tor-dev

tor-dev@lists.torproject.org

3581 discussions

routers as bridges
by Rob van der Hoeven 06 Dec '11

06 Dec '11

In July i posted a message on this list proposing to use a router as a Tor bridge. Recently i liberated one of my routers with OpenWrt which made it possible to test this idea. Seems to work. Wrote a small article about it on my blog: http://freedomboxblog.nl/routers-as-tor-bridges/ Cheers, Rob. http://freedomboxblog.nl

1 0

Automatically retrieve and store information about bridges
by Sebastian Hahn 01 Dec '11

01 Dec '11

Filename: xxx-store-bridge-information.txt Title: Automatically retrieve and store information about bridges Author: Sebastian Hahn Created: 16-Nov-2011 Status: Open Target: 0.2.[45].x Overview: Currently, tor already stores some information about the bridges it is configured to use locally, but doesn't make great use of the stored data. This data is the Tor configuration information about the bridge (IP address, port, and optionally fingerprint) and the bridge descriptor which gets stored along with the other descriptors a Tor client fetches, as well as an "EntryGuard" line in the state file. That line includes the Tor version we used to add the bridge, and a slightly randomized timestamp (up to a month in the past of the real date). The descriptor data also includes some more accurate timestamps about when the descriptor was fetched. The information we give out about bridges via bridgedb currently only includes the IP address and port, because giving out the fingerprint as well might mean that Tor clients make direct connections to the bridge authority, since we didn't design Tor's UpdateBridgesFromAuthority behaviour correctly. Motivation: The only way to let Tor know about a change affecting the bridge (IP address or port change) is to either ask the bridge authority directly, or reconfigure Tor. The former requires making a non-anonymized direct connection to the bridge authority Tonga and asking it for the current descriptor of the bridge with a given fingerprint - this is unsafe and also requires prior knowledge of the fingerprint. The latter requires user intervention, first to learn that there was an update and second to actually teach Tor about the change. This is way too complicated for most users, and should be unnecessary while the user has at least one bridge that remains working: Tonga can give out bridge descriptors when asked for the descriptor for a certain fingerprint, and Tor clients learn the fingerprint either from their torrc file or from the first connection they make to a bridge. For some users, however, this option is not what they want: They might use private bridges or have special security concerns, which would make them want to connect to the IP addresses specified in their configuration only, and not tell Tonga about the set of bridges they know about, even through a Tor circuit. Also see https://blog.torproject.org/blog/different-ways-use-bridge for more information about the different types of bridge users. Design: Tor should provide a new configuration option that allows bridge users to indicate that they wish to contact Tonga anonymously and learn about updates for the bridges that they know about, but can't currently reach. Once those updates have been received, the clients would then hold on to the new information in their state file, and use it across restarts for connection attempts. The option UpdateBridgesFromAuthority should be removed or recycled for this purpose, as it is currently dangerous to set (it makes direct connections to the bridge authority, thus leaking that a user is about to use bridges). Recycling the option is probably the better choice, because current users of the option get a surprising and never useful behaviour. On the other hand, users who downgrade their Tors might get the old behaviour by accident. If configured with this option, tor would make an anonymized connection to Tonga to ask for the descriptors of bridges that it cannot currently connect to, once every few hours. Making more frequent requests would likely not help, as bridge information doesn't typically change that frequently, and may overload Tonga. This information needs to be stored in the state file: - An exact copy of the Bridge stanza in the torrc file, so that tor can detect when the bridge is unconfigured/the configuration is changed - The IP address, port, and fingerprint we last used when making a successful connection to the bridge, if this differs from/supplements the configured data. - The IP address, port, and fingerprint we learned from the bridge authority, if this differs from both the configured data and the data we used for the last successful connection. We don't store more data in the state file to avoid leaking too much if the state file falls into the hands of an adversary. Security implications: Storing sensitive data on disk is risky when the computer one uses gets into the wrong hands, and state file entries can be used to identify times the user was online. This is already a problem for the Bridge lines in a user's configuration file, but by storing more information about bridges some timings can be deduced. Another risk is that this allows long-term tracking of users when the set of bridges a user knows about is known to the attacker, and the set is unique. This is not very hard to achieve for bridgedb, as users typically make requests to it non-anomymized and bridgedb can selectively pick bridges to report. By combining the data about descriptor fetches on Tonga and this fingerprint, a usage pattern can be established. Also, bridgedb could give out a made-up fingerprint to a user that requested bridges, thus easily creating a unique set. Users of private bridges should not set this option, as it will leak the fingerprints of their bridges to Tonga. This is not a huge concern, as Tonga doesn't know about those descriptors, but private bridge users will likely want to avoid leaking the existence of their bridge. We might want to figure out a way to indicate that a bridge is private on the Bridge line in the configuration, so fetching the descriptor from Tonga is disabled for those automatically. This warrants more discussion to find a solution that doesn't require bridge users to understand the trade-offs of setting a configuration option. One idea is to indicate that a bridge is private by a special flag in its bridge descriptor, so clients can avoid leaking those to the bridge authority automatically. Also, Bridge lines for private bridges shouldn't include the fingerprint so that users don't accidentally leak the fingerprint to the bridge authority before they have talked to the bridge. Specification: No change/addition to the current specification is necessary, as the data that gets stored at clients is not covered by the specification. This document is supposed to serve as a basis for discussion and to provide hints for implementors. Compatibility: Tonga is already set up to send out descriptors requested by clients, so the bridge authority side doesn't need any changes. The new configuration options governing the behaviour of Tor would be incompatible with previous versions, so the torrc needs to be adapted. The state file changes should not affect older versions.

