- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Scott Bennett 30 Mar '11

30 Mar '11

On Wed, 9 Mar 2011 19:18:34 -0500 cmeclax-sazri <cmeclax-sazri(a)ixazon.dynip.com> wrote: >On Wednesday 09 March 2011 17:20:17 Chris Palmer wrote: >> On 03/09/2011 01:48 PM, Arjan wrote: >> >> We are saying hello on port 443, and then saying goodbye. Once. Using >> >> normal TCP and TLS handshaking, no tricks. For the good of the internet. >> > >> > That would be enough to get me in trouble with my ISP for performing >> > portscans (if I were running an exit node). >> >> And how would you, or anyone else, differentiate that from normal web >> browsing? > >If a lot of those connection attempts are going to IP addresses with no host >present, or hosts not running a webserver, it looks like portscanning. If >almost all of the connection attempts are to webservers that have port 443 >open, it looks like normal https web browsing. Are you kidding? Closing a connection upon receipt of the ACK response to the SYN you sent looks like normal HTTPS web browsing? On what planet? Normal web browsing, whether HTTP or HTTPS, involves data transmission occurring in both directions between receipt of that ACK and the closing of the connection by the web browser. Closing the connection upon receipt of the ACK response to the SYN without any intervening data transmission is, OTOH, a characteristic behavior of port scanners. So you had it backwards. Here's a tidbit for you to consider. pf offers an option on filtering rules for inbound SSL connections called "synproxy", which relieves server software of the effort of dealing with bogus connection attempts by handling the SSL exchanges itself before passing the connection on to the server. It also means that a connection from something that doesn't know how to perform the SSL handshaking will sit until the timeout occurs, so the attacker is stuck with an outstanding connection tying up resources until that happens. That delay of a couple of minutes can be a long and wasteful nuisance to an attacker. OTOH, a legitimate application, e.g., a tor client or relay trying to connect to the ORPort of another relay, completes the handshake and begins communicating with its peer with no delay, and the software accepting the connection only deals with the legitimate connections. It works just great! :-) I highly recommend it to anyone running a tor relay on a system that supports pf. > >I have only one external address and only a few ports forwarded, so I can't >detect portscans. I have noticed that an attempt to guess passwords on SSH is >often, but not always, preceded by a connect and disconnect from the same IP >address, which is probably part of a portscan. I don't block addresses that >scan ports, but I do block addresses that try to guess passwords (not on the >Tor box, just on the other one). The block expires in a day. > To each his/her own. Legitimate port scanning operations are typically run by system/network administrators against the machines on their *own networks*. I treat any others as attackers or at least attacker-wannabes, and I keep track of such miscreants indefinitely against the possibility that I might someday provide services other than tor relaying. The miscreants will have no access to such services on general principles and will only have access to the tor node if and when they are currently running a public (i.e., not a bridge) tor node on the system with the IP address from which their tor attempts to connect to mine. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

4 4

Bridges on OpenWrt
by Mitar 29 Mar '11

29 Mar '11

Hi! Is there some package for running Tor bridges on OpenWrt supported devices? But as I understand Tor bridges consumes same amount of CPU power and RAM as Tor itself so they are not really possible for low power devices as WiFi routers where OpenWrt normally runes (with typically around 16 MB RAM and 200 MHz CPU power). But on the other hand, as we have in operation a lot of WiFi routers around the country, many of them having their own public IP from very diverse IP ranges, this would be quite useful for bridges. So my question is if somebody has tried to do something like that? Have some experience with it? And also if maybe bridges support would be possible to extend so that we could make (low overhead) tunnels from this WiFi routers to the central server where there would be running a Tor node connected to the Tor network, having enough CPU power and RAM to run everything. So it would be great if the Tor clients would be able to connect to those VPNed end points, but encryption itself would be done on the server. Mitar

3 5

multiple tor nodes on one router? was first using bridge then become bridge
by Lorenz Kirchner 27 Mar '11

27 Mar '11

Hi everyone, so I received no hint as to how or whether to pursue this thought... i shall find other sources of information I just started reading the manual, would you believe it.. I have a new question now, I currently have set up number of tor relays on my router which are loadbalanced using squid... in the hope to increase throughput and perhaps achieve increased anonymity by sending requests for one site through different tor routes... Is that advisable or even effective? My feeling is that the connection is somewhat more reliable than with just one tor relay.. and following on with this could one of these relays be set up to connect to tor via a bridge and then pass directory info on to the other relays running on the same machine? Kind regards, Loz On Thu, Mar 10, 2011 at 11:16 PM, Lorenz Kirchner <znerol2(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On 3/9/11 11:29 PM, mick wrote: > >> >> This this: >>> https://sites.google.com/a/infosecurity.ch/testst/ >>> >>> It's the google spreadsheet that load the bridge information embedded >>> into a google site. >>> >> I need a google account for that. What if I don't want one? >> >> So, any new ideas anybody? I still feel it would be best if 1. there was > a special function within tor to change from using a bridge to becoming a > bridge whithin the censored network, and 2. spreading this bridge-status > info locally... perhaps like dht in torrent.. only revealing a small > selection of available bridges nearby.. i obviously only have a very dim > idea of what i'm talking about.. sorry about that > > anyways, if these two problems could be addressed tor could be a biggie > with a lot of people here.. ;) -- think: cheap openwrt low maintenance > appliance.. > > Loz >

