Hi devs,
we had an IRC meeting last week, on March 7, to discuss next steps for
the Tor Instant Messaging Bundle (TIMB). At the end of that meeting we
decided to have another meeting 1 week later, so today.
However, there will be no such meeting today!
The main reason for today's meeting was to make a decision on an instant
messaging client to use in the new bundle. But we already made this
decision in internal discussions with the main developers Arlo and
Sukhbir. The final decision is that we're going to use Instantbird.
The wiki page states some reasons for this decision:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorO/TIMB
If you had planned to attend today's meeting to find out how to best
help out with the project, please be patient. The project is still in
an early state, and we don't have a good list of things that we need
help with. Maybe take a look at the Trac tickets in the TIMB component
and at the wiki page linked above. There will be IRC meetings in the
future to discuss progress on this project, I just can't say when that
will be. Thanks for your patience, and thanks for wanting to help out!
All the best,
Karsten
Hi,
I am currently working on a personal project implementing an onion-router,
vaguely similar to Tor (let's just call it Oor, other onion router, for the
moment), and I have a few questions about attacks, which I think are not
really protected by Tor, and whether my solution could possibly work. Of
course, if Tor defends against such attacks, then please enlighten me.
- Traffic volume correlation. Tor's FAQ says that it doesn't plan on
defending against an adversary monitoring traffic volumes flowing
through
the Tor network. Oor tries to protect against this attack by:
- Obfuscating every single link with a protocol derived by Tor's
obfs3 protocol
- No public list of all node addresses; this makes determining
whether certain traffic is Oor traffic much harder. More at the next
bulletpoint
- Splitting each circuit (termed "onion stew") into many subcircuits,
all terminating at the same exit node. Ã la multipath TCP. Cells
going
through the subcircuits have a randomly-determined *uneven
*distribution
of choice of subcircuit, barring attackers from deducing total
traffic from
observing one subcircuit.
- Blanket blacklist attacks by censors. Censors can poll the directory
and block all ordinary Tor nodes. (obfsproxy) bridges are a workaround.
- Oor's directory maintains a *graph* of all nodes. Each node knows
the public keys of all the other nodes, but each node only knows the
addresses of *adjacent* nodes.
- Note that this allows (sub)circuit-building along any path in the
graph. The "extend circuit" command takes the next node's public
key as the
parameter, rather than the address.
- This reduces the bootstrapping problem to distributing (an alias
of) the directory server address. Unlike with Tor bridges, this
does not
create a bandwidth bottleneck, and no nodes need to be reserved for a
special pool of bridges, unable to be used by usual users.
Bridges often go
offline, but this would work until the alias is blocked. However,
as with
Tor bridges, things like e-mail can be used to distribute many
dynamically-generated aliases of the directory server.
- Protocol recognition. In "free" countries like the US of A, Tor users
see no pressure to use obfuscated bridges. Tor traffic is rather easily
distinguished, and could be used to form suspicion on people. Even with
obfsproxy, Tor's constant 512-byte cell length may be an issue. The
"Stegotorus" paper presents a filter that finds cell lengths typical
of Tor.
- Every link is obfuscated in oor with obfs3.
- obfs3 happens to create various cell lengths. This would be a
problem for Tor-like circuits because it doesn't hide data sizes
at all,
but I think that breaking circuits into subcircuits solves this
problem.
There is a not-really-working but readable PoC implementation of everything
except the "onion stewing" part, i.e. circuits can only work with one
subcircuit, athttps://github.com/quantum1423/kirisurf-dev/
Current work is underway to rewrite a more robust version with various
repos at
https://github.com/KirisurfProject/
(yes, it is currently called Kirisurf, oor is just for short previously,
and I want to change the kirisurf name anyways. You may find a "kirisurf"
on sourceforge. That is a simple one-hop encrypted proxy I made a long time
ago just for breaking censorship without privacy protection; Kirisurf
gradually grew onion-routing things until I decided to redesign it;
namechange probably needed to prevent misleading version numbers)
I would be interested to know what research has been done on these areas in
Tor (to avoid reinventing the wheel), and whether any of my ideas are novel.
Thanks!
I sent this to the Twisted mailing list at twisted-python(a)twistedmatrix.com
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_________________________________________________________
GPG: 4096R/A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
Greetings humans,
this is an email to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to happen tomorrow. Place is the #tor-dev
IRC channel in OFTC. Time is 17:00 UTC.
