February 2020 - tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics
by teor 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

Hi, Here is an initial draft of Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics. This proposal includes: * logging the number of IPv6 relays in the consensus, and * relays publishing IPv6 connection and consumed bandwidth statistics. This is the third of 3 proposals: * Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability * Proposal 312: Automatic Relay IPv6 Addresses * Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics I revised proposals 311 and 312 last week, and merged them to torspec as drafts. There are still some TODO items in the proposal, about: * safely collecting these new statistics on bridges, and * getting accurate IPv6 connection statistics. If you know about tor's statistics, please give us some feedback! The full text is included below, and it is also available as a GitHub pull request: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/108 The related tickets are #33159 (proposal) and #33051 and #33052 (implementation): https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33159 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33051 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33052 Please feel free to reply on this list, or via GitHub pull request comments. Filename: 313-relay-ipv6-stats.txt Title: Relay IPv6 Statistics Author: teor Created: 10-February-2020 Status: Draft Ticket: #33159 0. Abstract We propose that Tor relays (and bridges) should log the number of relays in the consensus that support IPv6 extends, and IPv6 client connections. We also propose that Tor relays (and bridges) should collect statistics on IPv6 connections and consumed bandwidth. Like tor's existing connection and consumed bandwidth statistics, these new IPv6 statistics will be published in each relay's extra-info descriptor. 1. Introduction Tor relays (and bridges) can accept IPv6 client connections via their ORPort. But current versions of tor need to have an explicitly configured IPv6 address (see [Proposal 312: Relay Auto IPv6 Address]), and they don't perform IPv6 reachability self-checks (see [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability]). As we implement these new IPv6 features in tor, we want to monitor their impact on the IPv6 connections and bandwidth in the tor network. Tor developers also need to know how many relays support these new IPv6 features, so they can test tor's IPv6 reachability checks. (In particular, see section 4.3.1 in [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability]: Refusing to Publish the Descriptor.) 2. Scope This proposal modifies Tor's behaviour as follows: Relays, bridges, and directory authorities log the number of relays that support IPv6 clients, and IPv6 relay reachability checks. They also log the corresponding consensus weight fractions. As an optional change, tor clients may also log this information. Relays, bridges, and directory authorities collect statistics on: * IPv6 connections, and * IPv6 consumed bandwidth. The design of these statistics will be based on tor's existing connection and consumed bandwidth statistics. Tor's existing consumed bandwidth statistics truncate their totals to the nearest kilobyte. The existing connection statistics do not perform any binning. We do not proposed to add any extra noise or binning to these statistics. Instead, we expect to leave these changes until we have a consistent privacy-preserving statistics framwework for tor. As an example of this kind of framework, see [Proposal 288: Privacy-Preserving Stats with Privcount (Shamir version)]. We avoid: * splitting connection statistics into clients and relays, and * collecting circuit statistics. These statistics are more sensitive, so we want to implement privacy-preserving statistics, before we consider adding them. Throughout this proposal, "relays" includes directory authorities, except where they are specifically excluded. "relays" does not include bridges, except where they are specifically included. (The first mention of "relays" in each section should specifically exclude or include these other roles.) Tor clients do not collect any statistics for public reporting. Therefore, clients are out of scope in this proposal. (Except for some optional changes to client logs, where they log the number of IPv6 relays in the consensus). When this proposal describes Tor's current behaviour, it covers all supported Tor versions (0.3.5.7 to 0.4.2.5), as of January 2020, except where another version is specifically mentioned. 3. Logging IPv6 Relays in the Consensus We propose that relays (and bridges) log: * the number of relays, and * the consensus weight fraction of relays, in the consensus that: * have an IPv6 ORPort, * support IPv6 reachability checks, and * support IPv6 clients. In order to test these changes, and provide easy access to these statistics, we propose implementing a script that: * downloads a consensus, and * calculates and reports these statistics. As well as the statistics listed above, this script should also report the following relay statistic: * support IPv6 reachability checks and IPv6 clients. The following consensus weight fractions should divide by the total consensus weight: * have an IPv6 ORPort (all relays have an IPv4 ORPort), and * support IPv6 reachability checks (all relays support IPv4 reachability). The following consensus weight fractions should divide by the "usable Guard" consensus weight: * support IPv6 clients, and * support IPv6 reachability checks and IPv6 clients. "Usable Guards" have the Guard flag, but do not have the Exit flag. If the Guard also has the BadExit flag, the Exit flag should be ignored. We propose that these logs happen whenever tor: * receives a consensus from a directory server, or * loads a live, valid, cached consensus from disk. As an optional change, tor clients may also log this information. Some of this information is not directly relevant to clients, but these logs may help developers (and users). 4. Collecting IPv6 Consumed Bandwidth Statistics We propose that relays (and bridges) collect IPv6 consumed bandwidth statistics. To minimise development and testing effort, we propose re-using the existing "bw_array" code in rephist.c. In particular, tor currently counts these bandwidth statistics: * read, * write, * dir_read, and * dir_write. We propose adding the following bandwidth statistics: * ipv6_read, and * ipv6_write. (The IPv4 statistics can be calculated by subtracting the IPv6 statistics from the existing total consumed bandwidth statistics.) We propose adding a new BandwidthStatistics torrc option and consensus parameter, which activates reporting of all these statistics. Currently, the existing statistics are controlled by ExtraInfoStatistics, but we propose using the new BandwidthStatistics option for them as well. The default value of this option should be "auto", which checks the consensus parameter. If there is no consensus parameter, the default should be 1. (The existing bandwidth statistics are reported by default.) TODO: Should we collect IPv6 bandwidth statistics on bridges? On bridges, should bandwidth statistics be on or off by default? If we do want to collect bridge statistics, and we think it's safe, modify proposals 311 and 312 to allow bridge statistics. 