2 2

what updates do I need to install?
by Kathryn Cramer 26 Mar '11

26 Mar '11

I gather from Jacob's Twitter feed that I should download and install the new Tor Browser Bundle because of security updates. Will this affect the relay I am running? Do I also need to update Vidalia? Kathryn

2 1

IRQ affinity
by Mitar 24 Mar '11

24 Mar '11

Hi! I do not know if you have solved this but reading here: http://www.alexonlinux.com/smp-affinity-and-proper-interrupt-handling-in-li… It is written that: "So if on your system CPU0 handles all interrupts by default, this probably means that APIC configured ambiguously." So maybe it is nothing wrong with e1000e drivers/cards but with APIC configuration? Mitar

1 1

frequency of checking an IP change
by tagnaq 23 Mar '11

23 Mar '11

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hi, I'm wondering how often Tor tries to detect an IP change of itself and if a relay operator can modify that frequency? Observing the detection point in time and the actual IP change I guess it takes several minutes: - From the logfile: 00:33:30 Tor: Our IP Address has changed from ... to ... The new IP address was actually assigned several minutes before: 00:27:53 (check occurs every 10seconds) It would be valueable to modify the frequency because the relay in question gets a new IP address every few hours (<10h). Looking at the man page I couldn't find anything regarding that frequency. kind regards, tagnaq -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iF4EAREKAAYFAk2J3ZIACgkQyM26BSNOM7b4NwD/QmH0RWDsp0muCy0PFtkE0Gw4 TDNZx4eDYcOLKfvRX5UA/1PdG8w7DYtfvktWGkzBj82d6/gFo68oVJ+QAM8yqvWU =wnE6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

abuse reports from shadowserver.org
by Alexander Bernauer 21 Mar '11

21 Mar '11

Hi everybody, my ISP keeps on receiving abuse reports from shadowserver.org. They claim that an IRC bot operates from the IP that belongs to my tor exit. The strange thing is that my exit policy only allows web and mail ports. Furthermore, the IPs of the shadowserver honeypots have a ptr entry for *.sinkhole.shadowserver.org. So, I could block their servers either by means of the exit policy or with iptables. Which one would you prefer? I additionally wanted to ask here if there is any experience with shadowserver in this regard? Explaining the issue to my ISP failed. They keep on getting nervous. Talking to shadowserver also failed, because subscription to their public mailing list is moderated and my direct mails have been ignored for several months now. Any advice? regards Alex

6 6

weighting algorithm
by Olaf Selke 16 Mar '11

16 Mar '11

Hi, between Saturday evening and Tuesday afternoon (UTC+1) my relay's bandwidth dropped to about 2/3 of its normal value. Did some changes in directory's weighting algorithm occur during this time period? regards Olaf

5 6

Re: [tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Scott Bennett 11 Mar '11

11 Mar '11

On Sat, 26 Feb 2011 12:13:53 -0800 Chris Palmer <chris(a)eff.org> wrote: >On Feb 26, 2011, at 9:53 AM, mick wrote: > >> No reputable security researcher would a) scan a network without that >> network owner's explicit permission, nor b) use tor for that scan. > >Lots of reputable security researchers who scan the entire internet without getting permission. You can't get permission from every operator in the world, but you still need to do good and interesting research. Examples of reputable researchers who have scanned the whole internet include Dan Bernstein, Dan Kaminsky, and EFF. (At least I think we're reputable. :) ) I don't know for sure, but I can't imagine Arbor, CAIDA, and Renesys can do their jobs without scanning the internet. Well, as I've just finished describing in another topic here, I treat scanning of my system as attempted security breaches. Such scans will not elicit any apparent response from my system, except that the scanner's IP address will shortly be added to my "block" file, which will deny all future access to my tor node's ORPort and DirPort. > >Using Tor to scan the internet is a good way to see how the internet looks from different perspectives at once, which can be quite valuable. > I disagree and, as noted above, treat that as a cracking attempt. tor nodes that you abuse in such fashion will continue to function by the means described below, provided they are listed in the current consensus document. My current procedures are described in the next two paragraphs. However, your implication quoted above that EFF has/does/will abuse tor exits in this manner suggests I may have to modify my treatment of tor exits from which your scans emerge, given the increased likelihood that the offenses did not originate from the exit node's system and that the exit node was instead a victim as well. Nevertheless, your scans will not get responses from my system, except for connection attempts to the ORPort or the DirPort. First, I have set the sysctl variable called net.inet.tcp.blackhole to 2, which causes the kernel to drop all incoming packets addressed to closed ports. The IP addresses of tor nodes, including exit nodes, listed in the cached-consensus file on my system are placed into a "pass" file every 30 minutes, which temporarily exempts them from being checked against the "block" file. It is temporary in that the exemption lasts for 30 minutes only, although it will be exempted for another 30 minutes whenever the address exists in the cached-consensus file at the time the "pass" file is rebuilt. Anyone who may be concerned that their IP address or address range might be listed in my "block" file is welcome to write to me to inquire about it. If it is, then I will offer to remove the block on an indefinitely probationary basis. However, if I encounter the same IP address in my pf log again, then I will block the address permanently. Frankly, I think it's appalling that a previous sponsor organization for the tor project should turn on the tor network in the fashion you've confessed here that it has. I'm tempted to dig out all of the EFF IP address ranges and block them permanently, just as a matter of principle, although it would obviously have little real effect upon your organization. No wonder so many of us have run afoul of our ISPs when trying to run exit nodes when even EFF is trying to spoil the tor network for us. Who needs enemies with "friends" like EFF? Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

