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strange ARM results
by Rob van der Hoeven 20 Oct '16

20 Oct '16

Hi folks, I'm on a quest to find the average circuit-creation rate of clients. I looked in path-spec.txt to find an answer, but it wasn't there. So I thought: lets take some measurements using ARM. This got me some strange results. I start ARM, do some browsing, and close my browser. During the browsing ARM reports 3 circuits with ID's: 398, 399 and 400. These circuits are still there 45 minutes after the browser was closed. If I then restart ARM it reports that there are only two circuits, with circuit ID's 405 and 406. It looks to me that ARM does not update the circuits page when old circuits are closed and replaced by new circuits. It's also possible that ARM keeps old circuits alive after they are not being used anymore by my Tor proxy. Note: I use ARM version: 1.4.5.0, Tor version: 0.2.5.12 Regards, Rob. https://hoevenstein.nl

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metrics-lib/DescripTor 1.5.0 is released
by Karsten Loesing 20 Oct '16

20 Oct '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello devs, we just released metrics-lib/DescripTor 1.5.0: https://dist.torproject.org/descriptor/1.5.0/ - From the change log: # Changes in version 1.5.0 - 2016-10-19 * Major changes - Make the DescriptorCollector implementation that uses CollecTor's index.json file to determine which descriptor files to fetch the new default. Applications must provide gson-2.2.4.jar or higher as dependency. * Minor changes - Avoid running into an IOException and logging a warning for it. All the best, Karsten -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJYCImbAAoJEC3ESO/4X7XBKKkH/Rk+Umu8asLOv2UQYBBsU6Mx nQzhap6XbeO3sFVNUK5KXA2Q35MRGOdeE8GWuroOm/JZu6v8A4xONKaMJqLV4EPK HRpIrsHtcgZFZ5maBYpJ866DA4vi7pnmLLG0kGhx94gj8tIneZuQZs96bDbVgdUP 0GXbC75bkVRiFWTnTpCAzP2cN+kmEjpK7XE0FSmMvdaLse5e7+p93doCEdwT3vjw a91zOm9nEOJWtUGdYfDBPToCVN2U4xFCzxASgdfZt5n7Ez+KmcyxCb2xh3bU2RSH MJ7PBCkdoMNnZgENDmIZqPNQ/3dRCw0Q0QcmpoZIKxdYpf4r7+Vf4o1n5912iaU= =2Xwl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Tor Relays on Whonix Gateway
by bancfc＠openmailbox.org 20 Oct '16

20 Oct '16

Should Whonix document/encourage end users to turn clients into relays on their machines?

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[RELEASE] Torsocks 2.2.0 stable
by David Goulet 18 Oct '16

18 Oct '16

Greetings! This is the release of Torsocks 2.2.0 stable version. One of the major change between this version and the previous RC1 is that we added a check for Apple's System Integrity Protection (a.k.a the next step for DRM protection in OS X :P). This prevents torsocks to work for any binaries located in: /usr/* (with an exception of /usr/local/*), /System/* /sbin/* /bin/* A note maybe to the packagers, the tarball is now compressed with xz. Apart from that, mostly bug and portability fixes. Here is the ChangeLog: 2016-10-18 torsocks 2.2.0 * Use xz for dist tarball now * Remove TODO as we use the bugtracker for those * execve: only include xattr.h for Linux * syscall: sched_getaffinity is only Linux * close: Prefix debug messages with [close] * Add check for Apple's System Integrity Protection. * Quote the non-zero length check of $getcap. * compat: Fix bad use of defined macro for OS X * Use AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS to try to use POSIX extensions * log: Fix whitespace in log.h * syscall: OS X doesn't support sched_getaffinity() * Fix memcpy buffer overrun in gethostbyaddr() * Fix memcpy() buffer overrun in gethostbyname() * Fix typo: catched -> caught * syscall: Whitelist sched_getaffinity(2) Tarball: https://people.torproject.org/~dgoulet/torsocks/torsocks-2.2.0.tar.xz http://sbe5fi5cka5l3fqe.onion/~dgoulet/torsocks/torsocks-2.2.0.tar.xz Sig: https://people.torproject.org/~dgoulet/torsocks/torsocks-2.2.0.tar.xz.asc http://sbe5fi5cka5l3fqe.onion/~dgoulet/torsocks/torsocks-2.2.0.tar.xz.asc Please let us know if anything went wrong or any bugs! https://trac.torproject.org Huge thanks to everyone who contributed by reporting issues, making patches and testing! Cheers! David

