- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

tor-roaster.org creates incentives for *non*-proper MyFamily configurations
by nusenu 05 Mar '16

05 Mar '16

(since this is not really part of that ticket I'm moving this reply to tor-dev) Replying to [comment:21 virgil][1]: > Re: comment #15 >> 2) there are no incentives for a relay operator to set it properly > > Roster aims to fix this. http://tor-roster.org Quite the opposite I think. tor-roster creates incentives for lazy operators because it does not require a proper MyFamily configuration to aggregate relays into a group. tor-roaster's way to group relays (one mutual connection into a group of relays is enough iirc) does not match tor's definition of MyFamily. While tor-roster's way to group actual set of relays to it's operator might represent a more accurate picture of reality than systems that do require proper MyFamily configs, it misses the possibility to create incentives for proper configurations. > For what it's worth, Roster also makes MyFamily a bit less painful to > work with because the detected families are now robust to changes > in the Family graph. For details see [3] This causes the offset between tor's and tor-roster's interpretation/definition. To give you an example, roster says this relay is part of a 24 relays group [4] even though it has only a mutual MyFamily with two other relays: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E6E18151300F90C235D3809F90B31330737CE… Ideally tor-roster would make it very clear on their website that groups do not require a complete mutual MyFamily agreement between all relays in that group, or require proper MyFamily configuration to create incentives for properly configured families. [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6676 [3] ttps://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16750 [4] http://tor-roster.org/family_detail/E26AFC5F718E21AC502899B20C653AEFF688B0D2

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Next version of the algorithm
by Ola Bini 04 Mar '16

04 Mar '16

Hi, Here is the next version of the algorithm - put it in a gist to make it easier to look at: https://gist.github.com/olabini/343da01de8e01491bf5c Cheers -- Ola Bini (https://olabini.se) "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined.

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Tor in Google Summer of Code 2016
by Damian Johnson 03 Mar '16

03 Mar '16

Interested in coding on Tor and getting paid for it by Google? If you are a student, we have good news for you: we have been accepted as a mentoring organization for Google Summer of Code 2016! https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6655685232164864/ Here's the facts: GSoC gives you the opportunity to work on your own Tor-related coding project with one of the Tor developers as your mentor. Your mentor will help you when you're stuck and guide you in becoming part of the Tor community. Google pays you 5,500 USD for the three months of your project, so that you can focus on coding and don't have to worry about how to pay your bills. https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Projects Did we catch your attention? These are your next steps: Go look at the Google Summer of Code FAQ [1] to make sure you are eligible to participate. Have a look at our ideas list [2] to see if one of those projects matches your interests. If there is no project on that list that you'd want to work on, read the documentation on our website [3] and make up your own! Come to #tor-dev on OFTC [4] or let us know about your project idea here. Communication is essential to success in the summer of code, and we're unlikely to accept students we haven't heard from before reading their application. So really, speak up on this list or come to our IRC channel and talk to us! Finally, write down your project idea using our template [5] and submit your application to Google before March 25th [6]. We are looking forward to discussing your project idea with you! [1] https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/faq [2] https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Coding [3] https://www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en#UpToSpeed [4] https://www.torproject.org/about/contact.html.en#irc [5] https://www.torproject.org/about/gsoc.html.en#Template [6] https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/timeline

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Set up Tor private network
by SMTP Test 02 Mar '16

02 Mar '16

Hi all, I try to set up a Tor private network. I found two tutorials online ( http://liufengyun.chaos-lab.com/prog/2015/01/09/private-tor-network.html and https://ritter.vg/blog-run_your_own_tor_network.html) but seems that they both are outdated. Could anyone please give me a tutorial or some hints on building a private Tor network? Another question is: what is the minimum number of required directory authorities for a private Tor network? I am wondering if one directory authority is enough. Thanks

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[Vidalia Bundle] Linux support
by Yaroslav Pronin 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

Hello. Why Vidalia Bundle doesn't support Linux? A few years ago there was Vidalia for Linux (https://dist.torproject.org/vidalia/) but its development stopped abruptly. I'm maintainer Vidalia package in the AUR and concerned about the fate and future development of the GUI client. Whenever possible, I would have been able to help support the implementation of Linux in the Vidalia Bundle, or to take care of Vidalia (https://dist.torproject.org/ vidalia/) and maintain it.