2 1

Proposal: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries
by George Kadianakis 01 Dec '11

01 Dec '11

Filename: XXX-mitm-bridge-detection-resistance.txt Title: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries Author: George Kadianakis Created: 07 Nov 2011 Status: Open 1. Overview Proposals 187, 189 and 190 make the first steps toward scanning resistant bridges. They attempt to block attacks from censoring adversaries who provoke bridges into speaking the Tor protocol. An attack vector that hasn't been explored in those previous proposals is that of an adversary capable of performing Man In The Middle attacks to Tor clients. At the moment, Tor clients using the v3 link protocol have no way to detect such an MITM attack, and will gladly send an VERSIONS or an AUTHORIZE cell to the MITMed connection, thereby revealing the Tor protocol and thus the bridge. This proposal introduces a way for clients to detect an MITMed SSL connection, allowing them to protect against the above attack. 2. Motivation When the v3 link handshake protocol is performed, Tor's SSL handshake is performed with the server sending a self-signed certificate and the client blindly accepting it. This allows the adversary to perform an MITM attack. A Tor client must detect the MITM attack before he initializes the Tor protocol by sending a VERSIONS or an AUTHORIZE cell. A good moment to detect such an MITM attack is during the SSL handshake. To achieve that, bridge operators provide their bridge users with a hash digest of the public-key certificate their bridge is using for SSL. Bridge clients store that hash digest locally and associate it with that specific bridge. Bridge clients who have "pinned" a bridge to a certificate "fingerprint" can thereafter validate that their SSL connection peer is the intended bridge. Of course, the hash digest must be provided to users out-of-band and before the actual SSL handshake. Usually, the bridge operator gives the hash digest to her bridge users along with the rest of the bridge credentials, like the bridge's address and port. 3. Security implications Bridge clients who have pinned a bridge to a certificate fingerprint will be able to detect an MITMing adversary in timely fashion. If after detection they act as an innocuous Internet client, they can successfully remove suspicion from the SSL connection and subvert bridge detection. Pinning a certificate fingerprint and detecting an MITMing attacker does not automatically aleviate suspicions from the bridge or the client. Clients must have a behavior to follow after detecting the MITM attack so that they look like innocent Netizens. This proposal does not try to specify such a behavior. Implementation and use of this scheme does not render bridges and clients immune to scanning or DPI attacks. This scheme should be used along with bridge client authorization schemes like the ones detailed in proposal 190. 4. Tor Implementation 4.1. Certificate fingerprint creation The certificate fingerprints used on this scheme MUST be computed by applying the SHA256 cryptographic hash function upon the ASN.1 DER encoding of a public-key certificate. 4.2. Bridge side implementation Tor bridge implementations SHOULD provide a command line option that exports a fully equipped Bridge line containing the bridge address and port, the link certificate fingerprint and any other enabled Bridge options, so that bridge operators can easily send it to their users. In the case of expiring SSL certificates, Tor bridge implementations SHOULD warn the bridge operator a sensible amount of time before the expiration, so that she can warn her clients and potentially rotate the certificate herself. 4.3. Client side implementation Tor client implementations MUST extend their Bridge line format to support bridge SSL certificate fingerprints. The new format is: Bridge <method> <address:port> [["keyid="]<id-fingerprint>] \ ["shared_secret="<shared_secret>] ["link_cert_fpr="<fingerprint>] where <fingerprint> is the bridge's SSL certificate fingerprint in hexademical encoding. Tor clients who use bridges and want to pin their SSL certificates must specify the bridge's SSL certificate fingerprint as in: Bridge 12.34.56.78 shared_secret=934caff420aa7852b855 \ link_cert_fpr=38b0712e90bed729df81f2a22811d3dd89e91406d2522f4482ae4079e5245187 4.4. Implementation prerequisites Tor bridges currently rotate their SSL certificates every 2 hours. This not only acts as a fingerprint for the bridges, but it also acts as a blocker for this proposal. Tor trac ticket #4390 and proposal YYY were created to resolve this issue. 5. Acknowledgements Thanks to Robert Ransom for his great help and suggestions on devising this scheme and writing this proposal!

