- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

torrc, unit files, confusion
by Martin Gebhardt 18 Feb '22

18 Feb '22

Hello together, I've gotten myself stuck in a situation that I can't get out of. The following: I have a working relay. You can find the config for it in the attachment [1]. I want to move parts of the config. So I use %include. I don't do anything else than moving parts of the working config to other files. There are no changes at all. But, tor does not start anymore.In the attachment [2] you can find the config with %include. The folder structure is the following: ├── info.html ├── rc.d │ ├── contact.rc │ ├── family.rc │ └── nickname.rc ├── torrc └── torsocks.conf No matter what I do, I can't get it to enable debug logs when I start tor from the unit file. This is unchanged, but I attached it anyway [3]. Anyway, I start tor as root, then everything works [4]. I have no idea where something should be wrong with the permissions. I have also recursively set the permission of /etc/tor/ to the user debian-tor, but it doesn't help. When I do the following: cat rc.d/* >> torrc && sed -i /include/d torrc && systemctl restart tor Everything works fine again. My system: Linux privacy 5.10.0-11-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 5.10.92-1 (2022-01-18) x86_64 GNU/Linux Tor version 0.4.6.9. Tor is running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.12-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1k, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.5, Libzstd 1.4.8 and Glibc 2.33 as libc. Tor compiled with GCC version 10.2.1 Maybe I'm still too tired to figure it out. But please, can someone give me some advice where to look further? Or at least tell me how to get a debug log when I start tor from the systemd-unit. Then I would surely get further. Thanks for your attention and help. -- Martin

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New relay has a problem - Re-used IP blocked in consensus?
by Olaf Grimm 17 Feb '22

17 Feb '22

Hello Tor community! I have some identical new relays, but only one of them has a problem. My intention was an IPv6 problem, so there ist IPV6 diabled at all. Fingerprint: 3F1AE2170CAD31B5694BD9052A2A29E5793BDC1F IP: 107.189.14.123 Ports open: 22, 80, 9001 Test from outside by scanner: ok UFW firewall open ports set to: 22, 80, 9001 torrc: No IPv6 configuration enabled. The same configuration about all relays. With Nyx I can see built circuits, but the relay does not appear in the metrics, but other relays already show strong traffic. Debian system updates are possible, the HTTP frontpage is displayed at the given IP address, DNS 'unbound' ok because updates are possible. Unbound is set to 127.0.0.1 only. Here some logs from Nyx (copy like displayed): 11:18:41 [INFO] find_my_address(): Unable to find our IP address. 11:18:41 [INFO] address_can_be_used(): Address '::1' is a private IP address. Tor relays that use the default DirAuthorities must have public IP addresses. 11:18:41 [INFO] tor_getaddrinfo(): (Sandbox) getaddrinfo succeeded. 11:18:41 [INFO] get_address_from_interface(): Could not get local interface IP address. 11:18:41 [INFO] get_interface_address6_via_udp_socket_hack(): connect() failed: Cannot assign requested address 11:18:41 [INFO] address_can_be_used(): Address '::' is a private IP address. Tor relays that use the default DirAuthorities must have public IP addresses. 11:18:41 [INFO] get_address_from_config(): No Address option found in configuration. 11:18:39 [INFO] update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads(): 0 router descriptors downloadable. 0 delayed; 6795 present (0 of those were in old_routers); 0 would_reject; 0 wouldnt_use; 0 in progress. I can not find what is wrong, but I see "::" what is IPv6. In Debian /etc/sysctl.conf IPv6 is disabled. net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1 Can you help me? Please check the IP in the consensus. Blocked? Olaf

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Help a newbie
by chuck＠relay-security.org 14 Feb '22

14 Feb '22

I have a problem. This relay was running fine until I changed the nickname. After making the change, I ran “tor --verify-config” just to make sure, and then ran “sudo systemctl restart tor@default” I see it running, but the syslog shows: Feb 14 23:31:46 tor1 tor[592]: Feb 14 23:31:46.000 [info] should_delay_dir_fetches(): Delaying dir fetches (Hibernating or shutting down) Feb 14 23:31:47 tor1 tor[592]: Feb 14 23:31:47.000 [info] should_delay_dir_fetches(): Delaying dir fetches (Hibernating or shutting down) Feb 14 23:31:47 tor1 tor[592]: Feb 14 23:31:47.000 [info] should_delay_dir_fetches(): Delaying dir fetches (Hibernating or shutting down) Feb 14 23:31:48 tor1 tor[592]: Feb 14 23:31:48.000 [info] should_delay_dir_fetches(): Delaying dir fetches (Hibernating or shutting down) and on and on .… What have I done wrong? The fqdn is https://tor1.relay-security.org

