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man page: MyFamily
by nusenu 11 May '17

11 May '17

Hi, I wanted to help improve the man page section for MyFamily in the light of today's MyFamily change [1]. I sometimes contact relay operators about their MyFamily configuration and a common request is: "Please send me an example" So I added an example to the man page (including the new multiline support in 031) - replaced "node" with "fingerprint" (no one is using nicknames anymore, or onionoo does not display fingerprints?) Are nicknames still supported? (Roger started to remove remaining bits of the past Named "world" so this might be another place?) - made clear that you can still have multiple fingerprints in a single line (if this will be deprecated at some point I can add a deprecation info) - added info that the fingerprint can be prefixed with $ - changed "This option can be repeated many times, for multiple families" to "This option can be repeated many times, for multiple fingerprints" (from one relay's view there is only one family) nusenu inline patch below (I can paste it to trac if you like) [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=d76cffda601eed40d6a81eadb1… https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4998#comment:11 1735c1735 < [[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __node__:: --- > [[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,__...__:: 1738,1739c1738,1741 < their identity fingerprints. This option can be repeated many times, for < multiple families. When two servers both declare that they are in the --- > their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints. > This option can be repeated many times, for > multiple fingerprints, all fingerprints in all MyFamily lines will be merged. > When two servers both declare that they are in the 1745,1746c1747,1753 < When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by < nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. --- > Example: + > MyFamily AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA,BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB + > MyFamily CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC + > + > is identical to: + > + > MyFamily AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA,BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB,CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC

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Re: [tor-dev] blacklisting relays with end-to-end correlation capabilities?
by Sebastian Hahn 09 May '17

09 May '17

Dear all, below mail was meant to make it to tor-dev, but I got a bounce and didn't notice until now. Whoops, my apologies. > On 8. Dec 2016, at 14:29, Sebastian Hahn <tor(a)sebastianhahn.net> wrote: > > Hi, > >> On 08 Dec 2016, at 14:03, nusenu <nusenu(a)openmailbox.org> wrote: >> >> Dear tor directory authorities, >> >> TLDR: Would you blacklist relays with end-to-end correlation capabilities? >> >> I'm asking to find out whether it makes sense to put any effort into >> finding such operators [2]. If most dir auths would not blacklist such >> relays than it does not make sense to look for them I guess. >> >> So please let us know whats your opinion on that - thank you. >> >> >> More information below and there [1]: >> >> >> The process could look something like this: >> >> - someone identifies such a relay groups (basically based on contactinfo >> [2]) >> - contact the operators asking to fix this (ideally this would be a >> @torproject.org sender) >> - give them 15 days to fix it >> - if not fixed: blacklist respective guard relays >> - give them the possibility to get removed from the blacklist once fixed > > I do not think that this is worthwhile. It establishes a precedent where > setting your contact info is something that gets you banned, potentially > incorrectly because it's unauthenticated, whereas we're unable to identify > people who actually maliciously run several relays without such indicators. > > Additionally, it's yet one more thing to update the dirauths' configs > for, but with rather more overhead as we might get multiple mails back > and forth about how MyFamily is annoying to maintain, how they're just > trying to help, etc. All not so bad arguments. > > If we did this, also why would we blacklist the nonexit relays? That > seems to not make sense, as a relay operator could have multiple relays > that act as guard and exit simultaneously. I think we'd need to > blacklist at least all the exit relays, if not all of them. BadExiting > them would then be the more sensible choice. Scarcity of resources has > in the past led us to bad designs like Valid/Invalid relays etc, which > causes way more annoyances than good things. > > Cheers > Sebastian Cheers Sebastian

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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-commits] [tor/master] Bug 17592: Clean up connection timeout logic.
by Roger Dingledine 09 May '17

09 May '17

On Mon, May 08, 2017 at 06:00:18PM +0000, nickm(a)torproject.org wrote: > commit d5a151a06788c28ac1c50398c6e571d484774f47 > Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> > Date: Tue Feb 21 21:28:00 2017 -0500 [...] > + - Increase the intial circuit build timeout testing frequency, to help > + ensure that ReducedConnectionPadding clients finish learning a timeout > + before their orconn would expire. The initial testing rate was set back > + in the days of TAP and before the Tor Browser updater, when we had to be > + much more careful about new clients making lots of circuits. With this > + change, a circuit build time is learned in about 15-20 minutes, instead > + of ~100-120 minutes. Fyi, the current Tor network has "cbttestfreq=60" set in its consensus params. Is this something we should change? --Roger

