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OONI Community Meeting: Friday, 31st May 2019
by Maria Xynou 30 May '19

30 May '19

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Friday for our monthly community meeting. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel) When: Friday, 31st May 2019 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 15:00 UTC) The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and hope you can join us! Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack or IRC (#ooni) on any other day! All the best, ~ OONI team -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Nigeria report: Measuring internet censorship during 2019 elections
by Maria Xynou 29 May '19

29 May '19

Hello, Today OONI and Nigeria's Paradigm Initiative jointly published a research report examining information controls during Nigeria's 2019 elections. We have published two versions of this report: * Nigeria's 2019 elections through the lens of network measurements: https://ooni.io/post/2019-nigeria-internet-censorship/ (focusing on OONI analysis) * Nigeria's 2019 elections through the lens of digital rights: https://paradigmhq.org/download/the-2019-nigerian-elections-through-the-len… (includes full PDF with broader digital rights analysis) Thousands of OONI measurements collected from 16 different ASNs between 1st February 2019 to 31st March 2019 suggest that major internet services were accessible in Nigeria throughout the 2019 general elections. Most of the tested websites were found to be accessible, while popular instant messaging platforms, WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, were working as well. However, a number of sites hosting content associated to the Biafra secessionist movement remained blocked. Recent OONI measurements show that Globacom continues to block these sites by means of TCP/IP blocking, MTN by means of DNS tampering, and Airtel at the HTTP layer. This is strongly suggested by the fact that the same network anomalies (in comparison to last year) are observed on the same networks with regards to the testing of the same list of sites. Out of more than a thousand URLs tested in total, only sites associated to Biafra consistently presented network anomalies throughout the testing period. You can expand upon this study through the use of OONI Probe (https://ooni.io/install/) and OONI data (https://ooni.io/data/) which is openly available. Best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Beta testing of new OONI Explorer
by Maria Xynou 17 May '19

17 May '19

Hello, The OONI team will launch a sparkling, brand new OONI Explorer in June 2019! Thanks to great feedback provided by the community, the OONI team has been working on revamping OONI Explorer entirely. To further improve upon OONI Explorer before the stable release (public launch), we invite you to test the OONI Explorer beta and to report any bugs/issues. # Beta of OONI Explorer Access the beta of the revamped OONI Explorer here: https://explorer-beta.ooni.io/ # Reporting issues Once you have played around with the OONI Explorer beta, we encourage you to report any issues you encounter. You can file tickets on the following GitHub repository: https://github.com/ooni/explorer/issues Please check if the problem you are encountering has already been reported. If you’re not a GitHub user, you can share your feedback with us by: * Writing an email to bugs(a)openobservatory.org or * Clicking on the icon on the bottom right corner in the OONI Explorer beta (https://explorer-beta.ooni.io/) and submitting your feedback via the pop-up form Your feedback and bug reporting is hugely appreciated, as it will help us launch a better OONI Explorer for the community! Thanks a million, and happy testing! ~ The OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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China now blocks all language editions of Wikipedia - OONI report
by Maria Xynou 06 May '19

06 May '19

Hello, Over the last few weeks, China started blocking all language editions of Wikipedia. We share OONI data on the blocking via our latest report: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/ Thanks to our local collaborators, we were able to publish a Chinese version of the report as well: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking.zh/ You can also find the report published on iYouPort: https://www.iyouport.org/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/ Previously, Chinese ISPs only blocked the Chinese language edition of Wikipedia (zh.wikipedia.org) Now, they are blocking all language editions of *.wikipedia.org (in addition to zh.wikinews.org) by means of both DNS injection and SNI filtering (which could perhaps be viewed as a form of "defense in depth" tactic for network filtering, as they create multiple layers of censorship that make circumvention harder). OONI measurements show blocking of all wikipedia.org sub-domains from 25th April 2019 onwards. Regards, OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Report on social media blocking & internet blackout in Benin
by Maria Xynou 01 May '19

01 May '19

Hello, OONI & IODA collaborated on a joint report which shares network measurement data on the recent censorship events that occurred in Benin during its elections. We share OONI data and Ripe Atlas measurements which show the blocking of social media in Benin on 28th April 2019, as well as IODA data which shows that an internet blackout occurred on 4 large ASes in Benin. You can find our report here: https://ooni.io/post/2019-benin-social-media-blocking/ All the best, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI community meeting tomorrow, 30th April 2019
by Maria Xynou 29 Apr '19

29 Apr '19

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us tomorrow for our monthly community meeting. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel) When: Tuesday, 30th April 2019 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 15:00 UTC) The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and hope you can join us! Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack or IRC (#ooni) on any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ OONI team -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday, 26th March 2019
by Maria Xynou 25 Mar '19

