- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

SHA-3 isn't looking so hot to me
by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen 04 Nov '11

04 Nov '11

Watson Ladd: > (HMAC is a bad idea anyway: quadratic security bounds are not the best > possible, we have to use nonces anyway to prevent replay attacks, so > Wegman-Carter is a better idea for better in{faster, more secure}. GCM > would be an example of this.) GCM has quadratic security bounds, not only in the proof but in practice too. Furthermore a 128-bit GCM MAC offers much less than 128-bit security; in this sense it is certainly weaker than, say, MD5-HMAC ! And there are the implementation caveats mentioned already mentioned in the list, including Joux's "forbidden attack" which may indeed be very real in many implementations. GCM also tends to be slow on software. I've been told that GCM was pushed through the NIST standardization process mainly by CISCO who were concerned about the performance of their hardware crypto accelerators (many hash functions are tricky to implement on hardware). There's also the issue of weak keys etc. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/202.pdf This came out in ECRYPT II Hash Workshop 2011, 19-20 May 2011, Tallinn, Estonia. The current ECRYPT recommendations take this into account, see section 8.5.5 of "ECRYPT II Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes (2010-2011)" for a brief discussion: http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/documents/D.SPA.17.pdf I should be expanding this work as Niels Ferguson noted in the Redmond Crypto Retreat workshop last August that there's a trivial extension of this attack that allows arbitrary message modification. Also a significantly faster method for identifying weak AES-GCM keys has been discovered. As a hash function researcher I would personally select SHA-512 with digest truncated to required number of bits as an interim solution. SHA-512/256 tends to be faster than SHA-256 in software. Also it makes sense to implement a single hash core rather than two (SHA-256 and SHA-512 are fundamentally different). This is also in the standards, see: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/fips180-4/Draft-FIPS180-4_Feb2011.… Cheers, - markku Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos(a)reveresecurity.com>

8 8

Subject: Re: The consequences of key compromise (or the reasons for changing)
by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen 04 Nov '11

04 Nov '11

From: Jon Callas <joncallas(a)me.com> > People should get off of 80-bit crypto as soon as is reasonably possible. This means RSA 1024, SHA-1, etc. NIST recommended doing this by the end of 2010, but are now holding their nose and saying that 2013 is the real new date. Absolutely agree. The 80-bit figure was apparently adopted by U.S. Government some 25+ years ago (skipjack etc). > This seems basically reasonable to me. No one has yet factored a 768-bit number, let alone a 1K one. 768-bit RSA was factored in 2009 and the authors of that paper conjecture that 1024 bits would be factored "within a decade" and recommend that 1024-bit RSA should be phased out within a couple of years. http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/006.pdf I am certainly doing that with the stuff that I am maintaining. > SHA-1 actually looks safer today than it did in 2005. But still. Moving away is a Good Thing, so long as it doesn't make you do something stupid. Well, after the 2005 Wang-Yin-Yu paper which had a 2^69 attack, there was a claimed 2^52 attack in 2009 which turned out to have a flawed cost evaluation. There has also been talk of a 2^63 attack, but that difference can be put down to attack implementation skill and detail. I was always doubtful whether or not those techniques could be expanded to work against the SHA-2 algorithms. It is also funny that many people talk about SHA-2 as if was a single algorithm; there are actually two quite distinct algorithms, one for (now fading) 32-bit architectures (SHA-224,SHA-256) and one for 64-bit algorithms (SHA-384,SHA-512,SHA-512/224,SHA-512/256). The variants of these two algorithms only differ in the number of output bits and the IV values and hence have a constant speed regardless of their digest size. You can run "openssl speed sha" to see a real-world performance comparison on a particular box. Cheers, - markku Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos(a)reveresecurity.com>

2 1

The consequences of key compromise (or the reasons for changing)
by Watson Ladd 04 Nov '11

