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Report on blocking of social media in Gabon
by Maria Xynou 19 Feb '26

19 Feb '26

Hi friends, Yesterday, Gabon started blocking access to social media platforms. We just published a short report, documenting the *blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube in Gabon* based on OONI data: https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/340845567300 OONI data suggests that the blocks are implemented by means of DNS interference, as DNS queries return NXDOMAIN errors. We thank community members in Gabon for contributing measurements! ~ OONI team.

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Thank you for donating to OONI <3
by Maria Xynou 11 Feb '26

11 Feb '26

Hi friends, I am excited to share that as part of OONI's 2025 end-of-year fundraising campaign (https://ooni.org/post/2025-fundraising-campaign/) we raised €45,108. Huge thanks to everyone who donated to OONI! We are deeply grateful for each and every contribution. <3 Your support means a great deal to us, and helps us continue providing free software tools and open data in defense of a free and open internet. Thanks a million for your trust and support! Warmly, OONI team.

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OONI Training Course Videos on YouTube
by Maria Xynou 09 Feb '26

09 Feb '26

Hi friends, In October 2022, an online OONI Training Course was launched on Small Media's Advocacy Assembly platform ( https://ooni.org/post/2022-ooni-training-course-advocacy-assembly/) The *videos of this OONI Training Course* are now available on the OONI YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2mWSqEPsbto&list=PL1sH9kYR-16lsaqiLckQsggTe… The course has 21 videos, including: * Videos explaining what is internet censorship and why it matters * OONI Probe screencasts * OONI Explorer screencasts * Video in Swahili by Zaina Foundation discussing how communities in Tanzania use OONI tools to measure internet censorship * Video by Access Now discussing how the global #KeepItOn advocacy campaign uses OONI data As the training course was created in 2022, some of the screencasts might be a bit outdated. We nonetheless hope that they’re still helpful resources for you and your communities. All the best, OONI team.

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New OONI Anonymous Credential System
by Maria Xynou 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

Hi friends, The OONI team is excited to announce *OONI's New Anonymous Credential System* to strengthen trust in OONI data. Details of the system are shared in our blog post: https://ooni.org/post/2025-announcing-ooni-new-anonymous-credential-system/ We welcome feedback, especially from cryptographers and implementers. Thanks, OONI team.

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OONI Report on Social Media Blocks in Uganda
by Maria Xynou 23 Jan '26

23 Jan '26

Hi friends, Hope you're doing well. Today OONI published a short report, documenting the *5-day internet shutdown during Uganda's 2026 general elections*, and the subsequent *blocking of major social media and messaging apps*. Read the report here: https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/352623460000 Last week, Uganda experienced an internet shutdown during its 2026 general elections. After 5 days, internet access was restored, but major social media and messaging platforms remained blocked. In this report, we share third-party data (IODA, Cloudflare Radar, and Google traffic data) to document the internet connectivity shutdown. We also share OONI data on the subsequent blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter/X in Uganda over the past week. The internet disruptions during Uganda’s (latest) 2026 general elections seem quite similar to those during the (last) 2021 elections, which we reported on 5 years ago ( https://ooni.org/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/) In both cases, internet access was shut down completely for about five days – including election day – and the shutdown coincidentally spanned 13th to 18th January in both years (2021 and 2026). Access to major social media and instant messaging platforms was blocked in the 2021 election run-up, while access to such platforms was blocked after the 2026 election. Overall, the shift toward imposing complete internet shutdowns during elections, combined with selective blocking of major social media platforms before and after elections, suggests an effort to maximize the political impact of targeted disruptions while minimizing the economic, political, and social costs associated with prolonged connectivity shutdowns. This is a pattern observed in many other countries as well. We thank OONI Probe users in Uganda for contributing measurements. ~ OONI team.

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New report: How Internet Censorship Impacts Iran’s Women’s Rights Movement
by Maria Xynou 19 Dec '25