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[prop269] Further changes to the hybrid handshake proposal (and NTor)
by isis agora lovecruft 18 Oct '16

18 Oct '16

Hello, After discussion with John Schanck and Trevor Perrin over the last month, we've decided to make some alterations to the specification for hybrid handshakes in Tor proposal #269. It seems that John, Trevor, and I are mostly in agreement about most of the construction. First, I'll try to summarise a list of changes and the reasoning/concerns which provoked them. For what it's worth, these concerns mostly involve highly theoretical problems surrounding whether we model a hash function with a random oracle or try to make some stronger claims to its properties, and aren't due to any real world attacks (assuming that hash functions do what you'd expect them to do and aren't something crazy like a NULL op or a pineapple slicing machine). Changes: 1. [NTOR] Inputs to HKDF-extract(SALT, SECRET) which are not secret (e.g. server identity ID, and public keys A, X, Y) are now removed from SECRET and instead placed in the SALT. Reasoning: *Only* secret data should be placed into the HKDF extractor, and public data should not be mixed into whatever entropic material is used for key generation. This eliminates a theoretical attack in which the server chooses its public material in such a way as to bias the entropy extraction. This isn't reasonably assumed to be possible in a "hash functions aren't probablistically pineapple slicers" world. Previously, and also in NTor, we were adding the transcript of the handshake(s) and other public material (e.g. ID, A, X, Y, PROTOID) directly into the secret portion of an HMAC call, the output of which is eventually used to derive the key material. The SALT for HKDF (as specified in RFC5869) can be anything, even a static string, but if we're going to be adding transcript material into the handshake, it shouldn't be in the entropy extraction phrase. 2. [NTOR] The authentication of transcript data, i.e. (ID, A, X, Y, EPK, C) where EPK is the public and ephemeral portion which the client sends in the post-quantum KEM, and C is the reconciliation data, is now distinctly separate from the production of SALT for the extractor, and is first HMACed separately (where the key is derived from the same HKDF extraction which produces the seed) before being included within the expansion phase. Reasoning: The idea is to avoid attempting to do context-binding (of the transcript, in this case) and entropy extraction at the same time, in order to have a stronger argument that the shared key used for authenticating the context is secure, whereas (before, in NTor) things were a bit murky. The use of auth_input in ntor was designed to prevent a certain type of collision attack (see [Zav12, SZW16]). However the auth_input countermeasure is unnecessary if the authentication tag is of length 2*LAMBDA. A collision attack on a random function of output length 2*LAMBDA has cost 2^LAMBDA. This change additionally avoids the collision attack. 3. The hashing of first SALT has been removed. (Or, alternatively, it's still there, assuming you're following the specification for HKDF extraction in RFC5869 to the T and hashing any incoming SALT longer than 32 bytes. If you're using something like SHAKE-256 or similar… well, it's not exactly clear or specified yet how to use SHAKE as a dropin replacement for a KDF. Joan is apparently writing something.) Reasoning: It was originally included due to concerns that a malicious adverary could potentially choose some SALT such that when passed into the HKDF-extractor, it would "nullify" the SECRET input rather than extracting from it. However, the HKDF-extractor is HMAC(SALT, SECRET) and we assume the HMAC's underlying hash function is not a machine which factors discrete logarithms or a slices pineapples. Were you to replace your own hash function with a pineapple slicer, you'd simply be creating a vulnerability for yourself, and thus it doesn't really make sense in Tor's case to hash the SALT first because we're not living in the horrible world where hash functions can turn out to be pineapple slicers. (And even if it were possible for them to be pineapple slicers, it personally still doesn't make sense to me why you'd want to protect against potential pineapple slicers by putting your data through a pineapple slicer twice.) Best regards, -- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt

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Note on my GPG key update
by Nick Mathewson 18 Oct '16

18 Oct '16

Hi! Please see https://people.torproject.org/~nickm/key-transition-statement-2.txt for information on my updated GPG key. Thanks! (I wouldn't ordinarily send this here, but this new key signs the Tor source and tags these days, so it's a good idea to make sure people know about it. The most recent releases were signed with both my old key and my new key: this is the last time that I'm planning to be doing that, however, since it seemed to confuse a lot of software.)

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Proposal 273: Exit relay pinning for web services
by Philipp Winter 18 Oct '16

18 Oct '16

The proposal is in draft state. We have several open questions that we are still wrestling with in Section 2.6. Any feedback is greatly appreciated. You can track the evolution of our proposal online: <https://github.com/NullHypothesis/exit-pinning> --- Filename: 273-exit-relay-pinning.txt Title: Exit relay pinning for web services Author: Philipp Winter, Tobias Pulls, Roya Ensafi, and Nick Feamster Created: 2016-09-22 Status: Draft Target: n/a 0. Overview To mitigate the harm caused by malicious exit relays, this proposal presents a novel scheme -- exit relay pinning -- to allow web sites to express that Tor connections should preferably originate from a set of predefined exit relays. This proposal is currently in draft state. Any feedback is appreciated. 1. Motivation Malicious exit relays are increasingly becoming a problem. We have been witnessing numerous opportunistic attacks, but also highly sophisticated, targeted attacks that are financially motivated. So far, we have been looking for malicious exit relays using active probing and a number of heuristics, but since it is inexpensive to keep setting up new exit relays, we are facing an uphill battle. Similar to the now-obsolete concept of exit enclaves, this proposal enables web services to express that Tor clients should prefer a predefined set of exit relays when connecting to the service. We encourage sensitive sites to set up their own exit relays and have Tor clients prefer these relays, thus greatly mitigating the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks. 2. Design 2.1 Overview A simple analogy helps in explaining the concept behind exit relay pinning: HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) allows web servers to express that browsers should pin certificates for a given time interval. Similarly, exit relay pinning (ERP) allows web servers to express that Tor Browser should prefer a predefined set of exit relays. This makes it harder for malicious exit relays to be selected as last hop for a given website. Web servers advertise support for ERP in a new HTTP header that points to an ERP policy. This policy contains one or more exit relays, and is signed by the respective relay's master identity key. Once Tor Browser obtained a website's ERP policy, it will try to select the site's preferred exit relays for subsequent connections. The following subsections discuss this mechanism in greater detail. 2.2 Exit relay pinning header Web servers support ERP by advertising it in the "Tor-Exit-Pins" HTTP header. The header contains two directives, "url" and "max-age": Tor-Exit-Pins: url="https://example.com/pins.txt"; max-age=2678400 The "url" directive points to the full policy, which MUST be HTTPS. Tor Browser MUST NOT fetch the policy if it is not reachable over HTTPS. Also, Tor Browser MUST abort the ERP procedure if the HTTPS certificate is not signed by a trusted authority. The "max-age" directive determines the time in seconds for how long Tor Browser SHOULD cache the ERP policy. After seeing a Tor-Exit-Pins header in an HTTP response, Tor Browser MUST fetch and interpret the policy unless it already has it cached and the cached policy has not yet expired. 2.3 Exit relay pinning policy An exit relay pinning policy MUST be formatted in JSON. The root element is called "erp-policy" and it points to a list of pinned exit relays. Each list element MUST contain two elements, "fingerprint" and "signature". The "fingerprint" element points to the hex-encoded, uppercase, 40-digit fingerprint of an exit relay, e.g., 9B94CD0B7B8057EAF21BA7F023B7A1C8CA9CE645. The "signature" element points to an Ed25519 signature, uppercase and hex-encoded. The following JSON shows a conceptual example: { "erp-policy": [ "start-policy", { "fingerprint": Fpr1, "signature": Sig_K1("erp-signature" || "example.com" || Fpr1) }, { "fingerprint": Fpr2, "signature": Sig_K2("erp-signature" || "example.com" || Fpr2) }, ... { "fingerprint": Fprn, "signature": Sig_Kn("erp-signature" || "example.com" || Fprn) }, "end-policy" ] } Fpr refers to a relay's fingerprint as discussed above. In the signature, K refers to a relay's master private identity key. The || operator refers to string concatenation, i.e., "foo" || "bar" results in "foobar". "erp-signature" is a constant and denotes the purpose of the signature. "start-policy" and "end-policy" are both constants and meant to prevent an adversary from serving a client only a partial list of pins. The signatures over fingerprint and domain are necessary to prove that an exit relay agrees to being pinned. The website's