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OONI Community Meeting tomorrow: 26th November 2019
by Maria Xynou 25 Nov '19

25 Nov '19

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us tomorrow for our monthly community meeting. => Where? OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC: ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni) => When? Tuesday, 26th November 2019 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 15:00 UTC) The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and hope you can join us! Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack/IRC on any other day! All the best, ~ OONI team -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Report on Iran's internet blackout
by Maria Xynou 23 Nov '19

23 Nov '19

Hello, In collaboration with CAIDA/IODA and Iranian community members (Kandoo), we co-published a research report which shares measurement data and technical observations on Iran's internet blackout. Our report is available here: https://ooni.org/post/2019-iran-internet-blackout/ Iran’s nation-wide Internet blackout is confirmed by several data sources, such as IODA, Google traffic data, and Oracle’s Internet Intelligence data. These data sources show that the Internet blackout in Iran started on 16th November 2019 and has been ongoing. As of 21st November 2019 (and more drastically from 23rd November 2019), Internet connectivity is being restored in Iran. IODA data shows that Iranian cellular operators were disconnected first on 16th November 2019 (followed by almost all other operators over the next 5 hours), and that ISPs appear to have used diverse mechanisms to enforce the blackout. By analyzing packet captures from the MCCI (AS197207) network, we found that a RST packet is injected at both ends of the connection. During the blackout, most Iranians were barred from connecting to the global Internet, but they still had access to Iran’s national intranet: the domestic network hosting Iranian websites and services. Yet, OONI measurements (which require Internet connectivity) were collected from multiple networks in Iran between 16th November 2019 to 23rd November 2019, showing that the internet blackout was not total. To explore whether and how connectivity to the Internet could be possible from Iran during the blackout, we performed manual testing locally. We found that DNS tunneling could possibly be a low bandwidth solution to get network traffic to leave Iran. We also found that it was possible to connect to the Internet by using virtual private servers (VPS) to setup a local proxy in Iran and use that proxy to tunnel traffic to another proxy outside Iran. Please share this report with your networks: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1198321792076701696 Thank you, ~ OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI workshop slides
by Maria Xynou 14 Nov '19

14 Nov '19

Hello friends, First, I'd like to thank those of you who have been facilitating OONI workshops over the last years, engaging communities far and wide with OONI Probe and censorship measurement research. We really appreciate your important work! To support your efforts and encourage others to facilitate OONI workshops too, we have published some OONI workshop slides that you can use: https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1UAxGeF1NhCXc8pT7cfWTp0NPdkWB5LInBkG… We have published these OONI workshop slides on Google Slides so that you can: * download the slides in the format of your choice * edit and customize the slides (so that they're more relevant to your local context and to the needs of the communities you teach) You can also find the OONI workshop slides via the Get Involved section of the OONI website: https://ooni.org/get-involved/ We hope you find these workshop slides useful and feel encouraged/inspired to teach your local communities! Feedback is very much appreciated, and I'm happy to address any questions you may have (particularly since not all slides are self-explanatory). If anyone else would like to share their OONI workshop slides, that too is of course encouraged! :) Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Report on blocking of abortion sites
by Maria Xynou 29 Oct '19

