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What does TorBulkExitList.py return?
by Linus Nordberg 18 Mar '16

18 Mar '16

Hi, I'm trying to figure out why a list from [TorBulkExitList.py] is so much larger than what is seen in [exit-addresses]. Point in case: Earlier today the list from TorBulkExitList.py contained 58% more addresses than exit-addresses: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- $ curl-tor -q 'https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py?ip=8.8.8.8' | egrep -v ^# | wc -l 1554 $ curl-tor -q https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses | egrep ^ExitNode | wc -l 985 --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- Counting relays with the Exit flag in a consensus of roughly the same time gives 912: --8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8--- $ curl-tor -q http://171.25.193.9:443/tor/status-vote/current/consensus | egrep '^s.*Exit' | wc -l 912 --8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8--- If I read the code [check.py][exitips.py] correctly, we include the following IP addresses in what is served from [TorBulkExitList.py]: - all routers in the current consensus - with exit addresses from TorDNSEL file(s) added - for which stem's exit_policy.is_exiting_allowed() returns true I haven't read any TorDNSEL code and don't know exactly what above mentioned TorDNSEL file(s) are but I think they include results from active testing of what address exit relays really use for exiting. [exit-addresses] seems to be from TorDNSEL too but holding more of a snapshot while the files mentioned above supposedly cover some period of time. Before I dig further, perhaps someone here already know why the numbers differ so? I wouldn't expect the churn of addresses used for exiting to be high enough to explain the difference. [TorBulkExitList.py] https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py?ip=8.8.8.8 [exit-addresses] https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses [check.go] https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git/tree/check.go [exitips.py] https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git/tree/scripts/exitips.py Thanks, Linus

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Revisiting prop224 cells
by George Kadianakis 17 Mar '16

17 Mar '16

Hello, I took a look at proposal 224 again, with the aim of revisiting the cell logic and format. Here are some matters that require discussion: 1) Should we keep backwards compability with old introduction and rendezvous points? Currently, proposal 224 actually tries to maintain backwards compatbility but at the cost of complicating the design. Specifically, to achieve backwards compatibility we need at least the following functionality: - Hidden services need to generate and publish an extra encryption key for each legacy introduction point (legacy enc-key). - Hidden services need a new cell subtype to register themselves to legacy introduction points (LEGACY_EST_INTRO). - Clients need a new cell to introduce themselves through legacy introduction points (LEGACY-INTRODUCE1) The above features are not extremely hard to implement, but because of their hacky backwards-compatible nature they do complicate the protocol and the code. Also, at some point when the network has upgraded we will have to rip this code off our codebase, otherwise it will just rot there. Also also, we will have to write non-trivial chutney tests to ensure the correctness of the backwards compatibility logic. Alternatively, we could choose to completely drop backwards compatibility with old introduction and rendezvous points. This means, that we will have to wait till a good part of the network has upgraded before we enable prop224 support for clients and services. This means that we will probably have to wait a whole release cycle (till the relay-side prop224 code becomes stable; is that 6 months?) before we can globally enable the client/HS prop224 functionality (although we can use the network ourselves for testing prop224 till then). What do you people think we should do here? Paradoxically, I'm currently thinking of _keeping_ the backwards compatibility design. Looking at the spec it seems like a medium difficulty engineering issue for us (maybe an 8% of the total prop224 task size), which sucks, but at least we don't have to worry about doing proper incremental deployment of prop224 on the network and worrying about release cycles. Also, as we move towards implementing prop224 cells, we can reevaluate our position here. I'm not confident about my position here, so feedback would be helpful. 2) I'd like to simplify the ESTABLISH_INTRO logic. Currently, ESTABLISH_INTRO seems like a needlessly _complex_ cell that is also _incomplete_. It's _complex_ because it takes 3 different forms depending on the value of its first byte. This complexity is caused partially by our backwards compability needs (see above), but also because we tried to cram the MAINT_INTRO message into this cell. It's _incomplete_ because it does not actually contain the "introduction point encryption key", so hidden services are forced to send the encryption key right after the initial ESTABLISH_INTRO cell using a second ESTABLISH_INTRO cell that is actually a MAINT_INTRO/UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD message. I have two suggestions here: * Let's include the intro point encryption key in the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, so that hidden services can establish intro with a single cell (not for performance, but for simplicity). * Let's introduce a new cell type for MAINT_INTRO instead of cramming it into ESTABLISH_INTRO. Or at least, let's make it an extension of ESTABLISH_INTRO instead of using the first byte of the cell to get the cell subtype. What do you think? Also, this brings me to the next topic which is: 3) What is UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD good for? And why do intro points need to know the intro point encryption key? UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD seems to be the only use of MAINT_INTRO currently. It seems to be able to update the encryption keys of an introduction point circuit on the fly. But why does the introduction point need to know the encryption key in the first place? That key is only used by clients and hidden services to encrypt stuff end-to-end to each other. After discussing with dgoulet, the only reason I can think of is that so that the IP is aware of the encryption key, and if an incoming client Alice does not know the correct encryption key, then the IP can send it to her using an INTRODUCE_ACK message with [00 02] (and then Alice does not need to refetch the descriptor). But why would a client know the authentication key but not the encryption key? Do they have different rotation times? Why would the encryption key rotate before the authentication key? Maybe all these things are not necessary for now and we can just ditch UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD completely, assuming that both of those keys have the same rotation lifetime? And maybe even the IP does not need to know the encryption key at all? Am I missing something? Cheers!