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Tor installation from Source
by nikoloskid＠pm.me 11 Feb '22

11 Feb '22

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi, My relay is running on Raspberry OS so the updates are a little late for some packages, so my relay is running on obsolote version 0.3.5.15, I installed Tor from source and tor --version gives me Tor version 0.4.6.10. Tor is running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1d, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma N/A, Libzstd N/A and Glibc 2.28 as libc. Tor compiled with GCC version 8.3.0but tor(a)default.service is still running on 0.3.5.15 (I have restarted the service multiple times)... Regards, Daniel Nikoloski Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: ProtonMail wsBzBAEBCAAGBQJiBMpiACEJEAutNI6WgEWAFiEE/jRLdx96gF2z0p05C600 jpaARYCzgQf5AXlzmz1cV38y+/4DMFGMwV74+2acsiAhw8dml1/In34debY1 JgoP6CP+GugKMPAq7JQPvhRF2eVrTYdSN9h0OFrZE3OT45YZWR7uU38MzXd0 NorjBu9lALsE321ocL80igKd+0nXgOofQoWyelaLMRc1YCP8BQLXqv7JLAee 0eZLaHyX8u3OdgyE/ejpbb+7tKzXSkSQZ7vh6e0BEcmQZFXfzEbTuS6jzGQk x8OOYZmF7t4Q1m54NffydyXbQv7hUPYaRFwyMLwdonRl51GFATr+G6vMQqkf QsxxvRQflJ0ANv0cw9oUieMCYXyzrb3oNf9avOucHP477CG6UjwV3A== =m7jC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Legal bases
by Martin Gebhardt 10 Feb '22

10 Feb '22

Hello all, I would like to read about experiences with local laws of various countries. So far I run my exits in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. I have found a provider for me that also covers the following countries and has no problem with Tor exits: - Poland - Australia - Singapore - France My goal is to have a unified website for each country, where you can find links to official websites of the countries with "traffic passing " laws. For AT, DE and NL these are known to me. For the other countries not. Now before I start searching and messing around with translators, I hope someone here has experience in one or more of these countries and can provide with paragraphs. I am grateful for any hint. -- Martin

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Re: [tor-relays] snowflake vs bridges (vs node)
by Fran 08 Feb '22

08 Feb '22

Thanks meskio, this helped a lot to clarify things. So I thought of trying to run a bride and a snowflakeproxy on one VM with individual IP addressing in v4 and v6 for each by adding secondary addresses to to the WAN interface. But after compiling the go binary I fail to find out how to tell snowflake which IP to bind to/use. For the bridge this can be achieved with: Address <IPv4> Address <IPv6> OutboundBindAddress <IPv4> OutboundBindAddress <IPv6> (and maybe to be save also set OutboundBindAddressPT, OutboundBindAddressExit and OutboundBindAddressOR) But for snowflake I'm missing the options: Usage of ./proxy: -broker string broker URL (default "https://snowflake-broker.torproject.net/") -capacity uint maximum concurrent clients -keep-local-addresses keep local LAN address ICE candidates -log string log filename -nat-retest-interval duration the time interval in second before NAT type is retested, 0s disables retest. Valid time units are "s", "m", "h". (default 24h0m0s) -relay string websocket relay URL (default "wss://snowflake.bamsoftware.com/") -stun string broker URL (default "stun:stun.stunprotocol.org:3478") -summary-interval duration the time interval to output summary, 0s disables retest. Valid time units are "s", "m", "h". (default 1h0m0s) -unsafe-logging prevent logs from being scrubbed -verbose increase log verbosity Could be solved with VRFs/namespaces but would involve bridging, veths...too snowflaky for me (same goes for containers). So I guess I'll just keep the bridges and make then relays one day. Thanks for all who helped! best fran On 2/7/22 11:12, meskio wrote > Yes, there are many differencies. snowflake does make the traffic look like > webrtc (like a video conference) and obfs4 makes the traffic look like random > noise. Also the clients use different mechanisms to discover the relays. > > If you run both in the same IP address and the censor has a way to discover one > but not the other both of them will be blocked at once. So you are making it > easier for the censor to discover them and block them. That is why we don't want > people to run both in the same IP address.

