- tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

repo: TLS vs. GPG signed files (#12871)
by Nusenu 25 Oct '14

25 Oct '14

Hi Ondrej, [I felt it is better to discuss this via email if you feel otherwise feel free to move the discussion back to trac.] even though it was also me requesting the use of HTTPS for the repos [1] - and I'm glad it has been (partially) accepted and implemented I do not follow your comment that HTTPS is "better" than repo_gpgcheck [2]. It is my opinion that even in the case of HTTPS GPG signatures provide a security improvement since (I hope) the private GPG key used to sign the repo is less exposed than the wildcard certificate for *.tpo. (I filed #13553 [4] to address rogue CAs / certificate pinning for yum.) Could you elaborate on your issue regarding repo_gpgcheck not showing fingerprints? (It does show the gpg key fingerprint on a fc20 system after adding repo_gpgcheck=1 and running 'yum update' [3]). thanks for providing and maintaining the RPM repo, Nusenu [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12897 [2] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12871#comment:8 [3] Importing GPG key 0x5AC001F1: Userid : "torproject.org RPM signing key" Fingerprint: 3b9e eeb9 7b1e 827b cf0a 0d96 8af5 653c 5ac0 01f1 From : https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/rpm/RPM-GPG-KEY-torproject.org.asc Is this ok [y/N]: [4] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13553

2 1

Pluggable transports meeting tomorrow (16:00UTC Wednesday 22nd of October 2014)
by George Kadianakis 21 Oct '14

21 Oct '14

Hello! just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC. Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network. Thanks for your attention!

1 0

Re: [tor-dev] Potential projects for SponsorR (Hidden Services)
by str4d 21 Oct '14

21 Oct '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 George Kadianakis wrote: > == Opt-in HS indexing service == > > This seems like a fun project that can be used in various ways in > the future. Of course, the feature must remain opt-in so that only > services that want to be public will surface. > > For this project, we could make some sort of 'HS authority' which > collects HS information (the HS descriptor?) from volunteering > HSes. It's unclear who will run an HS authority; maybe we can work > with ahmia so that they integrate it in their infrastructure? > > If we are more experimental, we can even build a basic petname > system using the HS authority [2]. Maybe just a "simple" NAME <-> > PUBKEY database where HSes can register themselves in a FIFO > fashion. This might cause tons of domain camping and attempts for > dirty sybil attacks, but it might develop into something useful. > Worst case we can shut it down and call the experiment done? > AFAIK, I2P has been doing something similar at > https://geti2p.net/en/docs/naming > We have been running our petname system for at least five years (probably longer), mostly without incident. The above linked page covers details of the current system; see [0] for a (slightly dated) more general discussion of the reasons behind the I2P naming system, common arguments and possible alternatives. We have also started looking at GNS as an option[1,2]. I like the concept, and the ability for users to easily control their own domain name zones, which replaces the problem of a user losing their Destination keys (.onion equivalent) down to only needing to securely maintain their zone key. But the UI/UX needs vast improvement if everyday users are to understand it, and we need to research the trade-offs carefully. I am happy to discuss this further if anyone is interested, because a combined / general approach would benefit multiple networks. str4d [0] https://geti2p.net/en/docs/discussions/naming [1] http://zzz.i2p/topics/1545 (in I2P) [2] http://trac.i2p2.de/wiki/GNS -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJURgOtAAoJEIA97kkaNHPnfUQP/RQIBUCjCQcRvDyXL5l+D0Cv yoE7JT2vr7mqQx+/4nT9w/EhuQvakS5lK8gsod3yHDErtbNa8Ot/NylDbPYvdSo0 mXYOWRtaozv/8VIrRZuFc1NLne/08RYAIrnC3A9NCbpCcvwVLMxWXdl3DzEuZ+R5 rVijvHXW2nhVKjEYFez4dtErA+qTC/nKtdlG5hG1gq4mTTbWyYPEVmUonZe7t8l6 +iVc5jG9bKS6ng1Mcvmj5XwDN2rRRk3igo+64gyk7GsHSi3IXxq2S8H+hVD16hk+ gPmS0+oX5Vy6Ww04xM+x55X3NBHbLzkb+dEMYC/gYVLZrmxeG76iAQ/vBDCJncGC 8JI+KhoCx/hQGzvIby1T2VEf8t/fyREKwDq/jmAQdraxqoA5/z5xHwgpetNRRJOM 6LuOtc3jkxe0fOrsJcvHXLQybOKE8bLrLf0jLlmOpKR60EqmFAZaXC8qbzfItvaA KBHKO9t4e1F0t96PH0qhTJjlqqJVunfHyaulC6i9/HBRIZAnjrDtxvN9oQgtyYzI TRw/uxqR0o4c3iDet472YOjLR0JDwz23OHGT66VG/xiNYN2siNpSeBoVXmpc7YuC PGqjgZJkl3EZ/AIU+2mS+lAvmouT9UmW58fIF0BD+bmsr1//zfCIxXH8/EeOZBCw sXUQa30VVMdDYCmQc8dX =HUK1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Reminder: weekly Tor development meeting (Wed), and weekly patch workshop (Tue)
by Nick Mathewson 21 Oct '14

