- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-dev] A suggestion for differential private statistics gathering
by Eyal Ronen 11 Jan '18

11 Jan '18

Hi Tim, First of all thanks for your detailed and quick response. I am sorry for my delayed response as I am attending Real World Crypto (BTW if there are any devs here it will be nice to try and meet). I will try to answer your questions and remarks below. >Hi Eyal, > >Thank you for letting us know about your research. > >You've emailed an internal discussion list, so I'm going to direct all >responses to the public tor-dev@ list. That is the list where we discuss >changes to Tor. > >Please see my response below: > >> On 7 Jan 2018, at 20:31, Eyal Ronen <eyal.ronen(a)weizmann.ac.il> wrote: >> >> I am a PHD student, and have just published online a paper, that shows a protocol that I think might be relevant to the TOR network. >> The protocol allows a server to privately learn information from a client, and is resilient to a situation where a malicious adversary wants to temper with the statistics. >> The main use case in our paper is learning popular passwords, > >Are you aware of this password list? >(It has no privacy apart from hashing the passwords, because the >passwords are already publicly available in data breaches.) > > https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-downloadable-<https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-downloadable-pwned-…> pwned<https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-downloadable-pwned-…> -passwords/<https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-downloadable-pwned-…> One of the assumptions of our paper is that if we blacklist known vulnerable passwords, we will change the passwords distribution and new passwords will become "popular". We enable the server to continually learn the changing password distribution. Another example is that the previously popular password "superman" might be replaced today with the password "wonderwoman", and we want to be able to learn this kind of changes. > >> but we believe that it might also be usable for other cases in the TOR network. As we do not know the needs and challenges in the TOR network, we would greatly appreciate any feedback from the TOR metrics community. > >I would be interested in an explanation of the tradeoffs between the >16 and 32 bit versions of the protocol. In particular, we may not be >able to provide servers with 4 GB of RAM for the 32 bit protocol. > >What would we lose with a 16 bit version? Is a 24 bit version possible? Any bit number is possible , and without any impact on security. The number of bit is the size of the domain or histogram of items you want to measure. If you use a low number of bits, you can have collision between different measured values, that may change the statistics. For example, lets assume we want to find out popular sites in the TOR network. We encode the sites IP. If you use 32 bit version, you can measure each IP individually. Otherwise you use a truncated a hash of the IP address. Now when you find a heavy hitter, you know what possible IP contributed to this measurement. But you can't know which one or more IP addresses are the popular ones. However I believe that this might not be a problem. One of the main differences to other solutions is that we work in the "Local model" and do no require any "Tally Reporters" to protect the data or for answers to be aggregate on the relay servers. The only place that needs to store the whole histogram is the one server that aggregates all of the information. I think that it greatly reduce the communication and implementation overheads of the solution. I think that the main differences are the one above and our provable malicious resilient. There are other differences but I think that this is the most relevant one. If we don't care about malicious users or relays we can use the semi honest version, that takes have almost zero computation requirements, and can be done either by the user, or by the relay. If we want to use the malicious resilient, it is a bit more costly, and we need to think of the right way and place to incorporate it. If it sounds interesting I will like to find a possible use case that I can try and design the best tailored solution for you. And we can try to prove the security and complexity of the solution, and verify this with safety board. If needed I have a POC written in Python to be easily understandable, but I can easily implement it using TOR's cryptographic package of choice. I will also try to go over the current proposal on the other papers in more details. Thanks again, Eyal Ronen > >> The paper is titles "How to (not) share a password: Privacy preserving protocols for finding heavy hitters with adversarial behavior" and can be found at https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/003 >> >> The abstract is: >> "Bad choices of passwords were and are a pervasive problem. Most password alternatives (such as two-factor authentication) may increase cost and arguably hurt the usability of the system. This is of special significance for low cost IoT devices. >> >> Users choosing weak passwords do not only compromise themselves, but the whole eco system. For example, common and default passwords in IoT devices were exploited by hackers to create botnets and mount severe attacks on large Internet services, such as the Mirai botnet DDoS attack. >> >> We present a method to help protect the Internet from such large scale attacks. We enable a server to identify popular passwords (heavy hitters), and publish a list of over-popular passwords that must be avoided. This filter ensures that no single password can be used to comprise a large percentage of the users. The list is dynamic and can be changed as new users are added or when current users change their passwords. We apply maliciously secure two-party computation and differential privacy to protect the users' password privacy. Our solution does not require extra hardware or cost, and is transparent to the user. >> >> The construction is secure even against a malicious coalition of devices which tries to manipulate the protocol in order to hide the popularity of some password that the attacker is exploiting. We show a proof-of-concept implementation and analyze its performance. >> >> Our construction can also be used in any setting where one would desire to privately learn heavy hitters in the presence of an active malicious adversary. For example, learning the most popular sites accessed by the TOR network." > >Tor Proposals > >There is a current proposal to add privacy-preserving statistics to Tor >using a scheme that's based on PrivCount: > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/288-<https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/288-privcount-with…> privcount<https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/288-privcount-with…> -with-shamir.txt<https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/288-privcount-with…> > >PrivCount is limited to counters with integer increments, so we can't >easily find the most popular site (the mode), or calculate the median. > >We discussed the proposal on tor-dev@, and decided that we could add >more sophisticated statistics later. We would appreciate your feedback >on the proposal. In particular, please let us know if there is anything >we should change in the proposal to make it easier to extend with schemes >like yours in future. > >Here is the proposal thread: > > https://lists.torproject.org/<https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-December/012699.html>pipermail<https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-December/012699.html>/tor-dev/2017-December/012699.html<https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-December/012699.html> > > >Anyone is welcome to submit Tor proposals, the process is described here: > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/001-process.txt > > >Related Research > >There was a paper at CCS 2017 that sounds very similar to your scheme: > >Ellis Fenske, Akshaya Mani, Aaron Johnson, and Micah Sherr. Distributed >Measurement with Private Set-Union Cardinality. In ACM Conference on >Computer and Communications Security (CCS), November 2017. > >Source: http://safecounting.com/ > >Can you explain how your scheme differs from PSC? > > >There's a forthcoming paper at NDSS 2018 that measures a single onion >site's popularity with differential privacy using PrivCount: > >Inside Job: Applying Traffic Analysis to Measure Tor from Within >25th Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS 2018) >Rob Jansen, Marc Juarez, Rafael Galvez, Tariq Elahi, and Claudia Diaz > >Source: https://onionpop.github.io/ > >But the measurement was limited to one site, because PrivCount can't >calculate the modal value from set of samples. So I can see the >advantages of a scheme like yours over PrivCount. > > >Your Own Research > >And finally, if you do want to do research on the public Tor network, I >would recommend contacting the Tor Research Safety Board for advice: > > https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard.html > >T > >-- >Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) Best regards, Eyal

