- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] Relay not connecting
by denny.obreham＠a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net 16 Jan '24

16 Jan '24

> On 01/16/2024 02:48 AM Chris Enkidu-6 wrote .. > If > you're running other services on the same server of course the heavy > load might disrupt those services as well, which is why it's always a > good idea to only run Tor on the server and not to mix it with other > services. That is the funny thing, everything else was working fine. Only the Tor relays experienced connection problems. Even the Tor bridge seemed to be running fine. > And in the long run, if you find that you don't > have the resources or patience to deal with such heavy load, consider > running a middle/Guard relay instead of an Exit. They're much easier to > deal with during an attack. But don't quit. It'll pass. I'm still in the process of gaining experience but don't worry about me quitting, I consider this my new hobby. My servers are exclusively dedicated to this - so there is nothing important on them for me to lose. Also, I pride myself on running exclusively exit relays as this is what is apparently needed and thus it is where the challenge lies for me. Hi, I didn't see your original email and I don't currently have it in my inbox to reply to it directly but I can tell you by looking at your metrics history for "Alberta", indeed you had the same problem on Dec.18 that happened to my relays. The attackers seem to be picking a group of relays at a time and move on to others and it may be a while before they come back again. However the problem gets amplified if you're running an exit relay without having large enough resources to deal with all this traffic. I'm not running an exit relay, so I have to deal with the problem for a few hours, but all this outgoing traffic from my relay and other relays that are under attack will inevitably end up at exit relays. This means that even if they move on from my relay to another one, the traffic will still continue to poor into exit relays, so the duration of the attack for an exit relay may be much longer. This shouldn't stop you from bringing your rely back up. You're not doing anything wrong and there's nothing wrong with your set up. If you're running other services on the same server of course the heavy load might disrupt those services as well, which is why it's always a good idea to only run Tor on the server and not to mix it with other services. My suggestion for the time being, keep running my firewall scripts as they do help making the duration of the attack shorter by putting some of those IP addresses in the block list and help making it less painful and see how it goes. And in the long run, if you find that you don't have the resources or patience to deal with such heavy load, consider running a middle/Guard relay instead of an Exit. They're much easier to deal with during an attack. But don't quit. It'll pass. Cheers. On 1/15/2024 8:14 PM, denny.obreham(a)a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net wrote: > > Sorry, but I'm going to vent a little bit. I'm not a network > specialist, so 11 days ago I sent the following email to this mailing > list asking for help because two of my Tor exit relays were completely > frozen and I was unable to put them online again. > > > Nobody answered, not even a comment. No wait, there was one person - > very active on this mailing list recently - who sent me an email > personally to tell me that I was an idiot (referring to what, I don't > know) who should kill himself. Adding furthermore that if I didn't > commit suicide within 72 hours, he would personally come to my house > and kill me with a Glock 9 mm. Fun stuff, very disturbing. > > > Anyway, no serious answers, someone calling m e an idiot: I tried to > look as best as I could at what I did wrong. Couldn't find anything. > My only available solution was to rebuild completely my server, > something I wanted to do for a while because of other undesired quirks > that were bothering me with my setup. I knew it would take a long time > - which I didn't really have - but I finally finished my new setup > yesterday. (Don't look for 25FC41154DCB2CAE3ABD74A8DFCD5B90D2CFFD57 or > the bridge, they have been shut down for the moment.) > > > Today, I read a line from Chris Endiku-6 saying: "Thereâs something > going on for a while and I havenât seen any mentions of it." The exact > problem I mentioned! He says it goes "as early as Dec.23"; my problem > goes to Dec 18 as shown in my previous email. Also, not mentioned in > my previous email, before I renewed my setup, my tor-ddos firewall > rules (I use the ones f rom Endiku-6) had blocked about 5 times more > IP than usual - if that can be useful information to anyone. > > > Sorry for the rent, I just needed to vent a little: There was > something wrong, and I wasn't crazy or incompetent! > > > I still would like to know how to restart such a relay, if this > happens again in the future - other than reinstalling the entire > server, that is. > > > Thanks in advance. > > > On 01/06/2024 01:52 PM denny.obreham(a)a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net wrote .. > > I manage the two following exit relays: * > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/25FC41154DCB2CAE3ABD7 4A8DFCD5B90D2CFFD57* > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/3B85067588C3F017D5CCF 7D8F65B5881B7D4C97C > They are both on the same IP and servers. A few hours ago they > lost contact even though I have both Apache and I2P servers on the > same machine that are reachable. The weird log messages seem to go > back to Dec 18, after a restart: ``` Dec 18 07:49:47 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done Dec 18 > 07:54:18 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Your computer is too > slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please > consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or > choosing a more restricted exit policy. Dec 18 07:57:11 > a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Your computer is too slow to > handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using > the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more > restricted exit policy. [14254 similar message(s) suppressed in > last 180 seconds] ``` There are a few more of these messages > appearing afterward (My bandwidth is unlimited). This is the > typical Heartbeat that comes afterward: ``` Dec 18 13:49:42 > a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 6:00 > hours, with 476 circuits open. I've sent 30.87 GB and received > 9.04 GB. I've received 13401 connections on IPv4 and 0 on IPv6. > I've made 46754 connections with IPv4 and 0 with IPv6. Dec 18 > 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: While not > bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 6412201 (server descriptor > fetch); 1424 (server descriptor upload); 376002 (consensus > network-status fetch); 57564 (microdescriptor fetch) Dec 18 > 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Circuit handshake > stats since last time: 8/8 TAP, 1356688/6457307 NTor. Dec 18 > 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Since startup we > initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and > received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 > connections; initiated 0 and received 429 v4 connections; > initiated 285 and received 11137 v5 connections. Dec 18 13:49:42 > a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since > startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits > rejected, 0 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 > same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections > rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. ``` > Then I have this kind of message appearing: ``` Dec 18 14:13:23 > a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: No circuits are opened. Relaxed > timeout for circuit 4487 (a Measuring circuit timeout 3-hop > circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to > 60000ms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway. [4 > similar message(s) suppressed in last 3300 seconds] ``` Then a few > days later, this bug report: ``` Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: > ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal > assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor > 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) > failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567. > Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5b) > [0x55651f95b37b] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x18a) > [0x55651f97294a] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x40e) [0x55651fa12afe] (on > Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: > Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x75) > [0x55651fa12ec5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9ed63) [0x55651f908d63] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xae) > [0x55651f90b80e] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x6f) [0x55651fa2b9df] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c2fb4) [0x55651fa2cfb4] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x73ffc) [0x55651f8ddffc] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x1ff58) [0x7fcee899bf58] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x577) > [0x7fcee899d8a7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x127) > [0x55651f8de7c7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) > [0x55651f8e2805] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x4d) > [0x55651f8e2c6d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x55651f8d4dcd] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x29d90) [0x7fcee80a8d90] (on Tor > 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x80) > [0x7fcee80a8e40] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) > [0x55651f8d4e25] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching > client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux > 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: > 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 > 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: > conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor > 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: > conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 > launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: > (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux > set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux > has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x556536e76c20 idx 138 marked > at line ../src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 > 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: tor_bug_occurred_(): > Bug: ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: > Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on > Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: > Bug: Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) > <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at > ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec > 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5b) [0x55651f95b37b] (on Tor > 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x18a) [0x55651f97294a] (on Tor > 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x40e) [0x55651fa12afe] (on > Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: > Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x75) > [0x55651fa12ec5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9ed63) [0x55651f908d63] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xae) > [0x55651f90b80e] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x6f) [0x55651fa2b9df] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c34dd) [0x55651fa2d4dd] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x73ffc) [0x55651f8ddffc] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x1ff58) [0x7fcee899bf58] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x577) > [0x7fcee899d8a7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x127) > [0x55651f8de7c7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) > [0x55651f8e2805] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x4d) > [0x55651f8e2c6d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x55651f8d4dcd] > (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x29d90) [0x7fcee80a8d90] (on Tor > 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: > /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x80) > [0x7fcee80a8e40] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) > [0x55651f8d4e25] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching > client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux > 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: > 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 > 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: > conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor > 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: > conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 > launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: > (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux > set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux > has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x556536e76c20 idx 138 marked > at line ../src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) ``` It is > then an alternation of these three last messages (Heartbeat + "No > circuits are opened" + bug) until yesterday where I get a series > of these messages: ``` Jan 5 21:58:59 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path. > Discarding this circuit. Jan 5 21:58:59 a-n-o-n-y-m-e > Tor-Alberta[904715]: Our circuit 0 (id: 355722) died due to an > invalid selected path, purpose Unlinked conflux circuit. This may > be a torrc configuration issue, or a bug. ``` At this point, I > learned that my relays were down via Tor Weather. I restarted the > relays - even rebooted the whole server - and both relays seem to > be unable to connect to the network. Here's a sample: ``` Jan 6 > 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: 254 connections have > failed: Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: 254 > connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL > object) Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: Problem > bootstrapping. Stuck at 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay. > (Connection timed out; TIMEOUT; count 256; recommendation warn; > host 65369D044C659CD299E35763914FFD0FC9AD4509 at > 92.205.161.164:80) ``` I also have a bridge on this server > (different IP) and it seems OK ( > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/7CEB9D16C5218FE1A9BAB 8E8A6EA9471D2E1F9B8 > ). Last messages after the server reboot are: ``` Jan 6 08:34:17 > a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done Jan > 6 08:35:21 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: Performing bandwidth > self-test...done. Jan 6 09:54:22 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: No > circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit 527 (a Measuring > circuit timeout 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with > channel state open) to 60000ms. However, it appears the circuit > has timed out anyway. ``` I have stopped both relays until I > figure out what is going on. Help would be appreciated. > >