12 27

first using bridge then become bridge
by Lorenz Kirchner 11 Mar '11

11 Mar '11

Hi everybody, i'm in china and when i start tor nodes (on a linux server) i often have to first start up the node using bridges, after i ran tor for a while i can restart the node as a bridge-no-exit-relay-entry-node, or whatever, and it will (through its cached data, I guess) be able to connect to the tor network.. and, importantly, help other nodes to connect to the tor network. It would be great if the node's mode could automatically change, when I start the tor node it will try to be a bridge relay according to my torrc, if it can not establish a connection it will first use a bridge and when it has enough data (non blocked entry nodes) will return to becoming a relay. Does this make sense? btw i think bridges.torproject.org is blocked in china (perhaps not surprisingly). And also, on linux servers, couldn't the tor node get the bridges via email by itself, that would be fantastic! each tor node could have its own gmail account, but i guess it would probably somehow be a problem for anonymity..? take care :)

4 11

tor not working
by prafull moulekhi 10 Mar '11

10 Mar '11

hi I m having problem in running tor since last 1 week. I am getting the following log. Mar 08 14:17:17.950 [Notice] Initialized libevent version 1.4.14-stable using method win32. Good. Mar 08 14:17:17.950 [Notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050 Mar 08 14:17:17.950 [Notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051 Mar 08 14:17:17.950 [Notice] Parsing GEOIP file. Mar 08 14:17:22.831 [Notice] No current certificate known for authority moria1; launching request. Mar 08 14:17:22.831 [Notice] No current certificate known for authority tor26; launching request. Mar 08 14:17:22.831 [Notice] No current certificate known for authority dizum; launching request. Mar 08 14:17:22.831 [Notice] No current certificate known for authority ides; launching request. Mar 08 14:17:22.831 [Notice] No current certificate known for authority gabelmoo; launching request. Mar 08 14:17:22.832 [Notice] No current certificate known for authority dannenberg; launching request. Mar 08 14:17:22.832 [Notice] No current certificate known for authority urras; launching request.

1 0

about the balls of steel level of relay nodes
by Nicolas Bock 09 Mar '11

09 Mar '11

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello list, I was running a tor exit node until I came across this article: http://calumog.wordpress.com/2009/03/18/why-you-need-balls-of-steel-to-oper… While I don't live in the UK, I live in the US, I believe that the situation here has eroded to a point where running an exit node requires the mentioned balls of steel, which I admittedly don't have. Since I do want to support the tor project, I am wondering to what extend running a relay node is putting myself and my family at risk of legal prosecution. My understanding is that my host would simply generated encrypted traffic that is not objectionable to the ISP (because they can't look into it) unless the use of tor itself is outlawed. Is that correct? Thanks, nick -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAk11L2cACgkQf15tZKyRylKQKQCgxlmqlOQPy2tUiZW8VsqaiQKv 930AnRW/+5SpltOWtGQr6hwWgJc4RpzG =MoZM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

Re: [tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Scott Bennett 09 Mar '11

09 Mar '11

On Tue, 08 Mar 2011 14:25:16 -0800 Chris Palmer <chris(a)eff.org> wrote: >On 03/08/2011 02:04 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: > >> Frankly, I think it's appalling that a previous sponsor organization for >> the tor project should turn on the tor network in the fashion you've confessed >> here that it has. I'm tempted to dig out all of the EFF IP address ranges >> and block them permanently, just as a matter of principle, although it would >> obviously have little real effect upon your organization. No wonder so many >> of us have run afoul of our ISPs when trying to run exit nodes when even EFF >> is trying to spoil the tor network for us. Who needs enemies with "friends" >> like EFF? > >Do you understand the research we are doing? Do you know technically >what we have done, and what we hope to do, and what the impact has been >and will be? > >If you don't know yet, please check out our page: > >https://www.eff.org/observatory All right, I've looked. I knew someone was doing that sort of thing, but I didn't remember that EFF was involved. It looks interesting and valuable, but quite irrelevant to the point I made. Nothing on that page justifies subjecting tor exit node operators to the abuse and hassle of being shut down by their ISPs because EFF is so crass as to run port scans through the tor network. Nothing on that page justifies damaging the tor network by reducing the exit node pool by getting exit nodes shut down, which also reduces the total number of relays, often for entry and middle usage, too. > >If you have seen and understood that, please explain what about it you >find so objectionable. Note also that the Tor Project is using our Done. See above. >database to improve Tor itself, too. Fine. I don't see that EFF's port scans have to be done through the tor network. > >We are working to make the internet safer for everyone. > Well, sometimes, at least. I'll never forget how John Barlow sold us out during the time of William the Prevaricator, though. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