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Re: [tor-dev] Public Key Chaos
by thomas.hluchnik＠netcologne.de 11 Jan '18

11 Jan '18

Am Wednesday 10 January 2018 17:37:57 schrieb Azat Khuzhin: > Nick suggested me to upload my key to repo (github), to make people know > that at least I have admin rights to that repo. > > But now I remembered, that my github account has attached gpg key to it, > you can see it here: > https://github.com/libevent/libevent/releases/tag/release-2.1.8-stable > > Does this enough for your needs? No, not really. Let's assume, an evil 3rd party is redirecting my download (by DNS spoofing or that), using a fake web server certificate. This would enable the attacker to exchange the libevent package + the checksum files + signature file. This fake signing key could be uploaded to the key servers by them, pretending it were your personal key. If I would trust in that, the tor network would be in danger. TOR executables would rely on insecure shared libraries. The only way for establishing trust is: the signature must be created with a GPG key which was signed by other trustworthy persons. For example, Nick's key is signed by many people since many years. So I have no doubt that files which are signed with that key are really from Nick. If he signs your key, then I can trust in files, signed with your key. If you are going to sign more packages in the future, don't hesitate to collect further signatures from other trustworthy persons or organizations. Best Regards, Thomas Hluchnik

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Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
by debug 11 Jan '18

11 Jan '18

Is there any specific reason why there is no comment from Tor-team for this issue? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24351

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Tor dev help
by Beastr0 10 Jan '18

10 Jan '18

Hey guys, For the time being I would prefer to not have my real name attached to Tor so I hope you don't mind if I introduce myself as Beastro. I love Tor and its mission. I was wondering if you guys had any projects that I could help out with? I can write code in python, java, C and also have plenty of experience with plenty other languages. As a student, I don't have a ton of time, so I can only spend maybe an hour or two a day helping out. Let me know if there's anything I can do! Best, - Beastro Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Why do DirAuths take that long to update a relay's version information?
by nusenu 10 Jan '18