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Re: [tor-relays] Relay not connecting
by denny.obreham＠a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net 16 Jan '24

16 Jan '24

> According to > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/3B85067588C3F017D5CCF7D8 F65B5881B7D4C97C > the relay is back since 1-2 days, good. Exiting to port 22 might lead > to a lot of complaints ending at your ISP or yourself. Default SSH. Yes, as I said I put it back online by rebuilding my server completely. Did not know that about port 22. I used a variant of the ReducedExitPolicy which accepts port 22 according to https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/ReducedExitPolicy . > Did you check > https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/ for the bug you > reported? I wasn't even sure if it was a bug, if I did something wrong, or if it was related to my ISP; hence my question on the mailing list.

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Re: [tor-relays] Relay not connecting
by denny.obreham＠a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net 16 Jan '24

16 Jan '24

Sorry, but I'm going to vent a little bit. I'm not a network specialist, so 11 days ago I sent the following email to this mailing list asking for help because two of my Tor exit relays were completely frozen and I was unable to put them online again. Nobody answered, not even a comment. No wait, there was one person - very active on this mailing list recently - who sent me an email personally to tell me that I was an idiot (referring to what, I don't know) who should kill himself. Adding furthermore that if I didn't commit suicide within 72 hours, he would personally come to my house and kill me with a Glock 9 mm. Fun stuff, very disturbing. Anyway, no serious answers, someone calling me an idiot: I tried to look as best as I could at what I did wrong. Couldn't find anything. My only available solution was to rebuild completely my server, something I wanted to do for a while because of other undesired quirks that were bothering me with my setup. I knew it would take a long time - which I didn't really have - but I finally finished my new setup yesterday. (Don't look for 25FC41154DCB2CAE3ABD74A8DFCD5B90D2CFFD57 or the bridge, they have been shut down for the moment.) Today, I read a line from Chris Endiku-6 saying: "Thereâs something going on for a while and I havenât seen any mentions of it." The exact problem I mentioned! He says it goes "as early as Dec.23"; my problem goes to Dec 18 as shown in my previous email. Also, not mentioned in my previous email, before I renewed my setup, my tor-ddos firewall rules (I use the ones from Endiku-6) had blocked about 5 times more IP than usual - if that can be useful information to anyone. Sorry for the rent, I just needed to vent a little: There was something wrong, and I wasn't crazy or incompetent! I still would like to know how to restart such a relay, if this happens again in the future - other than reinstalling the entire server, that is. Thanks in advance. On 01/06/2024 01:52 PM denny.obreham(a)a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net wrote .. I manage the two following exit relays: * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/25FC41154DCB2CAE3ABD7 4A8DFCD5B90D2CFFD57 * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/3B85067588C3F017D5CCF 7D8F65B5881B7D4C97C They are both on the same IP and servers. A few hours ago they lost contact even though I have both Apache and I2P servers on the same machine that are reachable. The weird log messages seem to go back to Dec 18, after a restart: ``` Dec 18 07:49:47 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done Dec 18 07:54:18 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. Dec 18 07:57:11 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. [14254 similar message(s) suppressed in last 180 seconds] ``` There are a few more of these messages appearing afterward (My bandwidth is unlimited). This is the typical Heartbeat that comes afterward: ``` Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 6:00 hours, with 476 circuits open. I've sent 30.87 GB and received 9.04 GB. I've received 13401 connections on IPv4 and 0 on IPv6. I've made 46754 connections with IPv4 and 0 with IPv6. Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 6412201 (server descriptor fetch); 1424 (server descriptor upload); 376002 (consensus network-status fetch); 57564 (microdescriptor fetch) Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Circuit handshake stats since last time: 8/8 TAP, 1356688/6457307 NTor. Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Since startup we initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 429 v4 connections; initiated 285 and received 11137 v5 connections. Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. ``` Then I have this kind of message appearing: ``` Dec 18 14:13:23 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit 4487 (a Measuring circuit timeout 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to 60000ms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway. [4 similar message(s) suppressed in last 3300 seconds] ``` Then a few days later, this bug report: ``` Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5b) [0x55651f95b37b] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x18a) [0x55651f97294a] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x40e) [0x55651fa12afe] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x75) [0x55651fa12ec5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9ed63) [0x55651f908d63] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xae) [0x55651f90b80e] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x6f) [0x55651fa2b9df] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c2fb4) [0x55651fa2cfb4] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x73ffc) [0x55651f8ddffc] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x1ff58) [0x7fcee899bf58] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x577) [0x7fcee899d8a7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x127) [0x55651f8de7c7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x55651f8e2805] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x4d) [0x55651f8e2c6d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x55651f8d4dcd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x29d90) [0x7fcee80a8d90] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x80) [0x7fcee80a8e40] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x55651f8d4e25] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x556536e76c20 idx 138 marked at line ../src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5b) [0x55651f95b37b] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x18a) [0x55651f97294a] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x40e) [0x55651fa12afe] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x75) [0x55651fa12ec5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9ed63) [0x55651f908d63] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xae) [0x55651f90b80e] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x6f) [0x55651fa2b9df] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c34dd) [0x55651fa2d4dd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x73ffc) [0x55651f8ddffc] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x1ff58) [0x7fcee899bf58] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x577) [0x7fcee899d8a7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x127) [0x55651f8de7c7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x55651f8e2805] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x4d) [0x55651f8e2c6d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x55651f8d4dcd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x29d90) [0x7fcee80a8d90] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x80) [0x7fcee80a8e40] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x55651f8d4e25] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x556536e76c20 idx 138 marked at line ../src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) ``` It is then an alternation of these three last messages (Heartbeat + "No circuits are opened" + bug) until yesterday where I get a series of these messages: ``` Jan 5 21:58:59 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit. Jan 5 21:58:59 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Our circuit 0 (id: 355722) died due to an invalid selected path, purpose Unlinked conflux circuit. This may be a torrc configuration issue, or a bug. ``` At this point, I learned that my relays were down via Tor Weather. I restarted the relays - even rebooted the whole server - and both relays seem to be unable to connect to the network. Here's a sample: ``` Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: 254 connections have failed: Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: 254 connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object) Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay. (Connection timed out; TIMEOUT; count 256; recommendation warn; host 65369D044C659CD299E35763914FFD0FC9AD4509 at 92.205.161.164:80) ``` I also have a bridge on this server (different IP) and it seems OK ( https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/7CEB9D16C5218FE1A9BAB 8E8A6EA9471D2E1F9B8 ). Last messages after the server reboot are: ``` Jan 6 08:34:17 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done Jan 6 08:35:21 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: Performing bandwidth self-test...done. Jan 6 09:54:22 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit 527 (a Measuring circuit timeout 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to 60000ms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway. ``` I have stopped both relays until I figure out what is going on. Help would be appreciated.

3 2

Relay’s first seen date got reset
by Rafo (r4fo.com) 16 Jan '24

16 Jan '24

I run the following relay: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/6C336E553CC7E0416EBC8577A728…. I just noticed that my relay’s ‘first seen’ date got reset. Tor now thinks that my relay is less than 2 weeks old. But when you open the 6 months graph, you can see the actual ‘first seen’ date which is November 29th 2023. Is it possible to fix this ‘first seen’ date back to the actual value?

