- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Is this next bad exit trick?
by lists＠for-privacy.net 14 Oct '20

14 Oct '20

Wtf, this exit has addresses that do not belong to it! https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/385527185E26937D05E0933DD29F… I'm very sure there are only nifty rabbits on the 185.220.101.0/24 subnet! -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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Relay JPsi2 not getting into consensus anymore
by Random Tor Node Operator 14 Oct '20

14 Oct '20

Hi all, some weeks ago, my relay JPsi2 (F6EC46933CE8D4FAD5CCDAA8B1C5A377685FC521) started experiencing moderate stability problems. It would freeze after a few hours or days. The provider said it was due to Spectre mitigations and the only way for me to fix this would be to switch to a newer (more expensive) plan... Some time later I did so and reinstalled it with Ubuntu 18.04 and placed the old keys into the new installation. It seems they are now expected to be in /var/lib/tor/.tor/keys, as opposed to /var/lib/tor/keys as I was used to in Ubuntu 16.04. However, it does not seem to be making it into the consensus anymore. Only the authority nodes moria1, dizum, and longclaw vote for Running. The others don't. So far I haven't been able to figure out the reason for that, so any help is appreciated. Here is part of the output of journalctl -u tor and the torrc file: Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus. Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 8 days 0:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 54.04 MB and received 163.30 MB. Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] While bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 9368438 (server descriptor fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 1060775 (consensus network-status fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 13332 (authority cert fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 2762395 (microdescriptor fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] While not bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 111548029 (server descriptor fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 100899 (server descriptor upload) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 15307429 (consensus network-status fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 1785 (authority cert fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] 942746 (microdescriptor fetch) Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 96.710%. TLS write overhead: 31% Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 1/1 TAP, 0/0 NTor. Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] Since startup we initiated 0 and received 0 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 2 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 114 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 1899 v4 connections; initiated 46 and received 5694 v5 connections. Oct 11 15:04:32 j60204.servers.jiffybox.net tor[11183]: Oct 11 15:04:32.000 [notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0 connections closed. 0 single hop clients refused. 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Oct 11 18:14:03 j60204.servers. # cat /etc/tor/torrc OfflineMasterKey 1 SOCKSPort 0 SOCKSPolicy reject * RunAsDaemon 1 ControlPort 9051 HashedControlPassword 16:28CD63819CB35660601EB9CED4BC2A4252D3DB80488DFD4F22CA4AE930 ORPort 9001 ORPort [2a00:1158:3::1ba]:9001 Nickname JPsi2 RelayBandwidthRate 12500 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 12500 KB ContactInfo 0xF1ADC390 Random Tor Node Operator <tor at unterderbruecke (dot) de> bitcoin:1LBoEppezy2HauE957HzfFn9UGywK6aboB DirPort 9030 MyFamily $B198C0B4B8C551F174FBB841A172616E3DB3124D, $F6EC46933CE8D4FAD5CCDAA8B1C5A377685FC521 IPv6Exit 0 ExitPolicy reject *:* ExitPolicy reject6 *:*

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Riseup invite code
by lists＠for-privacy.net 09 Oct '20

09 Oct '20

Hiho rise up members, I would like to receive the mails for my hosted Tor relays, such as support tickets from my provider, via Riseup. Can one of the Riseup.net users on this list send me an invite code? Right on me, not in the list ;-) mailto:admin@for-privacy.net or my lists address -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom!

