tbb-commits August 2017

tbb-commits@lists.torproject.org

3 participants
100 discussions

[tor-browser-build/master] meek: include *.1.txt instead of *.1 files on Windows
by boklm＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit 9a392fd711a582e1c275c1c454deb766e07c5c6f Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Aug 3 16:32:26 2017 +0200 meek: include *.1.txt instead of *.1 files on Windows --- projects/meek/build | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/projects/meek/build b/projects/meek/build index 81734be..57185b3 100644 --- a/projects/meek/build +++ b/projects/meek/build @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ cp -a meek-client-torbrowser[% IF c("var/windows") %].exe[% END %] $PTDIR [% END %] cd .. -cp -a README doc/*.1 $DOCSDIR +cp -a README doc/*.1[% IF c("var/windows") %].txt[% END %] $DOCSDIR cd firefox [% c('zip', {

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[tor-browser-bundle/maint-7.0] Bug 22884: about:tor page is not showing up
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit bfcf699785a7e7aa7cb49fe61400c4d4aee3836a Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Wed Jul 19 10:05:48 2017 -0400 Bug 22884: about:tor page is not showing up Whitelist about:tor so that NoScript does not block its JavaScript. --- .../Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js | 6 +++--- .../Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js | 6 +++--- .../Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/Bundle-Data/linux/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js b/Bundle-Data/linux/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js index 6ef2c45..d6e5546 100644 --- a/Bundle-Data/linux/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js +++ b/Bundle-Data/linux/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ pref("extensions.https_everywhere.toolbar_hint_shown", true); # NoScript Preferences: pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.javascript.enabled", "allAccess"); -pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); -pref("noscript.default", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); -pref("noscript.mandatory", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("noscript.default", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("noscript.mandatory", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); pref("noscript.ABE.enabled", false); pref("noscript.ABE.notify", false); pref("noscript.ABE.wanIpAsLocal", false); diff --git a/Bundle-Data/mac/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js b/Bundle-Data/mac/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js index 6ef2c45..d6e5546 100644 --- a/Bundle-Data/mac/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js +++ b/Bundle-Data/mac/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ pref("extensions.https_everywhere.toolbar_hint_shown", true); # NoScript Preferences: pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.javascript.enabled", "allAccess"); -pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); -pref("noscript.default", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); -pref("noscript.mandatory", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("noscript.default", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("noscript.mandatory", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); pref("noscript.ABE.enabled", false); pref("noscript.ABE.notify", false); pref("noscript.ABE.wanIpAsLocal", false); diff --git a/Bundle-Data/windows/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js b/Bundle-Data/windows/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js index 6ef2c45..d6e5546 100644 --- a/Bundle-Data/windows/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js +++ b/Bundle-Data/windows/Data/Browser/profile.default/preferences/extension-overrides.js @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ pref("extensions.https_everywhere.toolbar_hint_shown", true); # NoScript Preferences: pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.javascript.enabled", "allAccess"); -pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); -pref("noscript.default", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); -pref("noscript.mandatory", "about: about:tbupdate chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("capability.policy.maonoscript.sites", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("noscript.default", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); +pref("noscript.mandatory", "about: about:tbupdate about:tor chrome: resource: blob: mediasource: moz-safe-about: about:neterror about:certerror about:feeds about:tabcrashed about:cache"); pref("noscript.ABE.enabled", false); pref("noscript.ABE.notify", false); pref("noscript.ABE.wanIpAsLocal", false);