2 1

Relay reboots every 15 minutes
by torserver 15 Jan '24

15 Jan '24

Starting about a week or so the number of connections raised rapidly to 18000+ and since then my middle relay reboots every 15 minutes. Lowering the relaybandwidth to a few MBytes partly solved these reboots. Before these unplanned reboots the relay has run for months at 20 - 40 MBytes traffic without issues. The number of connections now is around 11000 per relay. How can I prevent these reboots?

1 1

Tor relay operator research
by Ana Custura 14 Jan '24

14 Jan '24

Dear operators, I'm conducting a study to understand relay operator motivations and needs, funded by OTF. If you had about 30-45 minutes to talk (completely anonymously if you wish) about your experience as a relay operator, it will really help this research, especially if you're running a relay in non-western country. If interested please reach out to me either on acute(a)torproject.org or ana(a)sr2.uk. Cheers Ana

1 0

OrNetStats Update Interval
by nusenu 14 Jan '24

14 Jan '24

Hi, OrNetStats, https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/ a website for relay operators and other interested parties, showing various stats about the tor network used to update its stats on a daily basis and recently switched to ~weekly updates while still maintaining a daily granularity. If you have any expectations or opinion on how often the stats should be updated on OrNetStats please let me know. Off-list replies are fine as well. kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io

1 0

[To the maintainers of Tor Metrics] Metrics showing erroneous data for my two relays, can somebody responsible please take a look at the issue?
by George Hartley 11 Jan '24

11 Jan '24

Hello, for about 3 months I have been hosting two Tor relays: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AF42E6C77196A37F041A1A1E953E… https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/7F7D1A5BE88FA7C9358955705AE7… After doing system maintenance (mainly upgrading packages), slightly adjusting my "BandwidthRate" and "BandwidthBurst" for both relays and then rebooting the server earlier, the guard relay now shows the following on Metrics, even though the graphs still show the old, correct data: > The first time that this relay was seen in the consensus: 2024-01-10 16:00:00 (8 hours 57 minutes and 21 seconds) This is even though metrics shows an uptime of almost 16 hours?! The fingerprints did not change according to both the metrics page, and the Tor log. I did not delete or mess with each relays DataDirectory or the secret keys. I have a MyFamily setting in both relays configs: > MyFamily $AF42E6C77196A37F041A1A1E953E51B4656BDC1B, $7F7D1A5BE88FA7C9358955705AE7AFA61EEDA2B0 Yet the relays don't show up as being in a family, and Metrics doesn't at all display the other relay counterpart as a family member when visiting the page for the guard or exit. There is also no line in the relays journal (from journalctl -u tor@guard) indicating that the guard relay is new to the network, and it retains its older flags. This only seems to affect my guard relay, the exit metrics page shows mostly valid data, except for the missing family member. Since I did not change anything that would cause this, this is likely a bug with the metrics page, and I would encourage you to look into it. Thank you very much, George

1 1

Re: [tor-relays] Remove my relay from relay search on Tor Metrics
by 0tpcqovw＠duck.com 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

I think it's after 30 days it gets automatically removed. Malcolm On Mon, Dec 25, 2023, 15:25 nemeto via tor-relays < tor-relays_at_lists.torproject.org_0tpcqovw(a)duck.com> wrote: > Hi, I set up a middle relay at first, but I changed my mind to run a > bridge to avoid blacklisting of my public IP by certain websites. Is it > possible to immediately remove my relay from relay search o > *DuckDuckGo* did not detect any trackers. More > <https://duckduckgo.com/> > Deactivate > <https://duckduckgo.com/> > Hi, > > I set up a middle relay at first, but I changed my mind to run a bridge to > avoid blacklisting of my public IP by certain websites. > > Is it possible to immediately remove my relay from relay search on Tor > Metrics? If not, when will my relay be removed from the relay list? > > Thanks! > > Nemeto > _______________________________________________ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >

2 1

Relay not connecting
by denny.obreham＠a-n-o-n-y-m-e.net 06 Jan '24

06 Jan '24

I manage the two following exit relays: * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/25FC41154DCB2CAE3ABD74A8DFCD… * https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/3B85067588C3F017D5CCF7D8F65B… They are both on the same IP and servers. A few hours ago they lost contact even though I have both Apache and I2P servers on the same machine that are reachable. The weird log messages seem to go back to Dec 18, after a restart: ``` Dec 18 07:49:47 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done Dec 18 07:54:18 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. Dec 18 07:57:11 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. [14254 similar message(s) suppressed in last 180 seconds] ``` There are a few more of these messages appearing afterward (My bandwidth is unlimited). This is the typical Heartbeat that comes afterward: ``` Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 6:00 hours, with 476 circuits open. I've sent 30.87 GB and received 9.04 GB. I've received 13401 connections on IPv4 and 0 on IPv6. I've made 46754 connections with IPv4 and 0 with IPv6. Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: 6412201 (server descriptor fetch); 1424 (server descriptor upload); 376002 (consensus network-status fetch); 57564 (microdescriptor fetch) Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Circuit handshake stats since last time: 8/8 TAP, 1356688/6457307 NTor. Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Since startup we initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 429 v4 connections; initiated 285 and received 11137 v5 connections. Dec 18 13:49:42 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. ``` Then I have this kind of message appearing: ``` Dec 18 14:13:23 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit 4487 (a Measuring circuit timeout 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to 60000ms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway. [4 similar message(s) suppressed in last 3300 seconds] ``` Then a few days later, this bug report: ``` Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5b) [0x55651f95b37b] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x18a) [0x55651f97294a] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x40e) [0x55651fa12afe] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x75) [0x55651fa12ec5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9ed63) [0x55651f908d63] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xae) [0x55651f90b80e] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x6f) [0x55651fa2b9df] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c2fb4) [0x55651fa2cfb4] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x73ffc) [0x55651f8ddffc] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x1ff58) [0x7fcee899bf58] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x577) [0x7fcee899d8a7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x127) [0x55651f8de7c7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x55651f8e2805] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x4d) [0x55651f8e2c6d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x55651f8d4dcd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x29d90) [0x7fcee80a8d90] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x80) [0x7fcee80a8e40] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x55651f8d4e25] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x556536e76c20 idx 138 marked at line ../src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at ../src/core/or/conflux.c:567. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5b) [0x55651f95b37b] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x18a) [0x55651f97294a] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x40e) [0x55651fa12afe] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x75) [0x55651fa12ec5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9ed63) [0x55651f908d63] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xae) [0x55651f90b80e] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x6f) [0x55651fa2b9df] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c34dd) [0x55651fa2d4dd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x73ffc) [0x55651f8ddffc] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x1ff58) [0x7fcee899bf58] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x577) [0x7fcee899d8a7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x127) [0x55651f8de7c7] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x55651f8e2805] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x4d) [0x55651f8e2c6d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x55651f8d4dcd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x29d90) [0x7fcee80a8d90] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x80) [0x7fcee80a8e40] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x55651f8d4e25] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 566550141B144136: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 75; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) Dec 21 15:18:48 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x556536e76c20 idx 138 marked at line ../src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) ``` It is then an alternation of these three last messages (Heartbeat + "No circuits are opened" + bug) until yesterday where I get a series of these messages: ``` Jan 5 21:58:59 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit. Jan 5 21:58:59 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[904715]: Our circuit 0 (id: 355722) died due to an invalid selected path, purpose Unlinked conflux circuit. This may be a torrc configuration issue, or a bug. ``` At this point, I learned that my relays were down via Tor Weather. I restarted the relays - even rebooted the whole server - and both relays seem to be unable to connect to the network. Here's a sample: ``` Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: 254 connections have failed: Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: 254 connections died in state connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object) Jan 6 09:44:46 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Alberta[5621]: Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5% (conn): Connecting to a relay. (Connection timed out; TIMEOUT; count 256; recommendation warn; host 65369D044C659CD299E35763914FFD0FC9AD4509 at 92.205.161.164:80) ``` I also have a bridge on this server (different IP) and it seems OK ( https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/7CEB9D16C5218FE1A9BAB8E8A6EA… ). Last messages after the server reboot are: ``` Jan 6 08:34:17 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done Jan 6 08:35:21 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: Performing bandwidth self-test...done. Jan 6 09:54:22 a-n-o-n-y-m-e Tor-Nestor[998]: No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit 527 (a Measuring circuit timeout 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to 60000ms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out anyway. ``` I have stopped both relays until I figure out what is going on. Help would be appreciated.

1 0

Remove my relay from relay search on Tor Metrics
by nemeto 27 Dec '23

27 Dec '23

Hi, I set up a middle relay at first, but I changed my mind to run a bridge to avoid blacklisting of my public IP by certain websites. Is it possible to immediately remove my relay from relay search on Tor Metrics? If not, when will my relay be removed from the relay list? Thanks! Nemeto

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Reboot torservers.net @ 37C3
by Stefan Leibfarth 25 Dec '23

25 Dec '23

Hello everyone, torservers.net has been inactive for quite some time. I have organized a meeting at the 37C3 to change this in the future, if you want to. You are a representative of a non-profit who is running Tor relays and you think it could be useful to a have some kind of umbrella association? Please attend this meeting. When: 30.12.2024 0:00 Where: Saal D Link: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2023/hub/de/event/torserversnet-meeting/ If you are not @ 37C3 but you'd like to work on a future for torservers.net, please contact me via mail. All the best Leibi

1 0

Tor Relay Operators Meetup @ 37C3
by Stefan Leibfarth 25 Dec '23

25 Dec '23

Hello everyone, there will be a Tor Relay Operators Meetup @ 37C3: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2023/hub/de/event/tor-relay-operators-meetup/ As always, TROMs are open for everyone (if you have a 37C3 ticket of course) who is running a relay, wants to run a relay or just thinks about it. :-) At this point we don't have a agenda, but everyone is free to bring up questions or topics at the meeting itself. Please share with your friends, social media and other mailing lists! See you there Leibi

1 0

Relay data limit
by Dan 22 Dec '23

22 Dec '23

Hi all, I've been running a middle relay on a VPS for about 2 months now. The provider limits the monthly data transferred to 5TB but does not charge for over-usage. Instead, the bandwidth is throttled to 1Mb/s after the limit is reached until the 1st of the next month. I currently have AccountingMax set to 2.5 TB (since it's the max in each direction) and AccountingStart set to "month 1 00:00". Generally that 5TB limit is hit between the 15th and 17th of the month, causing the relay to go dormant until the 1st. What I'm wondering is: 1 - Is it better for the network if the relay is active 24/7, even if sometimes it's much slower? 2 - Will it negatively affect my relay's reputation if sometimes it's very slow? Thank you -- Dan

4 5

Re: [tor-relays] Tor: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.10)
by George Hartley 21 Dec '23