5. Collecting IPv6 Connection Statistics We propose that relays (and bridges) collect IPv6 connection statistics. To minimise development and testing effort, we propose re-using the existing "bidi" code in rephist.c. (This code may require some refactoring, because the "bidi" totals are globals, rather than a struct.) In particular, tor currently counts these connection statistics: * below threshold, * mostly read, * mostly written, and * both read and written. We propose adding IPv6 variants of all these statistics. (The IPv4 statistics can be calculated by subtracting the IPv6 statistics from the existing total connection statistics.) We propose using the existing ConnDirectionStatistics torrc option, and adding a consensus parameter with the same name. This option will control the new and existing connection statistics. The default value of this option should be "auto", which checks the consensus parameter. If there is no consensus parameter, the default should be 0. (The existing connection direction statistics are reported by default.) TODO: Do enough relays report ConnDirectionStatistics, for accurate IPv6 connection statistics? * at least 25% of relays have IPv6 * at the end of the project, we expect at least 33% of relays to have deployed tor 0.4.4-stable If not, we should turn on ConnDirectionStatistics by default. (Or set the consensus parameter for a few days, to collect these statistics.) 6. Directory Protocol Specification Changes We propose adding IPv6 variants of the consumed bandwidth and connection direction statistics to the tor directory protocol. We propose the following additions to the [Tor Directory Protocol] specification, in section 2.1.2. Each addition should be inserted below the existing consumed bandwidth and connection direction specifications. "ipv6-read-history" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NUM,NUM,NUM... NL [At most once] "ipv6-write-history" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NUM,NUM,NUM... NL [At most once] Declare how much bandwidth the OR has used recently, on IPv6 connections. See "read-history" and "write-history" for more details. (The migration notes do not apply to IPv6.) "ipv6-conn-bi-direct" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) BELOW,READ,WRITE,BOTH NL [At most once] Number of IPv6 connections, that are used uni-directionally or bi-directionally. See "conn-bi-direct" for more details. We also propose the following replacement, in the same section: "dirreq-read-history" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NUM,NUM,NUM... NL [At most once] "dirreq-write-history" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NUM,NUM,NUM... NL [At most once] Declare how much bandwidth the OR has spent on answering directory requests. See "read-history" and "write-history" for more details. (The migration notes do not apply to dirreq.) This replacement is optional, but it may avoid the 3 *read-history definitions getting out of sync. 7. Optional Changes We propose some optional changes to help relay operators, tor developers, and tor's network health. We also expect that these changes will drive IPv6 relay adoption. Some of these changes may be more appropriate as future work, or along with other proposed features. 7.1. Log IPv6 Statistics in Tor's Heartbeat Logs We propose this optional change, so relay operators can see their own IPv6 statistics: We propose that tor logs its IPv6 consumed bandwidth and connection statistics in its regular "heartbeat" logs. These heartbeat statistics should be collected over the lifetime of the tor process, rather than using the state file, like the statistics in sections 4 and 5. Tor's existing heartbeat logs already show its consumed bandwidth and connections (in the link protocol counts). We may also want to show IPv6 consumed bandwidth and connections as a propotion of the total consumed bandwidth and connections. These statistics only show a relay's local bandwidth usage, so they can't be used for reporting. 7.2. Show IPv6 Statistics on Consensus Health The [Consensus Health] website displays a wide rage of tor statistics, based on the most recent consensus. We propose this optional change, to: * help relay operators diagnose issues with IPv6 on their relays, and * to drive IPv6 adoption on tor relays. Consensus Health adds an IPv6 section, with the following relay statistics: * have an IPv6 ORPort, * support IPv6 reachability checks, * support IPv6 clients, and * support IPv6 reachability checks and IPv6 clients. The definitions of these statistics are in section 3. These changes can be tested using the script proposed in section 3. 7.3. Add an IPv6 Reachability Pseudo-Flag on Relay Search The [Relay Search] website displays tor relay information, based on the current consensus and relay descriptors. We propose this optional change, to: * help relay operators diagnose issues with IPv6 on their relays, and * drive IPv6 adoption on tor relays. Relay Search adds a pseudo-flag for relay IPv6 reachability support. This pseudo-flag should be given to relays that have: * a reachable IPv6 ORPort (in the consensus), and * support tor subprotocol version "Relay=3" (or later). See [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability] for details. TODO: Is this a useful change? Are there better ways of driving IPv6 adoption? 7.4. Add IPv6 Connections and Consumed Bandwidth Graphs to Tor Metrics The [Tor Metrics: Traffic] website displays connection and bandwidth information for the tor network, based on relay extra-info descriptors. We propose these optional changes, to: * help tor developers improve IPv6 support on the tor network, * help diagnose issues with IPv6 on the tor network, and * drive IPv6 adoption on tor relays. Tor Metrics adds the following information to the graphs on the Traffic page: Consumed Bandwidth by IP version * added to the existing [Tor Metrics: Advertised bandwidth by IP version] page * as a stacked graph, like [Tor Metrics: Advertised and consumed bandwidth by relay flags] Fraction of connections used uni-/bidirectionally by IP version * added to the existing [Tor Metrics: Fraction of connections used uni-/bidirectionally] page * as a stacked graph, like [Tor Metrics: Advertised and consumed bandwidth by relay flags] 8. Test Plan We provide a quick summary of our testing plans. 