04 Nov '11

Dear all, Recently Zooko forwarded an email asking why we have to migrate. I am outlining the reasons in this email why I believe Tor needs to use stronger cryptography very soon. Tor currently uses RSA-1024 bit keys for OR public identities and 1024-bit Diffie Hellman for the negotiation of keys protecting circuits. It also uses SHA-1 for a hash in serveral applications, including key fingerprints. When deciding if these are adequate it is necessary to think about what compromise gives an attacker and what it costs to compromise Tor cryptography. We are aiming to protect users from TLAs with ASICs. Directory keys are 3024 bit RSA. Compromising a directory key is sufficient to generate directories containing fake entries, and thus break the anonymityof all users who see the fake directory. In the event of a compromise, Tor would be unusable until a new version is put out with a longer key length and new directory keys. But these are long keys. However, the keys that actually sign the directories are 1024 bits, but rotate every 3 months. OR keys are also 1024 bit RSA. Compromise of an OR key enables impersonation of the OR to an OP. Combined with fun and games with BGP it enables impersonation of an OR to other ORs, which can direct significant traffic to the fake OR. Detection is likely as the real OR will notice various refusals to connect by other OR to whom it is not connected. And if you can break the directory key why bother with ORs. Hidden services are also identified by 1024 bit RSA keys. At the circuit level DH keys are 1024 bits. An attacker who compromises these can read data intended for further down in the circuit. In particular they can determine the rest of a circuit if they are the first node. There is also the issue of keysize. A Tor cell is 512 bytes long. Thisis sufficent for only 4 keys, if we pack them very tightly. Smaller keys could enable fast circuit initiation or other cool tricks we cannot use today. So, how strong or weak are RSA-1024 and DH-1024 currently? We are using DH over F_q* where q = a big prime. For DH the best known algorithm is the index calculus. This attack proceeds in 3 steps. The first step, which can be spread over multiple keys is the collection of relations among a factor base, usually of small primes. The second step, again spread over multiple keys, is solving the linear system of equations from the first step. The third step is fast and key specific: given an element h,and generator g we attempt to factor g^s*h over the factor base. The general number field sieve is a very similar algorithm for factoring. It is more complicated but again relies on finding smooth numbers and factoring them with respect to a factor base of small primes. Currently the complexity of these algorithms is L_n[1/3,\sqrt^3_{\frac{64}{9}}]for GNFS and L_n[1/2,c] for index calculus. (From wikipedia). Sadly the sieving stepscan be done very well on special hardware. TWIRL, a specialized hardwaredevice designed by Adi Shamir and Eran Tromer is believed by Shamir and Tromer to be capable of factoring a 1024-bit RSA key in a year at a cost of $10 million dollars. To break 10 directory keys in 3 months is 10 times as many keys, and 4 times the speed. That will be $400 million dollars. That is half the cost of Golden Shield for a year: an amount of money that is not ludicrous. And such a machine once built can crack the next 10 keys for free. The cost is design and fabrication of this device: power is comparatively cheap. Of course, such a machine would be unsuited to other bit sizes. If the attacker instead decides to find a discrete logarithm base for DH over 1024, then they will have the ability to break DH-1024 fairly quickly. I haven't seen a good estimate for the time it would take to do this, but it will be a bit more. It will not be much more. And it will be a total break: once a factor basis is found discrete logs are very fast. So an adversary can spend more time and still be happy with the results. So it isn't just directory signing that is an issue but the link protocol as well. And $400 million is a lot. But when you are the Golden Shield director and someone says "for $400 million we can break Tor for a long time" that is not entirely out of the picture. As technology for ASIC fabrication gets better, this price drops. As GNFS gets better it also drops. As index calculus gets better it drops. And as Balmol's cost disease drives up the cost and budget of Golden Shields regular activities, the price drops. Sincerely, Watson Ladd

3 2

[idle speculation] Combining bridge partioning and limiting directory trust?
by Watson Ladd 04 Nov '11

04 Nov '11

Dear all, I read arma's blog entry calling for someone to see if limiting zig-zag attacks would harm anonymity. Well, I don't have an answer, but I did notice that we could increase the number of bridge authorities by having each bridge authority take a distinct subset of bridges to hand out, and then implementing a honest forwarder that forwards an email asking for bridges to a bridge authority based on some hash function of the requesting gmail address. Compromising an authority results in those bridges being cut off, but only a subset of users are affected. This also prevents zig-zag attacks: there are no clients who see bridges in two distinct authorities mandate. Unfortunately this only works if bridges are careful not to be listed by multiple authorities. Sincerely, Watson Ladd -- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin

1 0

patch to torspec that seperates out the crypto.
by Watson Ladd 03 Nov '11

03 Nov '11

Dear all, Here is a patch that removes crypto cruft from torspec.txt. It does make torspec unusable because we haven't written crypto.txt yet. In the process I noticed a few things I cleaned up, and also noticed that RELAY_EXTEND cells have to be understood by both ORs, which could be an impediment to migration. Sincerely, Watson Ladd

2 1

Leap Seconds
by Watson Ladd 03 Nov '11

03 Nov '11

Dear All, What precisely is the timestamp? Right now it says "number of seconds since the Unix epoch" which leaves open TAI, UTC, or UT1. We probably are using UTC so I should say that, but I just want to make sure. Sincerely, Watson Ladd

1 0

Rewriting tor-spec to be crypto agnostic
by Watson Ladd 03 Nov '11

03 Nov '11

Dear all, I'm busy rewriting tor-spec (well, mangling it) to be crypto agnostic (read: shoving hard choices to later). In the process I am trying to make it a bit clearer. The spec seems to hold open the possibility that nodes not on the two ends of a circuit can send recognized RELAY cells (the role of OPs in processing RELAY cells is also unclear). Is this the case, or is this not supported given that there are no points at which the spec explicitly calls for them to be sent? Sincerely, Watson Ladd