10 Jan '18

Hi, the goal of this email is to avoid a false positive warning for relay operators on atlas but the root cause might be in core tor. background: I really liked when irl added the big red warning to atlas when a tor relay runs an outdated (aka not running a "recommended") tor version because it actually triggered operators to upgrade, an important step toward a more healthy network. The problem is: This big red banner on atlas has false-positives which confuses operators [0]. Originally this has been an onionoo bug which has been fixed in v1.8.0, but it happens again and Karsten had the feeling that tor dir auths do not update the version information of a relay after it upgraded (and uploaded a new descriptor). I looked into one example and can confirm what Karsten suggested [1]. Let me show you that example of FP 1283EBDEEC2B9D745F1E7FBE83407655B984FD66. Data has been provided by Karsten and is available here: [2]. That relay was running 0.3.0.10 and upgraded to 0.3.0.13 and uploaded his first descriptor with 0.3.0.13 on: 2018-01-09 10:14:00,server,,0.3.0.13 except for bastet dir auths did not care and still said this relay runs 0.3.0.10: 2018-01-09 11:00:00,consensus,,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,bastet,0.3.0.13 <<<< note 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,dannenberg,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,dizum,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,Faravahar,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,gabelmoo,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,longclaw,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,maatuska,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,moria1,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 11:00:00,vote,tor26,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,consensus,,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,bastet,0.3.0.13 <<<<<< 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,dannenberg,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,dizum,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,Faravahar,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,gabelmoo,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,longclaw,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,maatuska,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,moria1,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 12:00:00,vote,tor26,0.3.0.10 even 6 hours later this is unchanged. Then the operator upgraded from 0.3.0.13 to 0.3.1.9 and uploaded his first descriptor: 2018-01-09 16:39:01,server,,0.3.1.9 this remained "unnoticed" by all dir auths until longclaw voted for the new version: 2018-01-09 23:00:00,consensus,,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,bastet,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,dannenberg,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,dizum,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,Faravahar,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,gabelmoo,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,longclaw,0.3.1.9 <<<<< 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,maatuska,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,moria1,0.3.0.10 2018-01-09 23:00:00,vote,tor26,0.3.0.10 On 2018-01-10 02:38:07 the relay uploaded a second descriptor with v0.3.1.9 and almost all dir auths agreed immediately: 2018-01-10 02:38:07,server,,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,consensus,,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,bastet,0.3.0.10 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,dannenberg,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,dizum,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,Faravahar,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,gabelmoo,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,longclaw,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,maatuska,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,moria1,0.3.1.9 2018-01-10 03:00:00,vote,tor26,0.3.1.9 So it took the operator 17 hours to convince enough dir auths that he upgraded. I can see multiple reasons why this can make sense (as the tor version is actually not that relevant consensus data) but maybe it was not clear what the side effects of not updating that field are. While I believe there is still another onionoo issue, this should also be improved. Thoughts? [0] http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2018-January/000620.html [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22488#comment:11 [2] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22488/task-22488… -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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prop279 global wildcard '*' exploits
by nullius 10 Jan '18

10 Jan '18

At https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24774#comment:5 , nickm stated: >I'm not sure that the sandboxing section is necessary. We should say >that _all_ plugins should only access the network over Tor, unless they >are using some comparably strong anonymity mechanism. [...] In reply https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24774#comment:6 , I ask: >The proposal as written states under §3.2, specifically discussing >`'*'`: > >>Perhaps we trust the name plugin itself, but maybe the name system >>network could exploit this? > >What does this mean? Is there any specific information on what >potential exploits the spec authors have thought of? '''Would >requiring Tor-only connections prevent these potential exploits?''' I >should ask on `tor-dev`. Per the discussion in the current version of the spec (686aaf1), there is concern that a '*' plugin may try to resolve ordinary DNS names. But this separate, quoted statement assumes a trustworthy plugin, which I take to mean that it would not grab .com, etc. So, what was the concern behind that statement? (And are there any other potential exploits, which may or may not be prevented by requiring name resolution through Tor?) -- nullius(a)nym.zone | PGP ECC: 0xC2E91CD74A4C57A105F6C21B5A00591B2F307E0C Bitcoin: bc1qcash96s5jqppzsp8hy8swkggf7f6agex98an7h | (Segwit nested: 3NULL3ZCUXr7RDLxXeLPDMZDZYxuaYkCnG) (PGP RSA: 0x36EBB4AB699A10EE) “‘If you’re not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to hide.’ No! Because I do nothing wrong, I have nothing to show.” — nullius

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Public Key Chaos
by thomas.hluchnik＠netcologne.de 10 Jan '18