8.1. Testing IPv6 Relay Consensus Count Logging We propose to test these changes using chutney networks. However, chutney creates a limited number of relays, so we also need to test these changes on the public tor network. Therefore, we propose to test these changes on the public network with a small number of relays and bridges. We can use the script and the tor logs to cross-check these calculations. The Tor Metrics team may also independently check these calculations. Once these changes are merged, they will be monitored by tor developers, as more volunteer relay operators deploy the relevant tor versions. (And as the number of IPv6 relays in the consensus increases.) 8.2. Testing IPv6 Extra-Info Statistics We propose to test the connection and consumed bandwidth statistics using chutney networks. However, chutney runs for a short amount of time, and creates a limited amount of traffic, so we also need to test these changes on the public tor network. In particular, we have struggled to test statistics using chutney, because tor's hard-coded statistics period is 24 hours. (And most chutney networks run for under 1 minute.) Therefore, we propose to test these changes on the public network with a small number of relays and bridges. During 2020, the Tor Metrics team will analyse these statistics on the public tor network, and provide IPv6 progress reports. We expect that we may discover some bugs during the first analysis. Once these changes are merged, they will be monitored by tor developers, as more volunteer relay operators deploy the relevant tor versions. (And as the number of IPv6 relays in the consensus increases.) References: [Consensus Health]: https://consensus-health.torproject.org/ [Proposal 288: Privacy-Preserving Stats with Privcount (Shamir version)]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/288-privcount-with… [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/311-relay-ipv6-rea… [Proposal 312: Relay Auto IPv6 Address]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/312-relay-auto-ipv… [Relay Search]: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html [Tor Directory Protocol]: (version 3) https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt [Tor Manual Page]: https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en [Tor Metrics: Advertised and consumed bandwidth by relay flags]: https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth-flags.html [Tor Metrics: Advertised bandwidth by IP version]: https://metrics.torproject.org/advbw-ipv6.html [Tor Metrics: Fraction of connections used uni-/bidirectionally]: https://metrics.torproject.org/connbidirect.html [Tor Metrics: Traffic]: https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth-flags.html [Tor Specification]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/tor-spec.txt

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CVE-2020-8516 Hidden Service deanonymization
by juanjo 06 Feb '20

06 Feb '20

Since no one is posting it here and talking about it, I will post it. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8516 The guy: http://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/868-Deanonymizing-Tor-… Is this real? Are we actually not verifying if the IP of the Rend is a node in the Tor network?

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Proposal 312: Automatic Relay IPv6 Addresses
by teor 05 Feb '20

05 Feb '20

Hi, Here is an initial draft of Proposal 312: Automatic Relay IPv6 Addresses. This proposal includes: * relay auto IPv6 addresses, and * relay auto IPv6 ORPorts. This is the second of 3 proposals: * Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability * Proposal 312: Automatic Relay IPv6 Addresses * Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics (I haven't written the final one yet.) I also want to make some minor changes to Proposal 306, so that bridge IPv6 behaviour stays in sync with client IPv6 behaviour. (See section 7 of this proposal for details.) There is still one TODO item in the proposal, about Tor's current behaviour. If you know the answer, please let me know. The full text is included below, and it is also available as a GitHub pull request: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/105 The related tickets are #33073 (proposal) and #5940 (implementation): https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33073 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5940 Please feel free to reply on this list, or via GitHub pull request comments. Filename: 312-relay-auto-ipv6-addr.txt Title: Tor Relays Automatically Find Their IPv6 Address Author: teor Created: 28-January-2020 Status: Draft Ticket: #33073 0. Abstract We propose that Tor relays (and bridges) should automatically find their IPv6 address, and use it to publish an IPv6 ORPort. For some relays to find their IPv6 address, they may need to fetch some directory documents from directory authorities over IPv6. (For anonymity reasons, bridges are unable to fetch directory documents over IPv6, until clients start to do so.) 1. Introduction Tor relays (and bridges) currently find their IPv4 address, and use it as their ORPort and DirPort address when publishing their descriptor. But relays and bridges do not automatically find their IPv6 address. However, relay operators can manually configure an ORPort with an IPv6 address, and that ORPort is published in their descriptor in an "or-address" line (see [Tor Directory Protocol]). Many relay operators don't know their relay's IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. So they rely on Tor's IPv4 auto-detection, and don't configure an IPv6 address. When operators do configure an IPv6 address, it's easy for them to make mistakes. IPv6 ORPort issues are a significant source of relay operator support requests. Implementing IPv6 address auto-detection, and IPv6 ORPort reachability checks (see [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability]) will increase the number of working IPv6-capable relays in the tor network. 2. Scope This proposal modifies Tor's behaviour as follows: Relays, bridges, and directory authorities: * automatically find their IPv6 address, and * for consistency between IPv4 and IPv6 detection: * start using IPv4 ORPort and DirPort for IPv4 address detection, and * re-order IPv4 address detection methods. Relays and directory authorities (but not bridges): * fetch some directory documents over IPv6. For anonymity reasons, bridges are unable to fetch directory documents over IPv6, until clients start to do so. (See [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections].) This proposal makes a small, optional change to existing client behaviour: * clients also check IPv6 addresses when rotating TLS keys for new networks. In addition to the changes to IPv4 address resolution, most of which won't affect clients. (Because they do not set Address, ORPort, or DirPort.) Throughout this proposal, "relays" includes directory authorities, except where they are specifically excluded. "relays" does not include bridges, except where they are specifically included. (The first mention of "relays" in each section should specifically exclude or include these other roles.) When this proposal describes Tor's current behaviour, it covers all supported Tor versions (0.3.5.7 to 0.4.2.5), as of January 2020, except where another version is specifically mentioned. 