- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Fwd: [guardian-dev] Orfox: New Firefox-based Android Private/Secure Browser
by Nathan Freitas 21 Aug '14

21 Aug '14

Nice outcome from GSoC! I think the primary discussion here is whether Tor Browser's existing build system can be extended for Android, and whether "Orfox" should exist at all as separate app/project. -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [guardian-dev] Orfox: New Firefox-based Android Private/Secure Browser Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 12:49:33 -0400 From: Nathan of Guardian <nathan(a)guardianproject.info> Organization: The Guardian Project To: guardian-dev <guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org> Based on work done this summer by Amogh Pradeep during his Google Summer of Code stint with me, we now have a real working version of Firefox/Fennec for Android with all the necessary defaults changed to match Tor Browser's defaults as closely as possible. We also remove the Android permissions for things like camera, mic, GPS and turn off webrtc. You can see the primary commits we've made here (many by me, but started successfully by Amogh): https://github.com/guardianproject/gecko-dev/commits/adaa37949dbba690ed0392… We still need to figure out which preferences and features map between the desktop mobile browser and the Android version, so there is quite a bit of work to do. For instance, even though the preference from Tor Browser is set to start in private browsing mode, it doesn't work at all in the Android app. Also, we haven't applied any of the lower level source patches to the gecko engine yet, or included any of the default extensions like HTTPS Everywhere or NoScript. Sorting out and resolving these differences is what is on deck for this fall, and everyone is welcome to join in. In addition, the recent audit work from iSec (https://blog.torproject.org/blog/isec-partners-conducts-tor-browser-hardeni…) is also on our minds, and figuring out how we can live up to the goals of that study on a mobile device is also very important. The current build successfully passes the DNSLeakTest.com tests and passed the HTML5 video leak issue here: http://xordern.net/why-you-really-shouldn't-use-orweb-anymore.html ip-check.info still doesn't see the browser as being Tor Browser, so there are some differences yet to resolve there. The whole project is automatically building on our jenkins server, and you'll find all the links to APKs and our test build repo below. Over the next few months we hope to launch this as our new official browser for Orbot, and deprecate Orweb as quickly as possible. *** Main project repo: https://github.com/guardianproject/OrfoxFennec Our fork of Mozilla's Gecko-Dev: https://github.com/guardianproject/gecko-dev/tree/adaa37949dbba690ed0392c1f… (which we can rebase on the original as needed) Nightly/dev builds direct APK download here: https://guardianproject.info/builds/OrfoxFennec/ OR our fdroid test build repo: https://dev.guardianproject.info/fdroid/repo?fingerprint=F8ED4C73C125E7A67F… *** +n _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: Guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: Guardian-dev-unsubscribe(a)lists.mayfirst.org Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/nathan%40guardianpr… You are subscribed as: nathan(a)guardianproject.info

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GSoC : Rewrite Tor Weather (Status Update 6)
by Sreenatha Bhatlapenumarthi 19 Aug '14

19 Aug '14

Hey folks! This is my 6th and final GSoC status update on the Weather-Rewrite project. Things I worked on since my last update : - Wrote a small python script to clear the subscription data stored in the django models of the weather database before running the standalone scripts. This is particularly useful while testing the site. - Fixed some bugs in the daily script. - Tested the whole thing after removal of the consensus event-listener mechanism with file-based SMTP backend as well as gmail SMTP server with a test email setup. - Modified the standalone daily/hourly scripts to work as custom django management commands as suggested in #10706. - Updated documentation regarding the shift in data backend to Onionoo. - Style-aligned the code base with PEP8. To review the code, check out https://github.com/meejah/tor-weather/tree/develop As a note on collaborating with the Tor community during this summer through GSoC, I want to mention that I had great time with this and will try to keep making meaningful contributions via various development activities. Thank You for the experience. Cheers, Sreenatha

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ooniprobe 1.1.0 is out!
by Arturo Filastò 19 Aug '14