29 Oct '19

Hello, Today, in collaboration with Coding Rights and Women on Waves / Women on Web, OONI jointly published a report examining the blocking of abortion rights websites womenonwaves.org and womenonweb.org around the world. You can read our research report here: https://ooni.org/post/2019-blocking-abortion-rights-websites-women-on-waves… We were quite recently told that the website of the abortion rights non-governmental organization womeonwaves.org, which provides reproductive health services and education to women in countries with restrictive abortion laws, was inaccessible in Brazil. To check whether womenonwaves.org is blocked in Brazil and in other countries, we analyzed OONI measurements from around the world. As part of our analysis, we also checked whether womenonweb.org - the sister organization of womenonwaves.org - is blocked around the world too. In this report, we share OONI data confirming the blocking of womenonwaves.org in Brazil, as well as in Iran and Turkey. We also share OONI data on the blocking of womeononweb.org in South Korea, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. We corroborated OONI findings by looking at Censored Planet data (https://censoredplanet.org/) as well, shared in the report. To monitor the accessibility of womenonwaves.org and womeonweb.org in your country: 1. Install the OONI Probe mobile app: https://ooni.org/install/ 2. Open this OONI Run link with your OONI Probe mobile app (not with a web browser): https://run.ooni.io/nettest?tn=web_connectivity&ta=%7B%22urls%22%3A%5B%22ht… 3. Tap “Run” to test womenonwaves.org and womeonweb.org (ensure your VPN is turned-off) You will then find the results in the Test Results section of your OONI Probe mobile app. The results will also automatically be published on OONI Explorer (https://explorer.ooni.org/) within 24 hours (unless if you disable publication in the app settings). Please share the report with your networks: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1189146571780304904 Thank you, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Targeted testing of specific types of websites
by Maria Xynou 25 Oct '19

25 Oct '19

Hello, Often when censorship events emerge (leading up to or during political events, such as protests or elections), social media, news media, and VPN sites are among the websites commonly blocked. To enable the testing of specific types of websites, we have set up a page which includes OONI testing buttons: https://ooni.org/get-involved/run/ If you have the OONI Probe mobile app installed, tap on each button in that page (https://ooni.org/get-involved/run/), open it with your OONI Probe mobile app (not with a web browser), and tap "Run". That's all. :) We hope that this can be useful for rapid response to emergent censorship events! To test different websites or to create different testing buttons (like the ones in the page shared above), use the OONI Run platform: https://run.ooni.io/ Please share the page (and the testing buttons) with your networks: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1187686984556396544 Thank you, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Report: Egypt blocks BBC and Alhurra
by Maria Xynou 26 Sep '19

26 Sep '19

Hello, In collaboration with community members in Egypt, OONI just published a report on the blocking of BBC and Alhurra in Egypt: https://ooni.org/post/2019-egypt-blocks-bbc-and-alhurra/ We share network measurement data on: * Blocking of BBC: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2019-09-26&domain=www.bbc.com&probe_… * Blocking of Alhurra: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2019-09-26&domain=www.alhurra.com&pr… We corroborated OONI measurements by performing manual curl tests with the help of our local partners, the findings of which we share in the report. We found that Egyptian ISPs are using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology that is aware of TLS and which is most likely fingerprinting the SNI field of the TLS handshake. Both bbc.com and alhurra.com could therefore benefit from supporting Encrypted SNI on their backend servers to enable censorship circumvention (at least for Firefox users). As more protests are planned tomorrow, there is the risk that further censorship events may be triggered in Egypt. You can track any potential new censorship events by digging through measurements contributed by OONI Probe users in Egypt: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2019-09-26&probe_cc=EG To check for blocked sites in Egypt, here are all the ones that present anomalies: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2019-09-26&probe_cc=EG&only=anomalies => this is automatically updated every day with new results (but there may be some false positives) Please share with your networks: https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1177294075948650499 Thanks, ~ OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday, 24th September 2019
by Maria Xynou 23 Sep '19

23 Sep '19

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Tuesday for our monthly community meeting. => Where? OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC: ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni) => When? Tuesday, 24th September 2019 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 15:00 UTC) The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and hope you can join us! Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack/IRC on any other day! All the best, ~ OONI team -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Launched: Next Generation OONI Explorer!
by Maria Xynou 12 Sep '19