1 0

Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Bianco Veigel 09 Mar '11

09 Mar '11

Today I got the second abuse mail within two weeks from my hosting provider. They forced me to take down the exit node, otherwise they will shutdown my server. How could I detect such a scan and take counter measures to prevent a network scan through tor? I've thougt about Snort, but I've never used it before. The exit node is running in a Xen-vm, behind a pfSense firewall. I've attached the report from the abuse mail. Does anyone have an idea, what steps should/could be taken? Thanks in advance, Bianco Veigel ----- attachment ----- ########################################################################## # Netscan detected from host 188.40.98.54 # ########################################################################## time protocol src_ip src_port dest_ip dest_port --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Feb 25 06:53:15 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45237 => 138.160.29.194 20019 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27681 => 94.207.140.89 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6869 => 94.207.140.93 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 33258 => 94.207.140.94 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 53464 => 94.207.140.95 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31041 => 94.207.140.96 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6299 => 94.207.140.97 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 40964 => 94.207.140.98 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8703 => 94.207.140.99 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 56759 => 94.207.140.187 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26247 => 94.207.140.227 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26247 => 94.207.140.227 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27847 => 94.207.140.228 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27847 => 94.207.140.228 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1219 => 94.207.140.229 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1219 => 94.207.140.229 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 38929 => 94.207.140.230 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 38929 => 94.207.140.230 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62958 => 94.207.140.235 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 46469 => 94.207.140.236 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 2704 => 94.207.140.237 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17272 => 94.207.141.12 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17272 => 94.207.141.12 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32482 => 94.207.141.13 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32482 => 94.207.141.13 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55860 => 94.207.141.14 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55860 => 94.207.141.14 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43390 => 94.207.141.15 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43390 => 94.207.141.15 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31712 => 94.207.141.16 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31712 => 94.207.141.16 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29316 => 94.207.141.17 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29316 => 94.207.141.17 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5286 => 94.207.141.18 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5286 => 94.207.141.18 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45139 => 94.207.141.19 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45139 => 94.207.141.19 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25311 => 94.207.141.20 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25311 => 94.207.141.20 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3675 => 94.207.141.21 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3675 => 94.207.141.21 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 51753 => 94.207.141.22 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 51753 => 94.207.141.22 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8993 => 94.207.141.23 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8993 => 94.207.141.23 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48305 => 94.207.141.24 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25717 => 94.207.141.25 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 15142 => 94.207.141.26 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24618 => 94.207.141.27 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43060 => 94.207.141.28 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45003 => 94.207.141.45 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 18691 => 94.207.141.48 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48452 => 94.207.141.60 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48452 => 94.207.141.60 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 37237 => 94.207.141.61 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 37237 => 94.207.141.61 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 39153 => 94.207.141.62 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10678 => 94.207.141.63 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 23127 => 94.207.141.64 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10755 => 94.207.141.65 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 13206 => 94.207.141.66 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32657 => 94.207.141.67 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1909 => 94.207.141.68 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3475 => 94.207.141.69 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3475 => 94.207.141.69 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1810 => 94.207.141.70 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1810 => 94.207.141.70 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 52358 => 94.207.141.71 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3828 => 94.207.141.72 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 46151 => 94.207.141.73 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17930 => 94.207.141.74 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4025 => 94.207.141.103 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4025 => 94.207.141.103 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48216 => 94.207.141.104 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48216 => 94.207.141.104 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61033 => 94.207.141.105 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61033 => 94.207.141.105 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 35460 => 94.207.141.106 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 35460 => 94.207.141.106 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34686 => 94.207.141.107 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34686 => 94.207.141.107 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8517 => 94.207.141.108 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8517 => 94.207.141.108 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34989 => 94.207.141.109 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 16795 => 94.207.141.110 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 54679 => 94.207.141.111 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 36103 => 94.207.141.112 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 59119 => 94.207.141.113 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29831 => 94.207.141.114 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24490 => 94.207.141.115 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8880 => 94.207.141.116 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43624 => 94.207.141.117 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31266 => 94.207.141.118 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 33438 => 94.207.141.119 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43359 => 94.207.141.120 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8168 => 94.207.141.121 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 36716 => 94.207.141.122 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5648 => 94.207.141.123 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 57277 => 94.207.141.124 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 20586 => 94.207.141.134 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 20586 => 94.207.141.134 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29953 => 94.207.141.135 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29953 => 94.207.141.135 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10770 => 94.207.141.136 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10770 => 94.207.141.136 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4466 => 94.207.141.137 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4466 => 94.207.141.137 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27801 => 94.207.141.138 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27801 => 94.207.141.138 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 14288 => 94.207.141.139 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 14288 => 94.207.141.139 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 11846 => 94.207.141.140 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 11846 => 94.207.141.140 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 42636 => 94.207.141.141 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 42636 => 94.207.141.141 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 7837 => 94.207.141.142 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 7837 => 94.207.141.142 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62271 => 94.207.141.143 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62271 => 94.207.141.143 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6908 => 94.207.141.144 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6908 => 94.207.141.144 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29951 => 94.207.141.145 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29951 => 94.207.141.145 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10582 => 94.207.141.146 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10582 => 94.207.141.146 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61463 => 94.207.141.147 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61463 => 94.207.141.147 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32072 => 94.207.141.148 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32072 => 94.207.141.148 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31807 => 94.207.141.149 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 41404 => 94.207.141.152 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6669 => 94.207.141.153 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24449 => 94.207.141.172 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24449 => 94.207.141.172 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 19439 => 94.207.141.173 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 19439 => 94.207.141.173 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55637 => 94.207.141.174 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55637 => 94.207.141.174 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 22382 => 94.207.141.175 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25961 => 94.207.141.176 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 49493 => 94.207.141.177 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10996 => 94.207.141.178 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 52247 => 94.207.141.179 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26122 => 94.207.141.180 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 44654 => 94.207.141.181 80