21 Oct '14

Hi, all! You probably know that we do our regular meetings for tor (the program) development on Wednesdays at 1330 UTC on the #tor-dev IRC channel on irc.oftc.net. But did you know everybody who's interested in doing anything with tor is welcome to attend? And did you know that anybody who's interested is welcome to lurk? Also, we've started doing a weekly patch workshop where we all look at each other's patches and try to help get them done, try to help code get better, and so forth. That's on Tuesdays at 1700 UTC on the same IRC channel! (Thanks for rl1987 for suggesting this.) cheers, -- Nick

1 1

tor2web 3.1.20 released!
by Giovanni Pellerano 19 Oct '14

19 Oct '14

Hi all, i've released a 3.1.20 version that includes some networking bugfixing and optimizations. it also includes the following two new features: 1) with numes we discussed https://github.com/globaleaks/Tor2web-3.0/issues/157 in past i added a feature in order to update the blocklist of a tor2web node mergin a remote bloklist. numes asked for the possibility to replace local blocklist with a remote one in order to implement different policies. the result is that we now have two modes for this REPLACE mode and MERGE mode 2) https://github.com/globaleaks/Tor2web-3.0/issues/158 in globaleaks in past we has the need to ad a TRANSLATION mode of tor2web to make a single node as a proxy for only a single hidden service: e.g., demo.globaleaks.org -> demo-HS now i've added an /etc/hosts like that enable a mapping like the following: demo.globaleaks.org hiddenservice1.onion adopter1.demo.globaleaks.org hiddenservice2.onion adopter2.demo.globaleaks.org hiddenservice3.onion this would result particular interesting in order to implement mnemonic names translation for specific hidden services e.g.: puppetname.tor2web.org antani123.onion as usual you will find documentation for this at https://github.com/globaleaks/Tor2web-3.0/wiki/Configuration-Guide and in /etc/tor2web.conf.example ciao! evilaliv3

1 0

Re: [tor-dev] Building TOR using Visual Studio
by teor 19 Oct '14

19 Oct '14

On 18 Oct 2014, at 13:29 , tor-dev-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 22:29:02 -0400 > From: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)freehaven.net> > To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Building TOR using Visual Studio > * Some people want to use paid versions of Visual Studio, and have > paid for a version earlier than VS2013, and don't want to pay for a > newer one. I sympathize with this: I've been on paid upgrade > treadmills myself, and it's always tempting to save money by skipping > steps in the upgrade treadmill. I've even paid for commercial > compilers in my misspent youth. Are there no-cost, non-license-restricted compilers available for Windows that support C99? This could be a way out for those who don't wish to pay for the VS 2013 upgrade. But it's a bit more of a barrier than using an existing compiler on the system. > * Some compilers for weird old hardware have never been upgraded to > even rudimentary C99 support, and trying to build code with those > weird old compilers is a good way to expose some bugs. I sympathize > with this too: there was one guy who would always compile new versions > of Tor on his old Irix boxes, and he always turned up a new warning or > two when he did. Static analysers, better compiler warnings, and runtime checks are starting to fill the role previous occupied by obscure systems. And mobile/embedded platforms help with this too :-) I think we may be able to compensate for lack of C89 support for old compilers, by using a combination of coverity, clang --analyze, gcc/clang -ftrapv , and clang -fsanitize=undefined-trap -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error. Oh, and unit tests :-) teor pgp 0xABFED1AC hkp://pgp.mit.edu/ https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 http://0bin.net/paste/Mu92kPyphK0bqmbA#Zvt3gzMrSCAwDN6GKsUk7Q8G-eG+Y+BLpe7w…