2 1

A concrete proposal for crypto (at least part of it)
by Watson Ladd 02 Nov '11

02 Nov '11

Dear All, Rather then get further sucked into a debate that is producing more heat then light about Wegman-Carter, I've decided to make a concrete proposal for how Tor can better protect its streams from manipulation. Right now Tor encrypts the streams of data from a client to a OR with AES-CTR and no integrity checks. I propose the following: On establishment of a new connection between a client and an OR (using either the Goldman et al paper or ephermental DH) the client and the OR derive a single 16-byte K. The client has an 8 byte counter which starts at 1, the client counter, the OR an 8 byte counter which starts at 0, the OR counter. Each cell from the client to the OR is protected by AES-GCM defined as in the NIST standard, with a 4 byte string "TorC" being used to make our counter 12 bytes. (If you read the standard you will see this is the method for generating nonces recommended). The counter is incremented by 2 each time a packet is sent. Under no circumstances can it go backward. Under no circumstances does an OR or Client accept a packet that reuses a nonce (nonces should be sent along if we make transport unreliable). Under no circumstances are more then 2^64 packets sent. Under no circumstances are packets longer then 2^32 bytes. Following these rules an attacker who sends 2^64 forgery attempts has probability 2^-36 of successfully forging one message. If we limit the attacker to 2 billion forgery attempts (forgery must be online) then the probability of forgery is 2^-68. I think we can live with that. These numbers come from http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/securitywcs-20050227.pdf. Note that these numbers assume AES is secure, and are theorems if AES is secure. This proposal is independent from the establishment of streams. This proposal eliminates issues relating to an intermediate node flipping bits in an HTTP request, thereby tagging the traffic, amongst other evil things manipulation can do. If we want more performance the evaluation of a polynomial over GF(2^128) can be replaced by GF(2^130-5), or AES could be replaced by xsalsa20, and the nonce lengthened. Sincerely, Watson Ladd --- "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." -- Benjamin Franklin

4 5

SHA-3 isn't looking so hot to me (was: Draft sketch document with ideas for future crypto ops)
by Zooko O'Whielacronx 02 Nov '11

02 Nov '11

In reference to: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2011-November/002999.html > FOR A HASH FUNCTION: SHA256, switching to SHA3 in 2012 when it comes > out. It might be worthwhile waiting for SHA3 in most places and > skipping over the SHA256 stage entirely. The AES contest resulted in a cipher that was much faster than 3-DES and probably safer as well. It is looking like the SHA-3 contest will result in a hash function that is slightly slower than SHA-256, and not obviously safer either! There are some details about the performance issue: the most efficient SHA-3 candidates are faster than SHA-256 on large, expensive, powerful x86_64 servers, and they are faster on long messages (more than a couple thousand bytes). This almost certainly doesn't matter to the tor project! (Nor, I suspect, to almost anyone else.) I'm guessing (sorry for my ignorance about these important facts) that tor uses secure hashes in two ways: first as the "nails" holding the crypto together, such as in commitments, key-derivation, HMAC, and so forth, and second to integrity-check the bulk data in chunks that are approximately "packet sized" -- a few thousand bytes. On a powerful x86_64 server for 4096 bytes [1], the most efficient SHA-3 candidate (Blake-256) takes about 33,000 cycles and SHA-256 takes about 73,000. So the difference is about 40,000 CPU cycles. Assuming that all of this is done on a single core of a 3.4 GHz chip, that means SHA-256 takes about 12 microseconds longer to hash this 4096-byte packet. I don't think that makes much of a difference to anyone. You'd have to process data at more than 190,000,000 bytes per second before this would exceed your ability to do it that with SHA-256 on a single one of the 4 cores that come in that chip. Is that a realistic amount of data for a single tor node to process per second in forseeable future? (Honest question: I have no idea if it is although I would guess not.) Anyway, if you *do* want to process more than 190 MBytes/s on a fancy server in the next few years, you can probably just use more than one of its cores. On the other hand, what if someone wants to deploy Tor in a 32-bit ARM CPU such as in a Freedom Box or in a smart phone. When it is doing 4096-byte packets, Blake-256 is actually less efficient than SHA-256 by about 36,000 cycles. Since the chip in that device is running at a slower clock rate (maybe 800 MHz), then it takes 45 microseconds more to hash that 4096-byte packet with Blake-256 than with SHA-256. If you hash those packets with the slower of the two algorithms (Blake-256), you could handle about 25 MBytes/s using 100% of the only CPU in the system. If you used SHA-256 instead you could handle 35 MBytes/s. If you are using say, 90% of that CPU for other tasks. such as playing a game or watching a movie while running Tor in the background, or even playing a movie which is streaming in over Tor live, then this is the difference between being able to process 2.5 MBytes/s (Blake-256) and 3.5 MBytes/s (SHA-256). That seems be a difference that might matter in practice, unlike the performance difference on expensive x86_64 servers. Okay, what about the "not obviously safer" part? I think there was a bit of a panic a few years ago, in the aftermath of Wang Xiaoyun's breakthrough on SHA-1, that someone might suddenly figure out a way to find collisions in SHA-256. This panic spurred the creation of the SHA-3 project. However, it seems like in the intervening years nobody has published any techniques that really threaten the safety of SHA-256, so now I'm personally no longer so confident that SHA-3 candidates like Blake will endure longer before someone finds a fatal flaw in them than SHA-256 will. SHA-256 has endured substantial analysis by experts for about a decade now. Blake and its fellow competitors have had about three years. I'm not saying that I'm confident that SHA-256 will outlast Blake! I'm saying it could go either way. Bottom line: I would probably move ahead toward SHA-256 and let SHA-3 mature for a few extra years before planning to move to that, if I were you. Regards, Zooko [1] http://bench.cr.yp.to/results-hash.html

5 8

Draft sketch document with ideas for future crypto ops
by Nick Mathewson 02 Nov '11