19 Aug '14

Hello beautiful humans! We are very pleased to announce that a new version of ooniprobe is now out. In this new release of ooniprobe we have added a new command line tool for listing the reports that have not been published to a collector and that allows the probe operator to choose which ones they would like to upload. We have also made some privacy improvements to the reports (we will sanitize all things that may look like file paths) and added metadata associated with the maxmind database being used by the probe operator. Here is a more detailed list of what has been done: * Annotate on disk which reports we have submitted and which ones we have not: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11860 * Add tool called oonireport for publishing unpublished ooniprobe reports to a collector: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11862 * Probe Report does not leak filepaths anymore: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12706 * Reports now include version information about the maxmind database being used: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12771 * We now do integrity checks on the ooniprobe.conf file so that we don't start the tool if the config file is missing some settings or is not consistent: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11983 (thanks to Alejandro López (kudrom)) * Improvements have been made to the sniffer subsystem (thanks to Alejandro López (kudrom)) * Fix the multi protocol traceroute test. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12883 Minor bug fixes: * Fix dns_spoof test (by kudrom) https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12486 * ooni might not look at requiresTor: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11858 * ooni spits out gobs of tracebacks if Tor is not running and the OONI config says it will be: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11859 * The README for ooni-probe should mention the bugtracker and repository https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11980 For the moment you can download the new version from pypi here: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/ooniprobe. Soon a there will also be a new debian package for it (thank to Lunar^). As always feedback is greatly appreciated so please submit any bugs you may find to our bug tracker: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=Ooni Have fun! ~ Art.

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Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: All Relays are Directory Servers
by Tim 19 Aug '14

19 Aug '14

On 19 Aug 2014, at 22:00 , tor-dev-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 01:32:25 +0000 > From: Matthew Finkel <matthew.finkel(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: All Relays are Directory Servers > Message-ID: <20140819013224.GB3689@localhost> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > > On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 02:17:28PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote: >> On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 11:53 AM, Matthew Finkel >> <matthew.finkel(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >>> Filename: xxx-directory-servers-for-all.txt >>> Title: All relays are directory servers >>> Author: Matthew Finkel >>> Created: 29-Jul-2014 >>> Status: >>> Target: 0.2.6.x >>> >>> Overview: >>> >>> This proposal aims at removing part of the distinction between the >>> relay and the directory server. Currently operators have the options >>> of being one of: a relay, a directory server, or both. With the >>> acceptance of this proposal the options will be simplified to being >>> either only a directory server or a combined relay and directory >>> server. All relays will serve directory requests. >> >> FWIW, we don't support being only a directory server right now, do we? >> > > Nope, you're right. Bad assumption. > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/390728d85644a6c062d6807ffc096343… Looking at the details of parse_ports(), the warning/comment isn't entirely accurate: it seems that any configured "port" is enough to disable the warning (even a DirPort, ControlPort/ControlSocket(!), or ExtORPort). Which is why I'm not seeing it on the directory-only tor instance I have configured. Then again, the core message is accurate - a tor instance that doesn't act as a tor client or relay isn't going to do much. Tim

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Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: All Relays are Directory Servers
by Tim 19 Aug '14

19 Aug '14

> On 19 Aug 2014, at 11:30, Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> wrote: > > Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 14:17:28 -0400 > From: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> > To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: All Relays are Directory Servers > > >> On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 11:53 AM, Matthew Finkel >> <matthew.finkel(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> Hi All, >> >> Below is the proposal for #12538 [0], with some changes after George's >> review and some other revisions. >> >> Feedback welcome! >> >> Thanks, >> Matt >> >> >> [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12538 > > Thanks! This is now proposal 237. Any revisions should be sent in as > patches against the one in the torspec repository. > >> Filename: xxx-directory-servers-for-all.txt >> Title: All relays are directory servers >> Author: Matthew Finkel >> Created: 29-Jul-2014 >> Status: >> Target: 0.2.6.x >> >> Overview: >> >> This proposal aims at removing part of the distinction between the >> relay and the directory server. Currently operators have the options >> of being one of: a relay, a directory server, or both. With the >> acceptance of this proposal the options will be simplified to being >> either only a directory server or a combined relay and directory >> server. All relays will serve directory requests. > > FWIW, we don't support being only a directory server right now, do we? I've recently configured a tor instance [for HTTP fuzzing] that does nothing but cache the entire directory - all that is required is setting the DirPort non-zero, and the ORPort to 0. No warnings are emitted, and the instance stays stable, up to date with the consensus and descriptors, and answers [local] directory requests [as configured]. Because it's a local/test instance, I have specifically disabled external access. I have also disabled the default relay/directory server behaviour of submitting its own descriptor to the authorities. So I don't actually know if it would submit a descriptor if I enabled that option. However, the man page says that either one of a directory or a router port is sufficient for a server to submit its descriptor to the consensus. I also don't know if clients would connect to a directory server that didn't have an ORPort. Do clients select directory guards based on flags that it's impossible for a directory-only Tor instance to obtain? What about HSDirs? Nick, which of these things did you mean by "support"? Does the consensus include directory-only Tor servers? Do tor clients connect to directory-only Tor servers? Will a directory-only Tor server ever get the flags needed to become a "directory guard"? Will a directory-only Tor server ever get the flags needed to become a HSDir? (I think we agree that a directory-only server is a far less useful configuration of an instance than a router would be.) Tim