14 27

Re: [tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Scott Bennett 08 Mar '11

08 Mar '11

I wrote: > On Sat, 26 Feb 2011 12:13:53 -0800 Chris Palmer <chris(a)eff.org> wrote: >>On Feb 26, 2011, at 9:53 AM, mick wrote: >> >>> No reputable security researcher would a) scan a network without that >>> network owner's explicit permission, nor b) use tor for that scan. >> >>Lots of reputable security researchers who scan the entire internet without getting permission. You can't get permission from every operator in the world, but you still need to do good and interesting research. Examples of reputable researchers who have scanned the whole internet include Dan Bernstein, Dan Kaminsky, and EFF. (At least I think we're reputable. :) ) I don't know for sure, but I can't imagine Arbor, CAIDA, and Renesys can do their jobs without scanning the internet. > > Well, as I've just finished describing in another topic here, I treat >scanning of my system as attempted security breaches. Such scans will not >elicit any apparent response from my system, except that the scanner's >IP address will shortly be added to my "block" file, which will deny all future >access to my tor node's ORPort and DirPort. >> >>Using Tor to scan the internet is a good way to see how the internet looks from different perspectives at once, which can be quite valuable. >> > I disagree and, as noted above, treat that as a cracking attempt. tor >nodes that you abuse in such fashion will continue to function by the means >described below, provided they are listed in the current consensus document. >My current procedures are described in the next two paragraphs. However, ^^^ Sigh. I added another paragraph ahead of those two and then missed changing the "two" to "three" above. Nothing of real consequence here, but I point my mistake out in case it was confusing to anyone before. >your implication quoted above that EFF has/does/will abuse tor exits in this >manner suggests I may have to modify my treatment of tor exits from which >your scans emerge, given the increased likelihood that the offenses did not >originate from the exit node's system and that the exit node was instead >a victim as well. Nevertheless, your scans will not get responses from my >system, except for connection attempts to the ORPort or the DirPort. > First, I have set the sysctl variable called net.inet.tcp.blackhole to 2, >which causes the kernel to drop all incoming packets addressed to closed ports. > The IP addresses of tor nodes, including exit nodes, listed in the >cached-consensus file on my system are placed into a "pass" file every 30 >minutes, which temporarily exempts them from being checked against the >"block" file. It is temporary in that the exemption lasts for 30 minutes >only, although it will be exempted for another 30 minutes whenever the >address exists in the cached-consensus file at the time the "pass" file is >rebuilt. > Anyone who may be concerned that their IP address or address range might >be listed in my "block" file is welcome to write to me to inquire about it. >If it is, then I will offer to remove the block on an indefinitely >probationary basis. However, if I encounter the same IP address in my pf log >again, then I will block the address permanently. > Frankly, I think it's appalling that a previous sponsor organization for >the tor project should turn on the tor network in the fashion you've confessed >here that it has. I'm tempted to dig out all of the EFF IP address ranges >and block them permanently, just as a matter of principle, although it would >obviously have little real effect upon your organization. No wonder so many >of us have run afoul of our ISPs when trying to run exit nodes when even EFF >is trying to spoil the tor network for us. Who needs enemies with "friends" >like EFF? Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Scott Bennett 08 Mar '11