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Notes from network team meeting Wed 3/16/2016
by Isabela 17 Mar '16

17 Mar '16

Hello there, this is something new we are trying out. The goal is to improve communication between team members, since we are spread out through many different time zones and is hard to get everyone together at the same time for discussions and updates. == Notes from little t Tor team - Wed March 16th 13:30 UTC @ #tor-dev == Participants + updates: * nickm - trying to get 028 done, getting ready to help with 029 triage, fixing that old 027-authorities bug, and trying to make sure that all the sponsorS EOM items get done, special focus on module isolation right now * isabela - sent a few emails with exercise to start triaging for 029 / working on a proposal for our release process * dgoulet - working on prop#224 (#17238, dev branch ticket17238_029_01) / reviewed 028 tickets and cleaned up the "tor-hs" ticket queue also / plan on triaging for 029 by Friday then PlanetLibre * asn - worked mostly on prop224 - wrote a thread about design issues (https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-March/010534.html) / working on GSoC preparations and review queue is empty so can help review code if needed * special - nothing much to report, been busy with travel and auxiliary responsibilities :< * Sebastian - helped implement 'sponsor' field on Trac / has ~8hrs next week to work on something that needs help * karsten - tried to find 028 tickets that need review, found one that's actually mine and that needed work, worked on that (#18460) == Discussion topics and action items: Triage 029 - first triage exercise is to mark sponsor tickets as: * 'sponsorY-must' means "We have promised this to sponsorY." * 'sponsorY-can' means "We can bill this to sponsorY, but we haven't promised this specifically." We will be looking into sponsor S, U and R tickets. Isabela sent a spreadsheet via email for people to use and mark the tickets. We should get it done by Friday EOM so we can move on with another triage exercise. If you have any questions, please reach out to isabela via irc or email. Meeting time discussion: Is impossible to have something that will work perfectly for everyone. We discussed a few possible solutions that Nick will compile and email the list to continue the discussion with other members of the team. We also decided on sharing meeting notes beyond the meet bot log. Triagging 'must-fix-before-028-rc': During this discussion we also ended up deciding on creating a new state for the review process 'need-merge', so when a ticket is done with the review process goes to this state. This is the equivalent to 'needs-nick-review' state we discussed during the Dev Meeting discussion. Some of the action items from the discussion are listed below. Mostly for folks to review tickets so we can close them and move one with 028-rc. Action Items ------------ * everybody look at https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-March/010534.html * nickm and dgoulet see if they have time to hang out when dgoulet is around for libreplanet * isabela to write her thoughts on release-engineering this stuff, and making broken things easier to revert * somebody open a ticket for a network-team mailing list : #18563 [DONE] * nickm will send an email about meeting times. * if you think something is in must-fix-before-028-rc and we can let it slip, please comment on the ticket. [people worked on it after the meeting] * dgoulet, Sebastian, teor: please take another look at the ed25519 patch and see if I fixed the issues in #18318 and #17668 ? * let's see if we can get weasel (or somebody else) to review or test my fix for #18253 * nickm asks athena for ETA on bugfix. == Next meeting and other updates: * I guess next meeting will depend on the results of the meeting time poll - we will keep the list updated. * We are having a proposal discussion meeting tomorrow, Thursday March 17th at 1500UTC - prop#267 * We had a proposal discussion meeting today as well, Wednesday March 16yh, on prop#224. You can check the log here: http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-dev/2016/tor-dev.2016-03-16-15.03.html -- PM at TorProject.org gpg fingerprint = 8F2A F9B6 D4A1 4D03 FDF1 B298 3224 4994 1506 4C7B @isa