5 6

Sanitizing and publishing our web server logs
by Karsten Loesing 01 Dec '11

01 Dec '11

Hi everyone, we have been discussing sanitizing and publishing our web server logs for quite a while now. The idea is to remove all potentially sensitive parts from the logs, publish them in monthly tarballs on the metrics website, and analyze them for top visited pages, top downloaded packages, etc. See the tickets #1641 and #2489 for details. Here's a suggested sanitizing procedure for our web logs, which are in Apache's combined log format: - Ignore everything except GET requests. - Ignore all requests that resulted in a 404 status code. - Rewrite log lines so that they only contain the following fields: - IP address 0.0.0.0 for HTTP request or 0.0.0.1 for HTTPS requests (as logged by our Apache configuration), - the request date (with the time part set to 00:00:00), - the requested URL (cut off at the first encountered "?"), - the HTTP version, - the server's HTTP status code, and - the size of the returned object. - Write all lines from a given virtual host and day to a single output file. - Sort the output file alphanumerically to conceal the original order of requests. Here's a sample sanitized log file for www.torproject.org from May 1, 2009 (462K): http://freehaven.net/~karsten/volatile/www.torproject.org-access.log-200905… Is there still anything sensitive in that log file that we should remove? For example: - Do the logs reveal how many pages were cached already on the requestor's site (e.g. as repeat accesses)? Note that log files are sorted before being published. - Are there other concerns about making these sanitized log files publicly available? Are the decisions to remove parts from the logs reasonable? In particular: - Do we have to take out all requests with 404 status codes? Some of these requests for non-existing URLs contain typos which may not be safe to make public. Should we instead put in some placeholder for the URL part and keep the 404 lines to know how many 404's we have per day? - Is there any good reason to keep the portion of a URL after a "?"? - Is it possible to leave some part of Referers in the logs that helps us figure out where our traffic originates and what search terms people use to find us? - Can we resolve client IP addresses to country codes and include those in the logs instead of our 0.0.0.0/0.0.0.1 code for HTTP/HTTPS? How would we handle countries with only a few users per day, e.g., should there be a threshold below which we consider requests to come from "a country with less than XY users?" Thanks, Karsten