08 Mar '11

On Fri, 25 Feb 2011 18:28:24 -0500 cmeclax-sazri <cmeclax-sazri(a)ixazon.dynip.com> wrote: >On Friday 25 February 2011 11:45:04 Bianco Veigel wrote: >> Today I got the second abuse mail within two weeks from my hosting >> provider. They forced me to take down the exit node, otherwise they will >> shutdown my server. >> >> How could I detect such a scan and take counter measures to prevent a >> network scan through tor? I've thougt about Snort, but I've never used >> it before. The exit node is running in a Xen-vm, behind a pfSense firewall. >> >> I've attached the report from the abuse mail. Does anyone have an idea, >> what steps should/could be taken? > >It may be possible to detect a scan by looking for RST packets coming back >from computers that have the port closed. I saw something about that on >snort.org, I wouldn't trust Snort to do the right thing in the case of >someone portscanning through Tor. I suggest closing the circuit, and only Tor Not only that, but some systems offer the option of not returning the RST packets. For example, on my system (FreeBSD 7.4-STABLE), I have a line in /etc/sysctl.conf, net.inet.tcp.blackhole=2 which takes effect during system startup. Its effect is to cause the kernel to discard and otherwise ignore ALL inbound TCP packets for closed TCP ports. Because the scanner receives no RST, it will likely be delayed until the timeout occurs for the expected ACK/RST that will never arrive. I also have two applicable rules for my packet filter (pf): block drop in log on bge0 proto tcp from any to bge0 flags S/S block drop in log on bge0 proto udp from any to bge0 where bge0 is my Internet-facing network interface. The former drops without returning an RST any SYN that arrives for a closed TCP port. This happens *before* the SYN can encounter the kernel blackhole code, so that I can have a log entry for the attempt. The latter does the same for any unexpected inbound UDP packets. (pf keeps the equivalent of state information for UDP, too, so that UDP responses to requests from my system (e.g., DNS queries) are recognized and allowed in without being subjected to the rule shown above.) I add the addresses logged by the rules above to my file of blocked addresses and address ranges. At present, the only open TCP ports I have are my relay's ORPort and DirPort, so having one's IP address in my "blocked" file can only cause grief to people attempting to connect to/probe my node directly from their tor clients. However, in the event that I might ever offer other services of any kind, all of those creeps will be denied access to those services as well. (N.B. that I have other pf rules that allow IP addresses of relays in the latest cached-consensus file on my node to connect to both of tor's ports. The cached-consensus file is converted every thirty minutes to a "pass" file for just those ports, so no tor user whose client happens to choose a route through a relay in my "block" file will be stopped from building and using a circuit through both the offending node and my node.) My "block" file is currently 10,177 lines long, each line bearing one IP address or address/mask range. >knows what the circuit is, so if an exit node notices several connection >attempts in a row on the same circuit fail, it could close the circuit >because it looks like a portscan. > However, by that time, the target may also have noticed the same series of attempts and will eventually complain to the OP's ISP. :-( Many of the scanning attempts I've seen in my log have involved just a single try on each of a handful of ports. Sometimes they repeat the sequence a few minutes later, a trick that would likely evade the tactic you propose. BTW, something I've noticed moderately frequently in recent weeks is the arrival of unsolicited UDP packets for the UDP port number that matches my (TCP) ORPort number. This usually involves only a single UDP packet so addressed from any given source address. This has me rather mystified regarding what it might be intended to accomplish. If anyone has an idea what it might be about, please let me know. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

1 0

500 TB since last reboot
by Olaf Selke 08 Mar '11

08 Mar '11

anonymizer2:~# ifconfig eth0 | grep bytes RX bytes:556140680407980 (505.8 TiB) TX bytes:575306739180987 (523.2 TiB) anonymizer2:~# uptime 20:14:25 up 123 days, 21:04, 1 user, load average: 1.62, 1.70, 1.60

1 0

Are friends family?
by cmeclax-sazri 04 Mar '11

04 Mar '11

A friend of mine is interested in Tor. If I set up Tor on her box, and I have root access, should I list her relay in my relay's family, or should I list my relay in her relay's family? cmeclax

2 1

Re: [tor-relays] Advice for high throughput Tor node
by Mike Perry 02 Mar '11

02 Mar '11

This discussion is better suited for tor-relays(a)torproject.org. Also, for reference, here is the previous tor-relays thread on the technical aspects of this topic: http://archives.seul.org/or/relays/Aug-2010/msg00034.html And also the social side: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment We really need to work on condensing that tor-relays thread into a single document like the blog post. We've still got a lot of mystery and voodoo to unravel in terms of utilizing all spare Tor capcity, though. Thus spake Mitar (mmitar(a)gmail.com) > Hi! > > We are planning a high throughput Tor node, we are hoping for 1 Gbit/s > node. But as I read there are some issues attaining that. So I would > like some suggestions what should we use for hardware and > configuration to attain it. So CPU, ethernet card, etc. As I > understood it is necessary to run multiple Tor instances, but that > then ethernet card's IRQ affinity is still problematic? Would it be > better to have multiple ethernet cards? How much CPU is needed for 1 > Gbit/s throughput? RAM? > > And it is probably also necessary to have multiple IPs to be able to > have more than 65k connections? > > The problem is that we will probably not be able to experiment much, > what we will buy we will have. So I am hoping to get it right. > > We are targeting a fully open exit node policy so some advice on how > to arrange things with ISP would also be good. We have good experience > with one local ISP, but not on this scale. So probably it would be > good to request a SWIP and abuse handle to our e-mail? Anything else? > Is there any software developed which would handle automatic abuse > e-mails with automatic replies? > > I am sorry if all this is already somewhere written. ;-) > > (And all this is still just in a planning stage, we will have to see > if the budget will support it.) > > > Mitar > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs

3 6

tor-relays archives now available
by Andrew Lewman 01 Mar '11

01 Mar '11

Sorry for the delay, but the archives are now available at https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/. -- Andrew pgp 0x74ED336B