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Come work on Tor at Freedom of the Press Foundation!
by Garrett Robinson 17 Mar '16

17 Mar '16

Hello tor-devizens, Freedom of the Press Foundation is hosting a Mozilla-Ford Open Web Fellow for 2016. We have a lot of potential projects for our fellow to work on, depending on their skill set, but we have our fingers crossed for an applicant who is interested in working on Tor! SecureDrop, our flagship project, depends heavily on Tor and Tor Hidden Services to protect the communications of journalists and anonymous sources. If we end up accepting such an applicant, we would like to have them work with the Tor Project on issues that are pertinent to SecureDrop, particularly Next Generation Hidden Services and the proposed padding defenses for website fingerprinting attacks. The deadline for applications is *March 20th* (this Sunday). More info on our blog: https://freedom.press/blog/2016/01/apply-be-freedom-press-foundations-open-… Apply: https://advocacy.mozilla.org/open-web-fellows/ Let me know if you have any questions! You can reply to this email on the list, or email me directly. Cheers, Garrett

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Interested in GSoC opportunity
by Deepankar Tyagi 17 Mar '16

17 Mar '16

Hi everyone, I am a computer science student at undergrad level, would love to contribute to Tor, currently in the process of drafting the proposal. This mail is an effort to seek guidance to define scope, goals and timeline more clearly. Currently interested in two ideas and plan to submit only one of these based on feedback and guidance from mentors. idea #1 Extending and Improving Krotor. This is continuation of my last year GSoC project in which libevent and Tor were ported to NaCl (a C/C++ sandbox environment on chrome), full detail can be seen at https://deepankar.io/gsoc and https://deepankar.io/krotor. It was later published on webstore and currently has close to 13k active users. A lot of improvement can be made to this project, viz supporting obfuscation, making it more user friendly, adding support for configuring exit gates etc, updating it to latest stable release. I would greatly appreciate any guidance on various matters for instance: making it more resistant to any privacy leaks such as dns leaks on webrtc and on windows due to no global policy of dns etc. I would be very grateful if anyone is willing to mentor for this. idea #2 Exitmap Improvements I got stuck when defining timeline for this project. I would appreciate any insights regarding what should be deliverable by mid-term of GSoC. Also this project will a involve lot of brainstorming, preferably with mentor, is there a possibility of weekly/every two weeks session for an hour or half hour with mentor on hangout/skype etc (at least in the beginning) What would be preferred means to get/see progress reports and preferred frequency of the same. Some hyperlinks: Github <https://github.com/codebuff> || LinkedIn <https://www.linkedin.com/in/codebuff> || KroTor <https://deepankar.io/krotor> Best Regards. *Deepankar Tyagi* *Projects & Resume : deepankar.io <https://deepankar.io>*

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Prop259 simulator and results
by George Kadianakis 16 Mar '16

16 Mar '16

Hello there, I'm not sure what kind of statistics we get out of the current guard simulator. In general, we are interested in security and performance. For security we are trying to minimize our exposure to network. For performance, we want to minimize our downtime when our current guard becomes unreachable or after our network comes back up. Here are some concrete statistics that we could gather in the simulator: Security statistics: - Number of unique guards we connected to during the course of the simulation. - Time spent connected to lower priority guards while a primary guard was online. - Time spent connected to lower priority guards while a higher priority guard was online and the network was up. Performance statistics: - Time spent cycling through guards. - Time spent cycling through guards while network is up. - Time spent on dystopic mode. - Time spent on dystopic mode while the network was utopic. Is it possible to collect those statistics? I'm curious to learn how the current guard algorithm compares to the new prop259 on those aspects. What other stats are important here you think?

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GSOC: Panopticlick
by - - 15 Mar '16

15 Mar '16

Hello! My name is Akito Ono. I'm a computer science student in Japan and very intrested in participating in GSoC this year. I read docs about projects and I was particularly intrested in Panopticlick project. And I have some questions about Panopticlick. Is this project based on Libre-Panopticlick( https://github.com/qqTYXn7/browserprint) or building from scratch? Is programming language used in project designated? Best regards!