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[tor-browser-bundle/maint-7.0] Revert "Apply patch for bug 23044"
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit 0711c3e7293f8a4970fd19a7ab11736b8e39d673 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 2 09:53:24 2017 +0000 Revert "Apply patch for bug 23044" This reverts commit a11a8b301950e1c25adcfd5bea07c773f5082533. We do the right thing and get the patch via the tor-brower repo. No need to use this workaround anymore which was there for our emergency release. --- gitian/descriptors/linux/gitian-firefox.yml | 2 -- gitian/patches/gio.patch | 48 ----------------------------- 2 files changed, 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/gitian/descriptors/linux/gitian-firefox.yml b/gitian/descriptors/linux/gitian-firefox.yml index 49c457c..1ff66a2 100644 --- a/gitian/descriptors/linux/gitian-firefox.yml +++ b/gitian/descriptors/linux/gitian-firefox.yml @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ files: - "gcc-linux32-utils.zip" - "gcc-linux64-utils.zip" - "get-moz-build-date" -- "gio.patch" - "re-dzip.sh" - "dzip.sh" - "versions" @@ -89,7 +88,6 @@ script: | mkdir -p $INSTDIR/Debug/Browser/ cd tor-browser - patch -p1 < ../gio.patch # run get-moz-build-date before removing .git, which is used to get the year chmod +x ~/build/get-moz-build-date eval $(~/build/get-moz-build-date $(cat browser/config/version.txt)) diff --git a/gitian/patches/gio.patch b/gitian/patches/gio.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1edae4d..0000000 --- a/gitian/patches/gio.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From a96f898e0da42de751a5e1367a9899cc96fadb1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> -Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2017 07:31:38 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Bug 23044: Don't allow GIO supported protocols by default - - -diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js -index aaeba630422d..3edaad88f59e 100644 ---- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js -+++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js -@@ -210,6 +210,9 @@ pref("network.protocol-handler.warn-external.mailto", true); - pref("network.protocol-handler.warn-external.news", true); - pref("network.protocol-handler.warn-external.nntp", true); - pref("network.protocol-handler.warn-external.snews", true); -+// Make sure we don't have any GIO supported protocols (defense in depth -+// measure) -+pref("network.gio.supported-protocols", ""); - pref("plugin.disable", true); // Disable to search plugins on first start - pref("plugins.click_to_play", true); - pref("plugin.state.flash", 1); -diff --git a/extensions/gio/nsGIOProtocolHandler.cpp b/extensions/gio/nsGIOProtocolHandler.cpp -index a378e8700821..5f6b2a0a2a57 100644 ---- a/extensions/gio/nsGIOProtocolHandler.cpp -+++ b/extensions/gio/nsGIOProtocolHandler.cpp -@@ -922,16 +922,16 @@ nsGIOProtocolHandler::InitSupportedProtocolsPref(nsIPrefBranch *prefs) - // Get user preferences to determine which protocol is supported. - // Gvfs/GIO has a set of supported protocols like obex, network, archive, - // computer, dav, cdda, gphoto2, trash, etc. Some of these seems to be -- // irrelevant to process by browser. By default accept only smb and sftp -- // protocols so far. -+ // irrelevant to process by browser. By default accept none. - nsresult rv = prefs->GetCharPref(MOZ_GIO_SUPPORTED_PROTOCOLS, - getter_Copies(mSupportedProtocols)); - if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { - mSupportedProtocols.StripWhitespace(); - ToLowerCase(mSupportedProtocols); - } -- else -- mSupportedProtocols.AssignLiteral("smb:,sftp:"); // use defaults -+ else { -+ mSupportedProtocols.AssignLiteral(""); // use none by default -+ } - - LOG(("gio: supported protocols \"%s\"\n", mSupportedProtocols.get())); - } --- -2.13.2 -

