October 2017 - tbb-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1286865 - Step 0: Turn off crash-on-seccomp-fail by default on non-nightly. r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit a878b3789b8b338124ba79efb5abba5f9bc34455 Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Fri Jan 27 14:25:50 2017 -0700 Bug 1286865 - Step 0: Turn off crash-on-seccomp-fail by default on non-nightly. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: 1It6HNizbAc --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 1e96f11904abf2c38c5b4e50de7609ddc86cdd8a --- security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp index 7f1182be9972..b4e65a1745df 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ int gSeccompTsyncBroadcastSignum = 0; namespace mozilla { +static bool gSandboxCrashOnError = false; + // This is initialized by SandboxSetCrashFunc(). SandboxCrashFunc gSandboxCrashFunc; @@ -148,15 +150,18 @@ SigSysHandler(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) // TODO, someday when this is enabled on MIPS: include the two extra // args in the error message. SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("seccomp sandbox violation: pid %d, syscall %d," - " args %d %d %d %d %d %d. Killing process.", + " args %d %d %d %d %d %d.%s", pid, syscall_nr, - args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5]); + args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5], + gSandboxCrashOnError ? " Killing process." : ""); - // Bug 1017393: record syscall number somewhere useful. - info->si_addr = reinterpret_cast<void*>(syscall_nr); + if (gSandboxCrashOnError) { + // Bug 1017393: record syscall number somewhere useful. + info->si_addr = reinterpret_cast<void*>(syscall_nr); - gSandboxCrashFunc(nr, info, &savedCtx); - _exit(127); + gSandboxCrashFunc(nr, info, &savedCtx); + _exit(127); + } } /** @@ -515,6 +520,21 @@ SandboxEarlyInit(GeckoProcessType aType) } MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(IsSingleThreaded()); + // Set gSandboxCrashOnError if appropriate. This doesn't need to + // happen this early, but for now it's here so that I don't need to + // add NSPR dependencies for PR_GetEnv. + // + // This also means that users with "unexpected threads" setups won't + // crash even on nightly. +#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD + gSandboxCrashOnError = true; +#endif + if (const char* envVar = getenv("MOZ_SANDBOX_CRASH_ON_ERROR")) { + if (envVar[0]) { + gSandboxCrashOnError = envVar[0] != '0'; + } + } + // Which kinds of resource isolation (of those that need to be set // up at this point) can be used by this process? bool canChroot = false;

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1320085 - Allow the getrlimit-equivalent subset of prlimit64. r=tedd
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit 99459c71ad61f1d7fb3995e616771a30516cf25b Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon Nov 28 12:05:28 2016 -0700 Bug 1320085 - Allow the getrlimit-equivalent subset of prlimit64. r=tedd This applies only to content processes, where we already allow getrlimit (but not setrlimit). The rule added here does not allow using prlimit64 to set any resource limits or interact with any other process. MozReview-Commit-ID: nMry3t6QPj --HG-- extra : rebase_source : ecf792077a672ab1f2c5edf9fbeb915a0d8dd30e --- security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp index f8db9dc802ea..018e9c64446c 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp @@ -735,6 +735,18 @@ public: CASES_FOR_getresgid: return Allow(); + case __NR_prlimit64: { + // Allow only the getrlimit() use case. (glibc seems to use + // only pid 0 to indicate the current process; pid == getpid() + // is equivalent and could also be allowed if needed.) + Arg<pid_t> pid(0); + // This is really a const struct ::rlimit*, but Arg<> doesn't + // work with pointers, only integer types. + Arg<uintptr_t> new_limit(2); + return If(AllOf(pid == 0, new_limit == 0), Allow()) + .Else(InvalidSyscall()); + } + case __NR_umask: case __NR_kill: case __NR_wait4:

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1361238 - Re-allow accept4, used by accessibility. r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit 724bcf6dc8132b87eaf397494d777a30f7cd8210 Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon May 1 21:51:11 2017 -0600 Bug 1361238 - Re-allow accept4, used by accessibility. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: 3M3T3bkx4nP --HG-- extra : rebase_source : b67332889615ae34cc67737da361f21ae545aeb4 --- security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp index f1520aa29e15..7e1771a62665 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp @@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ public: case SYS_SEND: case SYS_SOCKET: // DANGEROUS case SYS_CONNECT: // DANGEROUS + case SYS_ACCEPT4: // Used by a11y; see bug 1361238 case SYS_GETSOCKOPT: case SYS_SETSOCKOPT: case SYS_GETSOCKNAME:

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1355274 - Polyfill SOCK_DGRAM socketpairs with SOCK_SEQPACKET, for libasyncns. r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit 458e18efb75ff80d270cc875ac7c200da705752c Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Tue Apr 11 20:55:34 2017 -0600 Bug 1355274 - Polyfill SOCK_DGRAM socketpairs with SOCK_SEQPACKET, for libasyncns. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: 2DeklSGsjUV --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 8a202c23dc9a3ddede49b08ce1e0792dfb40bdbf --- security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp index 7e1771a62665..5ddd58029e85 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp @@ -496,6 +496,16 @@ class ContentSandboxPolicy : public SandboxPolicyCommon { return 0; } + static intptr_t SocketpairDatagramTrap(ArgsRef aArgs, void* aux) { + auto fds = reinterpret_cast<int*>(aArgs.args[3]); + // Return sequential packet sockets instead of the expected + // datagram sockets; see bug 1355274 for details. + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, fds) != 0) { + return -errno; + } + return 0; + } + public: explicit ContentSandboxPolicy(SandboxBrokerClient* aBroker):mBroker(aBroker) { } virtual ~ContentSandboxPolicy() { } @@ -508,6 +518,7 @@ public: switch(aCall) { case SYS_RECVFROM: case SYS_SENDTO: + case SYS_SENDMMSG: // libresolv via libasyncns; see bug 1355274 return Some(Allow()); case SYS_SOCKETPAIR: { @@ -517,9 +528,12 @@ public: return Some(Allow()); } Arg<int> domain(0), type(1); - return Some(If(AllOf(domain == AF_UNIX, - AnyOf(type == SOCK_STREAM, type == SOCK_SEQPACKET)), - Allow()) + return Some(If(domain == AF_UNIX, + Switch(type) + .Case(SOCK_STREAM, Allow()) + .Case(SOCK_SEQPACKET, Allow()) + .Case(SOCK_DGRAM, Trap(SocketpairDatagramTrap, nullptr)) + .Default(InvalidSyscall())) .Else(InvalidSyscall())); }

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1337162 - Enable the Linux content sandbox for non-Nightly builds. r=ted
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit f439d50e540ed21a474a2062d1b902931c042a3e Author: Gian-Carlo Pascutto <gcp(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon Feb 27 18:01:33 2017 +0100 Bug 1337162 - Enable the Linux content sandbox for non-Nightly builds. r=ted MozReview-Commit-ID: 65aPquHzyfP --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 017080e3ae33289bb0b6a790027f9d02c380d47b --- old-configure.in | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/old-configure.in b/old-configure.in index 0a0ba4465700..f5a2f05629ce 100644 --- a/old-configure.in +++ b/old-configure.in @@ -3997,14 +3997,14 @@ if test -n "$gonkdir"; then MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX fi -case "$OS_TARGET:$NIGHTLY_BUILD" in -WINNT:*) +case "$OS_TARGET" in +WINNT) MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX ;; -Darwin:*) +Darwin) MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX ;; -Linux:1) +Linux) case $CPU_ARCH in x86_64|x86) MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1374281. r=jld
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit 74a7688a81cb539e02431fff6dea8ee204b6ff80 Author: Gian-Carlo Pascutto <gcp(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon Jun 19 20:07:38 2017 +0200 Bug 1374281. r=jld MozReview-Commit-ID: Ko5m5i4Wkd6 --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 3076315ef3639a89f752addbb01d5d08a9c2db75 --- security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp index a31d1fc6684a..d79656c3407f 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp @@ -360,6 +360,10 @@ AllowOpen(int aReqFlags, int aPerms) if (aReqFlags & O_CREAT) { needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_CREATE; } + // Linux allows O_TRUNC even with O_RDONLY + if (aReqFlags & O_TRUNC) { + needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_WRITE; + } return (aPerms & needed) == needed; }