3. Finding Relay IPv6 Addresses We propose that tor relays (and bridges) automatically find their IPv6 address, and use it to publish an IPv6 ORPort. For some relays to find their IPv6 address, they may need to fetch some directory documents from directory authorities over IPv6. (For anonymity reasons, bridges are unable to fetch directory documents over IPv6, until clients start to do so.) 3.1. Current Relay IPv4 Address Implementation Currently, all relays (and bridges) must have an IPv4 address. IPv6 addresses are optional for relays. Tor currently tries to find relay IPv4 addresses in this order: 1. the Address torrc option 2. the address of the hostname (resolved using DNS, if needed) 3. a local interface address (by making a self-connected socket, if needed) 4. an address reported by a directory server (using X-Your-Address-Is) When using the Address option, or the hostname, tor supports: * an IPv4 address literal, or * resolving an IPv4 address from a hostname. If tor is running on the public network, and an address isn't globally routable, tor ignores it. (If it was explicitly set in Address, tor logs an error.) If there are multiple valid addresses, tor chooses: * the first address returned by the resolver, * the first address returned by the local interface API, or * the latest address returned by a directory server. 3.2. Finding Relay IPv6 Addresses We propose that relays (and bridges) try to find their IPv6 address. For consistency, we also propose to change the address resolution order for IPv4 addresses. We use the following general principles to choose the order of IP address methods: * Explicit is better than Implicit, * Local Information is better than a Remote Dependency, * Trusted is better than Untrusted, and * Reliable is better than Unreliable. Within these constraints, we try to find the simplest working design. Therefore, we propose that tor tries to find relay IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in this order: 1. the Address torrc option 2. the advertised ORPort address 3. the advertised DirPort address (IPv4 only; relays, not bridges) 4. a local interface address (by making a self-connected socket, if needed) 5. the address of the host's own hostname (resolved using DNS, if needed) 6. an address reported by a directory server (using X-Your-Address-Is) (Each of these address resolution steps is described in more detail, in its own subsection.) While making these changes, we want to preserve tor's existing behaviour: * resolve Address using the local resolver, if needed, * ignore private addresses on public tor networks, and * when there are multiple valid addresses, choose the first or latest address, as appropriate. 3.2.1. Make the Address torrc Option Support IPv6 First, we propose that relays (and bridges) use the Address torrc option to find their IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. There are two cases we need to cover: 1. Explicit IP addresses: * allow the option to be specified up to two times, * use the IPv4 address for IPv4, * use the IPv6 address for IPv6. Configuring two addresses in the same address family is a config error. 2. Hostnames / DNS names: * allow the option to be specified up to two times, * look up the configured name, * use the first IPv4 and IPv6 address returned by the resolver, and Resolving multiple addresses in the same address family is not a runtime error, but only the first address from each family will be used. These lookups should ignore private addresses on public tor networks. If multiple IPv4 or IPv6 addresses are returned, the first public address from each family should be used. We should also support the following combinations: A. IPv4 Address / hostname (for IPv6 only), B. IPv6 Address / hostname (for IPv4 only), C. IPv4 Address only / try to guess IPv6, then check its reachability (see section 4.3.1 in [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability]), and D. IPv6 Address only / guess IPv4, then its reachability must succeed. There are also similar configurations where a hostname is configured, but it only provides IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. Combination C is the most common legacy configuration. We want to support the following outcomes for legacy configurations: * automatic upgrades to guessed and reachable IPv6 addresses, * continuing to operate on IPv4 when the IPv6 address can't be guessed, and * continuing to operate on IPv4 when the IPv6 address has been guessed, but it is unreachable. At this time, we do not propose guessing multiple IPv4 or IPv6 addresses and testing their reachability (see section 3.4.2). It is an error to configure an Address option with a private IPv4 or IPv6 address, or with a hostname that does not resolve to any publicly routable IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. If the Address option is not configured for IPv4 or IPv6, or the hostname lookups do not provide both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, address resolution should go to the next step. 3.2.2. Use the Advertised ORPort IPv4 and IPv6 Addresses Next, we propose that relays (and bridges) use the first advertised ORPort IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, as configured in their torrc. The ORPort address may be a hostname. If it is, tor should try to use it to resolve an IPv4 and IPv6 address, and open ORPorts on the first available IPv4 and IPv6 address. Tor should respect the IPv4Only and IPv6Only port flags, if specified. (Tor currently resolves IPv4 addresses in ORPort lines. It may not look for an IPv6 address.) Relays (and bridges) currently use the first advertised ORPort IPv6 address as their IPv6 address. We propose to use the first advertised IPv4 ORPort address in a similar way, for consistency. Therefore, this change may affect existing relay IPv4 addressses. We expect that a small number of relays may change IPv4 address, from a guessed IPv4 address, to their first advertised IPv4 ORPort address. In rare cases, relays may have been using non-advertised ORPorts for their addresses. This change may also change their addresses. We propose ignoring private configured ORPort addresses on public tor networks. (Binding to private ORPort addresses is supported, even on public tor networks, for relays that use NAT to reach the Internet.) If an ORPort address is