December 2014 - tor-dev - lists.torproject.org

Trac spam filter
by David Fifield 01 Jan '15

01 Jan '15

The Trac spam filter just caused me to lose a comment full of carefully researched external links. It's not the first time, and it's really frustrating. Can we whitelist usernames or something? Submission rejected as potential spam Maximum number of external links per post exceeded I tried to solve the recaptcha five times (they were really hard) and when I finally solved it, the comment wasn't posted anyway. David Fifield

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Internet-wide scanning for bridges
by Vlad Tsyrklevich 01 Jan '15

01 Jan '15

Hello, while taking a looking at TorCloud I it used static OR and obfs2+obfs3 ports making them trivial to discover by scanning EC2's IP address space. This led me to consider the more general attack of internet-wide scanning to discover Tor bridges. Most Tor relays run their ORPorts on port 443 or 9001 so I began investigating there. I began by looking at Project Sonar's port 443 SSL certificate database looking for certificates matching the tor certificate pattern. In talking with Eric Wustrow about ZMap, I discovered that he and the other ZMap authors had already published about this attack in their original paper. Eric mentioned that in his discussion with Roger that the response to the attack was going to be the soon-to-be-deployed obfuscated transports which were intended to be run on random high ports; however, the eventual roll out of obfsproxy did not change the fact that bridge's ORPorts continue to be publicly accessible. While I was analyzing Internet-wide survey-data for port 443 and 9001 (helpfully provided by Project Sonar/H D Moore) I found the Onionoo data set. I was able to quantify the impact of the attack using the Onionoo data and verify it using the ZMap scans. There are 4267 bridges, of them 1819 serve their ORPort on port 443 and 383 serve on port 9001. That's 52% of tor bridges. There are 1926 pluggable-transports enabled bridges, 316 with ORPort 443 and 33 with ORPort 9001. That's 18% of Tor bridges. 203 (64%) of PT-enabled bridges with ORPort 443 were TorCloud. I was able to approximately verify these figures using the Internet-wide scans. By grabbing bridge's certificates and calculating their hashed fingerprint I realized I was also discovering a fair amount of private bridges not included in the Onionoo data set. The results aren't too awful, just under 20% of PT-enabled bridges are affected. It's unclear to me if the low number of PT-enabled bridges (and corresponding high number of vulnerable non-PT-enabled bridges) is a historical artifact or a consequence of out-of-date documentation like https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges.html.en not setting up pluggable transports. Eliminating the ORPort entirely for PT-enabled bridges seems like the ultimate solution to this attack, but the implications of such a change are unclear to me. Another change to mitigate this issue is changing the behavior of ports specified as 'auto' and then changing defaults and documentation to use auto by default. Currently specifying 'auto' in your torrc lets the OS decide the port; however, if tor were to generate a random port on first use that it continued to use across restarts it would it possible to use this for ORPorts and pluggable transports by default (as opposed to the current situation where for bridges you want ORPort auto but constant PT ports and a constant ORPort for relays which is confusing.) I've attached a patch to warn bridge operators running with ORPort set to 443 or 9001 as a stop-gap measure. - Vladislav

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stem on windows 7
by Tony Willingham 01 Jan '15

01 Jan '15

Any suggestions on how to deal with stem on Windows 7 getting stuck at: [notice] Bootstrapped 45%: Asking for relay descriptors. Occasionally it will make it to: [notice] Bootstrapped 50%: Asking for relay descriptors. If I run Vidalia in client mode only, it works fine. I see in the documentation it says: The timeout argument does not work on Windows, and relies on the global state of the signal module. I have no idea what the "global state of the signal module" means. Python 2.7 Thanks Tony

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Torsocks compile errors
by grarpamp 30 Dec '14

30 Dec '14

On gcc 4.2.1 freebsd 8 (thus not really expecting a fix)... commit ab81544478eb9a0db821fd33684cc2f6aac88c7c syscall.c:213: warning: implicit declaration of function 'handle_mmap' syscall.c:283: warning: cast from pointer to integer of different size ../../src/lib/.libs/libtorsocks.so: undefined reference to `handle_mmap' *** Error code 1

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Hidden service policies
by Mike Hearn 30 Dec '14

30 Dec '14

Hello, As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate things (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also sometimes get used by botnets and other problematic things. Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic they consider to be unwanted or abusive. In this way a kind of international group consensus emerges about what is and is not acceptable usage of Tor. For instance, SMTP out is widely restricted. Has there been any discussion of implementing similar controls for hidden services, where relays would refuse to act as introduction points for hidden services that match certain criteria e.g. have a particular key, or whose key appears in a list downloaded occasionally via Tor itself. In this way relay operators could avoid their resources being used for establishing communication with botnet CnC servers. Obviously such a scheme would require a protocol and client upgrade to avoid nodes building circuits to relays that then refuse to introduce. The downside is additional complexity. The upside is potentially recruiting new relay operators.

