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Public beta testing of OONI Probe mobile apps
by Maria Xynou 19 Nov '18

19 Nov '18

Hello, Thanks to great feedback provided by the community, the OONI team has been working on revamping and improving upon the OONI Probe mobile apps. Today, we are excited to announce that we have released the public beta! To further improve upon the apps before the stable release, we invite you to become beta testers and to report any bugs/issues. # Becoming a beta tester On Android: * Sign up to the beta: https://play.google.com/apps/testing/org.openobservatory.ooniprobe * Update your OONI Probe mobile app (to get the public beta) from Google Play On iOS: * Tap on this link from your device and follow the instructions: https://testflight.apple.com/join/rh3Ig7fE # Reporting issues Once you have installed and played around with the public beta of the OONI Probe mobile apps, we encourage you to report any issues you encounter. You can file tickets on the following GitHub repositories: * OONI Probe (all platforms): https://github.com/ooni/probe/issues * OONI Probe for Android: https://github.com/ooni/probe-android/issues * OONI Probe for iOS: https://github.com/ooni/probe-ios/issues Please check if the problem you are encountering has already been reported. If you’re not a GitHub user, you can share your feedback with us by writing an email to contact(a)openobservatory.org. Your feedback and bug reporting is hugely appreciated, as it will help us launch better apps! Thanks a million, and happy testing! ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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[New report] Uganda's Social Media Tax through the lens of network measurements
by Maria Xynou 12 Nov '18

12 Nov '18

Hello, Today, in collaboration with our Ugandan partners, DefendDefenders, OONI co-published a new research report: "Uganda's Social Media Tax through the lens of network measurements". Our research report is available via: * OONI site: https://ooni.io/post/uganda-social-media-tax/ * DefendDefenders site: https://www.defenddefenders.org/publication/Uganda%27sSocialMediaTax/ As of 1st July 2018, Uganda has introduced a new OTT (Over The Top) tax - commonly referred to as the Social Media Tax - which requires people in Uganda to pay taxes to the government in order to access several online social media platforms. Unless this tax is paid, access to these specific social media platforms is blocked. Civil society groups in Uganda have expressed concern that this new Social Media Tax will affect marginalized communities the most. Thanks to OONI Probe users in Uganda, internet censorship has been measured in the country since 2014 (previously enabling the detection and examination of social media censorship during the 2016 elections). In light of the new OTT tax, we joined forces with DefendDefenders to test the taxed social media platforms and to run a series of experiments, testing VPN blocking as well. Our key findings include: * Ugandan ISPs primarily implement internet censorship by means of HTTP blocking, resetting connections to taxed and banned sites. * MTN appears to block Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and Snapchat by means of TCP/IP blocking. The TCP/IP blocking of Snapchat may have caused collateral damage, possibly affecting thousands of sites hosted on the same CDN. However, even if this is the case, it doesn't affect most MTN users since MTN's proxy circumvents IP-level blocking. * Social media censorship varies across ASNs. Africell, for example, attempts to block Telegram, while MTN doesn't. Different social media sites were blocked by different ISPs. Some Ugandan ISPs don't block access to social media sites at all (such as Smile Communications and state-owned Uganda Telecom). * The blocking of circumvention tool sites also varies across ASNs. MTN blocks access to VPN servers using the OpenVPN protocol and to torproject.org, but not to the Tor network. The above findings are based on the collection and analysis of OONI network measurements from multiple local vantage points in Uganda: https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/UG To reproduce and expand upon our study, you can: 1. Run OONI Probe: https://ooni.io/install/ 2. Use OONI Run to test the sites of your choice: https://run.ooni.io/ 3. Download OONI data for your own analysis: https://api.ooni.io/ Warm thanks to all the volunteers in Uganda who have run OONI Probe, making this research possible! Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Reminder: OONI community meeting tomorrow
by Maria Xynou 23 Oct '18