private, address resolution should go to the next step. 3.2.3. Use the Advertised DirPort IPv4 Address Next, we propose that relays use the first advertised DirPort IPv4 address, as configured in their torrc. The following DirPort configurations can not be used for address resolution, because they are not supported: * bridge DirPorts, and * advertised IPv6 DirPorts. The DirPort address may be a hostname. If it is, tor should try to use it to resolve an IPv4 address, and open a DirPort on the first available IPv4 address. Tor should only look for IPv6 addresses if the IPv6Only port flag is specified. (Since advertised IPv6 DirPorts are not supported, a working configuration may also require the NoAdvertise flag.) Relays currently use the first advertised ORPort IPv6 address as their IPv6 address. We propose to use the first advertised IPv4 DirPort address in a similar way, for consistency. Therefore, this change may affect existing relay IPv4 addressses. We expect that a very small number of relays may change IPv4 address, from a guessed IPv4 address, to their first advertised IPv4 DirPort address. (But we expect that most relays that change will be using their ORPort address.) We propose ignoring private configured DirPort addresses on public relays. (Binding to private DirPort addresses is supported, for networks that use NAT.) If a DirPort address is private, address resolution should go to the next step. 3.2.4. Use Local Interface IPv6 Address Next, we propose that relays (and bridges) use publicly routable addresses from the OS interface addresses or routing table, as their IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. Tor has local interface address resolution functions, which support most major OSes. Tor uses these functions to guess its IPv4 address. We propose using them to also guess tor's IPv6 address. We also propose modifying the address resolution order, so interface addresses are used before the local hostname. This decision is based on our principles: interface addresses are local, trusted, and reliable; hostname lookups may be remote, untrusted, and unreliable. Some developer documentation also recommends using interface addresses, rather than resolving the host's own hostname. For example, on recent versions of macOS, the man pages tell developers to use interface addresses (getifaddrs) rather than look up the host's own hostname (gethostname and getaddrinfo). Unfortunately, these man pages don't seem to be available online, except for short quotes (see [getaddrinfo man page] for the relevant quote). If the local interface addresses are unavailable, tor opens a self-connected UDP socket to a publicly routable address, but doesn't actually send any packets. Instead, it uses the socket APIs to discover the interface address for the socket. Tor already ignores private IPv4 interface addresses on public relays. (Binding to private DirPort addresses is supported, for networks that use NAT.) We propose to also ignore private IPv6 interface addresses. If all IPv4 or IPv6 interface addresses are private, address resolution should go to the next step. 3.2.5. Use Own Hostname IPv6 Addresses Next, we propose that relays (and bridges) get their local hostname, look up its addresses, and use them as its IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. We propose to use the same underlying lookup functions to look up the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for: * the Address torrc option (see section 3.2.1), and * the local hostname. However, OS APIs typically only return a single hostname. Even though the hostname lookup may use remote DNS, we propose to use it on directory authorities, to maintain compatibility with current configurations. Even if it is remote, we expect the configured DNS to be somewhat trusted by the operator. The hostname lookup should ignore private addresses on public relays. If multiple IPv4 or IPv6 addresses are returned, the first public address from each family should be used. If all IPv4 or IPv6 hostname addresses are private, address resolution should go to the next step. 3.2.6. Use Directory Header IPv6 Addresses Finally, we propose that relays get their IPv4 and IPv6 addresses from the X-Your-Address-Is HTTP header in tor directory documents. To support this change, we propose that relays start fetching directory documents over IPv4 and IPv6. We propose that bridges continue to only fetch directory documents over IPv4, because they try to imitate clients. (Most clients only fetch directory documents over IPv4, a few clients are configured to only fetch over IPv6.) When client behaviour changes to use both IPv4 and IPv6 for directory fetches, bridge behaviour can also change to match. (See section 3.4.1 and [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections].) We propose that directory authorities should ignore addresses in directory headers. Allowing other authorities (or relays?) to change a directory authority's published IP address may lead to security issues. Instead, if interface and hostname lookups fail, tor should stop address resolution, and return a permanent error. (And issue a log to the operator, see below.) We propose to use a simple load balancing scheme for IPv4 and IPv6 directory requests: * choose between IPv4 and IPv6 directory requests at random. We do not expect this change to have any load-balancing impact on the public tor network, because the number of relays is much smaller than the number of clients. However, the 6 directory authorities with IPv6 enabled may see slightly more directory load, particularly over IPv6. To support this change, tor should also change how it handles IPv6 directory failures on relays: * avoid recording IPv6 directory failures as remote relay failures, because they may actually be due to a lack of IPv6 connectivity on the local relay, and * issue IPv6 directory failure logs at notice level, and rate-limit them to one per hour. If a relay is: * explicitly configured with an IPv6 address, or * a publicly routable, reachable IPv6 address is discovered in an earlier step, tor should start issuing IPv6 directory failure logs at warning level. (Alternately, tor could stop doing IPv6 directory requests entirely. But we prefer designs where all relays behave in a similar way, regardless of their internal state.) For some more complex directory load-balancing schemes, see section 3.5.2. Tor already ignores private IPv4 addresses in directory headers. We propose to also ignore private IPv6 addresses in directory headers. If all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in directory headers are private, address resolution should pause, and return a temporary error. Whenever address resolution fails, tor should warn the operator to set the Address torrc option for IPv4 and IPv6. (If IPv4 is available, and only IPv6 is missing, the log should be at notice level.) Address resolution should continue the next time tor receives a directory header containing a public IPv4 or IPv6 address. 