02 Nov '11

Here's an early draft document trying to sketch out the parameters for migrating to better crypto ops and designs in the future. Comments are invited, even comments of the form "you will need to be much more specific here before I can say anything sensible." This is proposals/ideas/xxx-new-crypto-sketch.txt in the torspec repository. Title: Design sketch for new crypto ops Date: 31 Oct 2011 Author: Nick Mathewson 0. Overview The point of this document is to discuss what crypto we ought to be using. See "Initial Thoughts on Migrating Tor to New Cryptography" from last year for general guidelines and principles. In broad strokes, the parts of our crypto are: IDENTITY KEYS AND FINGERPRINTS Addressed here in Section 2. LINK CRYPTO (TLS) -- Addressed in proposals 176, 184. We say a little here in section 5, though. CREATE/EXTEND CRYPTO -- Addressed in xxx-ntor-handshake.txt and rransom's EXTEND draft at [*] and subsequent discussion on the tor-dev mailing list. Not considered here. RELAY CRYPTO Addressed here in Section 6. DIRECTORY SYSTEM Addressed here. HIDDEN SERVICE SYSTEM Addressed in a forthcoming document by rransom. [*] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2011-March/002547.html 1. Base algorithm choice There seem to be two main candidate algorithms for signatures: RSA with big keys (hereinafter "RSA>1024"); and Ed25519, which is DSA with the sharp edges filed off on an Edwards curve related to DJB's Curve25519. We can look at other ECC groups too. {But see ECC Notes in 1.1 below.} FOR DIFFIE-HELLMAN: Curve25519 seems like a decent choice; failing that, one of the NIST P-groups. Failing that, DH on Z_p with big groups (hereinafter "DH>1024"). {But see ECC Notes in 1.1 below.} FOR A HASH FUNCTION: SHA256, switching to SHA3 in 2012 when it comes out. It might be worthwhile waiting for SHA3 in most places and skipping over the SHA256 stage entirely. FOR A STREAM CIPHER: AES-CTR is in one sense a conservative choice inasmuch as AES is well-analyzed, but AES's well-known issues with cache-based timing attacks are pretty worrisome. We can mitigate that some by using random secret IVs for AES-CTR, so that we will be encrypting neither attacker-chosen nor attacker-known plaintext with our AES cipher, but that's a bit kludgy. There are also supposed to be time-invariant implementations that use Intel's AESNI instructions where available, and time-invariant implementations that use bit-slicing. Salsa20 is what rransom likes these days, but IMO we aren't competent to tell whether it looks good or not; the existing attacks against it don't look like very bad news to me, but who knows whether it's getting enough attention that we can read. See also ChaCha; see also the other eSTREAM winners/finalists; see also SHA3 if the SHA3 winner specifies a way to use it as a stream cipher, or specifies an underlying stream/block cipher. If we're feeling cautious, we could run two independently-keyed stream ciphers and xor their streams together. FOR A RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR: We currently use OpenSSL seeded with RAND_poll and with platform entropy. OpenSSL uses a message-digest- based algorithm from SSLeay (See http://linux.die.net/man/3/sslrand for the ugly details.) The platform entropy management can be messy, obscure, or both. I suggest that: * We should seed our PRNG with more entropy sources if we can find some promising code with an appropriate license * Instead of just using OpenSSL's PRNG, we should use OpenSSL's MD-based PRNG xor'd with some other good PRNG. (Fortuna, maybe. Is there a combine operation better than xor? See also SHA3 if the SHA3 winner is one that specifies a PRNG mode of operation.) * We should consider splicing this combined-stream PRNG into OpenSSL as the RNG it uses for SSL and key generation. * We should re-seed the RNG before and after very sensitive operations, like private key generation. 1.1. ECC notes ECC is the brave new[*] crypto of the future! It's faster[**] than doing crypto in Z_n (as we do for RSA and DH now) for equivalent levels of security, and the resulting outputs are much shorter. As near as I can tell as a layman, Certicom is muddying the waters as much as possible wrt claiming that it's nigh-impractical to deploy ECC without licensing their patents. This is rather like the silliness that PKP used to pull back in the day, where they claimed that their patents covered not only the existing public key cryptography algorithms, but also the very idea of public key cryptography itself. DJB claims that for every patent he's aware of, either that patent doesn't cover his code, or that patent is invalid because of prior art. I'm not going to try to evaluate these claims, since I'm not supposed to be reading patents for typical "let's avoid the appearance of knowing infringement" reasons. But before we dive into the world of ECC, we should see if we can ask any friendly patent attorneys and ECC experts for a second or third opinion here. I note in passing that nearly all of the patents that DJB mentions in his list would appear to expire over the next 12 months or so. Additionally, there are ECC groups out there less fast than DJB's, but more widely available and analyzed. We should consider some of those too. One final issue to investigate is whether using these algorithms will make any major free software distribution decide not to include us. I seem to recall seeing that one or two of the big ones had at one point decided to ship OpenSSL only with ECC disabled, either because of real patent concerns, or because of an opinion that the Certicom license for ECC use in TLS was problematic for free software, or something like that. We should check that out. [*] Actually, it's older than onion routing, and older than some members of the Tor Project. [**] Actually, because of the common practice of choosing a small-ish prime value (65537) for e in RSA, RSA public key operations can be a little faster than equivalent-security ECDH or ECDSA operations. The private key operations in RSA are still much much slower. 