6 5

Re: [tor-dev] Building TOR using Visual Studio
by teor 18 Oct '14

18 Oct '14

On 17 Oct 2014, at 23:00 , tor-dev-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 15:09:38 +0400 > From: Vladimir <vilgeforce(a)gmail.com> > To: tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org > Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Building TOR using Visual Studio > > VS2013 if free only in Express version, and Express version is limited: > doesn't have a profiler, for example. Moreover, there are limitations for > using Express version, it's written in license. > > I'v attached a diff where I changed a code for VS2008 (tested on ubuntu-64 > gcc 4.8.2 too). Also I changed readme: it contained instruction to run > ./configure, but there's no such file. >

6 6

ooniprobe v1.2.2 is out
by Arturo Filastò 18 Oct '14

18 Oct '14

Hi all, This mail is to inform you that a new version of ooniprobe has just been released. Here is the changelog: v1.2.2 (Fri, 17 Oct 2014) ------------------------- Who said friday 17th is only bad luck? * Add two new report entry keys test_start_time and test_runtime * Fix bug that lead to ooniresources not working properly It is now available for download from pypi: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/ooniprobe and soon will be available for download in debian. Have fun! ~ Arturo

1 0

Building TOR using Visual Studio
by Владимир Мартьянов 17 Oct '14

17 Oct '14

Hi all! I'm new at this list :-) I decided to understand how TOR works and I want to build it in VS to debug it and explore it's internals. I have Visual Studio on my first PC and I got errors during build on address.c. I investigated the reason: commit 0ca83872468af59b94e14fe7fdfcb38cb5a3f496 I have Visual Studio express 2013 on my second PC and I didn't have any problems building the TOR. So I have two questions: did you decide not to support old Visual Studio versions or it'll be better to build TOR in VS2008 too? If old versions aren't supported, should it be some #error directives in sources to explain this decision? It was really hard to understand where's the problem, so I think #error will be very helpfull. If you give me some instructions about the problem, I'll try to commit the changes. Thank you.

