- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Rejecting 380 vulnerable guard/exit keys
by Sebastian Urbach 16 Apr '14

16 Apr '14

Hi Roger, That sounds good to me and from what i see there should be at least enough guard capacity to go through with it. Exit's are a whole other matter but honestly if those 12% still running around with the bleedingheart than kick 'em. Hi folks, I'm attaching the list of relay identity fingerprints that I'm rejecting on moria1 as of yesterday. I got the list from Sina's scanner: https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/ I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag rather than rejecting them outright, but this way they'll get notices in their logs. I also thought for a while about trying to keep my list of fingerprints up-to-date (i.e. removing the !reject line once they've upgraded their openssl), but on the other hand, if they were still vulnerable as of yesterday, I really don't want this identity key on the Tor network even after they've upgraded their openssl. If the other directory authority operators follow suit, we'll lose about 12% of the exit capacity and 12% of the guard capacity. I/we should add to this list as we discover other relays that come online with vulnerable openssl versions. Also these are just the relays with Guard and/or Exit flags, so we should add the other 1000+ at some point soon. --Roger

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Rejecting 380 vulnerable guard/exit keys
by Roger Dingledine 16 Apr '14

16 Apr '14

Hi folks, I'm attaching the list of relay identity fingerprints that I'm rejecting on moria1 as of yesterday. I got the list from Sina's scanner: https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/ I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag rather than rejecting them outright, but this way they'll get notices in their logs. I also thought for a while about trying to keep my list of fingerprints up-to-date (i.e. removing the !reject line once they've upgraded their openssl), but on the other hand, if they were still vulnerable as of yesterday, I really don't want this identity key on the Tor network even after they've upgraded their openssl. If the other directory authority operators follow suit, we'll lose about 12% of the exit capacity and 12% of the guard capacity. I/we should add to this list as we discover other relays that come online with vulnerable openssl versions. Also these are just the relays with Guard and/or Exit flags, so we should add the other 1000+ at some point soon. --Roger

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NHS UK blocking Tor?
by Chris Whittleston 16 Apr '14

16 Apr '14

Can someone else running a relay from their home connection confirm that they get an 'Access denied' error from http://www.nhs.uk? I've checked with someone using the same ISP in the flat above me and they seem able to access the site just fine, as can I via mobile internet so I'm down to suspecting that they are blocking all Tor relay IPs. This is the exact error I get: Access DeniedYou don't have permission to access "http://www.nhs.uk/" on this server. Reference #18.1f7f1002.1397514736.1fe2170c The reference seems to change each time I visit. If this does turn out to be them blocking Tor - advice on how to approach contacting them to resolve this would be appreciated. Thanks, Chris -- *Dr Chris Whittleston 栗主* Department of Chemistry University of Cambridge Lensfield Road, Cambridge, CB2 1EW Email: csw34(a)cam.ac.uk Tel: +44 (0)1223 336423

10 12

Consensus weights in light of recent insecurities
by Tora Tora Tora 15 Apr '14

15 Apr '14

I have two relays running, both with patched up SSL, latest alpha build and with new keys. Both are stable and guards, yet since the last restart several days ago one transferred: 40GB - https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/D0B1FAD2AE3C5CA526D8329D20FA55BF2BFDA… and the other 2GB - https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/3597D85E08CC511923A4E74F7F54E209E01E0… ; consensus stuck at 20 Given the situation with the recent insecurities, the latter relay sure seems under utilized. I realize that my relays are considered "small" by some standards, but somehow I was made to believe that in Tor is all about mixing things up. A paid-for bandwidth is a terrible thing to waste. :-)

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NSA knew about Heartbleed
by Jesse Victors 13 Apr '14