2. New identities Identity keys and their fingerprints are used: - To sign router descriptors. - To identify nodes in consensus directories. - To make sure we're talking to the right node in the link handshake. - To make sure that the extending node is talking to the right next node when sending an extend cell. - To identify particular nodes in the hidden service subsystem. - To identify nodes in the UI in various places. - Internally, to identify a node uniquely in the codebase. - To determine which part of the circuit ID space to use on a Tor instance's links. 2.1. New identities, option 1: "RSA>1024, slow migration" In this option, we use RSA for identity keys indefinitely. Nearly all operations done with an identity key are signature checking; signing happens only a few times an hour per node even with pathological cases. Since signature checking is really cheap with RSA, there's no speed advantage for ECC here. (There is a space advantage, since the keys are much smaller.) The easiest way to migrate to longer identity keys is to tell all Tors to begin accepting longer identity keys now, and to tweak all our protocols so that longer RSA identity keys are understood. We should then have a pair of parameters in the consensus that determines the largest and smallest acceptable identity key size in the network. Clients and servers should reject any keys longer or shorter than specified. Once all versions of Tor can accept long identity keys, we raise the maximum size from 1024 to somewhere in the 2048-4096 range. 2.2. New identities option 2: "RSA>1024, faster migration" In this option, we use RSA for identity keys indefinitely as above. But we allow nodes to begin having longer identities now, even though older Tors won't understand them. This implies, of course, that every such node needs to have at least 2 identities: one RSA1024 identity for backward compatibility, one RSA>1024 identity for more secure identification. We would have these identities cross-certify as follows: All keys would be listed in the router descriptor. RSA>1024 keys would be called something other than identity-key, so as not to confuse older clients. A signature with the RSA>1024 key would appear right before the current RSA1024 signature. This way, signed material would include both keys, and would be signed by both keys. [In other words, descriptors would look something like: router foo... ... identity-key -----BEGIN RSA KEY----- 1024-bit RSA key here -----END RSA KEY----- ext-identity-key -----BEGIN RSA KEY----- 3072-bit RSA key here -----END RSA KEY----- ... ext-signature -----BEGIN SIGNATURE----- signature of everything through "ext-signature\n", using the long key -----END SIGNATURE----- router-signature -----BEGIN SIGNATURE----- signature of everything through "router-signature\n", using the short key -----END SIGNATURE----- ] See "UI notes" in the "new fingerprints" section below for some of the implications of letting nodes have multiple identity keys. We'll need to advertise these new identities in consensus directories too; see 4.2 below for more info there. 2.3. New identities option 3: "RSA>1024 and/or Ed25519, faster migration" As in option 2 above, but new keys can also be Ed25519. If we expect that not all installations will allow Ed25519 (see "ECC Notes", section 1.1), we'll need to say that every server with an Ed25519 key must also have an RSA>1024 key. 2.4. Implications for current use of identity keys Let's review our use of identity keys again and make sure that we can handle all of them with the ideas above. - To sign router descriptors. We discussed this in 2.2. - To make sure we're talking to the right node in the link handshake. The current v3 link handshake can handle presenting multiple identity certificates in the CERT cell. We should consider ourselves to be connected to a node with identity X if _any_ of the identity certificates that it presents in its authenticated CERT cell has identity X. To handle EXTEND cells correctly, we should verify every identity we can. - To make sure that the extending node is talking to the right next node when sending an extend cell. The new extend cell format needs to allow the client to tell the extending node about some identity for the destination node that the extending node will be able to understand. This is a capability of the extending node that the client needs to be able to check. (Also, the extend cell needs to hash that identity in a form the extending node can understand, but that's a fingerprint issue.) - To determine which part of the circuit ID space to use on a Tor instance's links. We can continue to use RSA1024 identity key comparison here by default. We can also use some other parameter of the v3 handshake, or introduce a new link protocol where if the initiator authenticates, the initiator always gets the low circIDs and the responder always gets the high ones. - To identify nodes in consensus directories. - To identify nodes in the UI in various places. - Internally, to identify a node uniquely in the codebase. See sections 3 and 4 below. - To identify particular nodes in the hidden service subsystem. Out of scope. 2.5. Migrating away from short ID keys entirely Eventually, no version of Tor that requires 1024-bit identity keys will remain. When that happens, we should stop using them entirely. That means that if we take any path other than the "slow migration" path of 2.1, we'll need to make everything that looks at a node's identity also accept nodes with _only_ a RSA>1024/Ed25519 identity. At the directory service level, we should have an option to allow nodes without RSA1024 identity keys (off until all clients and nodes accept new identity keys). 2.6. Selective correctness attacks For any scheme based on having multiple signature types on a router descriptor or other document, an attacker could mount a partitioning attack by making a document which older clients will accept but newer clients will reject. It's easy to prevent this at the consensus step: directory authorities MUST NOT accept any descriptor unless all clients will be able to verify it. For bridge descriptors, we need to investigate more carefully. 