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1386279 - Renovate Linux sandbox file broker handling of access(). r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit b4d1d2223d7fed2bd88b06fa4e0f65936618d417 Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Tue Aug 8 18:02:31 2017 -0600 Bug 1386279 - Renovate Linux sandbox file broker handling of access(). r=gcp 1. X_OK is now allowed, and is limited only by the MAY_ACCESS permission. 2. The actual access() syscall is now used, if access is granted by the broker policy. This fixed bug 1382246, which explains the background. MozReview-Commit-ID: 926429PlBnL --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 6ae54c4c25e1389fa3af75b0bdf727323448294a --- security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp | 14 ++------------ security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp | 15 +++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp index d79656c3407f..56215b89b232 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ AllowOperation(int aReqFlags, int aPerms) static bool AllowAccess(int aReqFlags, int aPerms) { - if (aReqFlags & ~(R_OK|W_OK|F_OK)) { + if (aReqFlags & ~(R_OK|W_OK|X_OK|F_OK)) { return false; } int needed = 0; @@ -569,17 +569,7 @@ SandboxBroker::ThreadMain(void) case SANDBOX_FILE_ACCESS: if (permissive || AllowAccess(req.mFlags, perms)) { - // This can't use access() itself because that uses the ruid - // and not the euid. In theory faccessat() with AT_EACCESS - // would work, but Linux doesn't actually implement the - // flags != 0 case; glibc has a hack which doesn't even work - // in this case so it'll ignore the flag, and Bionic just - // passes through the syscall and always ignores the flags. - // - // Instead, because we've already checked the requested - // r/w/x bits against the policy, just return success if the - // file exists and hope that's close enough. - if (stat(pathBuf, (struct stat*)&respBuf) == 0) { + if (access(pathBuf, req.mFlags) == 0) { resp.mError = 0; } else { resp.mError = -errno; diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp index a311e181a9b1..bf5e58acbc40 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp @@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ SandboxBrokerTest::GetPolicy() const policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, "/tmp", AddAlways); policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_CREATE, "/tmp/blublu", AddAlways); policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_CREATE, "/tmp/blublublu", AddAlways); + // This should be non-writable by the user running the test: + policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, "/etc", AddAlways); return Move(policy); } @@ -206,6 +208,14 @@ TEST_F(SandboxBrokerTest, Access) EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/proc/self", R_OK)); EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/proc/self/stat", F_OK)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/tmp", X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/tmp", R_OK|X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/tmp", R_OK|W_OK|X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/proc/self", X_OK)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/etc", R_OK|X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/etc", W_OK)); } TEST_F(SandboxBrokerTest, Stat) @@ -257,10 +267,7 @@ TEST_F(SandboxBrokerTest, Chmod) close(fd); // Set read only. SandboxBroker enforces 0600 mode flags. ASSERT_EQ(0, Chmod("/tmp/blublu", S_IRUSR)); - // SandboxBroker doesn't use real access(), it just checks against - // the policy. So it can't see the change in permisions here. - // This won't work: - // EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/tmp/blublu", W_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/tmp/blublu", W_OK)); statstruct realStat; EXPECT_EQ(0, statsyscall("/tmp/blublu", &realStat)); EXPECT_EQ((mode_t)S_IRUSR, realStat.st_mode & 0777);

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1317802 - don't stop for SIGSYS in .gdbinit; r=jld
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit f114f92dda8c67e8f013cf01974b0e1f65c0d04e Author: Nathan Froyd <froydnj(a)mozilla.com> Date: Wed Nov 16 01:13:22 2016 -0500 Bug 1317802 - don't stop for SIGSYS in .gdbinit; r=jld The sandboxing code generates this signal nowadays, which makes debugging with tools like rr quite frustrating. DONTBUILD because NPOTB --- .gdbinit | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/.gdbinit b/.gdbinit index dd9a005f67a1..08f1fc0f2011 100644 --- a/.gdbinit +++ b/.gdbinit @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ handle SIGPIPE noprint nostop pass # sandboxing code on older kernels. handle SIG38 noprint nostop pass handle SIG64 noprint nostop pass +handle SIGSYS noprint nostop pass # Show the concrete types behind nsIFoo set print object on