6 10

Failed test in UNICODE
by Gisle Vanem 30 Nov '11

30 Nov '11

I just built Tor and the test suite with UNICODE enabled (MS Visual-C v16 on Win-XP SP3). With some patching, the test-programs compiled and ran mostly fine. Except test_util_spawn_background_ok() failed for a reason I did't understand initially: > test --warn util/spawn_background_ok: Nov 23 14:35:55.531 [warn] Failed to create child process test-child.exe: Systemet finner ikke angitt fil. FAIL test_util.c:1405: assert(process_handle.status == expected_status): -1 vs 1 [spawn_background_ok FAILED] util/spawn_background_partial_read: Nov 23 14:35:55.546 [warn] Failed to create child process test-child.exe: Systemet finner ikke angitt fil. FAIL test_util.c:1521: assert(process_handle.status == expected_status): -1 vs 1 [spawn_background_partial_read FAILED] ("Systemet finner ikke angitt fil" -> "System doesn't find specified file"). I think the reason is that CreateProcessW() is used in common/util.c. The function is passed a 'const char *const filename'. Either we should always use CreateProcessA() or convert 'filename' using mbstowcs(). What do you think? --gv

2 1

Periodic alert to outdated Tor operators?
by Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) 30 Nov '11

30 Nov '11

Hi all, should we send a periodic email reminder to all operators running outdated Tor routers? >From a brief look at cached-descriptors: grep 'Tor 0\.2\.0' /var/lib/tor/cached-descriptors | wc -l 111 grep 'Tor 0\.2\.1' /var/lib/tor/cached-descriptors | wc -l 5631 grep 'Tor 0\.2\.2' /var/lib/tor/cached-descriptors | wc -l 11572 grep 'Tor 0\.2\.3' /var/lib/tor/cached-descriptors | wc -l 1182 It would be nice to have an automatic system that spam periodically all Tor operators that run outdated Tor routers. -naif

3 2

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 178: Require majority of authorities to vote for consensus parameters
by Nick Mathewson 27 Nov '11

27 Nov '11

On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 1:34 AM, Sebastian Hahn <hahn.seb(a)web.de> wrote: > Design: > > When the consensus is generated, the directory authorities ensure that > a param is only included in the list of params if at least half of the > total number of authorities votes for that param. The value chosen is > the low-median of all the votes. We don't mandate that the authorities > have to vote on exactly the same value for it to be included because > some consensus parameters could be the result of active measurements > that individual authorities make. This is possibly bikeshed, but I would suggest that instead of requiring half of existing authorities to vote on a particular parameter, we require 3 or more to vote on it. (As a degenerate case, fall back to "at least half" if there are fewer than 6 authorities in the clique.) I think we don't want the number to be _less_ than 3, since 3 is the smallest number of parties who can come up with a low-median that isn't just the diktat of a single member (1 party), or as low as either member wants it to be (2 parties). yrs, -- Nick

2 7

Bug triage status
by Nick Mathewson 24 Nov '11

24 Nov '11

Hi, Roger! As discussed, I did some Tor bug triage tonight. Here's what I did: * I made a new "Tor: very long term" (formerly "Tor: distant future") milestone for stuff too long-term to be in "Tor: unspecified." Now we will no longer have "unspecified" mean "maybe never" to some of us and "I honestly don't know" to others. * I made a new "tor: 0.2.4.x" milestone * I went through every ticket in "post 0.2.3.x" (there were like 3 or 4) and reassigned them someplace better. * I went through every ticket without a component. * I went through every ticket in Tor: unspecified to see if it belonged there. Surprisingly, very few of them belonged in "Tor: very long term". * I went through every ticket without a milestone that was assigned to one of the core Tor components (that is, Tor Bridge, Tor Hidden Service, Tor Directory Authority, Tor Client, Tor Relay). Now they all have milestones; some few of them also have comments, or are closed. Still to do, possibly by me, possibly not: * Triage all 233 open 0.2.3.x tickets. The ones that are feature-like, big, and not planned to get done by nov 30 should get punted to "unspecified" or 0.2.4.x or "very long term." The ones that are feature-like and small should get ordinary triage. The ones that are bugs should get priorities assigned, or marked as deferrable, or such. * Triage all 23 open 0.2.2.x-final tickets. Some of these are bugs that we believe *should* have their fixes applied on 0.2.2; some are merely bugs that *exist* in 0.2.2, but which might not be important enough to alter a stable release. * Triage all core-Tor bugs in a milestone other than 0.2.2.x-final, 0.2.3.x-final, 0.2.4.x-final, unspecified, or very long term. Next steps for Roger here: * Go over the "Unspecified" stuff I've triaged to see if you agree. It should be cleaner than it was before, happy Thanksgiving, -- Nick

