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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-assistants] Protocol grammars as probabilistic channels
by Robert Ransom 28 Jul '12

28 Jul '12

On 7/28/12, Zack Weinberg <zack.weinberg(a)sv.cmu.edu> wrote: > [I'm moving this from a giant cc: list to tor-dev, I hope that's okay. > I *think* everyone involved is already on that list.] > > [I apologize for not picking up this ball for so long, I have been ill > and mostly without the brain.] > > On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 2:26 AM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> > wrote: >> >> Specifically, to obfuscate a ‘payload protocol’ data … [View More]stream: >> >> * send it through an arithmetic-code encoder, using a model which >> contains a (low-probability) ‘pad’ symbol; >> * encrypt it with a stream cipher; >> * send it through an arithmetic-code decoder, using a model which >> matches the ‘cover protocol’ (the protocol you are trying to mimic). > > I like this way of modeling the problem, but I see some practical > problems with it. The payload protocol in this case is Tor's link > protocol, which is already encrypted, so your first step would appear > not to do anything (well, except to TLS's cleartext record headers, > but I don't think that will gain you much). The first step (the arithmetic-code encoder) allows the obfuscator to introduce padding symbols into a bytestream without either understanding or breaking the protocol it is obfuscating. This is the only reason for the obfuscator to use an arithmetic coder on the payload protocol. If the payload protocol is datagram-oriented and can tolerate junk appended to the end of a datagram, or if the software implementing a stream-oriented payload protocol can generate padding at the end of a message when the obfuscator requests it, the payload-side arithmetic coder should be omitted. (Note that Tor itself doesn't satisfy either of these requirements; but Tor-over-TCP-over-IP is a datagram-oriented protocol with a length field in each datagram.) > The stream cipher > provides no integrity protection for the message, which maybe we can > get away with since the higher level has it, and more importantly, no > sequencing. The stream cipher in the middle prevents the payload-side arithmetic-code encoder (or the underlying protocol) from making the stream fed to the cover-side decoder (computationally) distinguishable from a random bitstream. A datagram-oriented payload protocol will need a different scrambling layer as well. The easiest solution I can think of is to encrypt the message header with a large-block block cipher, and assume that clients usually (but not always) keep the same IP address during a protocol session in order to reduce the number of keys that the server needs to try for each message. > Several cover protocols of interest (most importantly > HTTP) break a session up into many short-lived TCP connections. That > means you have to allow for the possibility that cover-protocol > messages will arrive at the decoder out of order. You also need the > ability to send control messages at a level below the payload > protocol, for key agreement, reassociation of new connections with > ongoing sessions, and possibly other things we haven't thought of yet. TCP transports a stream protocol over an unreliable unordered datagram protocol. Surely it can't be too hard to add a security (i.e. encryption and authentication) layer to an unreliable unordered datagram protocol. > The "chopper" component of StegoTorus tackles these problems. Have > you seen the draft paper? Probably not. > It has its own problems -- the one I'm > wrestling with now is, the _amount of payload data_ sent in any given > message gets frozen the first time it is transmitted; if you need to > _re_transmit, you'd better be able to send at least that much data > right now! (Padding can of course be varied.) TCP can increase or decrease the amount of data sent in a retransmitted datagram. (I suspect that real TCP implementations actually do retransmit datagrams with less data, during path MTU discovery.) > I would be curious to know if you think your arithmetic-decoding > approach to cover generation could reasonably be made to work within > StegoTorus' framework. The arithmetic-code decoder on the cover-protocol side may (should) have been proposed before. The other two pieces were my idea, but they were for stream-oriented obfuscation, and you pointed out above that they suck for a datagram-oriented obfuscator and need to be replaced. >>> George turned me on to this paper, >>> >>> "Provably Secure Steganography" >>> http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hopper/tc-stego.pdf > > I have to say that I am very skeptical about the practical value of > this paper, because it requires one to characterize the probability > distribution of all possible messages in the cover protocol, which is > not practically possible for any nontrivial protocol. I could see an > approximation being good enough for our purposes, though. (Note that Zack is quoting someone other than me there.) >> Don't hide information directly in the syntax -- it's easy enough for >> Them to rearrange protocol messages in ways that will not interfere >> with standard-conformant clients and servers, but will disrupt crappy >> protocol obfuscators that don't implement the cover protocol >> correctly. Use a semantic model of the cover protocol instead. > > vmon and I have been wrestling with this one a bit in the context of > HTTP and we've pretty much come to the conclusion that we need an > actual implementation of HTTP, into which we plug data. Fortunately > there is no shortage of HTTP implementations. > >> ‘Blocking resistance’ is *very* different from ‘detection resistance’ >> (i.e. ‘indistinguishability from normal traffic’ for some value of >> ‘normal traffic’). >> >> * ‘Blocking resistance’ does not require that a cover protocol be >> ‘indistinguishable from X’ by the adversary, only that the adversary >> be unable to block it. For example, an adversary which can only >> ‘block’ communications by disrupting a connection using extra (forged) >> packets will not be able to block a UDP-based protocol. > > The adversary we're concerned with has control of all the border > routers between the client and the server, so they can do things like > blackhole all packets with a particular source or destination. I > would argue that detection resistance is in fact required for blocking > resistance against this adversary. But only ‘detection resistance’ against any box that They can use to control a blocking system, and that can detect the protocol quickly enough to usefully reduce the amount of data that each user can exchange with each bridge. >> * A protocol which is ‘indistinguishable from’ some protocol which the >> adversary wants to not block may not provide ‘blocking resistance’. >> For example, a crappy obfuscator which uses a syntactic model of HTTP >> instead of a semantic model can be blocked by just about any >> off-the-shelf HTTP proxy. > > That effect also provides a distinguisher from real HTTP, doesn't it? Only if They can tell that They blocked an obfuscator's traffic. They may not be able to detect that. Robert Ransom [View Less]

