Hello Everyone,
I recently inadvertently opened a much larger can of worms than I'd
intended when fixing a bug reported downstream where cURL would,
when configured with certain DNS backends, fail to resolve .onion
addresses.
https://bugs.gentoo.org/887287
After doing some digging I discovered that the c-ares library was
updated in 2018 to intentionally fail to resolve .onion addresses
in line with RFC 7686, and another reported 'Bug' in cURL for
leaking .onion DNS requests:
https://github.com/c-ares/c-ares/issues/196https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/543
I took the obviously sane and uncontroversial approach of making
sure that cURL would always behave the same way regardless of the
DNS backend in use, and that it would output a useful error message
when it failed to resolve a .onion address.
Unfortunately, this has made a lot of people very angry and been
~~widely regarded as a bad move~~panned by a small subset of
downstream cURL users:
https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/11125https://infosec.exchange/@harrysintonen/110977751446379372https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/issues/202
I accept that, in particular, transproxy users are being inconvenienced,
but I also don't want to go back to 'cURL leaks .onion DNS requests
_sometimes_'. As a career sysadmin and downstream bug triager: this
is the stuff that keeps me up late at night. Quite literally, far too
often.
I have found, however that the downstreams that I expected to be
inconvenienced
most (Whonix and Tails) simply use socks:
https://github.com/Kicksecure/sdwdate/commit/5724d83b258a469b7a9a7bbc651539…https://github.com/Kicksecure/tb-updater/commit/d040c12085a527f4d39cb1751f2…https://github.com/Kicksecure/usability-misc/blob/8f722bbbc7b7f2f3a35619a5a…https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/issues/19488https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/merge_requests/1123
I've asked in the Tor Specifications issue (inspired by Silvio's
suggestions), and in the cURL issue, but I seem to be getting nowhere
and the impacted users are clamouring for a quick band-aid solution,
which I feel will work out worse for everyone in the long run:
>How can client applications (safely):
>
>1.discover that they're in a Tor-enabled environment
>2.resolve onion services only via Tor in that circumstance
>3.not leak .onion resolution attempts at all
>
>Right now, not making these requests in the first place is the
>safest (and correct) thing to do, however inconvenient it may be.
>Rather than immediately trying to come up with a band-aid approach
>to this problem, a sane mechanism needs to be implemented to:
>
>1.prevent each application from coming up with their own solution
>2.prevent inconsistency in .onion resolution (i.e. no "oh it only
>leaks if DO_ONION_RESOLUTION is set")
>3.provide a standardised mechanism for applications that want to be Tor
>aware to discover that they're in a Tor-enabled environment.
I'm not particularly attached to that last point, but it's worth discussing.
On a related note:
-is the use of a transparent proxy recommended?
-is there a sane alternative that involves as minimal configuration
as possible for these users?
I'm not sure what the best way forward is here, but I'm hoping that
actual Tor developers might have a useful opinion on the matter, or
at least be able to point me in the right direction.
Thanks for your time,
Cheers,
Matt