3.2.7. Disabling IPv6 Address Resolution Relays that have a reachable IPv6 address, but that address is unsuitable for the relay, need to be able to disable IPv6 address resolution. Based on [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability], and this proposal, those relays would: * discover their IPv6 address, * open an IPv6 ORPort, * find it reachable, * publish a descriptor containing that IPv6 ORPort, * have the directory authorities find it reachable, * have it published in the consensus, and * have it used by clients. Currently, relays are required to have an IPv4 address. So if the guessed IPv4 address is unsuitable, operators can set the Address option to a suitable IPv4 address. But IPv6 addresses are optional, so relay operators may need to disable IPv6 entirely. We propose a new torrc-only option, AddressDisableIPv6. This option is set to 0 by default. If the option is set to 1, tor disables IPv6 address resolution, IPv6 ORPorts, IPv6 reachability checks, and publishing an IPv6 ORPort in its descriptor. 3.2.8. Automatically Enabling an IPv6 ORPort We propose that relays that discover their IPv6 address, should open an ORPort on that address, and test its reachability (see [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability], particularly section 4.3.1). The ORPort should be opened on the port configured in the relay's ORPort torrc option. Relay operators can use the IPv4Only and IPv6Only options to configure different ports for IPv4 and IPv6. If both reachability checks succeed, relays should publish their IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in their descriptor. If only the IPv4 ORPort check succeeds, and the IPv6 address was guessed (rather than being explicitly configured), then relays should publish their IPv4 ORPort in their descriptor. 3.3. Consequential Tor Client Changes We do not propose any required client address resolution changes at this time. However, clients will use the updated address resolution functions to detect when they are on a new connection, and therefore need to rotate their TLS keys. This minor client change allows us to avoid keeping an outdated version of the address resolution functions, which is only for client use. Clients should skip address resolution steps that don't apply to them, such as: * the ORPort option, * the DirPort option, and * the Address option, if it becomes a relay module option. 3.4. Alternative Address Resolution Designs We briefly mention some potential address resolution designs, and the reasons that they were not used in this proposal. (Some designs may be proposed for future Tor versions, but are not necessary at this time.) 3.4.1. Future Bridge IPv6 Address Resolution Behaviour When clients automatically fetch directory documents via relay IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts by default, bridges should also adopt this dual-stack behaviour. (For example, see [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections].) When bridges fetch directory documents via IPv6, they will be able to find their IPv6 address using directory headers (see 3.2.6). 3.4.2. Guessing Muliple IPv4 or IPv6 Addresses We avoid designs which guess (or configure) multiple IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, test them all for reachability, and choose one that works. Using multiple addresses is rare, and the code to handle it is complex. It also requires careful design to avoid: * conflicts between multiple relays on the same address (tor allows up to 2 relays per IPv4 address) * flapping / race conditions / address switching * rare 3.4.3. Rejected Address Resolution Designs We reject designs that try all the different address resolution methods, score addresses, and then choose the address with the highest score. These designs are a generalisation of designs that try different methods in a set order (like this proposal). They are more complex than required. Complex designs can confuse operators, particularly when they fail. Operators should not need complex address resolution in tor: most relay addresses are fixed, or change occasionally. And most relays can reliably discover their address using directory headers, if all other methods fail. If complex address resolution is required, it can be configured using a dynamic DNS name in the Address torrc option, or via the control port. We also avoid designs that use any addresses other than the first (or latest) valid IPv4 and IPv6 address. These designs are more complex, and they don't have clear benefits: * sort addresses numerically (avoid address flipping) * sort addresses by length, then numerically (also minimise consensus size) * store a list of previous addresses in the state file, and use the most recently used address that's currently available. Operators who want to avoid address flipping should set the Address option in the torrc. Operators who want to minimise the size of the consensus should use all-zero IPv6 host identifiers. 3.5. Optional Efficiency and Reliability Changes We propose some optional changes for efficiency and reliability, and describe their impact. Some of these changes may be more appropriate in future releases, or along with other proposed features. 3.5.1. Only Use Authenticated Directory Header IPv4 and IPv6 Addresses We propose this optional change, to improve relay address accuracy and reliability. Relays should only use: * authenticated directory fetches, * to directory authorities, to discover their own IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. (Both changes are optional, and they can be made separately.) Tor supports authenticated, encrypted directory fetches using BEGINDIR over ORPorts (see the [Tor Specification] for details). Relays currently fetch unencrypted directory documents over DirPorts. The directory document itself is signed, but the HTTP headers are not authenticated. (Clients and bridges only fetch directory documents using authenticated directory fetches.) Using authenticated directory headers for relay addresses: * avoids caches (or other machines) mangling X-Your-Address-Is headers in transit, and * avoids attacks where directories are deliberately given an incorrect IP address. To make this change, we need to modify two different parts of tor: * when making directory requests, relays should fetch some directory documents using BEGINDIR over ORPorts, and * when using the X-Your-Address-Is HTTP header to guess their own IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, relays ignore directory documents that were not fetched using BEGINDIR over ORPorts. Optionally, relays should also ignore addresses from other relays: * when using the X-Your-Address-Is HTTP header to guess their own IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, relays ignore directory documents that were not fetched from directory authorities. Ideally, we would like all relays to do all their directory fetches: * using BEGINDIR over ORPorts, and * to directory authorities. However, this change may be unsustainable during high network load (see [Ticket 33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s]). Therefore, we propose a simple load-balancing scheme between address resolution and non-address resolution requests: * when relays do not know their own IP addresses, they should make as many address resolution directory fetches as is sustainable, and * when relays know their own IP addresses, they should make an occasional address resolution directory fetch, to learn if their address has changed. We use the load-balancing criteria in the next section, to select the ratio between: * ORPort connections to directory authorities, and * DirPort connections to directory mirrors. 