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Malicious Tor relays - post-analysis after two months
by Corl3ss 07 Oct '20

07 Oct '20

Hello, This summer Nusenu shared his posts about malicious relays [1][2] and it was followed by many answers. A very important is Roger's one [3] explaining that the malicious relays have been kicked out of the network and that any new one should be reported. I was wondering if, with some distance with this summer situation / discussion : * new malicious relays have been reported in any way ? * vigilance / watchfulness is still needed ? if yes : * is there specific cases to share (e.g. nodes that block HTTPS on a site or redirect to HTTP ?) * any concern to have on other protocols that use SSL (imaps, smtps, ssh) ? * is there / will there be things implemented as a conclusion of the "call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks" ? * has it been possible to prepare / set up precautions to avoid this king of situation or it is a too long shot for such a problem ? These questions come with a lot of respect for the project, its teams and the work done. No critics, it is just made to update the knowloedge on the subject as these questions came back with other friends and relay operators. And perhaps a last one, perhaps specific for Nusenu : how do you define a malicious relay ? Sorry but I did not get that precisely, moreover in big group analysis. All answers will be read with care and gratitude ! --- Corl3ss 2042 5D39 E7C1 E657 025E A28F 937D 8A90 FCB0 E24A [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-July/018643.html [2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-August/018817.html [3] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-August/018845.html

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question
by prizzz＠Safe-mail.net 05 Oct '20

05 Oct '20

Hello. Why is my Consensus Weight constantly changing? What factors influence its change? Thanks in advance for your reply =))

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Reconfiguring a middle relay as a bridge
by torix＠protonmail.com 30 Sep '20

30 Sep '20

Is there a security problem with turning a middle relay, whose ip address is known, into a bridge? TIA, --Torix Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus.
by Fran 27 Sep '20

27 Sep '20

Hello, I'm taking care of a server of a friend who's on holiday. The server is up and running but not part of the consensus. As beeing instructed I updated to the lastest OpenBSD snapshot when I saw that a new tor release is available (Tor 0.4.3.5 on OpenBSD). Excerpts from the log: Jul 13 20:04:02.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Jul 13 20:05:02.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. Jul 13 20:05:35.000 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done. Jul 14 02:04:01.000 [notice] Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus. Jul 14 02:04:01.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 6:00 hours, with 0 circuits open. I've sent 2.04 MB and received 6.25 MB. Jul 14 02:04:01.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 12.450%. TLS write overhead: 33% Jul 14 02:04:01.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 0/0 TAP, 5/5 NTor. Jul 14 02:04:01.000 [notice] Since startup we initiated 0 and received 157 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 5 v4 connections; initiated 48 and received 124 v5 connections. Jul 14 02:04:01.000 [notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0 connections closed. 0 single hop clients refused. 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Jul 14 06:04:02.000 [notice] Your relay has a very large number of connections to other relays. Is your outbound address the same as your relay address? Found 9 connections to 6 relays. Found 4 current canonical connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. 3 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and 0 had more than 4 connections. Jul 14 08:04:01.000 [notice] Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus. Jul 14 08:04:01.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 12:00 hours, with 1 circuits open. I've sent 3.46 MB and received 11.22 MB. Jul 14 08:04:01.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 12.450%. TLS write overhead: 47% Jul 14 08:04:01.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2/2 TAP, 1/1 NTor. Jul 14 08:04:01.000 [notice] Since startup we initiated 0 and received 340 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 10 v4 connections; initiated 57 and received 246 v5 connections. Jul 14 08:04:01.000 [notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0 connections closed. 0 single hop clients refused. 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Jul 14 14:04:01.000 [notice] Heartbeat: It seems like we are not in the cached consensus. Jul 14 14:04:01.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 18:00 hours, with 1 circuits open. I've sent 4.89 MB and received 15.33 MB. Jul 14 14:04:01.000 [notice] Average packaged cell fullness: 26.760%. TLS write overhead: 51% Jul 14 14:04:01.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 2/2 TAP, 6/6 NTor. Jul 14 14:04:01.000 [notice] Since startup we initiated 0 and received 493 v1 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v2 connections; initiated 0 and received 0 v3 connections; initiated 0 and received 18 v4 connections; initiated 64 and received 370 v5 connections. Jul 14 14:04:01.000 [notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0 connections closed. 0 single hop clients refused. 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Atlas show the server as down: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AC601DBDB7FBD53454045EDC08DA… Accessing the status page on port 80 works. No FW on the machine. Any ideas? Thanks and regards Fran