23 Oct '18

Hello, I'm sending this email as a reminder for OONI's October community meeting. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org (OONI Slack channel) or #ooni on IRC When: Tomorrow, 24th October 2018 at 12:00 UTC (for 1 hour) Please add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting here: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting Looking forward to connecting with you soon! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI Community Meeting: Wednesday, 24th October
by Maria Xynou 19 Oct '18

19 Oct '18

Hi friends, Thanks for marking your availability on doodle for this month's OONI community meeting. Based on the most popular options, below is the logistical info for the meeting: When: Wednesday, 24th October 2018 at 12:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 13:00 UTC) Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel) Do you have questions related to OONI Probe/OONI data/OONI methodologies? Do you have censorship research you would like to share with the community? Do you have ideas/thoughts/feedfack you'd like to share? Please join us! We'd love to meet you and hear from you. Please add topics that you'd like to discuss as part of the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack or IRC any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon. All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Scheduling the next OONI Community Meeting
by Maria Xynou 15 Oct '18

15 Oct '18

Hello friends, During the last OONI community meeting, participants expressed interest in a doodle that would allow everyone to come up with a time and date that's more convenient. We usually host the community meetings on the last Tuesday of the month, but as the OONI team will be at the OTF Summit during the last week of October and we'll be traveling to Taipei on 25th, our options this month are quite limited to the following dates: * Monday, 22nd October 2018 * Tuesday, 23rd October 2018 * Wednesday, 24th October 2018 Please take a few minutes to add your preference (in terms of time and date) in this doodle by Friday, 19th October: https://doodle.com/poll/xtg7szwwfysmwda7 I'll then follow up with a time and date for the meeting based on what works best for most. In the meanwhile, we encourage you to add topics that you'd like to discuss as part of the meeting here: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting Thanks and all the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Reminder: OONI community meeting tomorrow
by Maria Xynou 24 Sep '18

24 Sep '18

Hello, I'm sending this email as a reminder for OONI's September community meeting tomorrow. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org (OONI Slack channel) or #ooni on IRC When: Tomorrow, 25th September 2018 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour) Please add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting here: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting Looking forward to connecting with you soon! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday 25th September 2018
by Maria Xynou 20 Sep '18

20 Sep '18

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next week for our monthly community meeting. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel) When: Tuesday, 25th September 2018 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 15:00 UTC) Do you have questions related to OONI Probe/OONI data/OONI methodologies? Do you have censorship research you would like to share with the community? Do you have ideas/thoughts/feedback you'd like to share? Are you just curious to learn more about censorship research and meet the community? Please join us! We'd love to meet you and hear from you. :) We compile the agenda of the meeting here: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in the pad. If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack or IRC any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report: The State of Internet Censorship in Venezuela
by Maria Xynou 16 Aug '18

16 Aug '18

Hello, Today Venezuela Inteligente, IPYS Venezuela and OONI jointly published a research report examining internet censorship in Venezuela. Our research report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/venezuela-internet-censorship/ Our study is based on the analysis of hundreds of thousands of OONI Probe network measurements collected from multiple local vantage points over the last 4 years. Key findings include: 1. **Media censorship:** A number of independent media websites are blocked (primarily by means of DNS tampering) by (at least) 4 Venezuelan ISPs. These include El Pitazo and El Nacional, two of Venezuela's major, independent news outlets known for reporting extensively on corruption (and other political issues). All 3 of El Pitazo's domains (elpitazo.info, elpitazo.com, elpitazo.ml) were found to be blocked across ISPs (possibly in an attempt to reinforce the censorship). Over the last days, state-owned CANTV appears to have started blocking investigative journalism site armando.info as well (by means of HTTP blocking). This though requires further testing, since some measurements aren't consistent. 2. Blogs expressing political criticism, Zello (heavily used by protesters), and a number of currency exchange websites were found to be blocked. This suggests that internet censorship in Venezuela may be a symptom of its economic and political crisis. 3. **Tor blocking:** We were able to confirm the blocking of the Tor network and obfs4 by state-owned CANTV through OONI measurements and through a number of additional tests and experiments. Our report shares relevant data (in tsv files). The blocking started about two months ago, and appears to be ongoing. Overall, internet censorship in Venezuela doesn't appear to be centralized, since different ISPs were found to adopt different censorship techniques and censor different platforms. Moreover, ISPs don't always appear to roll out the same censorship in all regions (for example, CANTV appears to block armando.info in Caracas, but not in other states). The recent blocking of Tor and (more) independent media sites signifies that internet censorship in Venezuela is potentially becoming more pervasive. Further research and testing is therefore required. You can expand upon our study through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.torproject.org/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.torproject.org/data/). Thanks for reading! Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report on South Sudan: Measuring Internet Censorship in the World's Youngest Nation
by Maria Xynou 01 Aug '18