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[tor-browser-bundle/maint-7.0] Release preparations for 7.0.4
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit cd573d8a0c7a45594d19f8461124d7d7fa5e50d1 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Aug 3 09:45:14 2017 +0000 Release preparations for 7.0.4 Changelog update, version bumps, and config.yml update --- Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ gitian/versions | 18 +++++++++--------- tools/update-responses/config.yml | 9 +++++---- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt b/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt index d509505..8fa01c9 100644 --- a/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt +++ b/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt @@ -1,6 +1,34 @@ +Tor Browser 7.0.4 -- August 8 2017 + * All Platforms + * Update Firefox to 52.3.0esr + * Update Tor to 0.3.0.10 + * Update Torbutton to 1.9.7.5 + * Bug 21999: Fix display of language prompt in non-en-US locales + * Bug 18193: Don't let about:tor have chrome privileges + * Bug 22535: Search on about:tor discards search query + * Bug 21948: Going back to about:tor page gives "Address isn't valid" error + * Code clean-up + * Translations update + * Update Tor Launcher to 0.2.12.3 + * Bug 22592: Default bridge settings are not removed + * Translations update + * Update HTTPS-Everywhere to 5.2.21 + * Update NoScript to 5.0.8.1 + * Bug 22362: Remove workaround for XSS related browser freezing + * Bug 22067: NoScript Click-to-Play bypass with embedded videos and audio + * Bug 21321: Exempt .onions from HTTP related security warnings + * Bug 22073: Disable GetAddons option on addons page + * Bug 22884: Fix broken about:tor page on higher security levels + * Windows + * Bug 22829: Remove default obfs4 bridge riemann. + * Bug 21617: Fix single RWX page on Windows (included in 52.3.0esr) + * OS X + * Bug 22829: Remove default obfs4 bridge riemann. + Tor Browser 7.0.3 -- July 27 2017 * Linux * Bug 23044: Don't allow GIO supported protocols by default + * Bug 22829: Remove default obfs4 bridge riemann. Tor Browser 7.0.2 -- July 3 2017 * All Platforms diff --git a/gitian/versions b/gitian/versions index 873aa7f..0c9d620 100755 --- a/gitian/versions +++ b/gitian/versions @@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ DATA_OUTSIDE_APP_DIR=1 VERIFY_TAGS=1 -FIREFOX_VERSION=52.2.0esr +FIREFOX_VERSION=52.3.0esr TORBROWSER_UPDATE_CHANNEL=release TORBROWSER_TAG=tor-browser-${FIREFOX_VERSION}-7.0-1-build1 -TOR_TAG=tor-0.3.0.9 -TORLAUNCHER_TAG=0.2.12.2 -TORBUTTON_TAG=1.9.7.4 -HTTPSE_TAG=5.2.19 +TOR_TAG=tor-0.3.0.10 +TORLAUNCHER_TAG=0.2.12.3 +TORBUTTON_TAG=1.9.7.5 +HTTPSE_TAG=5.2.21 NSIS_TAG=v0.3.1 ZLIB_TAG=v1.2.8 LIBEVENT_TAG=release-2.0.22-stable @@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ GO_X_NET_TAG=7dbad50ab5b31073856416cdcfeb2796d682f844 OBFS4_TAG=obfs4proxy-0.0.5 NOTOFONTS_TAG=720e34851382ee3c1ef024d8dffb68ffbfb234c2 -GITIAN_TAG=tor-browser-builder-4-4 +GITIAN_TAG=tor-browser-builder-4-5 OPENSSL_VER=1.0.2k GMP_VER=5.1.3 FIREFOX_LANG_VER=$FIREFOX_VERSION -FIREFOX_LANG_BUILD=build1 +FIREFOX_LANG_BUILD=build2 BINUTILS_VER=2.24 GCC_VER=5.1.0 CLANG_VER=3.8.0 @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ YASM_VER=1.2.0 ## File names for the source packages OPENSSL_PACKAGE=openssl-${OPENSSL_VER}.tar.gz GMP_PACKAGE=gmp-${GMP_VER}.tar.bz2 -NOSCRIPT_PACKAGE=noscript_security_suite-5.0.7.1-fx+sm.xpi +NOSCRIPT_PACKAGE=noscript_security_suite-5.0.8.1-fx+sm.xpi CCTOOLS_PACKAGE=cctools.tar.gz OSXSDK_PACKAGE=MacOSX10.7.sdk.tar.gz MSVCR100_PACKAGE=msvcr100.dll @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ YASM_PACKAGE=yasm-${YASM_VER}.tar.gz OPENSSL_HASH=6b3977c61f2aedf0f96367dcfb5c6e578cf37e7b8d913b4ecb6643c3cb88d8c0 GMP_HASH=752079520b4690531171d0f4532e40f08600215feefede70b24fabdc6f1ab160 OSXSDK_HASH=da77bb0003fcca5ea8c4e8cb2da8828ded750c54afdcac29ec6f3b46ad5e3adf -NOSCRIPT_HASH=fe85a4c72b5a763462f3b264f54a0ef1c6f6879eb95d903f2dfee337f768a50b +NOSCRIPT_HASH=ef648454965242a57583d2541290bcf9526747b18335aeccdd55f39a23873bc3 CCTOOLS_HASH=e908fdebc2886ee5491ebfc7e7950af451b3c4e2439c2d7a923ed06ad05113e4 MSVCR100_HASH=1221a09484964a6f38af5e34ee292b9afefccb3dc6e55435fd3aaf7c235d9067 PYCRYPTO_HASH=f2ce1e989b272cfcb677616763e0a2e7ec659effa67a88aa92b3a65528f60a3c diff --git a/tools/update-responses/config.yml b/tools/update-responses/config.yml index 1547dfd..79c015d 100644 --- a/tools/update-responses/config.yml +++ b/tools/update-responses/config.yml @@ -20,13 +20,14 @@ build_targets: osx64: Darwin_x86_64-gcc3 channels: alpha: 7.0a4 - release: 7.0.3 + release: 7.0.4 versions: - 7.0.3: - platformVersion: 52.2.0 - detailsURL: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-703-released + 7.0.4: + platformVersion: 52.3.0 + detailsURL: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-704-released incremental_from: - 7.0.2 + - 7.0.3 migrate_archs: osx32: osx64 migrate_langs:

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[gitian-builder/tor-browser-builder-4] Bug 22467: Don't break upgrade on Jessie VM
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit cbcaacd2152ca43ebc51874dcbb074de14dcc392 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Aug 3 09:19:58 2017 +0000 Bug 22467: Don't break upgrade on Jessie VM The problem seems to be related to `linux-image-xxxx` trying to upgrade itself during `dist-upgrade` while `grub` is not installed, which causes the post-installation script to fail. The idea is to ensure that `linux-image-xxxx` is upgraded before removing `grub` and doing `dist-upgrade`. This patch was done by David Fifield --- target-bin/upgrade-system.sh | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/target-bin/upgrade-system.sh b/target-bin/upgrade-system.sh index 9384229..795c3b9 100644 --- a/target-bin/upgrade-system.sh +++ b/target-bin/upgrade-system.sh @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ set -e mkdir -p /var/cache/gitian +DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -y install grub +DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -y install linux-image-$(uname -r) + # remove obsolete grub, it causes package dependency issues apt-get -q -y purge grub > /dev/null 2>&1 || true

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.5-1] Bug 21321: .onion domains are shown as non-secure
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit df2223e1b1f8a4b782e7e49bbbeb79296ea74dff Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Aug 3 09:07:37 2017 +0000 Bug 21321: .onion domains are shown as non-secure Websites which collect passwords but don't use HTTPS start showing scary warnings from Firefox 51 onwards (see: blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/01/20/communicating-the-dangers-of-non-secur… for details). .onion sites without HTTPS support are affected as well, although their traffic is encrypted and authenticated. This patch addresses this shortcoming by making sure .onion sites are treated as potentially trustworthy origins. The secure context specification (https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/) is pretty much focused on tying security and trustworthiness to the protocol over which domains are accessed. However, it is not obvious why .onion sites should not be treated as potentially trustworthy given: "A potentially trustworthy origin is one which a user agent can generally trust as delivering data securely. This algorithms [sic] considers certain hosts, scheme, and origins as potentially trustworthy, even though they might not be authenticated and encrypted in the traditional sense." (https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy) We use step 8 in the algorithm to establish trustworthiness of .onion sites by whitelisting them given the encrypted and authenticated nature of their traffic. --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 3 +++ dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index 3edaad88f59e..5d209ccfdbe1 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -357,6 +357,9 @@ pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.enabled", false); // in case the download panel got removed from the toolbar. pref("browser.download.panel.shown", true); +// Treat .onions as secure +pref("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", true); + #ifdef TOR_BROWSER_VERSION #expand pref("torbrowser.version", __TOR_BROWSER_VERSION__); #endif diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp index c4e1ed8e18a9..c95226b56e91 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp @@ -689,6 +689,14 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipa } } } + // Maybe we have a .onion URL. Treat it as whitelisted as well when + // `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions` is `true`. + bool whitelistOnions = + Preferences::GetBool("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", false); + if (whitelistOnions && StringEndsWith(host, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".onion"))) { + *aIsTrustWorthy = true; + return NS_OK; + } } return NS_OK;