19 Dec '25

Hi friends, OONI and Miaan Group co-published a *new research report* documenting *how internet censorship impacts the women’s rights movement in Iran based on insights from OONI data and activist interviews*. Read our report through the following links: * OONI: https://ooni.org/post/2025-iran-censorship-womens-rights/ * Miaan Group: https://filter.watch/english/2025/12/19/investigative-report-december-2025-… *# Key Findings* As part of this study, OONI data shows the *blocking of the following 7 Persian women’s rights websites*: * *IranWire* (iranwire.com) Independent news website that extensively covers feminist issues and women’s rights in Iran. * *Zagah *(zaagaah.com): Reproductive rights and reproductive justice website run by a group of Iranian feminists. * *ASO* (www.aasoo.org) Independent media outlet that covers women’s rights, as well as other human rights issues affecting religious and ethnic minorities in Iran. * *ANF News* (anfpersian.com) Kurdish news agency that actively covers women’s rights issues in Iran. * *Feminist School *(feministschool.com): Persian‑language feminist media platform founded by Iranian women activists that publishes essays, analysis, and translations on women’s rights, gender equality, and social justice issues in Iran. * *We‑Change* (www.we‑change.org <http://www.xn--wechange-1m3d.org>): Persian‑language women’s rights and gender equality campaign site — originally launched as part of the One Million Signatures Campaign — dedicated to collecting signatures and mobilizing support for reforms to discriminatory laws against women in Iran. * *AvishanX* (avishanx.com) Persian-language platform providing sexual and reproductive health education, information on bodily autonomy, and resources related to gender and sexual well-being, supporting access to knowledge relevant to women’s rights in Iran. OONI data also shows the *blocking of 5 international women’s rights websites*: * *Association for Women’s Rights in Development *(AWID) (www.awid.org) International feminist membership organization working to advance gender justice and women’s human rights worldwide by supporting, connecting, and amplifying global women’s rights movements, organizations, and advocates. * *Women on Web* (www.womenonweb.org) International non‑profit organization that provides confidential online access to medical abortion pills and reproductive health information, enabling people — including those in restrictive contexts — to exercise their reproductive rights worldwide. * *Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML)* (www.wluml.org) Transnational feminist solidarity network that works to promote gender justice, human rights, and legal equality for women whose lives are governed by laws or customs framed as Muslim, by offering information, research, advocacy, and connection across more than 70 countries. * *Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)* ( www.rawa.org) Grassroots Afghan women’s organization, founded in 1977, that campaigns for women’s rights, secular democracy, and social justice in Afghanistan while providing social services, education, and resistance against fundamentalist repression. * *The Polygon Gallery* (thepolygon.ca): North Vancouver-based public photography and media art gallery that has featured Iranian art, including works highlighting women’s experiences and social issues, providing a platform for cultural expression related to gender and society in Iran. These blocks were automatically confirmed based on OONI data, as private IPs such as 10.10.34.35 and 10.10.34.36 (included in DNS blocking fingerprints) were returned during DNS resolution. Because the majority of measurements across all major ASes returned bogon IP addresses in DNS answers throughout the analysis period, we conclude that *DNS tampering is the primary censorship technique* used by major ISPs in Iran to block access to Persian women’s rights websites. Overall, although we tested and analyzed more international women’s rights websites (25) than Persian-language ones (17), a greater number of Persian websites (7) were found blocked compared to international sites (5). This suggests that Iranian authorities may prioritize censoring Persian-language content — likely because it is more directly accessible to local communities — and that such censorship is targeted rather than pervasive. According to Miaan Group, the qualitative analysis of the interview responses demonstrates that the persistent filtering of women’s rights websites and blogs in Iran has had a *profound impact on access to information and activities* in this field. The blocking of women’s rights websites has generally limited access to information, slowed down the process of raising awareness, and increased the cost and time required to access resources. While there are alternative ways to access information (such as social media), they cannot fully replace the depth and structure that specialized websites provide. Moreover, most major social media platforms (e.g., Telegram, X, Facebook, YouTube, etc.) and circumvention tools (like VPNs) are also blocked in Iran, adding another layer of cost, time, and friction. As a result, these blocks have left a significant void in women’s rights education and activism. Our analysis underscores the importance of accessible archives and websites in preserving the history of the women’s rights movement and highlights the need for strategies to counteract these restrictions. We thank OONI Probe users in Iran for contributing measurements, supporting this study. We also thank the interviewees of this study for sharing their knowledge and perspectives with us. ~ OONI team.

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OONI Survey: We'd love your feedback
by Maria Xynou 18 Dec '25

18 Dec '25

Hi friends, Over the last few years, we’ve introduced several major enhancements, such as the OONI Explorer Censorship Findings platform ( https://explorer.ooni.org/findings) We’re now seeking community feedback on these resources and methodological updates so we can evaluate their impact and continue improving them. *Please take a few minutes to complete our survey*: https://forms.gle/6s7MWdtUViB1NRMK8 We kindly ask that you submit your responses by *Sunday, 21 December 2025*. Thank you for your time! Your feedback is very valuable to us, as it will help us enhance censorship monitoring tools and resources for the global internet freedom community. ~ OONI team.

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Donate to OONI – Protect Our Internet, Document Censorship
by Maria Xynou 08 Dec '25

08 Dec '25

Hello, Today we are launching *OONI's end-of-year fundraising campaign*: https://ooni.org/post/2025-fundraising-campaign/ Around the world, access to information is increasingly blocked. Transparency of internet censorship is more important than ever. Since 2012, OONI has provided free software tools that empower communities to collect evidence of internet censorship around the world. Thanks to our global community, we host the world's largest open dataset on internet censorship, supporting research, advocacy, and litigation efforts defending a free and open internet. But now, following U.S government funding cuts, our ability to continue this work in the coming years is at risk. That’s why we need your support. Please *donate to OONI* – every contribution helps: https://ooni.org/donate If you would like to make an even greater impact, consider becoming an *OONI supporter with a larger in-kind contribution*: https://ooni.org/about/supporters/ Thank you for your support! We are deeply grateful. ~ OONI team.

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New OONI report on throttling of social media in Turkiye
by Maria Xynou 21 Nov '25

21 Nov '25

Hi friends, Based on OONI data, we published a *new report analyzing the throttling of social media and instant messaging apps* (Twitter/X, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, TikTok, and Signal) in *Türkiye during protests* earlier this year. Read our report here: https://ooni.org/post/2025-turkiye-throttling-social-media/ Our analysis of OONI data from Türkiye indicates that access to Twitter/X, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, YouTube, TikTok, and Signal was throttled, whereas access to Telegram was blocked. Additionally, YouTube was blocked via DNS on TurkNet (AS12735). These censorship events were primarily observed on the TTNET (AS47331) and Turkcell Superonline (AS34984) networks, occurring on 19th and 20th March 2025 (coinciding with the onset of protests) and on 8th September 2025 (following clashes between police and opposition supporters). Learn more through the report: https://ooni.org/post/2025-turkiye-throttling-social-media/ We thank OONI Probe users in Türkiye for contributing measurements, supporting this study. ~ OONI team.

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OONI report on social media blocks in Cameroon
by Maria Xynou 10 Nov '25

10 Nov '25

Hi friends, Last Friday, we published a brief report documenting the *blocking of TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and a few VPNs in Cameroon* over the past week, based on OONI data: https://explorer.ooni.org/findings/393608039300 Huge thanks to the OONI community in Cameroon for contributing measurements, supporting this study. You can find many more reports on our Censorship Findings platform: https://explorer.ooni.org/findings Warm regards, Maria.

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