01 Aug '18

Hello, Today, OONI and South Sudan's The Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID) published a joint report examining internet censorship in South Sudan. Our research report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/south-sudan-censorship/ Established in July 2011, South Sudan is the world's youngest nation. The country though is in turmoil in light of ongoing civil war. OONI and TAHURID joined forces to measure internet censorship locally, particularly following local reports on the blocking of media outlets. OONI data corroborates these reports, showing the blocking of media outlets Sudan Tribune and Radio Tamazuj, and of Nyamilepedia and Paanluel Wel, the leading blogs of the Nuer and Dinka tribes. MTN (AS37594) appears to block TCP/IP connections to these sites, while IPTEC (AS36892) blocks access by means of DNS tampering. We also detected the presence of the Mikrotik HTTP transparent proxy through measurements collected in 2017 from South Sudan's 4G Telecom (AS327786) network. This proxy though is more likely being used to improve connectivity and network performance, than to implement internet censorship. Based on our testing, internet censorship in South Sudan does not appear to be pervasive, but limited to sites that authorities deem to publish "subversive content" and incite violence. Locals report that the media operate in a state of fear, and most forms of censorship are currently non-digital (involving the intimidation, jailing, and killing of journalists). Self-censorship may therefore be one of the most effective forms of censorship in South Sudan today. That said, the fact that South Sudan has already started implementing internet censorship raises questions as to whether its internet censorship apparatus will expand as internet penetration levels increase and political events unfold. Our study shares some initial observations based on OONI network measurements. If you're interested in expanding upon this research, you can do so through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.torproject.org/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.torproject.org/data/). Please share this study with your contacts: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1024643397766860801 Thanks for reading! Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report: Social media disruptions in Mali amid 2018 presidential election
by Maria Xynou 31 Jul '18

31 Jul '18

Hello, Last Sunday, social media was reportedly inaccessible in Mali amid presidential elections. Today, OONI published a short report providing network measurement data that corroborates local reports on the blocking of social media during the elections. Our report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/mali-disruptions-amid-2018-election/ Daily OONI network measurements have been collected from Mali for more than a year, thanks to our local partners. This has allowed us to detect changes in censorship policies, particularly on the day of Mali's latest elections. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 1. Orange Mali (AS30985)**appears to have blocked access to WhatsApp (app and web.whatsapp.com), Twitter, guardianproject.info and anonymizer.ru in the evening of 29th July 2018 (election day). These platforms had previously been accessible (pretty much) every day over the last year in this network (strongly suggesting that they were temporarily blocked). 2. Measurements collected from SOTELMA (AS21271)**don't show signs of internet censorship on 29th July 2018. Therefore, social media sites (and circumvention tool sites) weren't blocked by all ISPs on Mali's election day. If you're interested in expanding upon this study (particularly as political events in Mali unfold), you can do so through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.torproject.org/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.torproject.org/data/). Thanks for reading! All the best, Maria.**** -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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