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New report on South Sudan: Measuring Internet Censorship in the World's Youngest Nation
by Maria Xynou 01 Aug '18

01 Aug '18

Hello, Today, OONI and South Sudan's The Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID) published a joint report examining internet censorship in South Sudan. Our research report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/south-sudan-censorship/ Established in July 2011, South Sudan is the world's youngest nation. The country though is in turmoil in light of ongoing civil war. OONI and TAHURID joined forces to measure internet censorship locally, particularly following local reports on the blocking of media outlets. OONI data corroborates these reports, showing the blocking of media outlets Sudan Tribune and Radio Tamazuj, and of Nyamilepedia and Paanluel Wel, the leading blogs of the Nuer and Dinka tribes. MTN (AS37594) appears to block TCP/IP connections to these sites, while IPTEC (AS36892) blocks access by means of DNS tampering. We also detected the presence of the Mikrotik HTTP transparent proxy through measurements collected in 2017 from South Sudan's 4G Telecom (AS327786) network. This proxy though is more likely being used to improve connectivity and network performance, than to implement internet censorship. Based on our testing, internet censorship in South Sudan does not appear to be pervasive, but limited to sites that authorities deem to publish "subversive content" and incite violence. Locals report that the media operate in a state of fear, and most forms of censorship are currently non-digital (involving the intimidation, jailing, and killing of journalists). Self-censorship may therefore be one of the most effective forms of censorship in South Sudan today. That said, the fact that South Sudan has already started implementing internet censorship raises questions as to whether its internet censorship apparatus will expand as internet penetration levels increase and political events unfold. Our study shares some initial observations based on OONI network measurements. If you're interested in expanding upon this research, you can do so through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.torproject.org/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.torproject.org/data/) Please share this study with your contacts: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1024643397766860801 Thanks for reading! Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report: Social media disruptions in Mali amid 2018 presidential election
by Maria Xynou 31 Jul '18

31 Jul '18

Hello, Last Sunday, social media was reportedly inaccessible in Mali amid presidential elections. Today, OONI published a short report providing network measurement data that corroborates local reports on the blocking of social media during the elections. Our report is available here: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/mali-disruptions-amid-2018-election/ Daily OONI network measurements have been collected from Mali for more than a year, thanks to our local partners. This has allowed us to detect changes in censorship policies, particularly on the day of Mali's latest elections. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 1. Orange Mali (AS30985)**appears to have blocked access to WhatsApp (app and web.whatsapp.com) Twitter, guardianproject.info and anonymizer.ru in the evening of 29th July 2018 (election day). These platforms had previously been accessible (pretty much) every day over the last year in this network (strongly suggesting that they were temporarily blocked). 2. Measurements collected from SOTELMA (AS21271)**don't show signs of internet censorship on 29th July 2018. Therefore, social media sites (and circumvention tool sites) weren't blocked by all ISPs on Mali's election day. If you're interested in expanding upon this study (particularly as political events in Mali unfold), you can do so through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.torproject.org/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.torproject.org/data/) Thanks for reading! All the best, Maria.**** -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Reminder: OONI community meeting tomorrow
by Maria Xynou 30 Jul '18

30 Jul '18

Hello, I'm sending this email as a reminder that OONI's July community meeting is taking place tomorrow (31st July) at 13:00 UTC (for 1 hour). Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org (OONI Slack channel) or #ooni on IRC Please add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting here: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting Looking forward to connecting with you soon! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday 31st July 2018
by Maria Xynou 23 Jul '18

23 Jul '18

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next week for our monthly community meeting. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel) When: Tuesday, 31st July 2018 at 13:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 14:00 UTC) We'd love to hear your thoughts and suggestions on how we can improve our tools and research methodologies. Please add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack or IRC any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Survey & Interviews: OONI Probe feedback
by Maria Xynou 19 Jul '18

19 Jul '18

Hello, Do you use OONI Probe? We'd love your feedback! *# Survey** * We're excited to hear more about your experience with OONI Probe so that we can meet your needs in future releases! Please take a few minutes to complete our survey: https://ooniuxteam.typeform.com/to/a1P0cn Alternatively, you can fill out the survey using Tor's self-hosted version of it: https://storm.torproject.org/shared/VpAFK13fdAozTGTolFd2EsT1CkLY8-YlBLbRERy… *# Interview*** The OONI team is currently working on revamping the OONI Probe mobile apps to improve their usability, design, and include some new features based on community requests. By participating in a *10-15 minute interview*, you can gain a sneak peak into the new OONI Probe mobile apps and provide feedback on our mockups. If you're interested in being interviewed, please notify us via the above survey or by emailing me. Learn more through our blog post: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/ooniprobe-ux-survey-and-interviews/ Thanks for your time. Your feedback will help us improve OONI Probe for a global community measuring internet censorship! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New Report: The State of Internet Censorship in Egypt
by Maria Xynou 02 Jul '18