13 Apr '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Saw this article: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-have-used-heartbleed-b… "The U.S. National Security Agency knew for at least two years about a flaw in the way that many websites send sensitive information, now dubbed the Heartbleed bug, and regularly used it to gather critical intelligence, two people familiar with the matter said. The NSA said in response to a Bloomberg News article that it wasn?t aware of Heartbleed until the vulnerability was made public by a private security report. The agency?s reported decision to keep the bug secret in pursuit of national security interests threatens to renew the rancorous debate over the role of the government?s top computer experts." Thanks NSA, glad you've got our backs there. If you run a relay and you have been on one of the affected versions of OpenSSL, I would urge you to STRONGLY CONSIDER your relay compromised. Delete your keys per the recommendations and let Tor generate new ones. It's better to cripple the network temporarily while we come back from this, rather than preserving the uptime with possibly compromised keys. Security matters here. Please follow the best practice recommendations. If you run a web server, rekey your SSL certificates. Basically, if you were affected, consider encryption to have been bypassed and passwords and other sensitive information compromised. We cannot afford to take chances here. If the NSA knew it, you can also bet that someone else with a good static analyzer discovered it as well, I'll let you imagine one. Good luck out there everyone, we really need to revoke our keys if we were affected. Seriously, guys. It's worth it. On a lighter note, https://xkcd.com/1354/ Stay safe. Live long and prosper. Jesse V. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJTSImHXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQxMjgyMjhENjEyODQ1OTU1NzBCMjgwRkFB RDk3MzY0RkMyMEJFQzgwAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yA0nIIAKj1lOXRGcwMFd39CxjnymSN FVzrPUa/JomCJHqW/A0xSFdxbVAZIvio6C1phuWHmiiDKhsBuBGwLNzXQMGFltaw BnaTO1lLCvvSbEdmXPg12hR3YqR1d5D7Xnb0iTlSfrjZ7gGDEsXoJG3pU/V/RCFo IOEqxfZtVcI3DdrImlwcR6gPw6ip9JlTo49w8ncy6/K4cHED2liCQ13JvWjaQzSl uB06eWNsNo1IhPCKkZ7gFzharhN/4kAQrytC+ZcTmIrXdPrsd1lUaVICHWK9AEon sciDu5lI77srXWwt77YVAKw6Jrls41N3USgvKBSrxZhfBVQlCPOmoXtTHdwbhks= =pmBQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

10 13

Relays vulnerable to OpenSSL bug: Please upgrade
by Moritz Bartl 13 Apr '14

13 Apr '14

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/openssl-bug-cve-2014-0160 A new OpenSSL vulnerability on 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f is out today, which can be used to reveal memory to a connected client or server. If you're using an older OpenSSL version, you're safe. Note that this bug affects way more programs than just Tor — expect everybody who runs an https webserver to be scrambling today. If you need strong anonymity or privacy on the Internet, you might want to stay away from the Internet entirely for the next few days while things settle. Here are our first thoughts on what Tor components are affected: Clients: Tor Browser shouldn't be affected, since it uses libnss rather than openssl. But Tor clients could possibly be induced to send sensitive information like "what sites you visited in this session" to your entry guards. If you're using TBB we'll have new bundles out shortly; if you're using your operating system's Tor package you should get a new OpenSSL package and then be sure to manually restart your Tor. Relays and bridges: Tor relays and bridges could maybe be made to leak their medium-term onion keys (rotated once a week), or their long-term relay identity keys. An attacker who has your relay identity key can publish a new relay descriptor indicating that you're at a new location (not a particularly useful attack). An attacker who has your relay identity key, has your onion key, and can intercept traffic flows to your IP address can impersonate your relay (but remember that Tor's multi-hop design means that attacking just one relay in the client's path is not very useful). In any case, best practice would be to update your OpenSSL package, discard all the files in keys/ in your DataDirectory, and restart your Tor to generate new keys. Hidden services: Tor hidden services might leak their long-term hidden service identity keys to their guard relays. Like the last big OpenSSL bug, this shouldn't allow an attacker to identify the location of the hidden service, but an attacker who knows the hidden service identity key can impersonate the hidden service. Best practice would be to move to a new hidden-service address at your convenience. Directory authorities: In addition to the keys listed in the "relays and bridges" section above, Tor directory authorities might leak their medium-term authority signing keys. Once you've updated your OpenSSL package, you should generate a new signing key. Long-term directory authority identity keys are offline so should not be affected (whew). More tricky is that clients have your relay identity key hard-coded, so please don't rotate that yet. We'll see how this unfolds and try to think of a good solution there. Tails is still tracking Debian oldstable, so it should not be affected by this bug. Orbot looks vulnerable; we'll try to publish more details here soon. It looks like most of the webservers in the https://www.torproject.org/ rotation need upgrades too, and maybe we'll need to throw away our torproject SSL web cert and get a new one — hopefully we'll deal with all that soon. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/

20 29

Should I Worry @ INTRODUCE1 Warnings
by Tami Kennedy 12 Apr '14

12 Apr '14

Hello, non-exit relay (Tor 0.2.4.21) started seeing these log Warning entries. Concern or normal? Apr 05 06:02:40.810 Warning Rejecting INTRODUCE1 on non-OR or non-edge circuit 2147503731 Apr 05 06:49:47.107 Warning Rejecting INTRODUCE1 on non-OR or non-edge circuit 2147493910 -Tami