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Proposal: All Relays are Directory Servers
by Matthew Finkel 19 Aug '14

19 Aug '14

Hi All, Below is the proposal for #12538 [0], with some changes after George's review and some other revisions. Feedback welcome! Thanks, Matt [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12538 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Filename: xxx-directory-servers-for-all.txt Title: All relays are directory servers Author: Matthew Finkel Created: 29-Jul-2014 Status: Target: 0.2.6.x Overview: This proposal aims at removing part of the distinction between the relay and the directory server. Currently operators have the options of being one of: a relay, a directory server, or both. With the acceptance of this proposal the options will be simplified to being either only a directory server or a combined relay and directory server. All relays will serve directory requests. Motivation: Fetching directory documents and descriptors is sometimes a non-trivial operation for clients. If they do not have a consensus then they must contact a directory authority (until directory sources are added or clients are able to use a fallback consensus). If they have a consensus and have at least one entry guard then the client can query that guard for documents. If the document isn't available then after a period of time the client will attempt to retry downloading it. If the entry guard isn't a directory server, as well, a directory server and/or directory guard must be chosen (based on the server having an open DirPort) and queried for the document. At a minimum, this has a potential performance impact, at worst it's another attack vector that allows for profiling clients and partitioning users. With the orthogonally proposed move to clients using a single guard, the potential performance bottleneck and ability to profile users could be exacerbated. If the client selects an entry guard and it is not a directory server then the client may select a distinct directory guard which will leak client behavior to a second node. In the case where the client does not use guards, it is important to have the largest possible amount of diversity in the set of directory servers. In a network where every relay is a directory server, the profiling and partitioning attack vector is reduced to the guard (for clients who use them), which is already in a privileged position for this. In addition, with the increased set size relay descriptors and documents are more readily available and it diversifies the providers. Design: The changes needed to achieve this should be simple. Currently all relays download and cache the majority of relay documents in any case, so the slight increased memory usage from downloading all of them should have minimal consequences. There will be necessary logical changes in the client, router, and directory code. Currently directory servers are defined as such if they advertise having an open directory port. We can no longer assume this is true. To this end, we will introduce a new server descriptor line. "tunnelled-dir-server" NL The presence of this line indicates that the relay accepts tunnelled directory requests. For a relay that implements this proposal, this line MUST be added to its descriptor if it does not advertise a directory port, and MAY be added if it also advertises an open directory port. In addition to this, relays will now download and cache all descriptors and documents listed in the consensus, regardless of whether they are deemed useful or usable, exactly like the current directory servers. All relays will also accept directory requests when they are tunnelled over a connection established with a BEGIN_DIR cell, the same way these connections are already accepted by bridges and directory servers with an open DirPort. Directory Authorities will now assign the V2Dir flag to a server if it supports a version of the directory protocol which is useful to clients and it has at least an open directory port or it has an open and reachable OR port and advertises "tunnelled-dir-server" in its server descriptor. Clients choose a directory by using the current criteria with the additional criterion that a server only needs the V2Dir status flag instead of requiring an open DirPort. When the client chooses which directory server it will query, it checks if the server has an open directory port and uses begindir if it does not have one. Directory servers should not be able to determine which version of Tor the client is using (or a lower-bound on the version), if possible. Continuing to prefer direct directory connections over begin may help mitigate a potential partitioning attack. Security Considerations and Implications: Currently all directory servers are explicitly configured. This is necessary because they must have a configured and reachable external port. However, this is a restriction and results in a reduced number of directory servers on the network. As a result, this could allow an adversary to control a significant fraction of the servers. By increasing the number of directory servers on the network the likelihood of selecting one that is malicious is reduced. Also, with this proposal, it will be more likely that a client's entry guard is also a directory server (as alluded to in Proposal 207). However, the reduced anonymity set caused when the guard does not have, or is unwilling to distribute, a specific document still exists. With the increased diversity in the available servers, the impact of this should be reduced. Another question that may need further consideration is whether we trust bad directories to be good guards and exits. Specification: The version 3 directory protocol specification does not currently document the use of directory guards. This spec should be updated to mention the preferred use of directory guards during directory requests. In addition, the new criteria for assigning the V2Dir flag should be documented. Impact on local resources: Should relays attempt to download documents from another mirror before asking an authority? All relays will now prefer contacting the authorities first, but this will not scale well and will partition users from relays. If all relays become directory servers, they will choose to download all documents, regardless of whether they are useful, in case another client does want them. This will have very little impact on the "typical" relay, however on memory constrained relays (BeagleBone, Raspberry Pi, and similar), every megabyte allocated to directory documents is not available for new circuits. Should we add a config option that allows operators to disable being a directory server? Is it more worthwhile for them to serve these documents or to relay cells? Future Considerations: Should the DirPort be deprecated at some point in the future?

