- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Tor Relay Downloading much more data than uploading
by borgersnick＠gmail.com 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

The log entry is: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 23 days 0:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 6.83 MB and received 177.12 MB. I don’t think I made any changes to the torrc, intend to provide a relay. I am using trickle to limit bandwidth consumption instead of the built-in method because I didn’t want to learn about the bursting concept. ExecStart = /usr/bin/trickle -d 500 -u 500 -t .5 /usr/bin/tor --runasdaemon 0 --defaults-torrc /usr/share/tor/defaults-torrc -f /etc/tor/torrc --quiet Running on Fedora. Firewall allows external port 80 and 443 access to the server.

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Dynamic upload limit
by Bram L 17 Feb '14

17 Feb '14

Dear list members, I am running a tor relay, but I have an upload limit (50GB/7 days). This limit usually can't be increased too much, because that might affect other network users. I would like to request my provider (university) for a bandwidth-free connection during the night (or whenever the network is not used very much), and a limited version during the peak times. My idea is that this way I could contribute to the Tor network without disturbing other users of my university network. Before I do so, however, I am curious whether it actually contributes to the Tor network. I noticed it takes time for the bandwidth to increase, and if my daytime upload limit is low (e.g. 80 kb/s) and unlimited (Gb/s) at night, my overall contribution could be very limited due to the time it takes Tor to utilize my available bandwidth. Do you have any insights in this matter? Thanks in advance! PS: currently, I drain the 50GB in about a day unlimited or I run at very slow speeds... Both don't give me the feeling I really contribute.

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Re: [tor-relays] TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Hi Mateusz, 19 days with 1/5 of the default pps value (1000) That would be around 4 days with pps 1000. That's exactly the value estimated in the project faq. Everything seems to be fine. Project site / faq: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html#faq Results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Thank you for participating ! -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman On 13 Feb 2014, at 13:10, Sebastian Urbach wrote: > Dear honorable list members, > Some stats from my side: bash-3.2$ PPS=200 DONTERASE=yes time ./traceroutes.sh 1645980.86 real 28760.92 user 181530.51 sys Started on 27 Jan 2014 00:49 GMT Finished on 15 Feb 2014 02:02 GMT ca. 19 days to complete with scamper on OSX 10.7 Thanks, -mateusz

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TTTT project
by Sebastian Urbach 15 Feb '14

15 Feb '14

Dear honorable list members, If anybody has questions regarding his / her submitted results than please include your public ip address in your mail. We can process your requests way faster if we have this essential information and don't have to ask for it. Btw. we are at 88 ip's with at least 1 complete run. Come on, let's make it 100 before the data review in March :-) Thank you very much for your attention ! The project: http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html The results: http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html -- Mit freundlichen Grüssen / Sincerely yours Sebastian Urbach ---------------------------------------------- Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. ---------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790), Inventor, journalist, printer, diplomat and statesman

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obfs3 a risk to scramblesuit?
by Delton Barnes 14 Feb '14

14 Feb '14

I am running a bridge with both obfs3 and scramblesuit. obfs3 is vulnerable to active probing. Say someone in China makes the mistake of connecting with obfs3 instead of scramblesuit, and active probing identifies it as a Tor bridge. Wouldn't the bridge IP address then be blacklisted, making it impossible for other people to connect even with scramblesuit? Would it make sense, then, as a bridge operator to elect to only support scramblesuit, even though no one will use it for a while? It seems you are only as good as your weakest transport. Thanks, Delton p.s. Would reply to original thread about scramblesuit, but I only just joined the mailing list, and cannot figure out how to reply to preexisting messages.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Thu, 13 Feb 2014 18:10:38 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > Hm, the "Could not set up listener" error message usually appears when > something is already listening on the port that obfsproxy wants to > bind to (Twisted throws the error.CannotListenError exception). > I managed to avoid the problem by running `killall obfsproxy` before restarting Tor. This time around I registered server transport 'obfs3' and registered server transport 'scramblesuit'. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 13 Feb '14