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.0-1] Bug 1344106 - Remove Linux todos() now that Linux sandboxing is riding the trains. r=haik
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit fcf32e4bdade5686f7dd3ca503d45fbfc6d56d2d Author: Haik Aftandilian <haftandilian(a)mozilla.com> Date: Fri Mar 3 09:50:29 2017 +0100 Bug 1344106 - Remove Linux todos() now that Linux sandboxing is riding the trains. r=haik MozReview-Commit-ID: 9tI2S6fEYkD --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 0a5d00f8498861e7ea281e527b2be6b2c4e472d6 --- .../sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js | 20 -------------------- .../test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js | 22 +--------------------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js index 946f86bb9a92..7439bd46ee53 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js +++ b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js @@ -96,25 +96,11 @@ add_task(function*() { prefExists = false; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); - if (!prefExists) { - return; - } - } - ok(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); if (!prefExists) { return; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(level > 0, "content sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - info(`security.sandbox.content.level=${level}`); ok(level > 0, "content sandbox is enabled."); if (level == 0) { @@ -124,12 +110,6 @@ add_task(function*() { let isFileIOSandboxed = isContentFileIOSandboxed(level); - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(isFileIOSandboxed, "content file I/O sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - // Content sandbox enabled, but level doesn't include file I/O sandboxing. ok(isFileIOSandboxed, "content file I/O sandboxing is enabled."); if (!isFileIOSandboxed) { diff --git a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js index d56456966b8a..848b145429f2 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js +++ b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ function areContentSyscallsSandboxed(level) { syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 1; break; case "Linux": - syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 2; + syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 1; break; default: Assert.ok(false, "Unknown OS"); @@ -140,25 +140,11 @@ add_task(function*() { prefExists = false; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); - if (!prefExists) { - return; - } - } - ok(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); if (!prefExists) { return; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(level > 0, "content sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - info(`security.sandbox.content.level=${level}`); ok(level > 0, "content sandbox is enabled."); if (level == 0) { @@ -168,12 +154,6 @@ add_task(function*() { let areSyscallsSandboxed = areContentSyscallsSandboxed(level); - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(areSyscallsSandboxed, "content syscall sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - // Content sandbox enabled, but level doesn't include syscall sandboxing. ok(areSyscallsSandboxed, "content syscall sandboxing is enabled."); if (!areSyscallsSandboxed) {

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[torbutton/maint-1.9.7] Bug 23887: Update banner locales and Mozilla text
by gk＠torproject.org 17 Oct '17