10 Jan '18

Hello all, I am just going to update my tor server, building packages from source. I do that not only for tor but also for libevent. So I downloaded the tarballs plus signature from libevent.org and that's what I found: $ gpg --verify libevent-2.0.22-stable.tar.gz.asc gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 16:16:20 2015 CET using RSA key ID 8D29319A gpg: Good signature from "Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)alum.mit.edu>" gpg: aka "Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)wangafu.net>" gpg: aka "Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net>" gpg: aka "[jpeg image of size 3369]" $ gpg --verify libevent-2.1.8-stable.tar.gz.asc gpg: Signature made Sun Jan 29 19:42:03 2017 CET using RSA key ID 8EF8686D gpg: Good signature from "Azat Khuzhin <a3at.mail(a)gmail.com>" gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. Primary key fingerprint: 9E3A C83A 2797 4B84 D1B3 401D B860 8684 8EF8 686D $ gpg --list-sigs "Azat Khuzhin" pub 2048R/8EF8686D 2010-06-10 uid Azat Khuzhin <a3at.mail(a)gmail.com> sig 3 8EF8686D 2010-06-10 Azat Khuzhin <a3at.mail(a)gmail.com> sub 2048R/7A34F923 2010-06-10 sig 8EF8686D 2010-06-10 Azat Khuzhin <a3at.mail(a)gmail.com> While nickm(a)alum.mit.edu was signed by many, many people, I find no signature for "Azat Khuzhin <a3at.mail(a)gmail.com>" at all. How can I trust that key? How can I be sure that libevent 2.1.8 is a good package? Why has Azat Khuzhin public key no signature from Nick Mathewson or anyone else? I don't trust that package for now until I find it signed with the keys of at least Nick Mathewson and Niels Provos. Correct me if I a wrong. Best Regards, Thomas

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Proposal 285: Directory documents should be standardized as UTF-8
by Nick Mathewson 09 Jan '18

09 Jan '18

Filename: 285-utf-8.txt Title: Directory documents should be standardized as UTF-8 Author: Nick Mathewson Created: 13 November 2017 Status: Open 1. Summary and motivation People frequently want to include non-ASCII text in their router descriptors. The Contact line is a favorite place to do this, but in principle the platform line would also be pretty logical. Unfortunately, there's no specified way to encode non-ASCII in our directory documents. Fortunately, almost everybody who does it, uses UTF-8 anyway. As we move towards Rust support in Tor, we gain another motivation for standarding on UTF-8, since Rust's native strings strongly prefer UTF-8. So, in this proposal, we describe a migration path to having all directory documents be fully UTF-8. 2. Proposal First, we should have Tor relays reject ContactInfo lines (and any other lines copied directly into router descriptors) that are not UTF-8. At the same time, we should have authorities reject any router descriptors or extrainfo documents that are not valid UTF-8. Simultaneously, we can have all Tor instances reject all non-directory-descriptor directory documents that are not UTF-8, since none should exist today. Finally, once the authorities have updated, we should have all Tor instances reject all directory documents that are not UTF-8. (We should not take this step until the authorities have upgraded, or else the behavior of updated and non-updated clients could be distinguished.) 2.1. Hidden service descriptors' encrypted bodies For the encrypted bodies of hidden service descriptors, we cannot reject them at the authority level, and so we need to take a slightly different approach to prevent client fingerprinting attacks. First, we should make Tor instances start warning about any hidden service descriptors whose bodies, post-decryption, contain non-utf-8 plaintext. At the same time, we add a consensus parameter to indicate that hidden service descriptors with non-utf-8 plantexts should be rejected entirely: "reject-encrypted-non-utf-8". If that parameter is set to 1, then hidden service clients will not only warn, but reject the descriptors. Once the vast majority of clients are running versions that support the "reject-encrypted-non-utf-8" parameter, that parameter can be set to 1.

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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-project] Intent to Minimise Effort: Fallback Directory Mirrors
by teor 09 Jan '18