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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-assistants] Protocol grammars as probabilistic channels
by Zack Weinberg 28 Jul '12

28 Jul '12

[I'm moving this from a giant cc: list to tor-dev, I hope that's okay. I *think* everyone involved is already on that list.] [I apologize for not picking up this ball for so long, I have been ill and mostly without the brain.] On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 2:26 AM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Specifically, to obfuscate a ‘payload protocol’ data stream: > > * send it through an arithmetic-code encoder, using a model which > contains a (low-probability) ‘… [View More]pad’ symbol; > * encrypt it with a stream cipher; > * send it through an arithmetic-code decoder, using a model which > matches the ‘cover protocol’ (the protocol you are trying to mimic). I like this way of modeling the problem, but I see some practical problems with it. The payload protocol in this case is Tor's link protocol, which is already encrypted, so your first step would appear not to do anything (well, except to TLS's cleartext record headers, but I don't think that will gain you much). The stream cipher provides no integrity protection for the message, which maybe we can get away with since the higher level has it, and more importantly, no sequencing. Several cover protocols of interest (most importantly HTTP) break a session up into many short-lived TCP connections. That means you have to allow for the possibility that cover-protocol messages will arrive at the decoder out of order. You also need the ability to send control messages at a level below the payload protocol, for key agreement, reassociation of new connections with ongoing sessions, and possibly other things we haven't thought of yet. The "chopper" component of StegoTorus tackles these problems. Have you seen the draft paper? It has its own problems -- the one I'm wrestling with now is, the _amount of payload data_ sent in any given message gets frozen the first time it is transmitted; if you need to _re_transmit, you'd better be able to send at least that much data right now! (Padding can of course be varied.) I would be curious to know if you think your arithmetic-decoding approach to cover generation could reasonably be made to work within StegoTorus' framework. >> George turned me on to this paper, >> >> "Provably Secure Steganography" >> http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hopper/tc-stego.pdf I have to say that I am very skeptical about the practical value of this paper, because it requires one to characterize the probability distribution of all possible messages in the cover protocol, which is not practically possible for any nontrivial protocol. I could see an approximation being good enough for our purposes, though. > Don't hide information directly in the syntax -- it's easy enough for > Them to rearrange protocol messages in ways that will not interfere > with standard-conformant clients and servers, but will disrupt crappy > protocol obfuscators that don't implement the cover protocol > correctly. Use a semantic model of the cover protocol instead. vmon and I have been wrestling with this one a bit in the context of HTTP and we've pretty much come to the conclusion that we need an actual implementation of HTTP, into which we plug data. Fortunately there is no shortage of HTTP implementations. > ‘Blocking resistance’ is *very* different from ‘detection resistance’ > (i.e. ‘indistinguishability from normal traffic’ for some value of > ‘normal traffic’). > > * ‘Blocking resistance’ does not require that a cover protocol be > ‘indistinguishable from X’ by the adversary, only that the adversary > be unable to block it. For example, an adversary which can only > ‘block’ communications by disrupting a connection using extra (forged) > packets will not be able to block a UDP-based protocol. The adversary we're concerned with has control of all the border routers between the client and the server, so they can do things like blackhole all packets with a particular source or destination. I would argue that detection resistance is in fact required for blocking resistance against this adversary. > * A protocol which is ‘indistinguishable from’ some protocol which the > adversary wants to not block may not provide ‘blocking resistance’. > For example, a crappy obfuscator which uses a syntactic model of HTTP > instead of a semantic model can be blocked by just about any > off-the-shelf HTTP proxy. That effect also provides a distinguisher from real HTTP, doesn't it? zw [View Less]