1 0

Blocked SYN floods?
by Michael Millspaugh 27 Feb '11

27 Feb '11

I've noticed that pretty regularly my firewall is blocking what it's calling SYN-FLOODS, 50 at a time, originating from my tor relay: 02-26-2011 09:09:41 Daemon.Debug ROUTER kernel: [2011 Feb 26 09:09:33] FVS338 SYN-FLOOD IN=LAN OUT=WAN SRC=192.168.1.5(FALCON) DST=85.78.242.156(unresolved) PROTO=TCP SPT=63848 DPT=23 02-26-2011 09:09:41 Daemon.Debug ROUTER kernel: [2011 Feb 26 09:09:33] FVS338 SYN-FLOOD IN=LAN OUT=WAN SRC=192.168.1.5(FALCON) DST=31.92.154.101(unresolved) PROTO=TCP SPT=63820 DPT=443 02-26-2011 09:09:41 Daemon.Debug ROUTER kernel: [2011 Feb 26 09:09:33] FVS338 SYN-FLOOD IN=LAN OUT=WAN SRC=192.168.1.5(FALCON) DST=188.88.159.200(unresolved) PROTO=TCP SPT=63839 DPT=5060 Most of them are on port 23 or 443, some are on 5060 and the rest are on random ports. I have read that port 23 is for MIRC, and that "syn-floods" are part of the way it operates - could that be causing these errors? Is it removing some functionality of mirc that is important to it's operation? I'd feel better knowing my firewall is stopping these syn-floods before my ISP can see them, and knowing that the relay is still working optimally. -Mike -- TERMS OF USE. By reading this e-mail, you agree, on behalf of your employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, terms-of-use, licenses, terms-of-service, shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer.

1 0

Network Scan through Tor Exit Node (Port 80)
by Bianco Veigel 26 Feb '11

26 Feb '11

Today I got the second abuse mail within two weeks from my hosting provider. They forced me to take down the exit node, otherwise they will shutdown my server. How could I detect such a scan and take counter measures to prevent a network scan through tor? I've thougt about Snort, but I've never used it before. The exit node is running in a Xen-vm, behind a pfSense firewall. I've attached the report from the abuse mail. Does anyone have an idea, what steps should/could be taken? Thanks in advance, Bianco Veigel ----- attachment ----- ########################################################################## # Netscan detected from host 188.40.98.54 # ########################################################################## time protocol src_ip src_port dest_ip dest_port --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Feb 25 06:53:15 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45237 => 138.160.29.194 20019 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27681 => 94.207.140.89 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6869 => 94.207.140.93 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 33258 => 94.207.140.94 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 53464 => 94.207.140.95 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31041 => 94.207.140.96 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6299 => 94.207.140.97 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 40964 => 94.207.140.98 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8703 => 94.207.140.99 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 56759 => 94.207.140.187 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26247 => 94.207.140.227 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26247 => 94.207.140.227 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27847 => 94.207.140.228 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27847 => 94.207.140.228 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1219 => 94.207.140.229 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1219 => 94.207.140.229 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 38929 => 94.207.140.230 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 38929 => 94.207.140.230 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62958 => 94.207.140.235 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 46469 => 94.207.140.236 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 2704 => 94.207.140.237 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17272 => 94.207.141.12 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17272 => 94.207.141.12 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32482 => 94.207.141.13 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32482 => 94.207.141.13 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55860 => 94.207.141.14 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55860 => 94.207.141.14 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43390 => 94.207.141.15 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43390 => 94.207.141.15 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31712 => 94.207.141.16 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31712 => 94.207.141.16 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29316 => 94.207.141.17 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29316 => 94.207.141.17 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5286 => 94.207.141.18 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5286 => 94.207.141.18 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45139 => 94.207.141.19 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45139 => 94.207.141.19 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25311 => 94.207.141.20 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25311 => 94.207.141.20 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3675 => 94.207.141.21 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3675 => 94.207.141.21 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 51753 => 94.207.141.22 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 51753 => 94.207.141.22 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8993 => 94.207.141.23 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8993 => 94.207.141.23 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48305 => 94.207.141.24 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25717 => 94.207.141.25 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 15142 => 94.207.141.26 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24618 => 94.207.141.27 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43060 => 94.207.141.28 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 45003 => 94.207.141.45 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 18691 => 94.207.141.48 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48452 => 94.207.141.60 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48452 => 94.207.141.60 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 37237 => 94.207.141.61 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 37237 => 94.207.141.61 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 39153 => 94.207.141.62 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10678 => 94.207.141.63 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 23127 => 94.207.141.64 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10755 => 94.207.141.65 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 13206 => 94.207.141.66 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32657 => 94.207.141.67 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1909 => 94.207.141.68 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3475 => 94.207.141.69 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3475 => 94.207.141.69 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1810 => 94.207.141.70 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 1810 => 94.207.141.70 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 52358 => 94.207.141.71 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 3828 => 94.207.141.72 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 46151 => 94.207.141.73 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 17930 => 94.207.141.74 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4025 => 94.207.141.103 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4025 => 94.207.141.103 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48216 => 94.207.141.104 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 48216 => 94.207.141.104 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61033 => 94.207.141.105 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61033 => 94.207.141.105 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 35460 => 94.207.141.106 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 35460 => 94.207.141.106 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34686 => 94.207.141.107 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34686 => 94.207.141.107 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8517 => 94.207.141.108 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8517 => 94.207.141.108 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 34989 => 94.207.141.109 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 16795 => 94.207.141.110 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 54679 => 94.207.141.111 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 36103 => 94.207.141.112 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 59119 => 94.207.141.113 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29831 => 94.207.141.114 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24490 => 94.207.141.115 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8880 => 94.207.141.116 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43624 => 94.207.141.117 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31266 => 94.207.141.118 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 33438 => 94.207.141.119 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 43359 => 94.207.141.120 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 8168 => 94.207.141.121 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 36716 => 94.207.141.122 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 5648 => 94.207.141.123 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 57277 => 94.207.141.124 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 20586 => 94.207.141.134 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 20586 => 94.207.141.134 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29953 => 94.207.141.135 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29953 => 94.207.141.135 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10770 => 94.207.141.136 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10770 => 94.207.141.136 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4466 => 94.207.141.137 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 4466 => 94.207.141.137 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27801 => 94.207.141.138 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 27801 => 94.207.141.138 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 14288 => 94.207.141.139 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 14288 => 94.207.141.139 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 11846 => 94.207.141.140 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 11846 => 94.207.141.140 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 42636 => 94.207.141.141 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 42636 => 94.207.141.141 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 7837 => 94.207.141.142 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 7837 => 94.207.141.142 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62271 => 94.207.141.143 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 62271 => 94.207.141.143 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6908 => 94.207.141.144 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6908 => 94.207.141.144 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29951 => 94.207.141.145 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 29951 => 94.207.141.145 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10582 => 94.207.141.146 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10582 => 94.207.141.146 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61463 => 94.207.141.147 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 61463 => 94.207.141.147 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:57 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32072 => 94.207.141.148 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 32072 => 94.207.141.148 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 31807 => 94.207.141.149 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 41404 => 94.207.141.152 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 6669 => 94.207.141.153 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24449 => 94.207.141.172 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 24449 => 94.207.141.172 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:55 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 19439 => 94.207.141.173 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 19439 => 94.207.141.173 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:56 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55637 => 94.207.141.174 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 55637 => 94.207.141.174 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 22382 => 94.207.141.175 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 25961 => 94.207.141.176 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 49493 => 94.207.141.177 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:58 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 10996 => 94.207.141.178 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 52247 => 94.207.141.179 80 Fri Feb 25 07:14:59 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 26122 => 94.207.141.180 80 Fri Feb 25 07:15:00 2011 TCP 188.40.98.54 44654 => 94.207.141.181 80