09 Jan '18

Hi all, I'd like to move this thread to the tor-dev list. I made a list of Core Tor tickets at the end of this email. Let's talk about them on tor-dev. Here's some background: Rebuilding the fallback list takes a lot of effort! So I'm picking up this tor-project thread while the latest fallback rebuild is fresh in my mind. The rebuild took a day or two of my time for regular changes. And another day or two for once-off changes. We made a few changes to streamline the process: * atagar and I wrote scripts that make it easier to generate fallback lines, and get operator contact details [0] * pastly, atagar and irl helped out with code reviews and list format changes, which should make the list easier to read and parse * pastly and nickm helped out with fallback list updates and backport Having this help meant that I had time to make the process better. Thanks! But there's still more we can do: > On 29 Aug 2017, at 11:12, teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >> On 28 Aug 2017, at 18:15, Linus Nordberg <linus(a)torproject.org> wrote: >> >> teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> wrote >> Sat, 26 Aug 2017 22:39:52 +1000: >> >>> So I can't see any reasons to keep running opt-ins. >> >> Are we listing non-exits? > > Yes. Non-exits and under-used exits are the best fallback directory > mirrors, because they are under less load. > >> I suppose those might see a radical change in >> their "IP reputation" when they end up on the blocklists after the next >> ransomware attack. Exits are already in the lists. > > Yes, there is a higher risk that a fallback will end up on one of these > lists. But all public Tor relays are at risk of ending up on a list like > this. Because of the higher risk, we will continue to ask relay operators to opt-in [1]. So we need to find people to help with this process every 6-12 months. And make it more efficient. >> On 28 Aug 2017, at 19:34, Silvia [Hiro] <hiro(a)torproject.org> wrote: >> >> On 26/08/17 15:44, nusenu wrote: >>>>> use ContactInfo >>>>> as a way to collect the intention of relay operators to opt-in/opt-out >>>>> of the fallback directory mirrors list. >>>> This is a good idea, *if* we still think an opt-in is necessary. >>> >>> Isn't that way to collect operator intentions also useful in opt-out >>> mode? (instead of continuing to use emails) Or how do you plan to >>> collect the opt-out info? >> >> Why are emails preferred over other methods? Another options would be >> wrapping a script that ops can run to create a cyberpunk trac ticket and >> opt-out. This is probably easier than merging emails. But maybe we do >> not want to handle this through trac. >> >> I'd be happy to help w/ that eventually, and the fallback script. > > This is a good idea. > > At the moment, I take emails sent to me or tor-relays, and turn them > into trac comments or trac tickets. If we put it directly on trac, > anyone could handle the ticket. The most time-consuming part of the rebuild is the opt-in process. Here's what we do at the moment: [2] 0. Send an email to tor-relays to ask operators to opt-in 1. Run a script to find fallbacks whose details have changed, and email tor-relays to ask operators if their details are permanent Here are the most time-consuming steps: 2a. Receive personal emails and emails to the list with fallback details 2b. Generate an updated fallback line for each relay [0] 2c. Update the whitelist And these steps are quick: 3. Run the update script to generate a new list 4. Write a changes file 5. Announce the new list 6. Backport the list to all supported Tor versions Here are some things I'd like to change: Just have relay fingerprints in the fallback whitelist [3] The fallback script checks relay details, but it can just rely on Onionoo to say when the address last changed. This removes step 1 and step 2b. Add a torrc option and descriptor line to opt-in as a FallbackDir [4] This is inspired by nusenu's "ContactInfo" idea, and Hiro's "bot" idea. Having a descriptor line and torrc option gets us a more reliable implementation, and it's easier for relay operators to use. And there's no need for an email bot or trac bot. This removes step 2a and step 2c, for tor versions with this feature. For tor versions without this feature, we can use the simpler fingerprint list. Make the hard-coded authorities into a separate include file with a standard format [5] We'll also change the fallback file format (again, sorry!) to make them consistent. This makes it easier for stem, metrics-lib, and other Tor implementations to use the same authorities and fallbacks. This makes step 5 easier (for libraries that use fallbacks). Let's discuss these changes on the tor-dev list! T [0]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/scripts/maint/generateFallbackDi… https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/scripts/maint/lookupFallbackDirC… [1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24789 [2]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectory… [3]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24838 [4]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24839 [5]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24818 -- Tim / teor PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Relay diversity master thesis
by Robin Descamps 07 Jan '18

07 Jan '18

Hello, I already sent this message to the metrics team, but they advice me to address it to the dev team, which seem to be more relevant. I realise this year a master thesis, in the Université catholique de Louvain in Belgium, about measuring the utility brought to the Tor network diversity by adding a new relay, according to its configuration. I added to this message my master thesis plan, as well as a poster that presents a summary of the key elements. May I ask you advices/feedback about this master thesis plan? Since I would like this project to bring a real contribution to the Tor development, I want to make sure that all the steps I will perform are useful and/or worth it. The master thesis plan: https://drive.google.com/open?id=1XEOSS29owavKJ_cJJAVaPiJe34Ez6XXx The poster: https://drive.google.com/open?id=1BlF2U-Kexyz6ihVSqvsVHv4PUsvXATc4 Thanks, Robin Descamps

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