21 Dec '23

Hello, this just happened again 5 days after the update to 0.4.8.10: > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.10 )Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:567. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5d) [0x57b884d219ad] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x194) [0x57b884d38764] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x57b884dd74ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x6d) [0x57b884ddf7fd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9bc59) [0x57b884cccc59] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa9) [0x57b884ccce39] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x76) [0x57b884df9a46] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c03f8) [0x57b884df13f8] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x6e72d) [0x57b884c9f72d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x22c45) [0x73761346dc45] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x4ff) [0x73761346f3af] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x104) [0x57b884c9ff44] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x57b884ca4165] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x5e) [0x57b884ca45ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x57b884c9608d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(+0x27cd0) [0x737612a7ecd0] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x8a) [0x737612a7ed8a] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x57b884c960e5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux C0292D60501F6C5F: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 29; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux C0292D60501F6C5F: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 29; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x57b898679070 idx 522 marked at line src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:567: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.8.10: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:567. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5d) [0x57b884d219ad] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x194) [0x57b884d38764] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x57b884dd74ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x6d) [0x57b884ddf7fd] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9bc59) [0x57b884cccc59] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa9) [0x57b884ccce39] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x76) [0x57b884df9a46] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c096f) [0x57b884df196f] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x6e72d) [0x57b884c9f72d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x22c45) [0x73761346dc45] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x4ff) [0x73761346f3af] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x104) [0x57b884c9ff44] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x57b884ca4165] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x5e) [0x57b884ca45ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x57b884c9608d] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(+0x27cd0) [0x737612a7ecd0] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x8a) [0x737612a7ed8a] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x57b884c960e5] (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux C0292D60501F6C5F: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 29; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux C0292D60501F6C5F: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 29; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) > Dec 21 13:54:54 matrix tor[558]: Dec 21 13:54:54.000 [warn] circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x57b898679070 idx 522 marked at line src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.10 ) The relay does not seem impacted by it at all and continues pushing it's 60-80 MBit/s, but if this is really just an assertion which does not have any security, performance or privacy implications, then please maybe just make it a harmless information message. Regards, George On Monday, December 18th, 2023 at 11:12 AM, trinity pointard trinity.pointard(a)gmail.com wrote: > Hi, > > this looks related to TROVE-2023-007 / > https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40897 . It should > no longer appear after you upgrade. > If it still does, please do come back. > > Regards, > trinity-1686a > > On Mon, 18 Dec 2023 at 07:05, George Hartley via tor-relays > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > while going through journalctl I noticed the following entries from my exit relay and wanted to report this non-fatal assertion. > > > > I also host a Guard relay on the same VM and IP, and it did not yet assert that message. > > > > The full assert() with the stack-trace is as follows: > > > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.8.9: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5d) [0x5fdf47b6a9ad] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x194) [0x5fdf47b81764] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5fdf47c2031e] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x6d) [0x5fdf47c285ed] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9bc59) [0x5fdf47b15c59] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa9) [0x5fdf47b15e39] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x76) [0x5fdf47c42866] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c0218) [0x5fdf47c3a218] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x6e72d) [0x5fdf47ae872d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x22c45) [0x7d444a49cc45] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x4ff) [0x7d444a49e3af] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x104) [0x5fdf47ae8f44] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x5fdf47aed165] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x5e) [0x5fdf47aed5ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x5fdf47adf08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(+0x27cd0) [0x7d4449a7ecd0] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(_libc_start_main+0x8a) [0x7d4449a7ed8a] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(start+0x25) [0x5fdf47adf0e5] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x5fdf581d3460 idx 4524 marked at line src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.8.9: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5d) [0x5fdf47b6a9ad] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred+0x194) [0x5fdf47b81764] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5fdf47c2031e] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x6d) [0x5fdf47c285ed] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9bc59) [0x5fdf47b15c59] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa9) [0x5fdf47b15e39] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x76) [0x5fdf47c42866] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c078f) [0x5fdf47c3a78f] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x6e72d) [0x5fdf47ae872d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x22c45) [0x7d444a49cc45] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x4ff) [0x7d444a49e3af] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x104) [0x5fdf47ae8f44] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x5fdf47aed165] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x5e) [0x5fdf47aed5ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x5fdf47adf08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(+0x27cd0) [0x7d4449a7ecd0] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x8a) [0x7d4449a7ed8a] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x5fdf47adf0e5] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x5fdf581d3460 idx 4524 marked at line src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > > > > Note how it happened twice for the same circuit. > > > > This is the relays configuration: > > > > # Main Config > > > > User tor > > ORPort 443 IPv4Only > > DirPort 0 > > SOCKSPort 0 > > ControlPort 9051 > > ShutdownWaitLength 60 > > CookieAuthentication 1 > > Nickname TrafficGuardExit > > RelayBandwidthRate 12500 KBytes > > RelayBandwidthBurst 15000 KBytes > > DataDirectory /var/lib/tor/tor_exit > > ContactInfo 0x576768BA hartley_george(a)proton.me > > > > # Exit Policy > > > > ExitPolicy reject *:22 > > ExitPolicy reject *:25 > > ExitPolicy accept : > > > > # Node Family > > > > MyFamily $AF42E6C77196A37F041A1A1E953E51B4656BDC1B, $7F7D1A5BE88FA7C9358955705AE7AFA61EEDA2B0 > > > > # Acceleration > > > > HardwareAccel 1 > > NumCPUs 4 > > > > # Sandboxing > > > > Sandbox 1 > > > > I will try to cooperate as best as possible, but my life is kind of messy right now. > > > > And because of TROVE-2023-007, I will have to update the relay to version 0.4.8.10, and reading the change-log of that version, it might actually fix this assert. > > > > Still wanted to let you guys know. > > _______________________________________________ > > tor-relays mailing list > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

1 0

Dutch Relays
by Christopher Sheats 19 Dec '23

19 Dec '23

Hello, Emerald Onion is looking for co-location and IP transit opportunities in the Netherlands for deploying new exit relays. We have our own ASN, v4 and v6 IP space. Priorities are: - Free or cheap transit - Free or cheap cross-connects - Free or cheap colo - Amsterdam Internet Exchange - Netherlands Internet Exchange Working with collectives, or starting a new one, is interesting too. Please share your thoughts! -- yawnbox https://disobey.net/@yawnbox https://digitalcourage.social/@EmeraldOnion

