- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

A few questions about my setting up my first Tor relay.
by Robert Smith 18 Apr '14

18 Apr '14

Judging by the level of your computer skills implied by the emails, those involved in Tor have better things to do than help a guy like me. I think it is important to the entire world that the internet links us together, and Tor may be the most crucial part of that. I have 3 machines as possible candidates for a Tor relay: A) A decent PC (around 6 years old) with Vista installed. It's been unused for 2 years. I am willing to do a clean re-install of Vista or even Linux (with help) to run it as a Tor relay, night and day. B) A MacBook Pro (4gb ram, Intel, Snow Leopard). Again, I am willing to wipe it, and do a clean install of the OS and use it for a Tor relay, night and day. C) My personal laptop an Asus G74S (12gb ram, i7 quad core 2.2ghz, Win7 Home Premium 64bit), which I "sleep" most nights. Modem: DSL from "Telus" (in Victoria, BC, Canada) with 4 ports (I use 1 cable port to my personal computer, 1 wireless port for my iPad or Android cell phone). Questions: 1) If I run a Tor relay with that modem, are there any security risks to the other devices? I am no technical guru. 2) If I run a Tor relay on either (or both the Vista PC and MacBook) of the computers mentioned above, will it be mostly a "set it and forget it" maintenance? I cannot devote much time (and definitely don't have much expertise). 3) Will I compromise the anonimity of Tor users due to my lack of technical skills while running a Tor relay? I don't want to do more damage than good. 4) Can I throttle down the bandwidth on my Tor relay(s) when I need it for my own personal machine? I don't want to disrupt the Tor net. 5) Can you suggest the best way to use my machine(s) to make a reliable, maintenance free and secure Tor relay, requiring the least amount of time? I am guessing it's the MacBook cabled to the DSL, running only Tor relay software, and running only a normal relay. 6) At this point is it worth my while, to attempt a Tor bridge or exit relay or am I even capable of doing it properly? I have little experience or expertise in networking and not much time. Thanks for spending your valuable time reading my questions. I hope to make it pay off, in a long term Tor relay. Rob Smith

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Init.d script for two simultaneous Tor instances
by Jesse Victors 18 Apr '14

18 Apr '14

In case anyone is interested in running two Tor instances (regular, bridge, relay, exit) on one machine, I've successfully made an init.d script to do just that. From searches on Google it looks like others have asked about this in the past, so I'm sharing this for them. Tor only allows two Tor instances per IP. When the TBB came with Vidalia it was much easier to casually run a couple of relays per IP, but with the service it's a bit more tricky. Nevertheless it is possible: Instructions are here: https://gist.github.com/Jesse-V/11007048 Tor should be stopped and be sure to make a backup of /etc/init.d/tor before doing this in case things go south. Be sure to set up the folders and separate torrc file before replacing the /etc/init.d/tor script. The commands will be the same as before, so "service tor start" launches both. The script is a fork of the one that's packaged with Tor 0.2.4.21. Use your own judgment with this, but I'm just posting this for anyone interested. Jesse V.

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Re: [tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed
by tor＠t-3.net 18 Apr '14

18 Apr '14

Perl script attached which I made to take this !reject formatted list of bleeding tor nodes and reformat it into a mega-long ExcludeNodes line and put it at the end of my exit node's torrc. My tor daemon did not bomb or complain upon seeing the line. Hopefully that is the right way to use that !rejects list for relay operators who want to do the best thing?

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Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed
by Andrea Shepard 18 Apr '14

18 Apr '14

A list of 1777 proposed reject lines of fingerprints which have ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed in my scans is available at the URL below. This was generated with the following query: (select distinct hb.probe_identity_digest as identity_digest from heartbleed_probe_results hb where hb.probe_has_heartbleed and hb.probe_tor_checked_identity) union (select distinct hb.expected_identity_digest as identity_digest from heartbleed_probe_results hb where hb.probe_has_heartbleed and not hb.probe_tor_checked_identity) order by identity_digest; That is, it includes all probe results for which a Tor handshake was actually completed with the identity digest in question *and* a response to the Heartbleed probe was seen (1729 digests) or for identity digests we expected to see for that IP/port pair for which the handshake did not succeed but a Heartbleed response was seen (additional 48 digests). The target list is all IP/port pairs which have ever appeared in a consensus or vote during the time I've been scanning, so some of these may not be in the current consensus or have ever appeared, or they may no longer be vulnerable but not have changed keys properly. There are a bit over 900 vulnerable relays in the latest consensus. http://charon.persephoneslair.org/~andrea/private/hb-fingerprints-201404170… -- Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5

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Fwd: Tracking the bleeding relays
by Sina Rabbani 17 Apr '14

17 Apr '14

Hi, I have an additional scan on all the relays in the current consensus: https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_relays/ You may also be interested in the one that tracks Exit and Guards also: https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/ All the best, SiNA -- "be the change we wish to see in the world." Gandhi

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Rejecting 380 vulnerable guard/exit keys
by Sebastian Urbach 16 Apr '14

16 Apr '14

Hi Roger, That sounds good to me and from what i see there should be at least enough guard capacity to go through with it. Exit's are a whole other matter but honestly if those 12% still running around with the bleedingheart than kick 'em. Hi folks, I'm attaching the list of relay identity fingerprints that I'm rejecting on moria1 as of yesterday. I got the list from Sina's scanner: https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/ I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag rather than rejecting them outright, but this way they'll get notices in their logs. I also thought for a while about trying to keep my list of fingerprints up-to-date (i.e. removing the !reject line once they've upgraded their openssl), but on the other hand, if they were still vulnerable as of yesterday, I really don't want this identity key on the Tor network even after they've upgraded their openssl. If the other directory authority operators follow suit, we'll lose about 12% of the exit capacity and 12% of the guard capacity. I/we should add to this list as we discover other relays that come online with vulnerable openssl versions. Also these are just the relays with Guard and/or Exit flags, so we should add the other 1000+ at some point soon. --Roger