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Exit not utilizing full bandwidth
by 4punk7＠mailbox.org 26 Sep '20

26 Sep '20

Hi, i am running a tor exit node for over 2 years now and it's just using around 1.7 MiB/s of a 100 MBit/s connection. My other relays (not exits) from the same hoster (same bandwidth) are using around 10 MiB/s (which is the rate I expect). I have tried to limit the bandwithrate, set no limits, adding IPv6 and also excluding relays from overseas (i'm located in Germany). Nothing happened. CPU is around 10%... Any idea how to speed up the exit ? Thanks, apunkt Tor Version is 0.4.2.7, here is my current torrc: /var/log/tor/notices.log RunAsDaemon 1 DataDirectory /var/lib/tor ControlPort 9051 ORPort 1234 ORPort [2a0a:51c0::103]:9001 Nickname 4punk7e1 RelayBandwidthRate 100 MBytes # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) RelayBandwidthBurst 100 MBytes # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb) MyFamily $CEFBCB5FCE5FB37784AD489BCDEC46F1D59C06CB,$ABA31795BAD2AB8097F3AD0FE1A9 20E518D3D3F3 ExitRelay 1 IPv6Exit 1 ExitPolicy reject6 *:22 ExitPolicy reject6 *:587 #ExitPolicy reject6 *:* ExitPolicy accept *:20-21 # FTP #ExitPolicy accept *:22 # SSH ExitPolicy accept *:23 # Telnet ExitPolicy accept *:43 # WHOIS ExitPolicy accept *:53 # DNS ExitPolicy accept *:79 # finger ExitPolicy accept *:80-81 # HTTP ExitPolicy accept *:88 # kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:110 # POP3 ExitPolicy accept *:143 # IMAP ExitPolicy accept *:194 # IRC ExitPolicy accept *:220 # IMAP3 ExitPolicy accept *:389 # LDAP ExitPolicy accept *:443 # HTTPS ExitPolicy accept *:464 # kpasswd ExitPolicy accept *:465 # URD for SSM (more often: an alternative SUBMISSION port, see 587) ExitPolicy accept *:531 # IRC/AIM ExitPolicy accept *:543-544 # Kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:554 # RTSP ExitPolicy accept *:563 # NNTP over SSL #ExitPolicy accept *:587 # SUBMISSION (authenticated clients [MUA's like Thunderbird] send mail over STARTTLS SMTP here) ExitPolicy accept *:636 # LDAP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:706 # SILC ExitPolicy accept *:749 # kerberos ExitPolicy accept *:853 # DNS over TLS ExitPolicy accept *:873 # rsync ExitPolicy accept *:902-904 # VMware ExitPolicy accept *:981 # Remote HTTPS management for firewall ExitPolicy accept *:989-990 # FTP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:991 # Netnews Administration System ExitPolicy accept *:992 # TELNETS ExitPolicy accept *:993 # IMAP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:994 # IRCS ExitPolicy accept *:995 # POP3 over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:1194 # OpenVPN ExitPolicy accept *:1220 # QT Server Admin ExitPolicy accept *:1293 # PKT-KRB-IPSec ExitPolicy accept *:1500 # VLSI License Manager ExitPolicy accept *:1533 # Sametime ExitPolicy accept *:1677 # GroupWise ExitPolicy accept *:1723 # PPTP ExitPolicy accept *:1755 # RTSP ExitPolicy accept *:1863 # MSNP ExitPolicy accept *:2082 # Infowave Mobility Server ExitPolicy accept *:2083 # Secure Radius Service (radsec) ExitPolicy accept *:2086-2087 # GNUnet, ELI ExitPolicy accept *:2095-2096 # NBX ExitPolicy accept *:2102-2104 # Zephyr ExitPolicy accept *:3128 # SQUID ExitPolicy accept *:3389 # MS WBT ExitPolicy accept *:3690 # SVN ExitPolicy accept *:4321 # RWHOIS ExitPolicy accept *:4643 # Virtuozzo ExitPolicy accept *:5050 # MMCC ExitPolicy accept *:5190 # ICQ ExitPolicy accept *:5222-5223 # XMPP, XMPP over SSL ExitPolicy accept *:5228 # Android Market ExitPolicy accept *:5900 # VNC ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6669 # IRC ExitPolicy accept *:6679 # IRC SSL ExitPolicy accept *:6697 # IRC SSL ExitPolicy accept *:8000 # iRDMI ExitPolicy accept *:8008 # HTTP alternate ExitPolicy accept *:8074 # Gadu-Gadu ExitPolicy accept *:8080 # HTTP Proxies ExitPolicy accept *:8082 # HTTPS Electrum Bitcoin port ExitPolicy accept *:8087-8088 # Simplify Media SPP Protocol, Radan HTTP ExitPolicy accept *:8232-8233 # Zcash ExitPolicy accept *:8332-8333 # Bitcoin ExitPolicy accept *:8443 # PCsync HTTPS ExitPolicy accept *:8888 # HTTP Proxies, NewsEDGE ExitPolicy accept *:9418 # git ExitPolicy accept *:9999 # distinct ExitPolicy accept *:10000 # Network Data Management Protocol ExitPolicy accept *:11371 # OpenPGP hkp (http keyserver protocol) ExitPolicy accept *:19294 # Google Voice TCP ExitPolicy accept *:19638 # Ensim control panel ExitPolicy accept *:50002 # Electrum Bitcoin SSL ExitPolicy accept *:64738 # Mumble ExitPolicy reject *:* ExcludeNodes {US},{CA}