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Chutney Default: DNS or Offline?
by teor 07 May '17

07 May '17

Dear chutney users, Do you use DNS with chutney? (Chutney uses IP addresses by default.) Chutney has never worked offline, because Tor Exits check DNS before publishing their exit policy. And if DNS fails while a test is being run, chutney fails. (See Tor bug #21900.) We can make chutney work offline by disabling DNS. See the chutney bug at: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21903 But we need to decide what the default is: Do you want chutney to work offline by default? Or do you want chutney to have working DNS by default? T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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making sure I configure OutboundBindAddressExit correctly
by nusenu 05 May '17

05 May '17

Hi, since I really like this new feature I added [1] initial autoconfiguration support for it to ansible-relayor (user can opt-in via a single boolean and we automate the rest). I want to make sure I do this correctly and would like your feedback on the following questions: a) Is 'OutboundBindAddressOR' in the following context optional (in the sense that it does not change tor's behavior)? ExitRelay 1 ExitPolicy reject *:25,accept *:* ORPort 1.2.3.4:9001 OutboundBindAddress 1.2.3.4 OutboundBindAddressOR 1.2.3.4 OutboundBindAddressExit 7.7.7.7 is identical to: ExitRelay 1 ExitPolicy reject *:25,accept *:* ORPort 1.2.3.4:9001 OutboundBindAddress 1.2.3.4 OutboundBindAddressExit 7.7.7.7 (since according to the manual page OutboundBindAddress*OR* would just override OutboundBindAddress, which is not needed in the above example since they match) b) Is it ok to set OutboundBindAddressExit for IPv4 only, even if we set 'IPv6Exit 1' or is setting an IPv6 OutboundBindAddressExit address required after setting OutboundBindAddressExit for IPv4? Since this question might be a bit confusing I'll give an example in form of torrc lines: ORPort 1.2.3.4:9001 OutboundBindAddress 1.2.3.4 OutboundBindAddressExit 7.7.7.7 IPv6Exit 1 ExitRelay 1 ExitPolicy reject *:25,accept *:* (this config has an IPv4 OutboundBindAddressExit entry but no IPv6 OutboundBindAddressExit entry) c) Similar to (b) is it ok to enable OutboundBindAddressExit for IPv6 only? d) Is it ok if multiple tor instances on the same host use the same OutboundBindAddressExit address? (ignoring the fact that big exits might run out of source ports?) thanks, nusenu [1] https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor/commit/00fa7c571e8b6f6256092d9928… -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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Leekspin and Stem descriptor creation
by Damian Johnson 02 May '17

02 May '17

Hi Isis. For kicks and giggles this weekend I added the ability for Stem to create descriptors... https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/mirror_mirror_on_the_wall.html#can-i-… https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=b2a54ad This is something Stem has always been able to do but it was buried in our testing helpers. Now descriptor subclasses have a static create() and content() method. This *doesn't* yet support signing descriptors. I'm looking into that next. To that end I took a peek today at leekspin (https://pypi.python.org/pypi/leekspin) and... damn. Beautiful work! Besides the crypto are there any other aspects of your library you think we should incorporate? Cheers! -Damian

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Prop279 and DNS
by Jeremy Rand 29 Apr '17