12 Sep '19

Hello, Today, the OONI team is thrilled to announce the public launch of the revamped, next generation OONI Explorer! Access the new OONI Explorer here: https://explorer.ooni.org/ Learn what's new in OONI Explorer 2.0: https://ooni.org/post/next-generation-ooni-explorer/ OONI Explorer is an open data resource on internet censorship around the world. Since 2012, OONI Probe users (https://ooni.io/install/) have contributed 280 million measurements from 18,000 networks in 233 countries -- all of which are available on OONI Explorer. And every day, OONI Explorer gets updated with new measurements from around the world! Our goal with the revamp is to improve OONI Explorer's usability and to support more advanced search functionalities in order to simplify and enable the process of exploring measurements and discovering censorship events. With the new OONI Explorer Search Tool, you can filter measurements to view: * Confirmed blocked websites * Websites whose testing presented anomalies * Measurements collected on different networks (i.e. filter based on ASN) With the new OONI Explorer Country Pages, you can: * Gain an overview of internet censorship in each country (based on OONI measurements) * View the most recently confirmed blocked sites * View the average speed and performance of tested networks * Check whether Tor is blocked * View charts with detailed stats on measurement coverage * Compare internet censorship, speed and performance, across networks within each country We encourage you to dig through OONI Explorer measurements and to uncover evidence of internet censorship worldwide! We thank OONI Probe users for contributing measurements, we thank community members for participating in usability studies and for sharing feedback for the improvement of OONI Explorer, and we thank Mozilla for supporting the revamp of OONI Explorer (via Mozilla Open Source Support). Please share the new OONI Explorer with your networks. Warm thanks, ~ OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI hardware?
by ilf 04 Sep '19

04 Sep '19

Friends, I do quite some traveling, including to regions and countries that could benefit from (another) OONI probe. However, I have not really found a good way to actually put OONI to use. The main reason is: all my devices heavily use VPNs and Tor. Have you ever thought about some tiny OONI hardware probe? I for one would love an small device, for example powered by PoE and getting uplink via ethernet, or powered by USB and getting uplink via WLAN. Something like a RIPE Atlas Probe: https://atlas.ripe.net/docs/probe-v2/ Three ideas come to mind: 1. Someone probably already hack up something like this on a Raspberry Pi or similar. Can someone point me to this? 2. Time and money are limited, and having something like this as a "product" needs both. But something like this could also vastly increase the amount of probes. The Android App already drastically lowered the bar to running a probe. But some dongle one would just have to plug in somewhere would lower that even more. And if cheap enough, they could just be left in interesting places. 3. RIPE Atlas Probes serve a different purpose. But has anyone ever talked to RIPE NCC about the possibility of maybe running OONI on them? I'd love to hear your thougths. I'm pretty sure others thought about this before. Best -- ilf If you upload your address book to "the cloud", I don't want to be in it.

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Ethiopia report on ongoing censorship events
by Maria Xynou 14 Aug '19

14 Aug '19

Hello, Today, OONI - in collaboration with Moses Karanja and Berhan Taye - published a research report documenting ongoing censorship events in Ethiopia, titled: "Resurgence of Internet Censorship in Ethiopia: Blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook, and African Arguments" You can read the report here: https://ooni.io/post/resurgence-internet-censorship-ethiopia-2019/ This report is a follow-up to our previous study, which documented the blocking of WhatsApp and Telegram in Ethiopia in mid-June 2019: https://ooni.io/post/ethiopia-whatsapp-telegram/ Following the latest internet blackout (between 22nd to 27th June 2019), Ethio Telecom has resumed to blocking social media -- but this time they blocked access to Facebook Messenger and facebook.com, instead of Telegram. OONI network measurement data shows that the blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and facebook.com in Ethiopia is ongoing. OONI data also shows that africanarguments.org (a pan-African platform covering investigative stories) is currently blocked by means of DNS tampering on mobile networks (but it's accessible on fixed-line networks). The political reforms of 2018 (and the associated unblocking of websites) were promising, but Ethiopia now seems to be sliding back to old ways when internet censorship was a pervasive practice. This study can be expanded upon through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.io/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.io/data/). ~ Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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