02 Jul '18

Hello, Today OONI and Egypt's AFTE published a joint research report on the state of internet censorship in Egypt. * Full report in English: https://ooni.io/documents/Egypt-Internet-Censorship-AFTE-OONI-2018-07.pdf * Full report in Arabic: https://ooni.io/documents/Egypt-Internet-Censorship-AFTE-OONI-2018-07.AR.pdf * Summary of the report in English: https://ooni.io/post/egypt-internet-censorship/ & https://blog.torproject.org/egypt-internet-censorship * Summary of the report in Arabic: https://ooni.io/documents/summary-egypt-internet-censorship-arabic.pdf You may remember that AFTE previously reported on hundreds of websites being blocked in Egypt. OONI and AFTE have now joined forces. We conducted a comprehensive study based on the analysis of OONI Probe measurements collected from multiple local vantage points over the last year and a half. More than 1,000 URLs presented signs of network interference, 178 of which seem to most likely have been consistently blocked throughout the testing period. The majority of these URLs include media websites, human rights sites, circumvention tools and sites expressing political criticism. More than 100 URLs that belong to media organizations were blocked, even though Egyptian authorities have only officially ordered the blocking of 21 news websites. AFTE interviewed journalists working with Egyptian media organizations whose websites got blocked to examine the impact of censorship. Many Egyptian journalists reported that the censorship has had a severe impact on their work and that some media organizations have been forced to suspend their operations entirely as a result of persisting internet censorship. Egyptian ISPs primarily block sites through the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology that resets connections. In some cases, instead of RST injection, ISPs drop packets, suggesting a variance in filtering rules. In other cases, ISPs interfere with the SSL encrypted traffic between Cloudflare's Point-of-Presence in Cairo and the backend servers of sites (pshiphon.ca, purevpn.com and ultrasawt.com) hosted outside of Egypt. Egyptian ISPs also appear to apply "defense in depth" tactics for network filtering by adding extra layers of censorship, making circumvention harder. This is suggested by the blocking of Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party's (FJP) site, which was blocked by two different middleboxes, as well as by the blocking of numerous circumvention tools. Apart from pervasive levels of internet censorship, Egyptian ISPs were found to hijack unencrypted HTTP connections and inject redirects to ads and cryptocurrency mining scripts. We first detected this back in 2016, when we reported that state-owned Telecom Egypt was hijacking unencrypted connections to porn sites and redirecting them to ads. The Citizen Lab significantly expanded upon this research in their latest Sandvine report. Now, following the analysis of thousands of measurements collected from the last year and a half, we have enough evidence to believe that (many) Egyptian ISPs are carrying out an ad campaign. The affected sites are diverse, including the sites of the Palestinian Prisoner Society, the Women's Initiative for Gender Justice, as well as a number of LGBTQI and Israeli sites. Even the sites of the UN were affected by this ad campaign! We will continue to monitor internet censorship in Egypt and around the world. We therefore welcome any feedback you may have. Thanks for reading! All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report: Unblocking of websites in Ethiopia
by Maria Xynou 29 Jun '18

29 Jun '18

Hello, OONI and Access Now published a joint report today, verifying the unblocking of websites in Ethiopia based on network measurement data. You can read our report here: https://ooni.io/post/ethiopia-unblocking/ We quite rarely see governments unblocking hundreds of websites in one go, and we even more rarely report on the unblocking of sites. Given that Ethiopia has experienced quite pervasive levels of internet censorship over the last decade, the unblocking of sites is a major event. An official list, however, detailing the 264 sites that are reportedly unblocked has not been published yet (to our knowledge). We therefore tested the sites that were previously known to be blocked in Ethiopia (based on our previous research). OONI data shows that most of the sites previously found to be blocked in Ethiopia are now indeed unblocked. Many thanks to volunteers running OONI Probe in Ethiopia, thus making this research possible! And thanks for reading! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Reminder: OONI community meeting today
by Maria Xynou 25 Jun '18

25 Jun '18

Hello, I'm sending this email as a reminder that OONI's June community meeting is taking place today (25th June) at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour). Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org (OONI Slack channel) or #ooni on IRC Please add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting here: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting Looking forward to connecting with you soon! Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI Community Meeting: Monday 25th June 2018
by Maria Xynou 21 Jun '18

21 Jun '18

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next week for our monthly community meeting. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel) When: Monday, 25th June 2018 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour) We'd love to hear your thoughts and suggestions on how we can improve our tools and research methodologies. Please add topics that you would like to discuss as part of the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack or IRC any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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New report: Status of Internet Freedom in Nigeria
by Maria Xynou 11 Jun '18

11 Jun '18

Hello, Today OONI and Nigeria's Paradigm Initiative published a joint research report: "Tightening the Noose on Freedom of Expression: 2018 Status of Internet Freedom in Nigeria". * Full report: https://ooni.torproject.org/documents/nigeria-report.pdf * Summary: https://ooni.torproject.org/documents/nigeria-report-summary.pdf * OONI censorship findings: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/nigeria-internet-censorship/ This report examines surveillance and internet censorship in Nigeria, the latter based on OONI Probe network measurements: https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/NG Most of the sites found to be blocked are associated with content on the secession agitations for Biafra in Eastern Nigeria. These sites were blocked by (at least) 3 Nigerian ISPs: MTN, Globacom, and Airtel. MTN appears to be blocking sites by means of DNS tampering, while Globacom blocks sites by means of TCP/IP blocking, and Airtel by means of HTTP blocking. News outlet naij.com was temporarily blocked in November 2017, but has since become accessible. Most sites and services appear to have been accessible in Nigeria throughout the testing period, including popular communications platforms like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, and circumvention tools like Tor. Thanks for reading! All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research and Partnerships Coordinator Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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