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.5-1] Bug 21321: Add test for .onion whitelisting
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit 490f3cc2d708cf693ebb7c730b7bb2562dc8987c Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 10:23:00 2017 +0000 Bug 21321: Add test for .onion whitelisting --- dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js index 7de8faa8f9cb..206b79742505 100644 --- a/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js +++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ XPCOMUtils.defineLazyServiceGetter(this, "gContentSecurityManager", var prefs = Cc["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"].getService(Ci.nsIPrefBranch); prefs.setCharPref("dom.securecontext.whitelist", "example.net,example.org"); +prefs.setBoolPref("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", false); add_task(function* test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy() { for (let [uriSpec, expectedResult] of [ @@ -38,10 +39,18 @@ add_task(function* test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy() { ["http://example.net/", true], ["ws://example.org/", true], ["chrome://example.net/content/messenger.xul", false], + ["http://1234567890abcdef.onion/", false], ]) { let uri = NetUtil.newURI(uriSpec); let principal = gScriptSecurityManager.getCodebasePrincipal(uri); Assert.equal(gContentSecurityManager.isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(principal), expectedResult); } + // And now let's test whether .onion sites are properly treated when + // whitelisted, see bug 21321. + prefs.setBoolPref("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", true); + let uri = NetUtil.newURI("http://1234567890abcdef.onion/"); + let principal = gScriptSecurityManager.getCodebasePrincipal(uri); + Assert.equal(gContentSecurityManager.isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(principal), + true); });

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 21321: Add test for .onion whitelisting
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit 7a03cca9991cfab93be16e9d5521bc58c35d4d44 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 24 10:23:00 2017 +0000 Bug 21321: Add test for .onion whitelisting --- dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js index 7de8faa8f9cb..206b79742505 100644 --- a/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js +++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ XPCOMUtils.defineLazyServiceGetter(this, "gContentSecurityManager", var prefs = Cc["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"].getService(Ci.nsIPrefBranch); prefs.setCharPref("dom.securecontext.whitelist", "example.net,example.org"); +prefs.setBoolPref("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", false); add_task(function* test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy() { for (let [uriSpec, expectedResult] of [ @@ -38,10 +39,18 @@ add_task(function* test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy() { ["http://example.net/", true], ["ws://example.org/", true], ["chrome://example.net/content/messenger.xul", false], + ["http://1234567890abcdef.onion/", false], ]) { let uri = NetUtil.newURI(uriSpec); let principal = gScriptSecurityManager.getCodebasePrincipal(uri); Assert.equal(gContentSecurityManager.isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(principal), expectedResult); } + // And now let's test whether .onion sites are properly treated when + // whitelisted, see bug 21321. + prefs.setBoolPref("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", true); + let uri = NetUtil.newURI("http://1234567890abcdef.onion/"); + let principal = gScriptSecurityManager.getCodebasePrincipal(uri); + Assert.equal(gContentSecurityManager.isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(principal), + true); });