17 Oct '17

commit dea1b11a4e600bcb1bffde09d550e5022a6eb5d3 Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Oct 16 23:09:56 2017 -0700 Bug 23887: Update banner locales and Mozilla text Also: change donation link to https://www.torproject.org/donate/donate-pdr-tbb-[locale] --- src/chrome/content/aboutTor/aboutTor.xhtml | 3 ++- src/chrome/content/aboutTor/donation_banner.js | 4 +++- src/chrome/skin/donation_banner.css | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/modules/donation-banner.js | 16 ++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/aboutTor.xhtml b/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/aboutTor.xhtml index 367f9a6..248df11 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/aboutTor.xhtml +++ b/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/aboutTor.xhtml @@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ window.addEventListener("pageshow", function() { <div id="banner-contents-container"> <div id="banner-tagline"><span></span></div> <div id="banner-slogan"><span></span></div> + <div id="banner-mozilla"><span></span></div> <a id="banner-donate-button-link" - href="https://www.torproject.org/donate/donate-tbb"> + href="https://www.torproject.org/donate/donate-pdr-tbb"> <div id="banner-donate-button"> <div id="banner-donate-button-inner"> <span></span> diff --git a/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/donation_banner.js b/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/donation_banner.js index 1c95822..391c28f 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/donation_banner.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/aboutTor/donation_banner.js @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ let avoidWidows = function (element) { let updateTextSizes = function () { fitTextInElement(sel("#banner-tagline")); fitTextInElement(sel("#banner-slogan")); + fitTextInElement(sel("#banner-mozilla")); fitTextInElement(sel("#banner-donate-button-inner")); avoidWidows(sel("#banner-tagline span")); }; @@ -54,10 +55,11 @@ let updateTextSizes = function () { let randomInteger = max => Math.floor(max * Math.random()); // The main donation banner function. -let runDonationBanner = function ({ taglines, slogan, donate, shortLocale }) { +let runDonationBanner = function ({ taglines, slogan, mozilla, donate, shortLocale }) { try { sel("#banner-tagline span").innerText = taglines[randomInteger(taglines.length)]; sel("#banner-slogan span").innerText = slogan; + sel("#banner-mozilla span").innerText = mozilla; let donateButtonText = sel("#banner-donate-button-inner span"); let rtl = window.getComputedStyle(donateButtonText).direction === "rtl"; donateButtonText.innerHTML = donate + " " + (rtl ? "◀" : "▶"); diff --git a/src/chrome/skin/donation_banner.css b/src/chrome/skin/donation_banner.css index 8580066..c91f0e5 100644 --- a/src/chrome/skin/donation_banner.css +++ b/src/chrome/skin/donation_banner.css @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ right: 85px; } #banner-slogan { - align-items: start; - bottom: 0px; + align-items: center; + bottom: 30px; color: #f8f8a0; display: flex; font-family: monospace; @@ -68,13 +68,30 @@ position: absolute; right: 285px; text-align: start; - top: 100px; + top: 90px; white-space: nowrap; } #banner-slogan:-moz-dir(rtl) { left: 285px; right: 85px; } +#banner-mozilla { + align-items: center; + bottom: 5px; + color: white; + display: flex; + font-family: sans-serif; + left: 85px; + position: absolute; + right: 285px; + text-align: start; + top: 120px; + white-space: nowrap; +} +#banner-mozilla:-moz-dir(rtl) { + left: 285px; + right: 85px; +} #banner-donate-button { background-color: #13a513; border: 0px; diff --git a/src/modules/donation-banner.js b/src/modules/donation-banner.js index bb35e86..3a954e5 100644 --- a/src/modules/donation-banner.js +++ b/src/modules/donation-banner.js @@ -9,14 +9,17 @@ Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm"); const kBannerLocales = [ "bg", "da", + "de", "el", "en", "es", "fr", - "fr_CA", "is", "it", + "pt", "nb", + "ru", + "sv", "tr", ]; @@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ const gStringBundle = Services.strings.createBundle(kPropertiesURL); // Check if we should show the banner, depends on // browser locale, current date, and how many times // we have already shown the banner. -const shouldShowBanner = function ({ locale, shortLocale }) { +const shouldShowBanner = function (shortLocale) { try { // If our override test pref is true, then just show the banner regardless. if (Services.prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.testBanner", false)) { @@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ const shouldShowBanner = function ({ locale, shortLocale }) { return false; } // Only show banner when we have that locale and if a donation redirect exists. - if (kBannerLocales.indexOf(locale) === -1 || + if (kBannerLocales.indexOf(shortLocale) === -1 || kDonationPageLocales.indexOf(shortLocale) === -1) { return false; } @@ -92,7 +95,7 @@ var bannerData = function () { // Read short locale. let locale = Services.prefs.getCharPref("general.useragent.locale"); let shortLocale = locale.match(/[a-zA-Z]+/)[0].toLowerCase(); - if (!shouldShowBanner({ locale, shortLocale })) { + if (!shouldShowBanner(shortLocale)) { return null; } // Load tag lines. @@ -102,10 +105,11 @@ var bannerData = function () { "aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline" + (index + 1)); taglines.push(tagline); } - // Read slogan and donate button text. + // Read slogan, mozilla, and donate button text. let slogan = gStringBundle.GetStringFromName("aboutTor.donationBanner.slogan"); + let mozilla = gStringBundle.GetStringFromName("aboutTor.donationBanner.mozilla"); let donate = gStringBundle.GetStringFromName("aboutTor.donationBanner.donate"); - return JSON.stringify({ taglines, slogan, donate, shortLocale }); + return JSON.stringify({ taglines, slogan, mozilla, donate, shortLocale }); }; // Export utility functions for external use.

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