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Final Fog Combiner GSoC Report and Fog Status/Description
by quinn jarrell 19 Aug '14

19 Aug '14

Hi all, This report is going to be a bit longer and more general than usual as it'll cover a lot more about the current state of Fog and a description of it. This is my last report for GSoC, but I will probably continue submitting patches to Fog. Here's a general description of what I worked on this summer. Fog provides an easy way to chain pluggable transports together. It allows users to obfuscate their Tor data in multiple layers by using the output of one pluggable transport as the input for another. This will hopefully make pluggable transports much more difficult to block and provide more anonymity for users. Fog has two components, a client written in Python and a server written in Go. It appears to Tor as a normal pluggable transport and acts like one. But instead of obfuscating the data itself like other pluggable transports, it proxies the data through other pluggable transports. It then receives the obfuscated data and passes it onto the next pluggable transport in the chain and so on. After the last pluggable transport obfuscates the data and sends it back to Fog, Fog sends it onto the bridge address where the Fog server is waiting. The Fog server works similarly, but reverses the order of the pluggable transports, allowing each pluggable transport to peel off a layer of obfuscation. When it completely deobfuscates the data after traveling through the chain in reverse, Fog sends the data onto Tor as if it is a normal pluggable transport. The nice part about Fog is that it requires very little if any modification of existing pluggable transports to create chains. As long as a pluggable transport talks obeys the PT-Spec[0] and sends its results to a prespecified server, it can be used. So for instance all the chains: b64|obfs3|scramblesuit, scramblesuit|fte|bananaphone|obfs3 will work without any modification of those pluggable transports. Now the exceptions to this are pluggable transports that send obfuscated data to different servers on every startup. This mainly includes the flash proxy and Meek pluggable transports. These can only be used currently at the end of a chain. The reason being that since they send to different servers every time, it is not possible to direct them to a SOCKS shim as they are configured to only talk a specific protocol instead of just TCP. They rely on receiving some sort of confirmation or direction instead of acting as dumb obfuscators. More specifically, this summer I've been working on generalizing a prototype that David Fifield(dcf1) and Ximin Luo(infinity0) built chaining together the pluggable transports obfs3 and flashproxy. The main features I've added to Fog include Generalizing Fog to use any pluggable transports instead of just obfs3 and flashproxy Generalizing Fog to use any number of pluggable transports to obfuscate data I modified how Tor connects to Fog, it now uses a SOCKS server to recieve the request from Tor instead of receiving TCP from the first pluggable transport as it did before. Added configuration systems to both Fog client and Fog Server to parse a format similar to the torrc config files. Added the ability to support multiple chains with one instance of Fog. The Fog client will only launch one copy of each pluggable transport even if that pluggable transport is used in multiple chains. Over the next few weeks outside of GSoC I plan on adding A system of passing ClientTransportOptions and ServerTransportOptions to the chain of pluggable transports. (I worked on this the last two weeks but was not able to submit it for code review before GSoC ended) Tests for everything! (Some are written but they are currently in code review, others will follow) Documentation. This email is just a general description of Fog, I'll be adding a bunch more documentation about the structure of fog and a guide to use it. Attempting to package Fog as a binary similar to Obfsproxy, though I've heard bad things about Py2Exe. In the future, Fog may need to Modify the PT-Spec to force all pluggable transport servers to transmit metadata about what IP/port the connection came from. This will let the Fog server use one copy of pluggable transport for multiple chains and fix an issue with high traffic causing data to be sent back in the wrong order. And thats about it for me. I'm headed back to UIUC next week but as when I have free time, I probably will continue contributed patches to Fog and maybe other parts of the Tor Project. I've had a great summer working for the Tor Project. Its been an awesome time developing Fog and I've learned a massive amount. I can't thank Infinity0 enough for being my main mentor and teaching me a ton about what's needed to do open source. He's really guided me to be a better coder and I'm thankful that he was able to put up with my at times messy/lazy code. I thought I knew something about how to write clean code at the beginning of summer. Now I know that I knew nothing lol. Seriously, Infinity0, thanks so much! I would also like to thank dcf for being my backup mentor and helping with questions about how the Fog server worked/potential enhancements to it. You can see the latest version of Fog at [1] Quinn [0] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/pt-spec.txt [1] https://github.com/infinity0/fog