3. New fingerprints Right now we compute fingerprints by taking the SHA1 hash of an ASN1 encoding of the RSA1024 identity key. We encode this in hex almost everywhere, and sometimes prefix it with a $. I propose that fingerprints of the future be determined by taking a digest using SHA256 or SHA3 of: "Hash Algorithm Name", "Key Type Name", encoded key When representing these internally, we should include the hash algorithm that was used. When representing them in the UI, we should use the notation %b64, where b64 is a base-64 encoding, omitting the trailing =s. (Other plausible characters to use are @, ?, +, ~, =, etc. I like %, but can be persuaded. Bikeshed bikeshed bikeshed.) Since 43 base-64 characters is enough to represent a 256-bit digest, with 2 bits left over, I propose that the b64 value encode hh | D(hash algorithm name, key type, encoded key) where hh is a 2-bit value, with one of the following values: 00 -- sha256 01 -- sha3 10 -- to be determined 11 -- reserved. We should investigate in the interface whether it's plausible to allow a prefix of a node ID where the full ID would otherwise be required. That seems risky for short prefixes, though. 3.1. How many fingerprints is that anyway?! Suppose that we allow sha256 and sha3 as hash algorithms, and we allow each node to have 3 identity keys: one RSA1024, one RSA>1024, and one ECC. Then we would have 7 fingerprints (6 plus the legacy SHA1(RSA1024) fingerprint), for a total of 20+6*32==212 bytes per node. It's not a horrible problem to accept them all in the UI, but the UI isn't the only place that needs to know fingerprints. Instead, let's say that RSA1024 identities are only identified with SHA1 hashes. This limits our fingerprint load to a more manageable 20+32*2 == 84 bytes per node. Still not great, though. 3.2. What does this imply for the UI? In the UI we'll lose the property that no node has more than one fingerprint: I do not believe that this actually hurts us. 3.3. Implications for directory information Clients must know a hash for each node's identity key, or else they can't make an authenticated connection to the node or tell ORs how to extend to the node. This means that if client Alice wants to connect to node Bob, Alice must have a fingerprint of Bob's ID key such that she understands the ID key type and the fingerprint algorithm. If Alice wants to extend from Bob to Carol, she must have a fingerprint of Carol's ID key such that Bob understands the ID key type and the fingerprint algorithm. So for every node, Alice must not only know a fingerprint that *she* can use for that node, but also a set of fingerprints such that every node can understand at least one fingerprint in the set. This implies a proliferation of fingerprints! We should tread carefully here. To prevent proliferation, the easiest solution is not to add too many new types and to have a good plan for retiring older types. 3.4. Implications for EXTEND cells As mentioned in 3.3, when a client Alice tells node Bob to extend to node Carol, she needs to give Bob a fingerprint for Carol that Bob will understand: one where Bob understands the digest algorithm, and understands the identity key type. There are two ways we can do this: 1) Alice's EXTEND cell contains every fingerprint for Carol that Alice knows about. Bob treats the cell as valid if every one he can verify is correct. 2) Alice knows which fingerprint types Bob understands (either via his version, or something else in his directory info). She selects a fingerprint for Carol using the best one of these types. The first seems more robust to me, if we have space for enough bytes. If we proliferate too many types, though, we'll need to do the second. 4. Directory changes 4.1. Better cross-referencing In some places, directory objects cross-reference one another by SHA1 hash. They should use a better hash algorithm instead. This does make problems in a few cases. Router descriptors and extrainfo descriptors: One problematic case is in determining node families. If node A and node B want to list each other as being in the same family, they need to do so in a way that clients can interpret. That could mean listing SHA1-RSA1024 fingerprints so old clients understand, AND new fingerprints for security. (But *that* could create interesting partitioning attacks wherein your family looks different depending on who's looking.) Solution: we need to move the responsibility for combining node families into the consensus voting process, so clients don't need to understand the cross-reference types themselves. Another case is in certifying extrainfo documents from descriptors. For that, we can list multiple extrainfo digests, either on the extrainfo line, or on additional lines. Voting and consensus documents: Adding more fingerprints in votes isn't a problem; votes are a tiny fraction of authority bw usage. Adding more hashes is easy. For consensus documents, we ought to have flavors that you can download depending on what set of fingerprint types you understand. For integrity purposes, consensuses can refer to microdescriptors or descriptors by any digest type that the client understands. But for downloading purposes, the digest type must be one that directory caches also support: see 4.4. 4.2. More fingerprints Because extending from node A to node B requires that we have node B's fingerprint in a way that node A will understand, it is not enough to get a set of identity fingerprints for each node in the format that the client likes best -- see 3.3 and 3.4 above. So every flavor of consensus we serve needs to include a node identity in a format the client understands, and node identities in formats such that every node will understand at least one. 4.3. An option: compound signatures on directory objects In Tor 0.2.2.x and later, when we check a signature on a directory object (not including hidden service descriptors), we only look at the first DIGEST_LEN bytes of the RSA-signed data. Once 0.2.1.x is obsolete, or on any types of signatures not checked in 0.2.1.x, we can use the rest of the space. (We're using PKCS1 padding on our signatures, which has an overhead of 11 bytes. Signing a SHA1 hash with a 1024-bit key therefore leaves 128-11-20==97 more bytes we could use for a SHA2 or a SHA3 hash.) 4.4. Downloading by digest We should have directory caches support downloading objects by more hash types. Right now, descriptors are downloaded by their SHA1 hashes and microdescriptors by their SHA256 hashes. This is okay for now, but once SHA3 is out, we should support downloading all of these by SHA3 digest. 