Thanks Sukhbir,
This was exactly it. I took me a few times, but I got it in the end. To make Chutney work:
1) Comment out the "TestingClientDownloadSchedule" line in torrc_templates/client.tmpl and in torrc_templates/client.tmpl
2) Comment out the "TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset" line in torrc_templates/authority.tmpl
3) In torrc_templates/authority.tmpl, change the value of "TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay" from 2 to 20
4) In the same file, change the value of "TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay" from 2 to 20. These are the lowest these values can go.
5) $ ./chutney configure networks/basic
6) $ ./chutney start networks/basic
7) $ ./chutney status networks/basic
As you pointed out, removing line 469 of lib/chutney/TorNet.py (removing the --quiet option at launch) does give some great diagnostic information.
10/10 nodes now running, thanks again for the help. Hopefully the Chutney devs see this!
Relevant: https://xkcd.com/196/
--
Jesse V.
On 07/27/2014 04:00 AM, tor-dev-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote:
> Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 18:51:44 -0400
> From: Sukhbir Singh <sukhbir.in(a)gmail.com>
> To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Chutney couldn't start Tor instances
> Message-ID:
> <CADtjFvXs=Zfvus75iSs6oUZ1tXmwayVG+3HZv8n4OVR8-5+5+w(a)mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
> Hi,
>
>> No log files are generated in <path>/net/nodes/000a, so I don't know what
>> happened. I don't see any conflicts with ports on localhost as far as I can
>> see.
>> Tor version 0.2.4.22 and Python 2.7.5+ are installed. Any ideas?
> I find it helpful to remove the "--quiet" switch from
> lib/chutney/TorNet.py (line 469) so that I can actually see why Tor
> failed to start. That is the right place to start looking.
>
> In your case, it is probably TestingClientDownloadSchedule or
> TestingServerDownloadSchedule that is causing the issue since I
> remember something with one of the versions in 0.2.4 (not exactly sure
> which). Try removing these lines from torrc_templates/client.tmpl,
> torrc_template/relay.tmpl and then reconfigure the network and then
> start it. It is either this, or DirServer/DirAuthority but the verbose
> output will tell you the exact problem (look for "err").
>
> I have found these issues to be common when using an earlier version
> because of mismatch between the templates Chuntey is configured to use
> (recent versions of Tor) versus earlier versions with different
> options. But the fix is easy -- just update the template and
> reconfigure the network.
>
Are there any roadblocks that prevent us from doing the following?
1. Remove the hard-coded bridge_prefs.js in the TBB.
2. Set meek as the default pluggable transport in the TBB.
3. Use meek to acquire an up-to-date bridge_prefs.js from, say,
torproject.org.
4. Use the information from the acquired bridge_prefs.js to connect to Tor
as normal.
Ostensibly, this doesn't do a better job of hiding bridge addresses.
However, it allows us to modify bridge addresses without releasing a new
TBB.
-Kevin
Hello everyone,
I'm doing some research on Tor and I'm trying to set up a small sample Tor network to play with. I cloned the Chutney repository with
/$ git clone https://git.torproject.org/chutney.git/
and then I ran
/$ ./chutney configure networks/basic/
which generated the keys for each of the three authorities and also set up five relays and two clients. Everything looked good, but when I ran
/$ ./chutney start networks/basic/
it says:
/Starting nodes//
//Couldn't launch test000a (tor --quiet -f <path>/net/nodes/000a/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test001a (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/001a/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test002a (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/002a/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test003r (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/003r/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test004r (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/004r/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test005r (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/005r/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test006r (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/006r/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test007r (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/007r/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test008c (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/008c/torrc): 255//
//Couldn't launch test009c (tor --quiet -f ///<path>//net/nodes/009c/torrc): 255/
No log files are generated in <path>/net/nodes/000a, so I don't know what happened. I don't see any conflicts with ports on localhost as far as I can see.
Tor version 0.2.4.22 and Python 2.7.5+ are installed. Any ideas?
--
Jesse V.