5 5

Declining Relay Usage
by likogan 18 Dec '23

18 Dec '23

My exit relay has seen steadily decreasing traffic from 8MBps to 6MBps over the span of three weeks. It averages a load of ~50% CPU usage and ~65% RAM usage. It's rated network capacity is 17Mbps on a 10GB link. Why would traffic decrease if I have plenty of spare resources? Are there ways I can configure my server to boost traffic? <https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/292FCACE773DC259B799914A23BE…>

4 3

Re: [tor-relays] Declining Relay Usage
by Roman Mamedov 18 Dec '23

18 Dec '23

On Mon, 18 Dec 2023 15:58:52 +0000 George Hartley <hartley_george(a)proton.me> wrote: > I had a quick look at the manual, and it stated: > > > HardwareAccel 0|1 > > > If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration > when available. Can not be changed while tor is running. (Default: 0) > > A quick look at the source code tells me that Tor relies entirely on OpenSSL. > > The call-chain here is as follows: > > crypto_set_options first determines whether to enable any available OpenSSL engines based on if the variable mentioned above is non-zero or if an accelerator name has been set: > > > const bool hardware_accel = options->HardwareAccel || options->AccelName; > > This bool is then passed into crypto_global_init, where it is the first argument, fittingly named "useAccel". > > useAccel is then passed into crypto_openssl_late_init, where if HardwareAccel is the default (0) or no engine name has been specified, OpenSSL will make no attempt to load any acceleration engines. > > Here is a permalink to that last relevant function in the call chain: > > https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/blob/main/src/lib/crypt_ops/cr… > > So yes, I think it is pretty safe to assume that if you do not set either configuration option, no OpenSSL engine will be used. > > Thank you for questioning me though, thanks to you I learned some more about Tor's inner workings, and you hopefully too :) It is not entirely clear to me what conclusion you came to after this research. If you mean that HardwareAccel is needed, I would still disagee. If I'm not mistaken the AES-NI support is implemented in OpenSSL not via an "engine" that you have to "use", it is just built-in internally on some deeper level. For a proof you can run "openssl engine" in the console of any AES-supporting machine, and you will not see any loadable engines there, aside from rdrand, which is unrelated, and "dynamic" which just means it can load some acceleration engines if it had any. And for instance VIA Padlock would show up as "padlock" in that list. Please use reply to all the mailing list. Sorry for bringing out your mail into the public, but it didn't seem to be strictly private in any case. -- With respect, Roman

2 2

Tor relay operator meetups
by telekobold 18 Dec '23

18 Dec '23

Hi, will there be a Tor relay operators meetup @37C3 [*]? Also, there were apparently no meetups in November and December this year? Kind regards telekobold [*] https://events.ccc.de/congress/2023/infos/startpage.html

2 1

Tor: Possible bug on 0.4.8.9 exit relay.
by George Hartley 18 Dec '23

18 Dec '23

Hi, while going through journalctl I noticed the following entries from my exit relay and wanted to report this non-fatal assertion. I also host a Guard relay on the same VM and IP, and it did not yet assert that message. The full assert() with the stack-trace is as follows: > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.9 )Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.8.9: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5d) [0x5fdf47b6a9ad] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x194) [0x5fdf47b81764] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5fdf47c2031e] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x6d) [0x5fdf47c285ed] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9bc59) [0x5fdf47b15c59] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa9) [0x5fdf47b15e39] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x76) [0x5fdf47c42866] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c0218) [0x5fdf47c3a218] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x6e72d) [0x5fdf47ae872d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x22c45) [0x7d444a49cc45] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x4ff) [0x7d444a49e3af] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x104) [0x5fdf47ae8f44] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x5fdf47aed165] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x5e) [0x5fdf47aed5ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x5fdf47adf08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(+0x27cd0) [0x7d4449a7ecd0] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x8a) [0x7d4449a7ed8a] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x5fdf47adf0e5] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x5fdf581d3460 idx 4524 marked at line src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/core/or/conflux.c:565: conflux_pick_first_leg: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed. (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: Tor 0.4.8.9: Non-fatal assertion !(smartlist_len(cfx->legs) <= 0) failed in conflux_pick_first_leg at src/core/or/conflux.c:565. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5d) [0x5fdf47b6a9ad] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x194) [0x5fdf47b81764] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(conflux_decide_next_circ+0x3fe) [0x5fdf47c2031e] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(circuit_get_package_window+0x6d) [0x5fdf47c285ed] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x9bc59) [0x5fdf47b15c59] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf+0xa9) [0x5fdf47b15e39] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_edge_process_inbuf+0x76) [0x5fdf47c42866] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x1c078f) [0x5fdf47c3a78f] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x6e72d) [0x5fdf47ae872d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(+0x22c45) [0x7d444a49cc45] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libevent-2.1.so.7(event_base_loop+0x4ff) [0x7d444a49e3af] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x104) [0x5fdf47ae8f44] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x215) [0x5fdf47aed165] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x5e) [0x5fdf47aed5ee] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d) [0x5fdf47adf08d] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(+0x27cd0) [0x7d4449a7ecd0] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x8a) [0x7d4449a7ed8a] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x25) [0x5fdf47adf0e5] (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching client sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: Matching server sets: (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_log_set(): Bug: Conflux 21CEFB4FACA11A02: 0 linked, 0 launched. Delivered: 7272; teardown: 0; Current: (nil), Previous: (nil) (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] conflux_pick_first_leg(): Bug: End conflux set dump (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) > Dec 14 16:29:36 matrix tor[575]: Dec 14 16:29:36.000 [warn] circuit_get_package_window(): Bug: Conflux has no circuit to send on. Circuit 0x5fdf581d3460 idx 4524 marked at line src/core/or/command.c:663 (on Tor 0.4.8.9 ) Note how it happened twice for the same circuit. This is the relays configuration: > # Main Config > User tor > ORPort 443 IPv4Only > DirPort 0 > SOCKSPort 0 > ControlPort 9051 > ShutdownWaitLength 60 > CookieAuthentication 1 > Nickname TrafficGuardExit > RelayBandwidthRate 12500 KBytes > RelayBandwidthBurst 15000 KBytes > DataDirectory /var/lib/tor/tor_exit > ContactInfo 0x576768BA hartley_george(a)proton.me > > # Exit Policy > > ExitPolicy reject *:22 > ExitPolicy reject *:25 > ExitPolicy accept *:* > > # Node Family > > MyFamily $AF42E6C77196A37F041A1A1E953E51B4656BDC1B, $7F7D1A5BE88FA7C9358955705AE7AFA61EEDA2B0 > > # Acceleration > > HardwareAccel 1 > NumCPUs 4 > > # Sandboxing > > Sandbox 1 I will try to cooperate as best as possible, but my life is kind of messy right now. And because of TROVE-2023-007, I will have to update the relay to version 0.4.8.10, and reading the change-log of that version, it might actually fix this assert. Still wanted to let you guys know.