5. Link crypto changes Currently we use TLS. That's fine. We should however look to longer link keys, bigger DH groups, etc. Once TLS versions 1.1/1.2 are available in OpenSSL, we should move to use them, I think. We should also look into how quickly we can deprecate TLS 1.0 and SSL <= 3 usage. 6. Relay crypto changes There are a few things we might want out of improved relay crypto. They include: - Resistance to end-to-end bitwise tagging attacks. - Better resistance to malleability. - If using counter mode, no block-cipher operations on any value known to the attacker. I'll try to provide these in increasing order of difficulty. None of these is necessarily correct; I should look for a security proof or a better construction for any that we seem likely to use. Rationales: Our existing malleability resistance is a kludge. Doing no block-cipher ops on attacker-known values increases our security margins a little. Our arguments about tagging attacks hold that an attacker who controls both ends has plenty of ways to win even if tagging attacks are foiled; nonetheless, most of these ways are technically slightly more difficult than xor-based tagging, and it could be useful to boost our defense-in-depth a little bit, just in case other active end-to-end attacks turn out to be harder than we'd thought. 6.1. Option 1: Use AES-CTR in a less scary mode When doing key expansion, in addition to establishing Kf, Kb, Df, and Db, also establish IVf and IVb. Use the current relay crypto, except instead of starting the counters at 0, start them at IVf and IVb. This way, an attacker doesn't have any known plaintexts to work with, which makes AES a little more robust. 6.2. Option 2: As 1, but tagging attacks garble the circuit after one block. Keep an HMAC of all previously received encrypted cells on a circuit. When decrypting a cell, use this HMAC value to determine the first 64 bits of the counter; increment the low 64 bits of the counter as usual. This way, if an adversary flips any bits before passing the stream through an honest node, no _subsequent_ block will be recoverable. To prevent any part of the stream from being re-used, close any circuit if the low 64 bits of the counter would ever wrap (that is, around 295 million terabytes). (If we're using a stream cipher with fast re-key, then we can just have the key used for each block be an HMAC of all previously received ciphertext.) 6.3. Option 3: As 1, but tagging attacks garble the circuit in the same block. Use a large-block cipher mode, such as BEAR or LIONESS (depending on whether we need a PRP or SPRP). Base the key material for each block on an HMAC of all previous blocks' ciphertexts. This way, if an adversary makes any alteration in a block, that block and all subsequent blocks will be garbled. It's more expensive than 2, though, especially if we need to use a LIONESS construction. {I considered IGE here, with a trick where odd-numbered nodes on a circuit start from the front of the block and even-numbered nodes start from the end, but it didn't seem much better. We should investigate relative performance, though.} 6.4. Option 4: Shall we have middle nodes be able to fast-stop bad data? In all the above options, if a cell is altered, the middle node can at best turn that cell and the rest of the cells on the circuit into garbage, which the last node won't deliver (if honest) or can't deliver (if dishonest). Might we prefer to do as in mixnets, and have nodes kill circuits upon receiving altered cells? It's not such an obvious improvement. Including more MACs is more expensive in per-cell overhead. The attacks that we would foil this way but not with Option 3 are not so much better than the the passive or timing-based-active end-to-end attacks that would still remain. Consider that if option 3 is in place, an end-to-end attacker who wants to do a tagging attack at one node can garble the rest of the circuit and see if the output is garbled at the exit node. But such an attacker could just as easily close the circuit at one of those nodes and watch for a corresponding close event, or even better -- simply pause traffic on that circuit for a while and watch for a corresponding gap at the exit. The only advantage of the garbling attack would be that garbled cells are presumably rarer than circuit closes or traffic pauses, and thus easier to use to distinguish target circuits. But that's still questionable: the other attacks win fine, and the pause attack doesn't risk detection as much. So why might we want to do this? First, the overhead doesn't need to be as bad as you might first expect (see below). Second, it would be nice to increase the security margin as much as possible: "attacks only get better". So let's figure out how it would look. To do this one, we'd want to have outgoing and incoming circuits treated differently. Incoming cells would get decrypted as in 1 above, except that we'd have a MAC on them. For outgoing cells, each node would check that the first N bytes of the cell match a MAC of all data seen so far, *including the rest of the cell*. They'd then remove the first N bytes, re-pad the cell with bytes from a PRNG, and decrypt the resulting re-padded cell. (This is basically how mixmaster works, and how mixminion works in the common case.) The space overhead here is kind of large: N bits per cell per node. In the most paranoid case, if we used 256-bit HMACs on 3-node paths, that's 96 bytes per cell, which is more than 20% of the total length. But we can probably do better if we let the CREATE operation also tell the node some N to check. For example, the first node doesn't need to check any bits. The second and third nodes could check 64 bits apiece; that only has 16 bytes overhead total, and high probability of catching any changes. (Birthday attacks don't matter here, and an attacker who mounts this attack for long enough to accidentally find a 64-bit MAC will break so many