March 2021 - tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Regarding GSoC'21
by Aashim Garg 20 Mar '21

20 Mar '21

Hi everyone, I hope you are all doing great! I am Aashim Garg, a third-year undergrad student studying Computer Science in India.In the past I have made projects using react , next and typescript. I want to work on the OONI: Integration and unit testing of OONI probe Desktop apps . Can you please guide me on how I can start working on it and I would love to be a part of this community! Regards Aashim Garg

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Re: [tor-dev] [tor-relays] Did 'Sandbox 1' break Tor for anyone else on 0.4.5.6?
by William Kane 15 Mar '21

15 Mar '21

Hi Peter, >Would be great if you could get details about the failing call. I already thought of gathering said details by tracing the process, but did not want to risk my uptime statistics, which would inevitably happen if I had to restart the server and service over and over (I disabled tracing globally through the Yama LSM as a security measure, i.e. kernel.yama.ptrace_scope == 3) - recently I lost the guard flag multiple times, caused by some sort of attack that I already reported on this list (tor-relays) - someone kept creating a fuckton of circuits through my relay (averaging 90k per minute), thus causing tor to run out of memory / get oom-killed by the kernel before it could even step in and close the circuits - if it was even trying to, it would make sense for the DoS mitigation code to be active only for the first link in the circuit aka the guard, and my node simply being a middle-only relay, it got completely stomped by said attack. After somewhat mitigating this attack by tweaking MaxMemInQueues, creating a bigger swap file and tuning vm.swappiness, I regained the guard flag, but then the hypervisor my KVM box is running under experienced some issues and had to be rebooted - once again, I received no notice of that until the relay was already offline for a few days, causing me to lose the guard flag again. Seems like luck is just not on my side these days, or well, it's been weeks now. > You should simply see a Permission Denied if the capability is the problem. Here's a copy from stdout, only happening if Sandbox is set to 1.: Mar 15 20:15:20.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. Mar 15 20:15:21.000 [warn] fstat() on directory /var/lib/tor_debug failed. Mar 15 20:15:21.000 [err] Can't create/check datadirectory /var/lib/tor_debug Mar 15 20:15:21.000 [err] Error initializing keys; exiting Running it as a privileged user does not change thing, so no permissions issue: Mar 15 20:17:24.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. Mar 15 20:17:24.000 [warn] You are running Tor as root. You don't need to, and you probably shouldn't. Mar 15 20:17:25.000 [warn] fstat() on directory /var/lib/tor_debug failed. Mar 15 20:17:25.000 [err] Can't create/check datadirectory /var/lib/tor_debug Mar 15 20:17:25.000 [err] Error initializing keys; exiting I've traced down the origin of the fstat() call to this piece of code: https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/src/lib/fs/dir.c#L158 However, looking at the code that establishes and populates seccomp rules, it seems like fstat and it's 64 bit counterpart are not subject to (parameter) filtering, i.e. seccomp_rule_add_0 is invoked with the parameter SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, reading the manpage for seccomp_rule_add(3) reveals: "The seccomp filter will have no effect on the thread calling the syscall if it matches the filter rule." References: https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c#L148 https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c#L15… https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/seccomp_rule_add.3.html So, even though technically, seccomp should allow these syscalls to be invoked, no matter which parameters are passed, somehow enabling the whole sandbox subsystem still breaks fstat. We are getting into tor-dev@ territory here, so maybe someone who is more experienced with the code base could figure out why this is happening, I'm pretty good at C/C++ on Linux / Windows and all the shenanigans that come with it, but lack time to debug this further. I've added tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org as a CC just in case. - William 2021-03-15 17:10 GMT, Peter Gerber <tor(a)arbitrary.ch>: > Hi William > > William Kane: >> Hi everyone, >> >> Ever since I upgraded to tor version 0.4.5.6, enabling tor's built-in >> seccomp sandbox completely breaks tor, i.e. it gets killed by the >> kernel on start for a seccomp violation (fstat(..)) - sandboxing >> worked fine on 0.4.4.6, my system configuration did not change between >> the updates. > > Tor itself usually fails with a Permission Denied error when a syscall > fails due to seccomp. So, this is rather odd. > >> I figured this was happening because I do not grant the >> CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capability, but I'm not so sure anymore if that's >> the reason. > > You should simply see a Permission Denied if the capability is the problem. > > Would be great if you could get details about the failing call. If > seccomp is involved, you should be able to get details like this: > > • install package auditd > • make sure auditd is running > • crash Tor > • find the syscall with `ausearch -ts recent -i` > > Peter >

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Proposal 328: Make Relays Report When They Are Overloaded
by David Goulet 03 Mar '21

03 Mar '21

Greetings, Attached is a proposal from Mike Perry and I. Merge requsest is here: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/merge_requests/22 Cheers! David -- uSxMMaJozH7GAo7qjzhVUm5FDynPYtBfOeZcLS88XeU=

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