Cheers!
Hi All,
Ahmia.fi interested in participating in GSoC.
Ahmia.fi's back-end is designed by Kordex (Mikko Kortelainen) and I (Juha
Nurmi) have built the front-end.
In practise, I will apply as a student. Also, kordex might apply.
Ahmia.fi is a HS search engine that needs improvements. At the moment, we
are using YaCy in the back-end and have developed Django based front-end
(Python).
Kordex is a Customer Service Architect, CEO of the Fail-Safe IT solutions
and software designer. I am a research, postgraduate student and university
lecturer. I have a long work experience with web services.
At the moment, ahmia.fi has integration to Tor2web and Globaleaks. We have
hidden service online cheker, RESTful API for the resources, tested idea
how hidden services could publish their information (
https://ahmia.fi/documentation/descriptionProposal/) and a lot of good
ideas. Unfortunately, we do not have any funding.
We would like to release the source code of ahmia.fi and develop our search
engine in GSoC.
Greetings
Juha Nurmi
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Hi all,
I'm a PhD student at COSIC (COmputer Security and Industrial
Cryptography) in KU Leuven, Belgium. My research topic is related to
network traffic analysis and I'm now focused in the more specific
problem of website fingerprinting
(http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~mjuarezm/).
I think website fingerprinting is one of the most threatening attacks to
Tor because it can be deployed with moderate resources and the
information that can be extracted as a result is highly sensitive (e.g.,
browsing history). It basically defeats one of the main privacy
guarantees offered by Tor which is unlinkability between sender and
recipient or, in this particular case, between the user and the web
server. However, I couldn't find any open project that tackles this
problem in
https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Projects. That
is why I'd like to propose a GoSC project for the implementation of
tools (packages, classes, etc.) that contribute in the development of a
countermeasure against this attack.
Regarding countermeasures, since Tor is oriented to low-latency
applications like web browsing, delaying strategies are unacceptable
and, therefore, they must necessarily be based on link-padding.
Link-padding normally incurs in high bandwidth overheads, however the
increasing broadband bandwidth capacity available makes it a relevant
feasible defence.
Some capabilities for link-padding have been already specified for Tor
by Steven Murdoch
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=tor-spec.t…,
Section 7.2). This functionality is very useful for such a
countermeasure but more sophisticated protocols are required for
countermeasures that try to adjust the bandwidth overhead.
There are several proposed countermeasures based on link-padding that
strive for such a trade-off that might be interesting to implement:
- Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO (http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.6022)
- Adaptive Padding (http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf)
Both countermeasures have some building blocks in common (e.g., a
control logic to adapt padding under some specific conditions and reduce
the overhead). The core of the project would be to implement them in the
most general way as possible so they can be useful for other
link-padding applications. For example, to implement the basis for a
statistical model in the onion proxy and the entry guard that generates
the appropriate cover traffic in both directions, where ?appropriate?
would be abstracted as it would be defined by each specific countermeasure.
I would like to have some feedback from the Tor developers about this
project (advices, comments..). I plan to specify it in more detail in
the application and to start coding some module that could be shown. But
I would like to know if the underlying idea is something that could be
of interest for the community.
Also, as a PhD student I'm also committed with my research group during
the summer so I would like to know if I could work as a part-time student.
Best,
- --
marc
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Oh dear. Daylight Savings Time has struck again.
The dev meeting this week needs to be at 19:00 UTC, so that I can be
done by 4 pm.
If you can make it then, great! Else, next week at 19:00 UTC.