3.5.1.1. General Load Balancing Criteria We propose the following criteria for choosing load-balancing ratios: The selected ratios should be chosen based on the following factors: * the current number of directory fetches that a relay makes: * when bootstrapping with an empty cache directory, and * in a steady state (per hour, or per new consensus), (these numbers aren't currently collected by tor, so we may need to write some extra code to include them in the heartbeat logs), * relays need to discover their IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to bootstrap, * it only takes one successful directory fetch from one authority for a relay to discover its IP address, * BEGINDIR over ORPort requires and TLS connection, and some additional tor cryptography, so it is more expensive for authorities than a DirPort fetch (and it can not be cached by a HTTP cache), * minimising wasted CPU (and bandwidth) on IPv4-only relays, and * other potential changes to relay directory fetches (see [Ticket 33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s]) The selected ratios should allow almost all relays to update both their IPv4 and IPv6 addresses: * at least twice when they bootstrap (to allow for fetch failures), and * at least once per directory fetch (or per hour). In this proposal, relays choose between IPv4 and IPv6 directory fetches at random (see section 3.2.6 for more detail). See the next section for an alternative load-balancing scheme. 3.5.2. Load Balancing Between IPv4 and IPv6 Directories We propose this optional change, to improve the load-balancing between IPv4 and IPv6 directories, when used by relays to find their IPv4 and IPv6 addresses (see section 3.2.6). This change may only be necessary if the following changes result in poor load-balancing, or other relay issues: * randomly selecting IPv4 or IPv6 directories (see section 3.2.6), or * only using directory headers for addresses when they come from directory authorities, via an authenticated connection (see section 3.5.1). We propose a new torrc option and consensus parameter: MaxNumIPv4DirectoryAttempts. This option limits the number of IPv4 directory requests, before the relay makes an IPv6 directory request. It should only apply to attempts that are expected to provide a usable IPv4 or IPv6 address in their directory header. (Based on sections 3.2.6 and 3.5.1.) The design is similar to MaxNumIPv4BootstrapAttempts in [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections]. Here is a quick sketch of the design: * when MaxNumIPv4DirectoryAttempts is reached, select an IPv6-capable directory, and make an IPv6 connection attempt, * use a directory authority, or an ORPort, if required (see section 3.5.1), * use a default value between 2 and 4: * the ideal value for load-balancing is >= 2 (because 6/9 directory authorities are already on IPv6) * the ideal value for minimising failures is ~4 (because relays won't waste too much CPU or bandwidth) * choose the default value based on the load-balancing criteria in section 3.5.1.1. Alternately, we could wait until [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections] is implemented, and use the directory fetch design from that proposal. 3.5.3. Detailed Address Resolution Logs We propose this optional change, to help diagnose relay address resolution issues. Relays (and bridges) should log the address chosen using each address resolution method, when: * address resolution succeeds, * address resolution fails, * reachability checks fail, or * publishing the descriptor fails. These logs should be rate-limited separately for successes and failures. The logs should tell operators to set the Address torrc option for IPv4 and IPv6 (if available). 3.5.4. Add IPv6 Support to is_local_addr() We propose this optional change, to improve the accuracy of IPv6 address detection from directory documents. Directory servers use is_local_addr() to detect if the requesting tor instance is on the same local network. If it is, the directory server does not include the X-Your-Address-Is HTTP header in directory documents. Currently, is_local_addr() checks for: * an internal IPv4 or IPv6 address, or * the same IPv4 /24 as the directory server. We propose also checking for: * the same IPv6 /48 as the directory server. We choose /48 because it is typically the smallest network in the global IPv6 routing tables, and it was previously the recommended per-customer network block. (See [RFC 6177: IPv6 End Site Address Assignment].) Tor currently uses: * IPv4 /8 and IPv6 /16 for port summaries, * IPv4 /16 and IPv6 /32 for path selection (avoiding relays in the same network block). 3.5.5. Add IPv6 Support to AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr We propose this optional change, to improve the health of the network, by rejecting too many relays on the same IPv6 address. Modify get_possible_sybil_list() so it takes an address family argument, and returns a list of IPv4 or IPv6 sybils. Use the modified get_possible_sybil_list() to exclude relays from the authority's vote, if there are more than AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr on the same IPv4 or IPv6 address. Since these relay exclusions happen at voting time, they do not require a new consensus method. 3.5.6. Use a Local Interface Address on the Default Route We propose this optional change, to improve the accuracy of local interface IPv4 and IPv6 address detection (see section 3.2.4). Rewrite the get_interface_address*() functions to choose an interface address on the default route, or to sort default route addresses first in the list of addresses. (If the platform API allows us to find the default route.) For more information, see [Ticket 12377: Prefer default route when checking local interface addresses]. This change may not be necessary, because the directory header IP address method will find the IP address of the default route, in most cases (see section 3.2.6). 