domain -- in this case example.com -- is part of the signature, so third parties such as evil.com cannot coerce exit relays they don't own to serve as their pinned exit relays. After having fetched an ERP policy, Tor Browser MUST first verify that the two constants "start-policy" and "end-policy" are present, and then validate the signature over all list elements. If any element does not validate, Tor Browser MUST abort the ERP procedure. If an ERP policy contains more than one exit relay, Tor Browser MUST select one at random, weighted by its bandwidth. That way, we can balance load across all pinned exit relays. Tor Browser could enforce the mapping from domain to exit relay by adding the following directive to its configuration file: MapAddress example.com example.com.Fpr_n.exit 2.4 Defending against malicious websites The purpose of exit relay pinning is to protect a website's users from malicious exit relays. We must further protect the same users from the website, however, because it could abuse ERP to reduce a user's anonymity set. The website could group users into arbitrarily-sized buckets by serving them different ERP policies on their first visit. For example, the first Tor user could be pinned to exit relay A, the second user could be pinned to exit relay B, etc. This would allow the website to link together the sessions of anonymous users. We cannot prevent websites from serving client-specific policies, but we can detect it by having Tor Browser fetch a website's ERP policy over multiple independent exit relays. If the policies are not identical, Tor Browser MUST ignore the ERP policies. If Tor Browser would attempt to fetch the ERP policy over n circuits as quickly as possible, the website would receive n connections within a narrow time interval, suggesting that all these connections originated from the same client. To impede such time-based correlation attacks, Tor Browser MUST wait for a randomly determined time span before fetching the ERP policy. Tor Browser SHOULD randomly sample a delay from an exponential distribution. The disadvantage of this defence is that it can take a while until Tor Browser knows that it can trust an ERP policy. 2.5 Design trade-offs We now briefly discuss alternative design decisions, and why we defined ERP the way we did. Instead of having a web server *tell* Tor Browser about pinned exit relays, we could have Tor Browser *ask* the web server, e.g., by making it fetch a predefined URL, similar to robots.txt. We believe that this would involve too much overhead because only a tiny fraction of sites that Tor users visit will have an ERP policy. ERP implies that adversaries get to learn all the exit relays from which all users of a pinned site come from. These exit relays could then become a target for traffic analysis or compromise. Therefore, websites that pin exit relays SHOULD have a proper HTTPS setup and host their exit relays topologically close to the content servers, to mitigate the threat of network-level adversaries. It's possible to work around the bootstrapping problem (i.e., the very first website visit cannot use pinned exits) by having an infrastructure that allows us to pin exits out-of-band, e.g., by hard-coding them in Tor Browser, or by providing a lookup service prior to connecting to a site, but the additional complexity does not seem to justify the added security or reduced overhead. 2.6 Open questions o How should we deal with selective DoS or otherwise unavailable exit relays? That is, what if an adversary takes offline pinned exit relays? Should Tor Browser give up, or fall back to non-pinned exit relays that are potentially malicious? Should we give site operators an option to express a fallback if they care more about availability than security? o Are there any aspects that are unnecessarily tricky to implement in Tor Browser? If so, let's figure out how to make it easier to build. o Is a domain-level pinning granularity sufficient? o Should we use the Ed25519 master or signing key? o Can cached ERP policies survive a Tor Browser restart? After all, we are not supposed to write to disk, and ERP policies are basically like a browsing history. o Should we have some notion of "freshness" in an ERP policy? The problem is that an adversary could save my ERP policy for example.com, and if I ever give up example.com, the adversary could register it, and use my relays for pinning. This could easily be mitigated by rotating my relay identity keys, and might not be that big a problem. o Should we support non-HTTP services? For example, do we want to support, say, SSH? And if so, how would we go about it? o HPKP also defines a "report-uri" directive to which errors should be reported. Do we want something similar, so site operators can detect issues such as attempted DoS attacks? o It is wasteful to send a 60-70 byte header to all browsers while only a tiny fraction of them will want it. Web servers could send the header only to IP addresses that run an exit relay, but that adds quite a bit of extra complexity. o We currently defend against malicious websites by fetching the ERP policy over several exit relays, spread over time. In doing so, we are making assumptions on the number of visits the website sees. Is there a better solution that isn't significantly more complex?