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 21321: .onion domains are shown as non-secure
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit 30b633b92a94bced2537354afe3d228f0eace8da Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Aug 3 09:07:37 2017 +0000 Bug 21321: .onion domains are shown as non-secure Websites which collect passwords but don't use HTTPS start showing scary warnings from Firefox 51 onwards (see: blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/01/20/communicating-the-dangers-of-non-secur… for details). .onion sites without HTTPS support are affected as well, although their traffic is encrypted and authenticated. This patch addresses this shortcoming by making sure .onion sites are treated as potentially trustworthy origins. The secure context specification (https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/) is pretty much focused on tying security and trustworthiness to the protocol over which domains are accessed. However, it is not obvious why .onion sites should not be treated as potentially trustworthy given: "A potentially trustworthy origin is one which a user agent can generally trust as delivering data securely. This algorithms [sic] considers certain hosts, scheme, and origins as potentially trustworthy, even though they might not be authenticated and encrypted in the traditional sense." (https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy) We use step 8 in the algorithm to establish trustworthiness of .onion sites by whitelisting them given the encrypted and authenticated nature of their traffic. --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 3 +++ dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index 3edaad88f59e..5d209ccfdbe1 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -357,6 +357,9 @@ pref("security.ssl.errorReporting.enabled", false); // in case the download panel got removed from the toolbar. pref("browser.download.panel.shown", true); +// Treat .onions as secure +pref("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", true); + #ifdef TOR_BROWSER_VERSION #expand pref("torbrowser.version", __TOR_BROWSER_VERSION__); #endif diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp index c4e1ed8e18a9..c95226b56e91 100644 --- a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp +++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp @@ -689,6 +689,14 @@ nsContentSecurityManager::IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipa } } } + // Maybe we have a .onion URL. Treat it as whitelisted as well when + // `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions` is `true`. + bool whitelistOnions = + Preferences::GetBool("dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions", false); + if (whitelistOnions && StringEndsWith(host, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".onion"))) { + *aIsTrustWorthy = true; + return NS_OK; + } } return NS_OK;

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.0-1] fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.
by gk＠torproject.org 03 Aug '17

03 Aug '17

commit 96a0b3ce8bf4b13d6c6f8d799af028c600ad1cb1 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 13 08:48:59 2017 +0000 fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides. We disable the GetAddons item on the about:addons page as we don't know which extensions Mozilla is advertising to our users and we don't want to have some random Google Analytics script running either on about:addons. Fixes bug 22073. --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index dc7e99701293..3edaad88f59e 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -297,6 +297,10 @@ pref("extensions.enabledScopes", 1); pref("extensions.pendingOperations", false); pref("xpinstall.whitelist.add", ""); pref("xpinstall.whitelist.add.36", ""); +// We don't know what extensions Mozilla is advertising to our users and we +// don't want to have some random Google Analytics script running either on the +// about:addons page, see bug 22073 and 22900. +pref("extensions.getAddons.showPane", false); // Toolbar layout pref("browser.uiCustomization.state", "{\"placements\":{\"PanelUI-contents\":[\"edit-controls\",\"zoom-controls\",\"new-window-button\",\"save-page-button\",\"print-button\",\"bookmarks-menu-button\",\"history-panelmenu\",\"find-button\",\"preferences-button\",\"add-ons-button\",\"developer-button\",\"https-everywhere-button\",\"downloads-button\"],\"addon-bar\":[\"addonbar-closebutton\",\"status-bar\"],\"PersonalToolbar\":[\"personal-bookmarks\"],\"nav-bar\":[\"noscript-tbb\",\"torbutton-button\",\"urlbar-container\",\"search-container\",\"webrtc-status-button\",\"loop-button\"],\"TabsToolbar\":[\"tabbrowser-tabs\",\"new-tab-button\",\"alltabs-button\"],\"toolbar-menubar\":[\"menubar-items\"]},\"seen\":[],\"dirtyAreaCache\":[\"PersonalToolbar\",\"nav-bar\",\"TabsToolbar\",\"toolbar-menubar\",\"PanelUI-contents\",\"addon-bar\"],\"currentVersion\":4,\"newElementCount\":0}");

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