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Stopping the censoring of tor users (via exit bridges / proxies / OpenVPNs)
by grarpamp 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

On 2/25/16, blacklight . <pandakaasftw(a)gmail.com> wrote: > hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought of > giving it a try. > > i was lately reading an article ( > http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-trea… > ) > and it was about tor users getting blocked from accessing alot of website. > but after giving this some thought i think i came up with a possible > solution to the problem :there is a thing called bridges, they are used to > access the tor network without your isp knowing that you use tor, but if > you can use those proxies to enter the network, it might also be possible > to exit the network with them. But then we face a second challenge, the > exit nodes have to be configured in such a way that it will relay traffic > to such a bridge, so the exit node owners also need to know the ip of the > bridge. While this doesn't seem difficult to do, it can become difficult. > You see if the bridges are published on a public list(like normal bridges > are) then the blocking sites in question will be able to block those > address too. While this also posses a problem, a possible solution could be > found in something called flashproxies, flashproxies are bridges with a > really short life span, they are created and destroyed fairly swiftly, when > this is done in a rapid pace, they become really hard to block because the > ip changes all the time. So if the exit nodes can be configured to make use > of such flash proxies, then the problem could be solved. I Must admit that > not an expert on this or anything, and it needs alot of more thought, but > it could work. so i was wondering if there are any experts who could help > me with thinking out this subject and maybe confirm if this idea could > work. Skipping that whoever wants to enumerate, test, block, and share lists of the IP of your final hop will find a way to do so... "flashproxies" - are essentially illegal to use as the operator got stupid, and didn't gave permission. - are unstable as were never intentionally provisioned, and the operators get smart when abuse reports and shut them off. - proxy lists are going to be a pain for you to scrape and maintain Options - run your own volunteer network of last hop "proxies" / bridges - buy them from AWS or wherever "meek" style - partner with or plug into already existing networks of those - get tor relays or bridges to do this I previously wrote in archives that exit relays could bind OpenVPN to extra IP's they configure on their exit relay boxes. Tor daemon has nothing to do with those IP so they never appear in tor's easily blacklistable consensus. Users then OpenVPN over tor to those via use of the relay fingerprint to reach vpn terminator IP over relay localhost to save bandwidth, and on out to clearnet. You can OpenVPN to some list of onions if you don't feel like listing the relay fingerprints / extra input IP's on wikis. But it's not going to stop dedicated blacklisters, and onion doubles bandwidth use. However it could also be used by non-exits that for whatever reason didn't want to be a tor-exit but did want to offer exit via some remote third party vpn service. And strictly social sharing on forums etc could happen for distribution. There are already some exits that for various reasons, intentional or other, do not exit from their OR IP. That is a feature that some tor users do now find and use. And relays don't offer OpenVPN yet which would also give users more than just IPv4-TCP exit scheme. Though it is integrated somewhat, I2P has this manual sort of exit offering model with false.i2p and a few other nodes. [Doesn't seem to require daemon dev work, updated subject, continuing thread reply to relays and talk.]

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Leif's important piece on update golden keys
by Nathan Freitas 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

The issues in this timely story came up a number of times today at Tor Dev as a threat model we must take more seriously. Fortunately, thanks to Tor Browser, Lunar, Holger, Hans, Fdroid and others, we are making real progress. http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/02/most-software-already-has-a-golden-…

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Is tor-wiki-changes ML dead?
by nusenu 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

Hi, tor-wiki-changes doesn't seem to send out any emails? https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-wiki-changes https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18262