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cases where relay overload can be a false positive
by s7r 07 Feb '22

07 Feb '22

Hello, One of my relays (guard, not exit) started to report being overloaded since once week ago for the first time in its life. The consensus weight and advertised bandwidth are proper as per what they should be, considering the relay's configuration. More than this, they have not changed for years. So, I started to look at it more closely. Apparently the overload is triggered at 5-6 days by flooding it with circuit creation requests. All I can see in tor.log is: [warn] Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. [68382 similar message(s) suppressed in last 482700 seconds] [warn] Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. [7882 similar message(s) suppressed in last 60 seconds] This message is logged like 4-5 or 6 time as 1 minute (60 sec) difference between each warn entry. After that, the relay is back to normal. So it feels like it is being probed or something like this. CPU usage is at 65%, RAM is at under 45%, SSD no problem, bandwidth no problem. Metrics port says: tor_relay_load_tcp_exhaustion_total 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="tap",action="processed"} 52073 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="tap",action="dropped"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="fast",action="processed"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="fast",action="dropped"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="processed"} 8069522 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="dropped"} 273275 So if we account the dropped ntor circuits with the processed ntor circuits we end up with a reasonable % (it's >8 million vs <300k). So the question here is: does the computed consensus weight of a relay change if that relay keeps sending reports to directory authorities that it is being overloaded? If yes, could this be triggered by an attacker, in order to arbitrary decrease a relay's consensus weight even when it's not really overloaded (to maybe increase the consensus weights of other malicious relays that we don't know about)? Also, as a side note, I think that if the dropped/processed ratio is not over 15% or 20% a relay should not consider itself overloaded. Would this be a good idea? Sending to tor-relays@ for now, if some of you think of this in any way we can open a thread about it on tor-dev@ - please let me know if I should do this.

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Genereal queations about MyFamily
by Martin Gebhardt 07 Feb '22

07 Feb '22

Hello, I am running some servers in the Tor infrastructure for research reasons and my own (mainly political) interest. I have a few questions, the answer to which would help me a lot at the moment. 1. can someone explain to me how the fingerprint of a Family is created? For example, I have 7 exit relays in a Family, and can't remember how that came about. 1. 2. to simplify the torrc, would it not be advantageous to enter in "MyFamily" not all fingerprints, but only that of the Family as such? Are there already suggestions for this with the developers? If not, which Git would be the most suitable to place my suggestion? I know, then everyone could "join" a family, since another node does not explicitly also include the one in the config. But there will be a solution for that. Like with AROI from nusenu. I explore various possibilities to deanonymize. My motives are solely dedicated to the Tor project. I have configured a bridge and I know that it is also possible to restrict exits. For example via the country code. I have also done that successfully, but: 2. 1. I don't manage to configure a bridge _and_ a fixed exit. 2. 2. also here I would welcome a feature to specify the fingerprint of a family as forced exits instead of single fingerprints or countrycodes. Also here the question like in 1.2, where could I place this then best. All this does not necessarily provide an advantage in anonymization, but it makes research much easier. And before someone says that i don't need that... there is a lot that i don't need and that doesn't serve the purpose of a software, you are not forced to configure it let alone recommend it. I'm just talking about possibilities that should facilitate the research. -- Martin

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snowflake vs bridges (vs node)
by Fran 07 Feb '22

07 Feb '22

Hey, I just saw, that it's possible to run snowflake[1] not only as browser plugin, but also standalone. So I am wondering what makes more sense, run a bridge with obsf4 or run a snowflake instance instead of a bridge. Or would it even make sense to install both on one server? And generally, what's more needed atm: bridge, non-exit, exit or snowflake? Thanks! fran [1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snow…

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ExitNodes Directive Evaluated Dynamicly or Bootstrap Only?
by Gary C. New 06 Feb '22

06 Feb '22

All: Is the ExitNodes Directive evaluated Dynamicly or only during Bootstrap? What happens if an exit in the ExitNodes list is down when selected? Respectfully, Gary— This Message Originated by the Sun. iBigBlue 63W Solar Array (~12 Hour Charge) + 2 x Charmast 26800mAh Power Banks = iPhone XS Max 512GB (~2 Weeks Charged)

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