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Building Torsocks for Armv7 - Build error
by Luca Bertoni 18 Oct '16

18 Oct '16

Goodmorning, I hope this is the correct section where to ask about building Torsocks. If that is the wrong place I apoligize and ask for a reference that can help me. So, I am trying to build torsocks for my armv7 smartphone. What I'm talking about is a cross-compilation, done using autools. After I have generated the configure script executing autogen.sh I configure torsocks using "./configure --host=armv7" and that doesn't raise errors. When I try to build it (using gnu-make) I get an error: ../src/lib/.libs/libtorsocks.a(log.o):(.data+0x0): multiple definition of `tsocks_loglevel' test_connect.o:(.data+0x0): first defined here I know what the error means but I can not figure out if I'm doing something wrong (that is the first time I cross-compile something so I am a newbie) or if there is a bug in the software. If it is a bug in the software I would like to submit it I downloaded torsocks from github (latest tag/release) and I am trying to build it using Debian 8.6 and gcc (Debian 4.9.2-10) 4.9.2. Thanks, Luca. Luca Bertoni

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Re: [tor-dev] Call for help on testing core tor releases
by perky＠sigaint.org 14 Oct '16

14 Oct '16

Heya I'd like to help too - able to test on debian stable and testing. isabela at riseup.net: > > What we are asking volunteers: > > * Validate release signature/checksum > > * Does it build with _no_ Warnings? > > * Does "make test" pass? > > * Does "make test-network-all" pass? (you'll need chutney for this - > chutney does not work on Windows) > > * Does it work as a client? As a relay? As a hidden service ? > > * Does it work if you drop the binary into (eg) torpbrowser? > > > We are hoping to find enough people that we can test the releases on as > many OS's as possible. > Some OS-specific notes: > > * on Linux and BSD, Tor requires some dependencies (read INSTALL). > > * on OS X, you'll need to choose a package manager (HomeBrew, > MacPorts, Fink), or install dependencies from source, > > * either way, you will need to tell configure where the dependencies > are located. > > * on Windows, people sometimes have trouble building Tor. Help us > update our build instructions for Windows! > > > Our goals: > > * We hope to have tor alpha releases tested within a week of it going out > > * We hope to have people testing it on as many OS's as possible > > * Reduce the number of bugs found when we launch a release candidate > and/or stable release > > * We want operating systems and configurations other than the ones we > use in development to get tested BEFORE we declare the release stable. > >

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performance of CREATE/CREATED handshake
by Rob van der Hoeven 13 Oct '16

13 Oct '16

Hi folks, I'm currently thinking about a new scalable network architecture for Tor. In order to get some idea about the performance of this architecture I need some data about the CREATE/CREATED handshake. This handshake involves PK encryption which is of course time consuming, and this probably determines the maximum client-capacity of a node in my new network architecture. I'm interested in two values: 1) The average circuit-rate of a single client (circuits/sec) 2) The average CPU-time it takes to perform a CREATE/CREATED handshake. Any data on these questions is much appreciated. Rob. https://hoevenstein.nl

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