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[GSoC] HTTPS Everywhere's Secure Ruleset Updater - Final Report
by Red 19 Aug '14

19 Aug '14

Hello everyone! Today is the official "pencils down" date for Google Summer of Code, so I am going to outline the results of my work this Summer as a way of concluding my project. The first thing I had done at the start of my project was learn about Mozilla's XPCOM components and how they are used to interface with Gecko and other Firefox internals from extension code. I also learned about special files included with any extension such as install.rdf which are used to describe an extension's version information and signature-verifying public key, among other things. This lead me to understanding how extensions are updated and discover the kinds of limitations I would find in trying to update HTTPS Everywhere's rulesets library without changing the rest of the extension. The next thing I did was draft the specification for the format of the JSON manifest used to describe ruleset updates and explain how the process of updating the rulesets library would work. This work has since been built on and improved, and the existing specification document can be found in my fork of the extension, and is linked below[0]. This document describes everything one needs to know about the ruleset updater. It details: * How an object signing certificate can be generated using certutil from the NSS toolset. * How to create an update.json manifest file using the ruleset_update_manifest.py utility script I created.[1] * How to sign the update.json file using pk1sign and an object signing certificate. * How update information is fetched and how download failures are handled. * How the contents of update.json and the rulesets library database file are verified to be authentic. * What the significance of each field in update.json is. * Approximately how the ruleset updating mechanism functions in pseudocode. After the details of how updating would work were outlined in updateJSONSpec.md, I began implementing the ruleset updater module code for the extension. I also started working on a way to write tests for HTTPS Everywhere that I would initially use to test my code. I discovered that Firefox extensions could import XPCOM components exported by other extensions added to a user's browser, and so began work on a separate extension[2] that could be installed and used solely for testing HTTPS Everywhere. This work was soon improved upon by my mentor, Yan, who had the idea of creating a skeleton of an extension inside of HTTPS Everywhere's own codebase[3]. This extension used the more modern Addon SDK, which includes a unit testing suite, enabling HTTPS Everywhere developers to start writing proper unit tests that could be included in the HTTPS-Everywhere repository and run from the command line. While the unit testing environment I now had available was very effective, I had run into some surprising difficulty with Mozilla's nsIDataSignatureVerified XPCOM component, used to verify the signatures we were generating. By this point, Yan and I had agreed to try to compute the signature over the SHA256 hash of update.json's contents, so that this data could be more easily transcribed from a regular work computer to the airgapped machine EFF uses to house an offline signing key. It was at this point that we found that the key and signatures OpenSSL were generating were, somehow, incompatible with nsIDataSignatureVerifier, and Yan managed to get the verification unit test to pass by using certutil and pk1sign. The same problem of verifying signatures was encountered again when I got around to testing the actual ruleset updater code again, and had to generate new data, despite using certutil and pk1sign. Quite unfortunately, this problem drained almost four whole weeks of my time, as I had been looking into solutions involving porting a Firefox extension signing tool called Uhura (written in Perl), which meant also trying to understand what the tool was doing with ASN.1 specifications, among other things. Finally, I found that the nsIDataSignatureVerifier tool successfully verified the signature I had created for testing when it was not the hash of update.json's contents that were signed and supplied to the verifier, but the contents of the file themselves. The component is poorly documented and, after reaching out to developers in Mozilla's ecosystem, I found that it isn't very well understood in general. As such, even now I do not really understand why the verifier did not behave as expected in this scenario. Regardless, while it is somewhat less convenient here to sign update.json, the signature verification process works. Finally, I was able to move on to solve the problems of downloading and verifying the authenticity of the rulesets database file, and of reinitializing the extension's rulesets with those of the new database file. These problems were technically nuanced, but have been solved. The ruleset updater has been integrated into my fork of the extension's repository on github. My tests of its performance have passed, and I am pleased to say that it appears to be working. I have since submitted a pull request[4] to have my work reviewed and merged, and have even made changes requested by Yan, who has reviewed my work already. I'd like to conclude by giving my thanks to everyone in both of these mailing lists. I have received some invaluable support and advice that has had a profoundly positive impact on my experience. I learned a lot from everyone that lent a hand, and I feel the project has benefited greatly from each of the contributions I received to my efforts. My mentor, Yan, has also been a pleasure to work with. Our weekly meetings added very significant structure to my workflow, helped to keep me organized, and were also a great opportunity for me to pique her brain for ideas and possible solutions to some of the tougher problems I've encountered. I sincerely regard this as having been a positive experience, and I hope that everyone who has helped me until now is satisfied with my efforts and the actual results of my work. Thanks, everyone! [0] - https://github.com/redwire/https-everywhere/blob/master/doc/updateJSONSpec.… [1] - https://github.com/redwire/https-everywhere/blob/master/utils/ruleset_updat… [2] - https://github.com/redwire/https-everywhere-testing [3] - https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/tree/master/https-everywhere-tes… [4] - https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/437