13 Feb '14

On Wed, 12 Feb 2014 18:29:26 +0000 Matt <matt(a)pagan.io> wrote: > I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing > this message: > > [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the > configuration protocol and will be destroyed. > > That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean? > Here is more from the debug log: Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Path is complete: 3 steps long Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Looking for firsthop '[redacted IPv4]:443' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_handle_first_hop(): Conn open. Delivering first onion skin. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First skin; sending create cell. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(): circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() found nothing for circ_id 2147489864, channel ID 2 (0x2ba73fe349b0) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuit_deliver_create_cell(): Chosen circID 2147489864. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] circuitmux_attach_circuit(): Attaching circuit 2147489864 on channel 2 to cmux 0x2ba73f9a1c90 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] append_cell_to_circuit_queue(): Made a circuit active. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): First hop: finished sending CREATE cell to '$5A0EF08FC99F236C5E48FB52E649F092088D009C=ganooloonix at [redacted IPv4]' Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] pt_configure_remaining_proxies(): Configuring remaining managed proxies (1)! Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (VERSION 1) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] handle_proxy_line(): Got a line from managed proxy '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy': (SMETHOD-ERROR obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Server managed proxy encountered a method error. (obfs3 Could not set up listener.) Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] tor_process_handle_destroy(): Terminated process with PID '30355'. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [info] mark_my_descriptor_dirty(): Decided to publish new relay descriptor: configured managed proxies Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] conn_write_callback(): socket 17 wants to write. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] flush_chunk_tls(): flushed 1542 bytes, 0 ready to flush, 0 remain. Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] connection_handle_write_impl(): After TLS write of 1542: 0 read, 1589 written Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_write_packed_cell(): Writing packed_cell_t 0x2ba7403cb698 to channel 0x2ba73fe349b0 with global ID 2 Feb 12 16:38:27.000 [debug] channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(): Made a circuit inactive.

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Re: [tor-relays] New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by Matt 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

On Mon, 10 Feb 2014 16:04:56 +0000 George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Greetings, > > a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit > is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it > at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ > > If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy > to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git > master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will > hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some > testing :) > > After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin > line from: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed to: > ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy > managed > > This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. > > It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based > pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a > password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't > connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor > will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that > clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random > password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a > torrc line like this: > ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit > password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA > > By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the > beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we > will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. > > Feel free to ask any questions you have! > > Thanks! > > PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, > please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not > hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the > number of obfuscated bridges out there. > > [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 > [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays I installed obfsproxy through pip. Running Tor 0.2.5.1, I'm seeing this message: [warn] Managed proxy at '/usr/local/bin/obfsproxy' failed the configuration protocol and will be destroyed. That doesn't sound too great. What does this message mean?

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New obfsproxy transport: scramblesuit [bridge operators: please upgrade!]
by George Kadianakis 12 Feb '14

12 Feb '14

Greetings, a few days ago we integrated ScrambleSuit to obfsproxy. ScrambleSuit is a pluggable transport by Philipp Winter; you can find more about it at: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/ If you are running a bridge, please consider upgrading your obfsproxy to the latest version (0.2.6) by using pip or fetching the latest git master. Unfortunately, we don't have Linux packages yet, but we will hopefully have some soon. In the meanwhile, we would appreciate some testing :) After you upgrade obfsproxy, please change your ServerTransportPlugin line from: ServerTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed to: ServerTransportPlugin obfs3,scramblesuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed This will disable obfs2 [0] and enable scramblesuit. It's also important to know that scramblesuit is a password-based pluggable transport, which means that each scramblesuit bridge has a password and if the user doesn't know the password he/she can't connect to the bridge. If you publishing your bridge to BridgeDB, Tor will automatically send the ScrambleSuit password to BridgeDB so that clients can get it. By default ScrambleSuit will generate a random password; if you want to specify your own password, you can use a torrc line like this: ServerTransportOptions scramblesuit password=LLDNOWV7I4P6RKFJMDEMIY2GNU2IQISA By the way, expect not to see any scramblesuit users in the beginning. After a few people have set up scramblesuit bridges, we will roll out a Tor Browser Bundle with scramblesuit enabled. Feel free to ask any questions you have! Thanks! PS: If you are running a bridge without any pluggable transports, please consider installing obfsproxy [1]. Normal bridges are not hard to block these days and we are working on increasing the number of obfuscated bridges out there. [0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10314 [1]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en

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Trusted Tor Traceroute Scoreboard Link Modified
by Anupam Das 11 Feb '14

11 Feb '14

Hi Relay Operators, We have made some modifications to the way we are running our live scoreboard script. Previously we were running into some problems with handling multiple simultaneous web requests, as the server started a heavy script for each incoming request. Now we are updating a static HTML files every 10 minutes. The link of our scoreboard has changed. Now the scoreboard is available at- http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/relay_scoreboard.html Sorry for the inconveniences. Thanks Anupam

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