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Re: [tor-dev] Pyonionoo Descriptors
by Karsten Loesing 28 Jul '12

28 Jul '12

Hi Megan, hi Erik, cc'ing Sathya and tor-dev, hoping you don't mind. On 7/27/12 5:21 PM, Megan Chang wrote: > We are currently almost done with the first draft of pyonionoo. Awesome! :) > We were > wondering what some of the entries might look like so we would be able to > see what information was being parsed to fill in some of the fields such as > the bandwidth handler's "write_history" and "read_history". We noticed that > the router descriptor format includes "… [View More]

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script for get bridges
by ??Phoenixing 27 Jul '12

27 Jul '12

hi Firstly, install wget, privoxy, then schedule a task three minutes one time just like: someone>$ wget https://bridges.torproject.org. Then you can get a lot of .htmlxxx files which contain the bridges from the website. Lastly, write a bash command or VBscript under windows, you can grap the xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:xxxx from the .htmlxxx files, and insert into the torrc file. It 's done! I hope that I can do this again! best regards

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Why change the bridges.torproject.org website to avoid to get bridges by script?
by ??Phoenixing 26 Jul '12

26 Jul '12

Hi I live in a country which it block the tor net strictly! Only I can do is that I get the bridges from the website. I just want to get the bridges automaticly by writing a script. But now I must get the bridges hand by hand and one by one. It's more uncomfortable! Could you change it back? best regards!

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Faravahar back online
by SiNA Rabbani 25 Jul '12

25 Jul '12

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Dear Tor, Faravahar is back online. Please see https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5749 and let me know what my next steps should be. All the best, SiNA - -- ?If I had eight hours to chop down a tree, I?d spend the first six of them sharpening my axe.? -Abraham Lincoln -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ … [View More]

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[GSoC] Stem - Status update
by Ravi Chandra Padmala 25 Jul '12

25 Jul '12

Hello The network status descriptor parsing has taken a lot longer than expected. I should be putting it up for review soon. Followed by the microdescriptor parsers. Given the current status of the project, I have prepared a revised schedule for the remaining GSoC period. The final evaluation is about a month away. I have spoken to Damian and we decided to reschedule the Arm port deliverable to after the GSoC timeline (most likely the week immediately following the end of the GSoC coding … [View More]

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ApachePayloadServer pushed
by vmonmoonshine＠gmail.com 24 Jul '12

24 Jul '12

Disc.:In the spirit of our discussion in Italy about unifying mailing list and that we should submit our technical discussions on tor-dev instead of tor-assistants, I'm moving my conversations with Zack here. If there's a strong opposition I'll go back to the old model (but you should have opposed it in Italy). Hey Zack, I pushed the ApachePayloadServer on your git on f--payload-servers branch. It compiles but I have to test it yet. However, it would be much easier to be tested when I change … [View More]

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GSoC Status Update - Testing and Transports
by Damian Johnson 24 Jul '12

24 Jul '12

Sending this on behalf of Brandon since tor-dev@ is bouncing his emails. ======================================== The last two weeks were spent getting the code in better shape, fixing bugs and streamlining so that I could get to the point that I could actually write some transports. Now it’s transport implementation time. I’ve written a Dust transport, using the most barebones version of Dust, which is basically just an ECDH handshake and Skein encryption. I’ll be adding the rest of Dust … [View More]

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hide my site in clearweb
by Salva . 22 Jul '12

22 Jul '12

Hello, I have launched a website in TOR and I can access it through the .onion address and also typing the ip of my server in my brower.I want my site was only accessible from TOR and not through clearweb, how can I solve it ? Thank you guys.

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