25 Mar '19

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Tuesday for our monthly community meeting. Where: https://slack.openobservatory.org/ (OONI Slack channel) When: Tuesday, 26th March 2019 at 14:00 UTC (for 1 hour, until 15:00 UTC) The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We'd love to meet you and hear from you, and hope you can join us! Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting If you're not able to join us, please feel encouraged to join us on Slack or IRC (#ooni) on any other day! Looking forward to connecting with you soon! All the best, ~ OONI team -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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(no subject)
by Willie Wonka 27 Feb '19

27 Feb '19

I have been fighting hackers in Lubbock, TX for over a year. On my parents property sits an AT&T tower #. . All of our computers, wifi, media devices, cell phones, Bluetooth devices have been compromised. There have been attempts on my life because I have uncovered a large scale Stingray Operation taking place in Lubbock. Our phones somehow have the firmware overwritten and there are hidden root files and external storages we have not set up. Our residences and vehicles are getting raided when we leave them for a short period of time. Nothing is ever taken, but items are out of place and doors ajar that were previously closed or vice versa. Attempts to capture video footage is fruitless because even phones without Sim cards sync to Bluetooth and wifi and data is uploaded and downloaded at will, but never our will. Countless accounts have been blocked and information and photos forevet lost due to these malicious individuals. I highly suspect that on our property sits a device, Femtocell, that dupes anyones devices in the vicinity as to the cell site being legitimate. We have found cell phones not belonging to us hidden on shelves with charged batteries and active Sim cards, upon pulling out a Sim card our wifi suddenly crashes and our Direct TV blinks out. Calls are misdirected or dropped when attempting to notify authorities or seek a cessation of these hostilities against our family. Vehicles at all times of the night pull onto the property next to ours and if I try to approach they speed away. During the day vehicles stop on the road in front of our residence and business while engrossed on their phones, the suspicion of these acts are that they always transpire in a certain area or "zone" and Wiggle WiFi, AIMSCID, Ooni Probe and other applications show that we are being middled and it is affecting not only us but neighbors and even residents in a town called Slaton that is about twenty miles away. Recent phone discoveries show that this has been actively going on since 2014, and some Metadata I discovered in our pictures points to possibly 2009 or earlier. I am no hacker, nor a penetration tester, and my knowledge of firmwares, kernels, IMEIs, Metadata, Apps and Apks were non existent until a year ago I decided to look into why our wifi and cell coverage was so lousy. Since that time I have spent countless sleepless nights studying and observing, frustrated and alone piecing together the anamolies and gathering data as I went even if it made no sense to me, I knew it would to others. Two attempts were made to put a stop to my persistence and stubbornness. Both times officials have worked to keep attention away from obvious terroristic acts and attempted murder. I stand with a banner that shouts, "Anonimity and Freedom!" Currently I stand alone, beaten and tired but far from defeated. Whatever the outcome my one year old son will see the stand I chose to take despite the odds. Adrift in the matrix Adrift in the matrix

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Cuba report on media censorship amid constitutional referendum
by Maria Xynou 26 Feb '19

26 Feb '19

Hello, We published a new research report on the blocking of independent media in Cuba amid the constitutional referendum last Sunday: https://ooni.torproject.org/post/cuba-referendum/ Some key findings include: * Independent media Tremenda Nota (which covers women's rights, LGBTQI and other human rights issues in Cuba) was blocked on the eve of the referendum * We observe that many other independent media websites (which have been pushing for a "no" vote) were blocked leading up to and during the referendum as well * Cuba's only ISP (ETECSA) has changed its censorship techniques: they have switched from serving blank block pages to now implementing IP-based blocking, thus censoring access to websites that support HTTPS as well * ETECSA continues though to serve blank block pages for sites that have not added HTTPS support * Some media sites may have previously been blocked by Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology, but they are now IP-blocked * Some media sites were temporarily unblocked in January 2019 (and the means of blocking changed thereafter), suggesting that ETECSA may have made changes to its censorship equipment around that time In the report, we share a graph (based on openly available OONI data) which shows how the blocking of media changed in Cuba over the last ~2 years. It seems that the OONI website (ooni.io) is now blocked in Cuba as well, but ooni.torproject.org remains accessible. We thank OONI Probe users in Cuba who made this study possible! All the best, OONI team. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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Funded opportunity to work on test lists
by Maria Xynou 21 Feb '19

21 Feb '19

Hey folks, A fellow community member has set up a new project which aims to improve upon the Citizen Lab test lists => i.e. the lists of websites tested for censorship by OONI Probe and other censorship measurement tools. They are now seeking to hire researchers who can work part-time to review and improve upon certain test lists: https://telegra.ph/Internet-Censorship-Researchers-02-15 Specifically, they're looking for researchers to work on the test lists for several MENA countries, China, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Details are provided in the link above. The deadline to apply to do research for the MENA countries is Monday, 25th February 2019, while the deadline for the other countries is 17th March 2019. Cheers, Maria. -- Maria Xynou Research & Partnerships Director Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) https://ooni.torproject.org/ PGP Key Fingerprint: 2DC8 AFB6 CA11 B552 1081 FBDE 2131 B3BE 70CA 417E

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