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[PATCH 1/4] Remove some unused variables
by Daniel Martí 18 Aug '14

18 Aug '14

Signed-off-by: Daniel Martí <mvdan(a)mvdan.cc> --- lib/chutney/TorNet.py | 5 ++--- lib/chutney/Traffic.py | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/chutney/TorNet.py b/lib/chutney/TorNet.py index 3685ec0..9d8efd1 100644 --- a/lib/chutney/TorNet.py +++ b/lib/chutney/TorNet.py @@ -297,7 +297,6 @@ class LocalNodeBuilder(NodeBuilder): """ datadir = self._env['dir'] tor = self._env['tor'] - idfile = os.path.join(datadir,'keys',"identity_key") cmdline = [ tor, "--quiet", @@ -445,9 +444,9 @@ class LocalNodeController(NodeController): def hup(self): """Send a SIGHUP to this node, if it's running.""" pid = self.getPid() - running = self.isRunning() + running = self.isRunning(pid) nick = self._env['nick'] - if self.isRunning(): + if running: print "Sending sighup to %s"%nick os.kill(pid, signal.SIGHUP) return True diff --git a/lib/chutney/Traffic.py b/lib/chutney/Traffic.py index 7202c3d..57250f7 100644 --- a/lib/chutney/Traffic.py +++ b/lib/chutney/Traffic.py @@ -312,7 +312,6 @@ import sys def main(): """Test the TrafficTester by sending and receiving some data.""" DATA = "a foo is a bar" * 1000 - DATA_CORRUPT = "a foo is a baz" * 1000 proxy = ('localhost', 9008) bind_to = ('localhost', int(sys.argv[1])) -- Daniel Martí - mvdan(a)mvdan.cc - http://mvdan.cc/ PGP: A9DA 13CD F7A1 4ACD D3DE E530 F4CA FFDB 4348 041C

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GSoC final progress update
by Белоус Михаил 18 Aug '14

18 Aug '14

During GSoC I have done following: Threadpool using pththread Benchmark for this pool Multithread version of command_proccess_cell and fix most of the data racing places Current version of tor daemon, passes chutney test, and chutney + valgrind for data racing test. I glad I work for tor, thank you all.

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