1 0

Re: [tor-dev] Tor glossary
by Shondoit 23 Nov '11

23 Nov '11

During translating last week it occurred to me that we do not have a consistent translation for some common phrases. I've set up a first draft of all common words that are used throughout the various Tor projects. Why I'm sending this to tor-dev is the following: - You as developers know which phrases are important for a clear communication of Tor's (and others) workings. I would very much like if you can add to the lists the words that are essential to be consistently translated. (as of writing this, I know I forgot to add 'Introduction Point') - Sometimes different phrases are used throughout the applications. Sometimes it's called an 'exit node' other times it's an 'exit relay'. It would benefit consistency when devs use the glossary for common terms. - Translators sometimes don't know the definition of words, or the context changes. A directory in the Tor context is different from a directory in an OS context. I'm not sure what the best way is to go about doing this, but we need definitions. The last version of the list can be found in my github: https://github.com/Shondoit/torglossary If you have additions to the list, definitions, suggestions, you can either email or clone/fork the repo and add it yourself. Thanks in advance

1 0

Re: [tor-dev] Regarding Metrics project
by Karsten Loesing 17 Nov '11

17 Nov '11

Hi Qiang, I'm cc'ing tor-dev, because I think your original request to work on Java codebases went there. On 11/17/11 2:13 AM, Qiang Wang wrote: > This is Qiang, and I am very interested in Tor project, and want to > contribute something. I was wondering if I can provide any help about > metrics project? > > Could you please let me know your recommendations? Sure thing. Three ideas come to mind: - Improve the consensus-health script: We have a Java program that downloads the network statuses from all eight directory authorities and compares them to each other to detect problems. One of the outputs is a web page [0], another output is a status email [1], and a third is a message sent to an IRC bot [2]. The code [3] needs some love. - Answer the question what fraction of exit relays exit from a different IP than is in their descriptor. This is a typical question that can be answered using the metrics data [4] we have. We'd want to publish the analysis code in the metrics-tasks repository [5], so that others can reproduce the results or refine the analysis. There's already a lot of Java code in that repository, because that's what I use when analyzing metrics data. We have plenty of other analysis questions similar to this one, so if you don't like this one, take a look at the Analysis component in our bug tracker [6]. - Implement an efficient relay-search database. We have a web site for searching relays by IP, nickname, or fingerprint [7], but it's really slow. The main problem is that the database originally was designed for aggregating statistics about relays, not for searching relays. I have two ideas here: The first is to design a separate PostgreSQL database [8] and go crazy with indexes, the second is to try out CouchDB for this [9]. This task isn't really that Java-specific, except for the fact that I'm using Java to import data and send queries. If anything sounds interesting to you, please let me know. I have more information about these tasks and can help you get started. Also look at the research section of the metrics website [10] to learn more. Best, Karsten [0] https://metrics.torproject.org/consensus-health.html [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2011-November/0… [2] See the IRC bot nsa in #tor-bots on OFTC, e.g., "< nsa> or: [consensus-health] The following directory authorities set conflicting or invalid consensus parameters: ides bwauthbestratio=1 bwauthcircs=0 bwauthdescbw=1 bwauthkp=10000 bwauthpid=1 bwauthtd=0 bwauthti=0 bwauthtidecay=5000 cbtnummodes=3 refuseunknownexits=1" [3] https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git/tree/HEAD:/src/org/torproject… [4] https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html [5] https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-tasks.git [6] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Ana… [7] https://metrics.torproject.org/relay-search.html [8] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2922 [9] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4440 [10] https://metrics.torproject.org/research.html

1 0

Jump to page:

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-dev