Hi all
I am releasing under the GPL a Java based Tor research framework that I
have developed. The goal of the framework is to provide a simple and easy
to read/modify implementation of the protocol that allows you to do things
wrong. This enables researchers to try things out without trying to battle
with the full tor client source or with a client that tries to help you
(e.g. by proactively building circuits) - this one does as its told and no
more.
At present, it is a fully functional client with a number of examples for
hidden services and SOCKS. You can build arbitrary circuits, build
streams, send junk cells, etc.
I want to build up the examples over the coming months to include sample
attacks on tor (e.g. traffic pattern generators/detectors). I also want to
build out the documentation to reduce the barrier to entry for researchers
as much as possible.
I hope it will be useful to someone - patches/pull requests always welcome!
Source:
https://github.com/drgowen/tor-research-framework
Best wishes
Gareth
--
Dr Gareth Owen
Senior Lecturer
School of Computing, University of Portsmouth
Tel: 02392 846423
Web: ghowen.me
Progress/activities since last time:
* incorporating BridgeRequest's together with an initial bridge request
API over JSON (it's easier to do both as they are tightly related.) The
bridge request api is based on isis' initial fix/12029-dist-api_r1;
* bogus server-side bridge provider that implements the json api: just
something that gives fake bridges based on the request (which is
handled/contained in BridgeRequest.) (will have server side code real soon
now (hoped to have it by now.))
* my churn_rewrite could probably make use of bridgedb's current approach
to pickled storage. (It's also worth switching to twisted.spread.jelly for
(mostly) security)
* experimenting with sending images over twitter DMs. Twitter API does
not support images in DMs, but the web as well as various mobile apps
support attaching images to DMs (images end up in twitter CDN. (served over
ton.twitter.com), which is good.) Some progress here: the web client DM
send requests (where image files can be attached) are contained; the bot
should be able to send images in DMs soon, emulating a normal web user
agent (but using the two twitter APIs for all other activities and DMs.)
* once bridgerequest's + request api (client-side + my mock server-side
thing) are done, the bot will have approached a not-far-from-functional
state
Apologies for the late report.
--
Kostas.
0x0e5dce45 @ pgp.mit.edu
Hi
I have to do some experiments on tor and I must disable counter-based
encryption for cells.
Is there a simple way to do that?
I appreciate any idea.
Soroosh
Hidden services quickly come to mind.
Are there other candidates? I can imagine people deciding not to view
certain content through Tor because of speed (e.g., pornhub). But I
suspect I am missing some use cases.
-V
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 6:34 PM, Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 11:24:47PM +0100, Noel David Torres Taño wrote:
>> What would happen if a Tor node changes behaviour and uses four or five
>> relay steps instead of three?
At around DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN 8 or above I get a lot of these, with
EXTEND being shown in various command locations, and no connectivity
to hidden services. Lower values or 4 or 5 probably work just fine but I
didn't bother testing more than a couple clearnet and onion circuits
since it's not yet a controller/config tunable and thus takes
edit/compile/run time. So even my test of 9 > 5 > 7 > 8 take with salt.
Don't know if this likely represent a bug to test more, or just timeouts...
the circuits that did work setup in times not feeling much more than
time/3*LEN. I'd suggest an undocumented tunable and unit test if
it's worth research/statistic/function_checking purpose.
relay_send_command_from_edge_(): Bug: Uh-oh. We're sending a
RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND cell, but we have run out of RELAY_EARLY cells on
that circuit. Commands sent before:
(unrecognized),(unrecognized),(unrecognized),(unrecognized),EXTEND,EXTEND,(unrecognized)
>> Would it enhance Tor's security?
>
> I assume you mean a Tor client?
>
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#ChoosePathLength
>
>> Is it possible to relay Tor through a Tor connection? I mean using Tor
>> with its three steps to reach a Tor entry node to get three extra steps.
>
> Yes, it is possible. But it is currently considered a flaw, because it
> can be used to work around the 'infinite path length' defenses.
> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#congestion-longpaths
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/110-avoid-in…
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2667
>
>> Would that difficult correlation attacks?
>
> Defending against correlation attacks is an open research, so "maybe".
> But it's not clear how it would, since an adversary who can see or
> measure your first hop (on the first circuit) and also your last hop
> (on the last circuit) would still be in the right place to do the attack.
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