3.5.7. Add IPv6 Support Using gethostbyname2() We propose these optional changes, to add IPv6 support to hostname resolution on older OSes. These changes affect: * the Address torrc option, when it is a hostname (see section 3.2.1), and * automatic hostname resolution (see section 3.2.5). Use gethostbyname2() to add IPv6 support to hostname resolution on older OSes, which don't support getaddrinfo(). But this change may be unnecessary, because: * Linux has used getaddrinfo() by default since glibc 2.20 (2014) * macOS has recommended getaddrinfo() since before 2006 * since macOS adopts BSD changes, most BSDs would have switched to getaddrinfo() in a similar timeframe * Windows has supported getaddrinfo() since Windows Vista; tor's minimum supported Windows version is Vista. See [Tor Supported Platforms] for more details. When looking up hostnames using gethostbyname() or gethostbyname2(), if the first address is a private address, we may want to look at the entire list of addresses. Some struct hostent versions (example: current macOS) also have a h_addr_list rather than h_addr. (They define h_addr as h_addr_list[0], for backwards compatibility.) However, having private and public addresses resolving from the same hostname is a rare configuration, so we may not need to make this change. (On OSes that support getaddrinfo(), tor searches the list of addresses for a publicly routable address.) As an alternative, if we believe that all supported OSes have getaddrinfo(), we could simply remove the gethostbyname() code, rather than trying to modify it to work with IPv6. Most relays can reliably discover their address using directory headers, if all other methods fail. Or operators can set the Address torrc option to an IPv4 or IPv6 literal. 3.5.8. Change Relay OutboundBindAddress Defaults We propose this optional change, to improve the reliability of IP address-based filters in tor. For example, the tor network treats relay IP addresses differently when: * resisting denial of service, and * selecting canonical, long-term connections. (See [Ticket 33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s] for the initial motivation for this change: resisting significant bandwidth load on directory authorities.) Now that tor knows its own addresses, we propose that relays (and bridges) set their IPv4 and IPv6 OutboundBindAddress to these discovered addresses, by default. If binding fails, tor should fall back to an unbound socket. Operators would still be able to set a custom IPv4 and IPv6 OutboundBindAddress, if needed. Currently, tor doesn't bind to a specific address, unless OutboundBindAddress is configured. So on relays with multiple IP addresses, the outbound address comes from the chosen route (usually the default route). 4. Directory Protocol Specification Changes We propose explicitly supporting IPv6 X-Your-Address-Is HTTP headers in the tor directory protocol. We propose the following changes to the [Tor Directory Protocol] specification, in section 6.1: Servers MAY include an X-Your-Address-Is: header, whose value is the apparent IPv4 or IPv6 address of the client connecting to them. IPv6 addresses SHOULD/MAY (TODO) be formatted enclosed in square brackets. TODO: require brackets? What does Tor currently do? For directory connections tunneled over a BEGIN_DIR stream, servers SHOULD report the IP from which the circuit carrying the BEGIN_DIR stream reached them. Servers SHOULD disable caching of multiple network statuses or multiple server descriptors. Servers MAY enable caching of single descriptors, single network statuses, the list of all server descriptors, a v1 directory, or a v1 running routers document, with appropriate expiry times (around 30 minutes). Servers SHOULD disable caching of X-Your-Address-Is headers. 5. Test Plan We provide a quick summary of our testing plans. 5.1. Test Find Relay IPv6 Addresses We propose to test these changes using chutney networks. However, chutney creates a limited number of configurations, so we also need to test these changes with relay operators on the public network. Therefore, we propose to test these changes on the public network with a small number of relays and bridges. Once these changes are merged, volunteer relay and bridge operators will be able to test them by: * compiling from source, * running nightly builds, or * running alpha releases. 5.2. Test Existing Features We will modify and test these existing features: * Find Relay IPv4 Addresses We do not plan on modifying these existing features: * relay address retries * existing warning logs But we will test that they continue to function correctly, and fix any bugs triggered by the modifications in this proposal. 6. Ongoing Monitoring To monitor the impact of these changes, relays should collect basic IPv4 and IPv6 connection and bandwidth statistics (see [Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics]). We may also collect separate statistics on connections from: * clients (and bridges, because they act like clients), and * other relays (and authorities, because they act like relays). Some of these statistics may be included in tor's heartbeat logs, making them accessible to relay operators. We do not propose to collect additional statistics on: * bridges, * address resolution, * circuit counts, or * failure rates. Collecting statistics like these could impact user privacy, or relay security. 7. Changes to Other Proposals [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections] needs to be modified to keep bridge IPv6 behaviour in sync with client IPv6 behaviour. (See section 3.2.6.) References: [getaddrinfo man page]: See the quoted section in https://stackoverflow.com/a/42351676 [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections]: One possible design for automatic client IPv4 and IPv6 connections is at https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/306-ipv6-happy-eye… (TODO: modify to include bridge changes with client changes) [Proposal 311: Relay IPv6 Reachability]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/311-relay-ipv6-rea… [Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/313-relay-ipv6-sta… (TODO) [RFC 6177: IPv6 End Site Address Assignment]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6177#page-7 [Ticket 12377: Prefer default route when checking local interface addresses]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12377 [Ticket 33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33018 [Tor Directory Protocol]: (version 3) https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt [Tor Specification]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/tor-spec.txt [Tor Supported Platforms]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/Support… (End)

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