4 5

Some ideas on the visualization of OONI data
by kudrom 17 Oct '14

17 Oct '14

Hi all For the last couple of days i've been thinking about the visualization of the bridge reachability data and how it relates to the currently deployed ooni [7] system, here are the conclussions: == Variables == I think that the statistical variables for the bridge reachability reports are: - Success of the nettest (yes, no, errors) - The PT of the bridge (obfs3, obfs2, fte, vanilla) - The pool from where the bridge has been extracted (private, tbb, BridgeDB https, BridgeDB email) - The country "of the ooni-probe" With these variables I believe we can answer a lot of questions related to how much censorship is being taken, where and how. But there's something left: the timing. George sent an email [0] in which he proposes a timeline of events [5] of every bridge that would allow us to diagnose with much more precission how and why is a bridge being censored. To build that diagram we should define first the events that will be showed in the timeline. I think those events are the values of the pool variable and if the bridge is being blocked in a given country. With the events defined i think we can define another variable: - Time deltas between bridge events. So, for example, what this variable will answer is: how many {days, hours...} does it take China to block a bridge that is published in bridgeDB? Is China blocking new bridges at the same speed that Iran? How many days does it take China block a private bridge? There are some ambiguities related to the deltas, for example if the bridge is sometimes blocked and sometimes not in a country, which delta should we compute? Finally, in the etherpad [1] the tor's bootstrap is suggested as a variable, i don't understand why. Is it to detect some way of censorship? Can anyone explain a little more? == Data schema == In the last email Ruben, Laurier and Pascal "strongly recommended importing the reports into a database". I deeply believe the same. We should provide a service to query the values of the previous variables plus the timestamp of the nettest and the fingerprint of the bridge. With this database the inconsistencies between the data formats of the reports should be erased and the work with the data is much more easy. I think that we should also provide a way to export the queries to csv/json to allow other people to dig into the data. I also believe that we could use mongodb just because one reason: we can distribute it very easily. But let me explain why in the Future section. == Biased data == Can a malicious ooni-probe bias the data? For example, if it executes in bursts some tests the reports are going to be the same and the general picture could be biased. Any more ideas? == Geo Data == In the etherpad [1] it's suggested to increase the granularity of the geo data to detect geographical patterns, but it seems [2] that at least in China there's not such patterns so maybe we should discard the idea altogether. == Playing with data == So until now i've talked about data. Now i want to address how to present the data. I think we should provide a way to play with data to allow a more thoughtful and precise diagnosis of censorship. What i was thinking is to enhance the interactivity of the visualization by allowing the user a way to render the diagrams at the same time she thinks about the data. The idea is to allow the user to go from more general to more concret data patterns. So imagine that the user loads the visualization's page, first he sees a global heated map of censorship measured with the bridge reachability test, he is chinese so he clicks in his country and a histogram like [3] for China is stacked at the bottom of the global map, he then clicks on the obfs2 and a diagram like [4] is also stacked at the bottom but only showing the success variable for the obfs2 PT, then he clicks on the True value for the success variable and all the bridges that have been reached by all the nettests executions in that period of time in China are showed, finally he selects one bridge and it's timeline [5] plus it's link to atlas [6] is provided. This is only a particular scenario, the core idea is to provide the user with the enhanced capability to drive conclusions as much as she desires. The user started with the more general concept of the data, and he applied restrictions to the datapoints to dig more into the data. From general to specific he can start making hypothesis that he later discards or approves with more info displayed in the next diagram. There are some usability problems with the selection of diagram+variable and the diverse set of users that will use the system, but i'd be very glad to think about them if you like the idea. == Users == I think there are three set of users: 1- User of tor that is interested in the censorship performed in its country and how to avoid it. 2- Journalist that wants to write something about censorship but isn't that tech savvy. 3- Researcher that wants updated and detailed data about censorship. I believe we can provide a system that satisfies the three of them if we succeed in the previous bullet point. == Future == So, why do i think that we should index the data with mongodb? Because i think that this data repository should be provided as a new ooni-backend API related to the current collector. Right now the collectors can write down reports from any ooni-probe instance that chooses to do so and its API is completly separated from the bouncer API, which overall is a wise design decision because you can deploy ooni-backend to only work as a collector. So it's not unreasonable to think that we can have several collectors collecting different reports because the backend is designed to do so, therefore we need the data repository to be distributed. And mongodb is good at this. If we build the database for the bridge reachability nettests, i think that we should design it to index in the future all nettest reports and therefore generalize the desgin, implementation and deployment of all the work that we are going to do to the bridge reachability. That way an analyst can query the distributed database with a proper client that connects to the data repository ooni-backend API. So to sum up, I started talking about the bridge reachability visualization problem and finished with a much broader vision that intends to integrate the ongoing efforts of the bridge reachability to improve ooni as a whole. Hope the email is not too large. ciao [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007585.html [1] https://pad.riseup.net/p/bridgereachability [2] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/closer-look-great-firewall-china [3] http://ooniviz.chokepointproject.net/transports.htm [4] http://ooniviz.chokepointproject.net/successes.htm [5] https://people.torproject.org/~asn/bridget_vis/tbb_blocked_timeline.jpg [6] https://atlas.torproject.org [7] https://ooni.torproject.org/

1 0