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"Your server (xxxx:443) has not managed to confirm that its ORPort is reachable."
by Pham Minh Duc 23 Sep '20

23 Sep '20

I see this in syslog: Your server (xxxx:443) has not managed to confirm that its ORPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc. torrc: Nickname Contake ORPort 443 ExitRelay 0 SocksPort 0 ControlSocket 0 ContactInfo contakechuyennghicmt(a)gmail.com What happened and how to fix this?

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Who am I?
by Kencf0618＠riseup.net 22 Sep '20

22 Sep '20

Whatever the torrc, with "Tor" I get Sep 18 08:02:12.538 [notice] Tor 0.3.2.10 (git-0edaa32732ec8930) running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.2, and Libzstd 1.3.3. Sep 18 08:02:12.538 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning Sep 18 08:02:12.538 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". Sep 18 08:02:12.542 [notice] Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 8192 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand. Sep 18 08:02:12.542 [notice] Scheduler type KIST has been enabled. Sep 18 08:02:12.542 [notice] Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:443 Sep 18 08:02:12.542 [warn] Could not bind to 0.0.0.0:443: Permission denied Sep 18 08:02:12.542 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to bind one of the listener ports. Sep 18 08:02:12.542 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. whereas with "sudo Tor" (yeah, yeah, I know, I know -"bad form") I get ep 18 08:04:12.236 [notice] Tor 0.3.2.10 (git-0edaa32732ec8930) running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.2, and Libzstd 1.3.3. Sep 18 08:04:12.236 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning Sep 18 08:04:12.237 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". Sep 18 08:04:12.240 [notice] Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 8192 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand. Sep 18 08:04:12.240 [notice] Scheduler type KIST has been enabled. Sep 18 08:04:12.240 [notice] Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:443 Sep 18 08:04:12.241 [warn] /home/kenneth/.tor is not owned by this user (root, 0) but by kenneth (1000). Perhaps you are running Tor as the wrong user? Sep 18 08:04:12.241 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Couldn't access/create private data directory "/home/kenneth/.tor" Sep 18 08:04:12.241 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. What is happening?

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