3 2

Lawsuit threat over (unlikely?) SYN flood
by Formless Networking 26 Feb '11

26 Feb '11

Just as a heads up, I got a curt, vague lawsuit threat the other day out of the blue. The guy claimed my node IP took down his (unmentioned) e-commerce sites for some unspecified period of time through a SYN flood. The sites that I could find associated with his email address appeared still up and functional. Since SYN floods can be spoofed, and since Tor nodes don't really have the resource amplification that typically makes them effective, I'm assuming it's probably just someone who forgot to take their meds for a while and/or who is just making things up to try to chill our tor node off line. Just in case, here is what I sent in response. If anyone else hears from this guy, feel free to copy and paste. ---------------------------- It seems very unlikely that what you pasted here is due to our Tor router (unless it has been compromised?). Our node is not capable of transmitting SYN packets on behalf of users fast enough to actually do damage. It is rather expensive for a tor client to generate this type of traffic, and a couple forms of protection mechanisms are built in to the tor router flow control that slow this down. We would be very surprised if this attack actually came through our node, and actually brought down any of your services. Unlike more direct attacks on your server at the application layer, SYN floods are possible to spoof. This packet could actually be coming from anywhere... However, in either case, this attack should be simple to block. You can prevent the entire Tor network (not just our router) from sending you traffic by using this exported IP list to generate firewall rules to drop SYN packets: https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py?ip=1.2.3.4&port=80 If this is in fact a SYN flood attack, they may just switch spoofed source IPs on you, though, so an IP block is probably not what you want. There are plenty of documents online that describe server parameters to help reduce the impact of this attack on your services, depending on your server OS. We recommend looking into them to better protect yourself and your customers. Thanks

3 2

setting up a bridge - troubleshooting
by Kathryn Cramer 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

I am trying to set up a Bridge on a Mac running OSX 10.5.8 and using a Trendnet Wireless Broadband router. UPnP is enabled. Clicking Test on the Vidalia Settings menu yields the message "Failed to add a port mapping." There is a menu on the router software entitled Gaming which is the only place I can find that allows setting of ports. I tried using that to configure the port forwarding needed by the router, but that didn't work. (It looks like this: http://screenshots.portforward.com/TRENDnet/TEW-631BRP/Gaming.htm ) It is described by the manufacturer as follows: "This option is used to open multiple ports or a range of ports in your router and redirect data through those ports to a single PC on your network. This feature allows you to enter ports in various formats including, Port Ranges (100-150), Individual Ports (80, 68, 888), or Mixed (1020-5000, 689)." Ideas?

4 5

New relay - hibernation issue?
by Bill 17 Feb '11

17 Feb '11

I've had a new non-exit relay ("Tor4Democracy") running for about six days, and today based on my daily usage limits: AccountingMax 880803840 AccountingStart day 21:00 it went into hibernation. I'm not sure if this is proper behaviour, but it didn't seem publish a descriptor during hibernation. When it woke up, it reset uptime = 0 and started publishing again. I've scoured the FAQs but haven't had any luck. Following the relay security suggestions, I haven't been logging. Before I start logging to see if it repeats, is there something I'm missing / misconfiguring? Thanks in advance, Bill

1 1