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Relay Database: Existing Schemas?
by nusenu 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi, I'm planing to store relay data in a database for analysis. I assume others have done so as well, so before going ahead and designing a db schema I'd like to make sure I didn't miss pre-existing db schemas one could build on. Data to be stored: - - (most) descriptor fields - - everything that onionoo provides in a details record (geoip, asn, rdns, tordnsel, cw, ...) - - historic records I didn't find something matching so far, so I'll go ahead, but if you know of other existing relay db schemas I'd like to hear about it. thanks, nusenu "GSoC2013: Searchable Tor descriptor archive" (Kostas Jakeliunas) https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/project/details/google/gsoc2013/wfn/ 5866452879933440 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-May/004923.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005357.htm l https://github.com/wfn/torsearch (btw, someone knows the license of this?) > This is true: the summary/details documents (just like in Onionoo > proper) deal with the *last* known info about relays. ernie https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-db.git/plain/doc/manual.pdf (didn't find db/tordir.sql mentioned in the pdf) "Instructions for setting up relay descriptor database" https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2010-March/001783.html "Set up descriptor database for other researchers" https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1643 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVLrmVAAoJEFv7XvVCELh0+ycP/0VkRWMGAhx7YwWhixtOPB0q ouitosse3SdLCMd1W7cps7nnQhcGv8E1xeUPYeizNQ+RIK9ldvnwgxhVt9ETOI3e oL6bcx3B/NSbTcGfZhIU6XCCX7+39CXz3/+/gXg4c1a5Cd9rYKuwTn7ZApPUNAK2 9yfckCwHaqh67ZDHB1A7nrHX1BJAjwhri5JRGomHSUXPwNZOyMzpgPkB+I92esqc Z4ajQo2D+Vyk42qF7apqp5ApVBLdt5ycUtW1j4s4KvyJH2BjeP4tCXvvYLKv9IvN TGHMJ111NQXbuk6H1OdaDmMZhhW6utPk8YAbNc7RZHqCdH7No40zFVlikLDrV2Xl uLt8FMlck7hGQv/4udA59Dw3PGHfrSiCbvJXb0S2jarnWOH2O+zSSuMs8jQM/x7k 6tIOlwtRDVGw3VuvNbb4MJnLzdHRxq3qy6ueDYuhmhHslxjD1Cbr3eE1RA7Da9aX kNDgjfXtdah52HWUZbIIxHQYzyCg5G3M5yy51GhUlA2Fe1sbPpNcEBeyEDK/jH3Y +7G+tgR+CdMvSFraCiYKHa1drVPJHeqNvZAqPNHKxpKwOwOoJEYrsW4wb/mJ7ybe o8xNYK691hcaMvHqwI47tw4hZfrI0f0+gQKKzENQQk8/8yUZ/0jgMRlW/Cz0yYIa FZEg+OJ/yEs8vKfYerIN =Rfn4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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stopping the censoring of tor users.
by blacklight . 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought of giving it a try. i was lately reading an article ( http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-trea… ) and it was about tor users getting blocked from accessing alot of website. but after giving this some thought i think i came up with a possible solution to the problem :there is a thing called bridges, they are used to access the tor network without your isp knowing that you use tor, but if you can use those proxies to enter the network, it might also be possible to exit the network with them. But then we face a second challenge, the exit nodes have to be configured in such a way that it will relay traffic to such a bridge, so the exit node owners also need to know the ip of the bridge. While this doesn't seem difficult to do, it can become difficult. You see if the bridges are published on a public list(like normal bridges are) then the blocking sites in question will be able to block those address too. While this also posses a problem, a possible solution could be found in something called flashproxies, flashproxies are bridges with a really short life span, they are created and destroyed fairly swiftly, when this is done in a rapid pace, they become really hard to block because the ip changes all the time. So if the exit nodes can be configured to make use of such flash proxies, then the problem could be solved. I Must admit that not an expert on this or anything, and it needs alot of more thought, but it could work. so i was wondering if there are any experts who could help me with thinking out this subject and maybe confirm if this idea could work. greetings, blacklight

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