circuits in the process as to become totally unreliable.) All of this leaks the path lengths and position on the path to various nodes. We might open ourselves up to partitioning attacks if different clients choose different numbers of bits. What's more, we might leak the length of the path to the last node by how much junk there is at the end of the cell. So we'd need to be careful! Here's a simple construction for this format, to be concrete: The CREATE operation's KDF produces the following outputs: Kf, IVf (stream cipher key and IV for forward direction) Kb, IVb (stream cipher key and IV for reverse direction) Mf (MAC key for forward direction) Mb (MAC key for reverse direction) SEEDf (PRNG key for forward direction) And it also sets the following user-selected parameter: MACBYTESf (an integer between 0 and 32 inclusive) MACBYTESb (an integer between 0 and 32 inclusive) CANEXIT (boolean: can we exit from this hop?) Let Kf[i], Mf[i], etc denote the parameter Kf, Mf, etc as shared between the client and the i'th node in its circuit. Relay cells sent towards the client have the following plaintext format: Body: Content: Relay Command [1 byte] StreamID [2 bytes] Length [2 bytes] Data [Up to CELL_DATA_LEN-5-MACBYTESb bytes] Padding [randomly generated as needed to fill the cell] MAC(All previous encrypted content + encrypted content, Mb)[:MACBYTESb] [MACBYTESb bytes] The originator of the client-bound cell encrypts the content with the next part of its Kb,IVb stream, then appends the MAC. Non-clients receiving a client-bound relay cell encrypt the entire cell body, MAC included, with the next part of the stream cipher that was keyed with Kb,IVb. When the client receives a relay cell body, it iteratively does: For node i in circuit from 1..N: Let cells_i = all previous cells which we previously decided were from node i, or relayed by node i, and let cellbody = the body of the cell, except for the last MACBYTESb[i] bytes, and let cellmac = the last MACBYTESb[i] bytes of this cell. If cellmac is nonempty, check wither cellmac = mac_received, where mac_received is the first MACBYTESb[i] bytes of MAC(cells_i | cellbody, Mb[i]). If so, this cell is from node i. If this cell is from node i, add cellbody to cells_i, then decrypt cellbody using the stream keyed with Kb[i],IVb[i]. Act on it as a relay cell. Otherwise add the entire cell to cells_i, and decrypt it, MAC included, with the stream keyed with Kb[i], IVb[i]. If no node sent this cell: it's junk and somebody is probably messing with us! Destroy the circuit. When the client *sends* a cell outbound to node N: Let cells[i] start at "" for all i in 1...N initially, and get updated as below. Let MACLEN = SUM(MACBYTESf[1...N]) Let Body = Relay Command [1 byte] StreamID [2 bytes] Length [2 bytes] Data [Up to CELL_DATA_LEN-5-MACLEN bytes] Padding [randomly generated, CELL_DATA_LEN-5-MACLEN-len(Data) bytes] Let PAD[i] = the next MACBYTESf[i] bytes from the PRNG keyed with SEEDf[i], for i in 1...N Let STREAM[i] = the next CELL_DATA_LEN bytes of the stream keyed by Kf[i],IV[i], for i in 1...N Let PADSEEN[1] == "" For i in 2...N: Let L = len(PADSEEN[i-1]) + len(PAD[i-1]) Let PADSEEN[i] = (PADSEEN[i-1] | PAD[i-1]) xor STREAM[i-1][CELL_DATA_LEN-L:] For i in N down to 1: Let Encbody = Body xor STREAM[i][:len(Body)] Let extra = "RECOGNIZED" if i == N, "OK" otherwise Let cells[i] = cells[i] | Body | PADSEEN[i] Let M = MAC(cells[i] | extra , Mf[i]) Let Body = M[:MACBYTESf[i]] | EncBody To receive an outbound cell: Let M be the first MACBYTESf bytes of the cell, let REST be the rest of the cell, and let "cells" be all previous cells on this circuit. If CANEXIT, and M = MAC(cells|rest|"RECOGNIZED", Mb)[:MACBYTESf], and MACBYTESf > 0, this cell is for us. If M = MAC(cells|rest|"OK", Mb)[:MACBYTESf], this cell is not for us, but is valid. Otherwise, destroy the circuit. Let PAD = the next MACBYTESf[i] bytes of the PRNG keyed with SEEDf, and decrypt REST | PAD using the stream cipher keyed with Kf,IVf. If this cell is for us, act on it as a relay cell. Otherwise, relay it. ANOTHER VARIANT: If we restrict MACBYTESf values to range 0..HL/2, where HL is the length of the MAC output, we can replace MAC(x | "RECOGNIZED")[:MACBYTESf] and MAC(x | "OK")[:MACBYTESf] with MAC(x)[:MACBYTESf] and MAC(x)[HL-MACBYTESf:] PICKING MACBYTESf,MACBYTESb. We don't need to worry about birthday attacks: Because we're using a MAC, only the parties who are making the MACs could try to do a brute-force search for a collision, but they have no reason to do so. If a collision occurs accidentally, an adversary can't substitute an earlier-seen cell for a later one with the same MAC, since the MAC covers not only the cell, but all previous cells on the circuit. So 16 bytes is about the most we should ever do, given our usual security parameters. Let me moot the number 8 for MACBYTESb. For outbound cells, for any hop we can exit from, choosing MACBYTESf=6 gets us the current security level. For the first hop, assuming we don't exit from it, choosing MACBYTESf=0 is totally safe, since the link crypto guarantees that nothing was corrupted on the way. In general, to prevent an end-to-end tagging attack, it seems sufficient to do something like setting MACBYTES=8 for the last hop, and MACBYTES=8 for one hop in the middle. OTHER VARIANTS: Can we combine this approach with one of the approaches in 2 or 3 above to ensure that if corrupt data passes (because of our use of truncated HMACs) it still corrupts the stream? Can/should we use GCM or something here instead of separate encrypt/hmac operations? It doesn't seem that GCM per se would apply without some tweaking, which we probably do not have the expertise to do. OVERHEAD NOTES: When computing additional overhead with this method, note that it lets us replace the old 4 byte "digest" field and the 2 byte "recognized" field. I note in passing that we need at most 9 bits for the length field, and at most 6 bits for the command field, yet we're using a total of 3 bytes for those 15 bits. That's an opportunity to save another byte. ACKS Lots of the good ideas and concerns here are due to Robert Ransom. Michael Stone helped some with "relay option 4" above.

5 4