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Issue with Relay Status Discrepancy on Tor Metrics
by Jan 18 Dec '23

18 Dec '23

Dear Tor Metrics Support Team, I hope this message finds you well. I am writing to report an issue regarding the status of my relay on Tor Metrics. According to Nyx, my relay appears to be running without any problems. However, Tor Metrics indicates that it is offline. Relay Details: Name:BtcToTheMoon IP Address: 116.203.227.107 Contact Email: janthor007(a)gmail.com I have verified through Nyx that the relay is operational, yet the status on Tor Metrics remains unchanged. I am concerned about this discrepancy and would appreciate any assistance in resolving this matter. Thank you for your attention to this issue. Your help in rectifying this discrepancy would be greatly appreciated. Sincerely, Michal

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Running a high-performance pluggable transports Tor bridge (FOCI 2023 short paper)
by David Fifield 11 Dec '23

11 Dec '23

Linus Nordberg and I wrote a short paper that was presented at FOCI 2023. The topic is how to use all the available CPU capacity of a server running a Tor relay. This is how the Snowflake bridges are set up. It might also be useful for anyone running a relay that is bottleneck on the CPU. If you have ever run multiple relays on one IP address for better scaling (if you are one of the relay operators affected by the recent AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr change), you might want to experiment with this setup. The difference is that all the instances of Tor have the same relay fingerprint, so they operate like one big relay instead of many small relays. https://www.bamsoftware.com/papers/pt-bridge-hiperf/ > The pluggable transports model in Tor separates the concerns of > anonymity and circumvention by running circumvention code in a > separate process, which exchanges information with the main Tor > process over local interprocess communication. This model leads to > problems with scaling, especially for transports, like meek and > Snowflake, whose blocking resistance does not rely on there being > numerous, independently administered bridges, but which rather forward > all traffic to one or a few centralized bridges. We identify what > bottlenecks arise as a bridge scales from 500 to 10,000 simultaneous > users, and then from 10,000 to 50,000, and show ways of overcoming > them, based on our experience running a Snowflake bridge. The key idea > is running multiple Tor processes in parallel on the bridge host, with > externally synchronized identity keys.

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obfs4 bridge management
by Christopher Sheats 10 Dec '23

10 Dec '23

Hello, I've has published a shell script for deploying and managing obfs4 bridges, I hope its useful to others. https://github.com/emeraldonion/bridge-management/ Feedback welcome! -- yawnbox https://disobey.net/@yawnbox https://digitalcourage.social/@EmeraldOnion

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Exit operators on the 0.4.8.x series, please upgrade to 0.4.8.10 ASAP!
by Georg Koppen 10 Dec '23

10 Dec '23

Hello exit node operators! Today (2023-12-08) the Network Team has released a new Tor version, 0.4.8.10[1]. This update contains a fix to a remotely triggerable crash bug (TROVE-2023-007) affecting exit relays on the 0.4.8.x series. Please upgrade as soon as possible to maintain network stability and security if your relays are on that series. For those of you running their Tor relays using the Tor Debian repository, expect a new deb package to be available soon. Please note that this bug is specific to Tor exit relays on the 0.4.8.x series and does not impact other relays nor Tor clients or Tor powered apps (Tor Browser, Orbot, OnionShare). Thanks, Georg [1] https://forum.torproject.org/t/security-release-0-4-8-10/10536

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Relay question
by Mulloch94 08 Dec '23

08 Dec '23

Greetings, I was directed to this relay subscription by the owner. I've recently started my own relay and everything has went smooth for the first few days. Then the relay mysteriously went offline for a period of 8-9 hours. Happened while I was sleeping I think, but any rate it came back on after I restarted the tor daemon and rebooted the server. I'm starting to think my firewall configurations might have been the culprit, even though I ran a very rudimentary setup. Basically just: -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <my SSH> -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9050 -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -j DROP Default ACCEPT on OUTPUT My ORPort is on 443, so I don't see how this could be interfering. I noticed my server reboot got rid of all my rules, so I'm thinking that could've been the issue. If so, what other ports should I add? Do I even need a firewall for the relay? I don't do anything else with that server, so If it doesn't need a firewall to stay secure I won't use one. One more thing, I had a flag on my relay that said I needed to "update the descriptor." It went away after rebooting my server as well, could that been the issue? Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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