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ScrambleSuit's replay protection incomplete
by Philipp Winter 28 Dec '14

28 Dec '14

In short: The implementation of ScrambleSuit's replay protection is incomplete which means that an active adversary can circumvent it. All the credit for this discovery goes to Lasse Øverlier. ScrambleSuit uses Uniform Diffie-Hellman as one of its authentication mechanisms. To defend against replay attacks, a sever caches the HMAC of a client's authentication message. The attack works as follows. In the first step, an active adversary (e.g., a censor trying to detect ScrambleSuit) observes a client authenticate successfully towards a ScrambleSuit server and captures the server's Uniform Diffie-Hellman response. In the second step, the adversary replays the captured response to the very same server. Since the server did not cache the HMAC of its own response, it will interpret the replayed data as legitimate authentication message of a new client and respond with an authentication response. The adversary now successfully tricked the server into responding despite not knowing the shared secret. This creates a noteworthy distinguisher which can help identifying ScrambleSuit. Luckily, it's easy to fix this problem. Introducing message types would be one option but it would break backwards compatibility. The easiest fix which retains backwards compatibility is to make the server also cache its own HMACs which are part of the response to a client's authentication message. The downside is that it doubles the size of the replay table but that's tolerable. Note that obfs4 is not affected by this problem because a client's and a server's authentication message are different. Cheers, Philipp

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Damian's Status Report - December 2014
by Damian Johnson 28 Dec '14

28 Dec '14

Hi all! Tis that time of year coal appears in all my sox so guess it's time for a status report. This month I set arm aside to polish improvements that accumulated in the Stem 1.3 release... https://blog.torproject.org/blog/stem-release-13 There were a lot of small tweaks, but the highlights for this month were... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hidden Service Tutorial -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By a bit of serendipity I came across a nice article by Jordan Wright for spinning up hidden services with Stem... https://jordan-wright.github.io/blog/2014/10/06/creating-tor-hidden-service… Federico Ceratto and Patrick O'Doherty have been improving our hidden service support, so I spruced up their contributions and wrote a tutorial of our own that demos it... https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/over_the_river.html -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gentoo Support -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks to Anthony Basile Stem is now packaged for Gentoo. Installing is as simple as... % emerge stem I've been delighted at how many Gentoo people have jumped out of the woodwork to help. toralf worked with me on ticket #13904 to address testing issues, and Manuel took on Stem 1.3 packaging the same day as its release - thanks guys! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Couple other quick things of note is that I updated our OpenHub repository listing so it includes most of our newer projects... https://www.openhub.net/p/tor ... and trimmed membership of our internal lists. Cheers! -Damian

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Drop or merge the projects wiki?
by Damian Johnson 25 Dec '14

25 Dec '14

Hi all. Quick question, any objections to us dropping the projects wiki? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects It's years out of date and redundant with the volunteer page, which I continue to update on occasion... https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Projects I'm asking here in case there's any strong objections, or folks want us to keep something from it. Cheers! -Damian

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Stem Release 1.3
by Damian Johnson 23 Dec '14

23 Dec '14

Greetings wonderful people of the world! After months down in the engine room I'm delighted to announce the 1.3.0 release of Stem. For those who aren't familiar with it, Stem is a Python library for interacting with Tor. With it you can script against your relay, descriptor data, or even write applications similar to arm and Vidalia. https://stem.torproject.org/ So what's new in this release? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Better Hidden Service Support ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Now it's easier than ever to spin up hidden services! Thanks to contributions from Federico Ceratto and Patrick O'Doherty we now have a set of methods specifically for working with hidden services. Check it out in our new tutorial... https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/over_the_river.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Faster Descriptor Parsing ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This release dramatically improves the speed at which Stem can parse decriptors. Thanks to optimizations from Nick Mathewson and Ossi Herrala we can now read descriptors 40% faster! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This is just the tip of the iceberg. For a full rundown on the myriad of improvements and fixes in this release see... https://stem.torproject.org/change_log.html#version-1-3 Cheers! -Damian

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Thinking of raising bandwidth stats interval from 15 minutes to 4 hours
by Nick Mathewson 23 Dec '14

23 Dec '14

See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13988 . Karsten suggests that I should announce this on tor-dev before merging/deploying it, and he's probably right. Will this break anything you know about? -- Nick

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