29 Apr '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello! Maybe this topic has already been brought up, but in case it hasn't, I'll do so. I notice that Prop279 (onion naming API) defines its own API rather than using DNS. I guess that this is because of security concerns about the centralization of the DNS. However, in case you're unaware, Namecoin is designed to interoperate with DNS. Let's say that, hypothetically, Tor defined a DNS-based naming system for onion services, where "_tor.example.com" had a TXT record that was verified with DNSSEC in order to make Tor direct "example.com" to whatever that TXT record had. If this were done, Namecoin would be able to produce the necessary TXT record and DNSSEC signatures, via the standard DNS protocol, using an authoritative nameserver that runs on localhost. (The DNSSEC keys used would be unique per user, generated on installation.) Indeed, this is how we're planning to interoperate with non-proxy-based Internet applications. My guess is that it would be a lot less work on Namecoin's end if such a system were used with Tor rather than a separate naming API. It's unclear to me how this would affect other naming systems such as GNS (does GNS interoperate with clients that use DNS?), and it's also unclear to me whether this would produce extra work for the Tor developers (maybe DNS adds extra attack surface that would need to be mitigated somehow, or maybe there would be complexity in implementing stream isolation?). Anyway, just figured I'd bring up the topic so that everyone's on the same page regarding figuring out whether it's a good idea. Cheers, - -- - -Jeremy Rand Lead Application Engineer at Namecoin Mobile email: jeremyrandmobile(a)airmail.cc Mobile PGP: 2158 0643 C13B B40F B0FD 5854 B007 A32D AB44 3D9C Send non-security-critical things to my Mobile with PGP. Please don't send me unencrypted messages. My business email jeremy(a)veclabs.net is having technical issues at the moment. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJY4rf2AAoJELPy0WV4bWVwviQP+wSz9/L8czef+L+viSIIrrtv BOp32fysFWw1HijQ/42IoELPhkkzsHjek4IuW6Hn3VHGYs9vJ+rQ9aOcCMGNGD/f f7ktcw3upH/UHiFPp2S0LeNqaoup8qvUQxG/AeP5R20gD/660ZXuIVl4uOaOu5HJ IaghO9ZpzSF695H97hf7bz3H3Wrmch8tjC+FZ+SwWdgqGa4ijjZbTvkypcPEZ6YI YQ22PmoQQWQBbe9JLujLa46PwRWU+UKsppmQYi7dY9K7aO7/J9eKQnOLkUWtdKrN WjtJMV+V4oL/g4IiJrPs5n82pGSvpFi/dMrakoGq2w+v1dJolz/lSGUj7+sWVQZl iqoq6c+l7MjKNynmj/Yn8IquhhwRmVAj4sjV+2jUeVmAf/tHDCBsDYvIDcDeIblu j6y9e7ePTlMTpuxbZ7OKJjsWgGF5+yumWHPtJYs9uBoATeYDM6+Gxm73rDZxRVCl +KGN1jMuREA9N1ZiWuK/ueeeZWGHii4L4UWvdK0qriSvc0HxaQeCGlovEDfO8btO ZDfq9P6USEZywqFyzjzvOUwxnhihwNMdFiSt0RfxLuX34H6POvFYHhw85ESlliY8 0RPjHW6GZywNuOgpYDu9kPS6HPFhXUtok708Jmc926ctX2TT0CJlK6Fl3R2kZGCa nOLHLSYVmkehj6u3RdBf =Hz3g -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tor Tech Report 2017-04-001 available
by iwakeh 28 Apr '17

28 Apr '17

Hi there! A new Tor Tech Report is available [0]: "Privacy analysis of Tor's in-memory statistics." Abstract: "This report analyzes which possibly sensitive, potentially personally identifying data is stored in memory of Tor relays and bridges or reported to the directory authorities and makes suggestions to reduce the collection and temporary storage of such data." The report addresses concerns regarding metrics collection about the Tor network that were often raised and discussed in the community. Many topics can only be briefly touched in the scope of such a report. Thus, there is quite some work in thinking, writing, and coding open to be done. Based on the report's suggestions the Metrics Team plans the following steps (mainly in May and June 2017): * Distill a change proposal for Tor server changes that address the most pressing of the identified issues. * Code the Tor server patches according to the proposal. * And, provide necessary patches for Tor Metrics products concerned by the changes for Tor servers. Future plans for the months after that are to assess privacy questions as raised in this report more in-depth and describe statistical accuracy throughout the data-verse of Tor Metrics. Many thanks to Aaron Johnson, Paul Syverson, Rob Jansen, and Tim Wilson-Brown, who gave very valuable feedback to ideas and questions we asked during the Amsterdam meeting! Also many thanks to Karsten Loesing, who collected the feedback in Amsterdam, patiently answered all questions about the details of Tor and Tor Metrics, and reviewed the report! Cheers! iwakeh [0] https://research.torproject.org/techreports/privacy-in-memory-2017-04-28.pdf

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txtorcon 0.19.0
by meejah 26 Apr '17