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Re: [tor-relays] NSA knew about Heartbleed
by Eric Giannini 12 Apr '14

12 Apr '14

This is an excellent email. ------------------------------ On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 5:32 PM PDT Jesse Victors wrote: > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA512 > > >Saw this article: >http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-have-used-heartbleed-b… > >"The U.S. National Security Agency knew for at least two years about a >flaw in the way that many websites send sensitive information, now >dubbed the Heartbleed bug, and regularly used it to gather critical >intelligence, two people familiar with the matter said. The NSA said in >response to a Bloomberg News article that it wasn?t aware of Heartbleed >until the vulnerability was made public by a private security report. >The agency?s reported decision to keep the bug secret in pursuit of >national security interests threatens to renew the rancorous debate over >the role of the government?s top computer experts." > >Thanks NSA, glad you've got our backs there. > >If you run a relay and you have been on one of the affected versions of >OpenSSL, I would urge you to STRONGLY CONSIDER your relay compromised. >Delete your keys per the recommendations and let Tor generate new ones. >It's better to cripple the network temporarily while we come back from >this, rather than preserving the uptime with possibly compromised keys. >Security matters here. Please follow the best practice recommendations. >If you run a web server, rekey your SSL certificates. Basically, if you >were affected, consider encryption to have been bypassed and passwords >and other sensitive information compromised. We cannot afford to take >chances here. If the NSA knew it, you can also bet that someone else >with a good static analyzer discovered it as well, I'll let you imagine one. > >Good luck out there everyone, we really need to revoke our keys if we >were affected. Seriously, guys. It's worth it. > >On a lighter note, https://xkcd.com/1354/ > >Stay safe. Live long and prosper. >Jesse V. > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) >Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > >iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJTSImHXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w >ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQxMjgyMjhENjEyODQ1OTU1NzBCMjgwRkFB >RDk3MzY0RkMyMEJFQzgwAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yA0nIIAKj1lOXRGcwMFd39CxjnymSN >FVzrPUa/JomCJHqW/A0xSFdxbVAZIvio6C1phuWHmiiDKhsBuBGwLNzXQMGFltaw >BnaTO1lLCvvSbEdmXPg12hR3YqR1d5D7Xnb0iTlSfrjZ7gGDEsXoJG3pU/V/RCFo >IOEqxfZtVcI3DdrImlwcR6gPw6ip9JlTo49w8ncy6/K4cHED2liCQ13JvWjaQzSl >uB06eWNsNo1IhPCKkZ7gFzharhN/4kAQrytC+ZcTmIrXdPrsd1lUaVICHWK9AEon >sciDu5lI77srXWwt77YVAKw6Jrls41N3USgvKBSrxZhfBVQlCPOmoXtTHdwbhks= >=pmBQ >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >_______________________________________________ >tor-relays mailing list >tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

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Long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor
by Tom van der Woerdt 10 Apr '14

10 Apr '14

What's the long-term effect of Heartbleed on Tor? * Should we consider every key that was created before Tuesday a bad key and lower their consensus weight? * Should authorities scan for bad OpenSSL versions and force their weight down to 20? A lot of relays will continue running bad OpenSSL versions which seriously hurts the security of Tor. A month from now the NSA/CGHQ/CIVD/etc may know the private keys of a large chunk of these relays and possibly be able to decode a big chunk of traffic... Tom

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Re: [tor-relays] Strange Problem Browsing Blocked Websites‏
by sssheep 10 Apr '14

10 Apr '14

On Thu, 10 Apr 2014 04:26:27 +0000 (UTC) Enrique Fynn <enriquefynn(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On 10 April 2014 01:01, Tor Relays at brwyatt.net <tor(a)brwyatt.net> > wrote: > > > > If I remember correctly, Firefox has a bug where it won't do DNS > > lookups over a SOCKS proxy. It will, however do DNS lookups through > > an HTTP proxy that supports it, such as Polipo. If you configure > > Polipo to act as an HTTP proxy that forwards to the Tor SOCKS > > proxy, and add Polipo to your Firefox config as an HTTP proxy (you > > can leave Tor's SOCKS proxy entry), this may resolve the issue your > > are seeing, assuming DNS blocking/filtering in your country. > > > > Bryan > > That's not a bug, it's firefox default behavior. To change this: > 1- Go to about:config > 2- Set network.proxy.socks_remote_dns to true > This is set already in TBB which you should be using. It exists for a reason, use it instead of attempting to create your own solution.

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