yrs,
--
Nick
- only participants today: baumanno and karsten
- karsten starts reporting what he did since last meeting
- karsten reviewed two tickets
- karsten wrote down GSoC idea (u. Rewrite Tor Weather on
https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Projects)
- karsten defined criteria for sending out welcome mails using Onionoo's
details documents (#11084)
- baumanno starts reporting what he did since last meeting
- baumanno closed issue reported by karsten on GitHub repo
- baumanno and karsten agreed that there should be unit tests in
weather; baumanno is going to create a ticket for this after the
meeting; there should be some unit testing framework that plays well
with Django
- baumanno used most of the existing weather code for scraping emails
from relay descriptors
- baumanno went on to begin implementation of the welcome script, which
leads to #11084
- baumanno notes that we're still missing the script nufuk is working
on; baumanno is going to ping him via email and suggest that either
feverDream or baumanno takes over
- baumanno and karsten wonder how far feverDream is with the vagrant
box; this will be very useful to have
- baumanno says that utility scripts are ready, so that branching off
stable weather would make sense
- karsten asked tor's git admins for a user/karsten/weather.git repo
that we can use as new stable for now; this is going to be much easier
than for feverDream or baumanno to ask for a repo on tor's git
- baumanno is going to keep tickets open until we merged them into
user/karsten/weather.git
- baumanno will create a new branch from atagar's weather repo, add
commits, push to a new branch on github, and comment on a trac ticket to
pull/review/merge; he's going to cc karsten on the ticket
- next meeting is next wednesday at 18:00 utc
> Hi,
>
> I've been directed to this email address by Matt in regards to volunteering
> for the project. Currently I work as a consultant that specialises in
> providing hosted services to my clients. I am a keen learner of technology
> and have learnt (mostly self taught) various languages (C/C++, python,
> Java), where I would like to further improve my knowledge through
> volunteering for the Tor project.
>
> I've browsed through the list of project currently available and have
> watched the video, although I cannot decide which project currently
> interests me the most. In the past I had used Vidalia when I worked in China
> with some limited success, which could be something that I can look to help
> upon if possible.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jialu
Hi Jialu, glad you want to get involved! Adding tor-dev@ in case the
wider community wants to chime in with ideas. The first step of
getting involved is to figure out what strikes your fancy and that,
obviously, nobody but you can decide. ;)
Since you mentioned Vidalia one thing you might want to consider is if
you like to work on projects alone or collaborate with others. I
include the 'Activity' column on...
https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Projects
... so you can easily determine for any given project if you would be
working with others or adopting a space all your own. Vidalia is
firmly in the later camp. Nobody has been actively working on Vidalia
for almost a year since chiiph departed.
If GUIs strike your fancy then a project you might want to consider is
a new stem-based UI. This is an idea we've been batting around for a
while now but has yet to get off the ground. Kamran created a python
GTK UI a few years back as part of GSoC...
http://inspirated.com/2011/07/17/summer-of-code-progress-garm-0-1
This piggybacked on arm, but since his work our controller libraries
have greatly improved to a point where we should be able to make a
solid, new Tor GUI without that sort of kludge. Like Vidalia, though,
nobody else is working in this space so it would involve taking the
lead on a new project of your own.
If any of the projects on the volunteer table strike your fancy then
my best suggestion is to dive in and get involved. Try to fix a minor
issue or two then reach out to the maintainer mentioned on the table.
Cheers! -Damian
Please see the image file for what I have in mind here.
http://oi62.tinypic.com/10x80ok.jpg
I hope this tool, when completed, can help reduce the barrier for
people seeking to set up hidden services.
I anticipate this tool being able to connect to a running tor and write
to that tor's torrc file. This tool will be able to connect to the
network through a proxy, a standard bridge, or a pluggable transport. It
will be able to send a HUP signal to tor. It will be able to read from
tor's hidden service directory and tor's log.
This mockup was made with wxPython 2.8. This is partially because I'm
somewhat familiar with wxWidgets already, and partially because I
thought incorporating stem might be a good plan.
Here are some pitfalls and shortcomings:
* * *
By it's current design, this tool has less functionality than
Vidalia. As a security property, there's no interface for setting up a
relay. This tool's primary focus will be running a hidden service.
By it's current design, this tool does not ship with any hosting
software. The tool will inform the user that she still needs to run
XAMPP or ApacheGUI to host a web page.
There's no interface for setting up or designing a blog, only for
hosting one that's already designed.
I'm still investigating Python's multithreading capabilities so
that the Tor log can be continuously read and reported. If I discovered
that I didn't need a controller library at all, I'd consider using wxGo
instead of wxPython (although writing in Go would be a new
experience for me and would take longer).
* * *
Perhaps some or all of these shortcomings could be overcome given time
and community feedback. I'm still not entirely sure where to take this
project, if anywhere.
Before I get much further with this idea, is this project worth
pursuing at all? Does this look like something that could benefit Tor
users, given that Vidalia still works for many people? Do you think
this tool has potential to function as a point-click-publish hidden
services software?