to start ??

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Help regarding Development
by Tom Mody 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

I would like to contribute to Tor ,, I'm not getting where to start .... Please , Can anyone help me how to start ??

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[PATCH] Tor Weather: Switched preferences and unsubscribes URLs.
by Ondrej Novy 01 Dec '14

01 Dec '14

--- weather/weatherapp/emails.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/weather/weatherapp/emails.py b/weather/weatherapp/emails.py index 2b5a0f5..cc298c9 100644 --- a/weather/weatherapp/emails.py +++ b/weather/weatherapp/emails.py @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ def _add_generic_footer(msg, unsubs_auth, pref_auth): unsubURL = url_helper.get_unsubscribe_url(unsubs_auth) prefURL = url_helper.get_preferences_url(pref_auth) - footer = _GENERIC_FOOTER % (unsubURL, prefURL) + footer = _GENERIC_FOOTER % (prefURL, unsubURL) return msg + footer -- 1.9.3 (Apple Git-50)

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Specification for 'How to Safely Sign a statement with a .onion key'
by Tom Ritter 01 Dec '14

01 Dec '14

Attached is a document written in the specification format for one aspect of CA-signed .onion addresses - specifically a "What is a safe way to sign (or not sign) a statement using the .onion key" It presents a couple options - I'd love to get feedback from folks on which they prefer. I recognize that no consensus or decision has been reached on whether to encourage or guide CAs on issuing .onions. (Although I'm in favor[0].) Although this is obviously written skewed towards CAs, it addresses a generic problem, and could be rewritten in that form. Excerpting from the Introduction/Motivation: Several organizations, such as Facebook, (collectively, 'applicants') have expressed a desire for an end-entity SSL certificate valid for their .onion Hidden Service address signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) present in browser trust stores. The existing Facebook .onion URL was issued by Digicert under a loophole in certificate issuance requirements. The Basic Requirements [0] is a document created by the Certificate Authority/Browser Forum that governs acceptable certificate issuing policies. Adherence to its policies is required for inclusion in many browsers' trust stores. .onion counts as an 'internal hostname' as it is not a recognized TLD by IANA. November 1, 2015 sets the deadline for when all internal server certificates must be revoked and no new certificates may be issued. Resolving the requirements and preferences for issuing .onion certificates before this date is extremely desirable, as it will determine if organizations such as Facebook will invest in the time and engineering effort needed to deploy Hidden Services. The full requirements for issuing .onion certificates is TBD, although recognition of .onion by IANA as a reserved domain is likely required. During discussions about the requirements for issuing for .onion one question that has arisen is what is a safe way to assert ownership of a .onion address and format an x509 certificate with a .onion Subject Alternate Name (SAN). This document is designed to address some of those questions. -tom [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007786.html

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