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Rejecting 380 vulnerable guard/exit keys
by Roger Dingledine 16 Apr '14

16 Apr '14

Hi folks, I'm attaching the list of relay identity fingerprints that I'm rejecting on moria1 as of yesterday. I got the list from Sina's scanner: https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/ I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag rather than rejecting them outright, but this way they'll get notices in their logs. I also thought for a while about trying to keep my list of fingerprints up-to-date (i.e. removing the !reject line once they've upgraded their openssl), but on the other hand, if they were still vulnerable as of yesterday, I really don't want this identity key on the Tor network even after they've upgraded their openssl. If the other directory authority operators follow suit, we'll lose about 12% of the exit capacity and 12% of the guard capacity. I/we should add to this list as we discover other relays that come online with vulnerable openssl versions. Also these are just the relays with Guard and/or Exit flags, so we should add the other 1000+ at some point soon. --Roger

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NHS UK blocking Tor?
by Chris Whittleston 16 Apr '14

16 Apr '14

Can someone else running a relay from their home connection confirm that they get an 'Access denied' error from http://www.nhs.uk? I've checked with someone using the same ISP in the flat above me and they seem able to access the site just fine, as can I via mobile internet so I'm down to suspecting that they are blocking all Tor relay IPs. This is the exact error I get: Access DeniedYou don't have permission to access "http://www.nhs.uk/" on this server. Reference #18.1f7f1002.1397514736.1fe2170c The reference seems to change each time I visit. If this does turn out to be them blocking Tor - advice on how to approach contacting them to resolve this would be appreciated. Thanks, Chris -- *Dr Chris Whittleston 栗主* Department of Chemistry University of Cambridge Lensfield Road, Cambridge, CB2 1EW Email: csw34(a)cam.ac.uk Tel: +44 (0)1223 336423

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Consensus weights in light of recent insecurities
by Tora Tora Tora 15 Apr '14

15 Apr '14

I have two relays running, both with patched up SSL, latest alpha build and with new keys. Both are stable and guards, yet since the last restart several days ago one transferred: 40GB - https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/D0B1FAD2AE3C5CA526D8329D20FA55BF2BFDA… and the other 2GB - https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/3597D85E08CC511923A4E74F7F54E209E01E0… ; consensus stuck at 20 Given the situation with the recent insecurities, the latter relay sure seems under utilized. I realize that my relays are considered "small" by some standards, but somehow I was made to believe that in Tor is all about mixing things up. A paid-for bandwidth is a terrible thing to waste. :-)

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NSA knew about Heartbleed
by Jesse Victors 13 Apr '14

13 Apr '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Saw this article: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-have-used-heartbleed-b… "The U.S. National Security Agency knew for at least two years about a flaw in the way that many websites send sensitive information, now dubbed the Heartbleed bug, and regularly used it to gather critical intelligence, two people familiar with the matter said. The NSA said in response to a Bloomberg News article that it wasn?t aware of Heartbleed until the vulnerability was made public by a private security report. The agency?s reported decision to keep the bug secret in pursuit of national security interests threatens to renew the rancorous debate over the role of the government?s top computer experts." Thanks NSA, glad you've got our backs there. If you run a relay and you have been on one of the affected versions of OpenSSL, I would urge you to STRONGLY CONSIDER your relay compromised. Delete your keys per the recommendations and let Tor generate new ones. It's better to cripple the network temporarily while we come back from this, rather than preserving the uptime with possibly compromised keys. Security matters here. Please follow the best practice recommendations. If you run a web server, rekey your SSL certificates. Basically, if you were affected, consider encryption to have been bypassed and passwords and other sensitive information compromised. We cannot afford to take chances here. If the NSA knew it, you can also bet that someone else with a good static analyzer discovered it as well, I'll let you imagine one. Good luck out there everyone, we really need to revoke our keys if we were affected. Seriously, guys. It's worth it. On a lighter note, https://xkcd.com/1354/ Stay safe. Live long and prosper. Jesse V. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQF8BAEBCgBmBQJTSImHXxSAAAAAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXQxMjgyMjhENjEyODQ1OTU1NzBCMjgwRkFB RDk3MzY0RkMyMEJFQzgwAAoJEK2XNk/CC+yA0nIIAKj1lOXRGcwMFd39CxjnymSN FVzrPUa/JomCJHqW/A0xSFdxbVAZIvio6C1phuWHmiiDKhsBuBGwLNzXQMGFltaw BnaTO1lLCvvSbEdmXPg12hR3YqR1d5D7Xnb0iTlSfrjZ7gGDEsXoJG3pU/V/RCFo IOEqxfZtVcI3DdrImlwcR6gPw6ip9JlTo49w8ncy6/K4cHED2liCQ13JvWjaQzSl uB06eWNsNo1IhPCKkZ7gFzharhN/4kAQrytC+ZcTmIrXdPrsd1lUaVICHWK9AEon sciDu5lI77srXWwt77YVAKw6Jrls41N3USgvKBSrxZhfBVQlCPOmoXtTHdwbhks= =pmBQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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