26 Apr '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I'm very happy to release txtorcon 0.19.0. This merges most of the development that happened over the last several months on the release-1.x branch. Featuring: * Full Python3 support (and universal wheels) * Drop txsocksx and use a custom implementation (this also implements the custom Tor SOCKS5 methods RESOLVE and RESOLVE_PTR). Uses Automat for the state-machine. * Drop support for older Twisted releases (12, 13 and 14 are no longer supported). * Add a top-level API object (txtorcon.Tor) that abstracts a running Tor. Instances of this class are created with txtorcon.connect or txtorcon.launch. These instances are intended to be "the" high-level API and most users shouldn't need anything else. * Integrated support for twisted.web.client.Agent, baked into txtorcon.Tor. This allows simple, straightforward use of treq or "raw" twisted.web.client for making client-type Web requests via Tor. Automatically handles configuration of SOCKS ports. * new high-level API for putting streams on specific Circuits. This adds txtorcon.Circuit.stream_via and txtorcon.Circuit.web_agent methods that work the same as the "Tor" equivalent methods except they use a specific circuit. This makes txtorcon.TorState.set_attacher the "low-level" / "expert" interface. Most users should only need the new API. * big revamp / re-write of the documentation, including the new Programming Guide: https://txtorcon.readthedocs.io/en/latest/guide.html * Issue 203: https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/issues/203 * new helper: txtorcon.Router.get_onionoo_details which downloads JSON for a particular relay from OnionOO * new helper: txtorcon.util.create_tbb_web_headers which returns headers resembling a recent Tor Browser suitable for use with Twisted or treq web agents. * Issue 72: https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/issues/72 * Specific SocksError subclasses for all the available SOCKS5 errors added by https://github.com/felipedau * (more) Python3 fixes from https://github.com/rodrigc You can download the release from PyPI or GitHub (or of course "pip install txtorcon"): https://pypi.python.org/pypi/txtorcon/0.19.0 https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/releases/tag/v0.19.0 Releases are also available from the hidden service: http://timaq4ygg2iegci7.onion/txtorcon-0.19.0.tar.gz http://timaq4ygg2iegci7.onion/txtorcon-0.19.0.tar.gz.asc You can verify the sha256sum of both by running the following 4 lines in a shell wherever you have the files downloaded: cat <<EOF | sha256sum --check 09d56fbd6e33eef7405c8ca354bbba06da2cefa02763d15c4bc9ac274c5daeeb dist/txtorcon-0.19.0.tar.gz cc51b4249ad126c31ea2746ec5ef1bcb7f6b0c34ced070913ed7772c0e48edf5 dist/txtorcon-0.19.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl EOF thanks, meejah -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJY+ZjOAAoJEMJgKAMSgGmnadEH/R0YCoID3xTkbFL7mVhtqY2e p7sPcFT50jUGDASaER2YoQ4syzptnQcLid5/pCf+F2xMwCVgayqaipNXtugNHZIl 9cCOnI09+IntCFLkVXQqMGnEzSSzcM0Ln87Qa9MMjNNZM+aj2WshmFnObdqsWNRo tIhnuKgMDgqoO9OgiXCsUXFQeooDDidnrnJgl5U7AA0+13nIar+/q9vCxMtDqSV9 kfh5IkB4RaeJTzDtTMYQKKHTIltdn7o0LrCyp1QsMhX+iHU4xZVOi7etgFnACqsP S1u2LMT1FggvyEAzIwn45ADhKpuPBrR35N5C21vQklHVEb9nQxI9LXTHCi0Fv5g= =mGZj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tor 0.3.1 ticket triage: please do this today if you hack on Tor.
by Nick Mathewson 26 Apr '17

26 Apr '17

Hi! We've got 3 weeks left in the 0.3.1 merge window (which closes on May 15) so let's try to triage the tickets. Here's what to do if you are going to develop anything for Tor 0.3.1: - Make sure that everything you are going to do for 031 is assigned to you, in the 0.3.1 milestone, and has a points estimate. ("Points" is a rough "how many days will this take me?" guess.) - If there is anything assigned to you for 031 that you _won't_ be doing for May 15, or that you won't be doing at all, please unassign it and/or defer it from the 031-milestone. - If your total points estimate is over 12 or so (or whatever number of programming days you think you will have, please defer the less important things, or tag them with 031-stretch. Then, in 24 hours or so, for all the tickets that don't get an owner, I will either defer them or mark them "too important to defer" and look for somebody else to do them. Let's see how this works! -- Nick

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