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User Behavior Tracking defenses in VMs
by bancfc＠openmailbox.org 15 Mar '16

15 Mar '16

Intended for qemu-discuss /cc/ libvir-list, whonix-devel, tor-dev *** Hello. I work on WhonixOS an anonymity distro based on Tor. This feature request is related to the topics of privacy and anonymity. Its a complex topic and probably not in your area of focus but I think it has important implications because security and privacy are very much related in today's hostile computing environment. Virtualization is useful in presenting an identical environment and set of "hardware" for each user which goes a long way in creating an anonymity set of systems. That way a system attacker, advertisers and online trackers would not be able to fingerprint a user or their hardware. The problem: Tracking techniques have become more sophisticated with time. They advanced from simple cookies to browser/device fingerprinting (which Tor Browser focuses on defeating) to user behavior fingerprinting. The latter is about profiling how a user types on a keyboard or uses a mouse [2]. Keystroke dynamics is a super creepy way to track users based on how long they press keys (dwell time) and the time between key presses (gap time). This is extremely accurate at identifying individuals because of how unique these measurements are. Advertising networks (Google, Facebook...) that fingeprprint users on both the clearnet and Tor can deanonymize users. This technique is already actively used in the wild [6][7]. Potential Solutions: Since input devices are all emulated its a great opportunity to stop this profiling technique. * A security researcher designed a proof of concept plugin for Chrome browser that mitigates this. Implementing something like the PoC addon in [1] known as KeyBoardPrivacy. Some random delay in milliseconds in a 50 millisecond range for dwell and gap times for the emulated keyboards is enough to skew the values to render this attack useless while not affecting performance. * The changes made to Tor Borwser to make JS timers more coarse grained but constant (250ms for keyboard events) were not enough to stop keystroke dynamics fingerprinting because a malicious script can evict the cache and allow extrapolation of true timing events within 1-5ms accuracy .[3][5] Their goal is to instead add jitter to the timers [4]. A similar solution proposed in [4] can be implemented in all QEMU-KVM timers to mitigate both attacks. [1] https://paul.reviews/behavioral-profiling-the-password-you-cant-change/ [2] http://jcarlosnorte.com/security/2016/03/06/advanced-tor-browser-fingerprin… [3] https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2015/07/30/double-bill-password-hashing… [4] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16110 [5] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1517 [6] http://scraping.pro/no-captcha-recaptcha-challenge/ [7] https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/11/01/facebook-to-silent-track-users-…

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GSoC: Tor Messenger CONIKS integration
by Elias Rohrer 13 Mar '16

13 Mar '16

Hello nice people of the Tor project! I'm very interested in using the Google Summer of Code stipend to integrate the CONIKS key verification protocol into Tor Messenger. So I wanted to say 'Hi!' and introduce myself: I'm a computer science student at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin in Berlin, Germany. The main focus of my studies lies on security, computer networks (such as the peer-to-peer ones) and privacy enhancing technologies. In the last years I mostly worked with C/C++, but these days I'm learning erlang – mostly for its benefits in concurrent & network scalable programming, but also to learn 'something different'. This brings me to some questions regarding the project: If I understand correctly (after reading [1], there are three parts which should get implemented in course of the project: - A server component which stores the tamper-resistant database and would be run by the identity providers. - An auditor module which tracks the states of the server and publishes its view, so users can check that theirs is consistent with it. - And a client side plugin for Tor Messenger written in JavaScript. Concerning the two first parts: What would be the requirements concerning the language of the server? The Projects page list JavaScript and C as required languages, but would you also consider a server component written in erlang? I could do that in C/C++, but since I'm experimenting with erlang I thought I'd ask, especially, because I could imagine that the auditor functionality could be implemented into a XMPP server such as ejabberd or prosody. So, while the CONIKS provider would be more or less centralised for Tor Messenger, third parties like the XMPP server hosters could act as auditors by just loading up a plugin for their XMPP server. This Idea is based on the Q&A found in the ticket [1]. Do you think this would be a viable idea to roll out the auditor software? This should be it for my first questions. I'll study the CONIKS paper more in depth in the next days and will come back at you if more questions come up concerning the project idea – if that's okay with you. Best Wishes! Elias Rohrer / _tnull @ irc [1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17961)

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What is Design?
by Spencer 13 Mar '16

13 Mar '16

1 de·sign verb \di-ˈzīn\ To plan and make decisions about [something]; to plan and make [something] for a specific use or purpose, or no purpose at all; to think of [something, such as a plan]; to plan [something]. ORIGIN - late Middle English as a verb in the sense 'to designate'; from Latin designare 'to designate', reinforced by French désigner; the noun is via French from Italian. TL;DR - to designate. --- Copied -dev, -ux, and -teachers once for relevance but, should there be, responses live on -talk. Wordlife, Spencer

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