- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

The Onion Box v4.0.0rc1
by theonionbox＠gmx.com 26 Jul '17

26 Jul '17

1 0

Tor fuzzying with AFL - issues with virt mem
by Toralf Förster 25 Jul '17

25 Jul '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I do fuzz test the Tor sources with AFL using the script in [1]. Today I was faced with the afl message : - - The current memory limit (47.7 TB) is too restrictive, causing the ... Therefore I re-run this: torproject@mr-fox ~ $ cd ~; for i in ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-*; do echo $(./recidivm-0.1.1/recidivm -v $i 2>&1 | tail -n 1) $i ; done | sort -n 140647294041983 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-hsdescv2 210556434775808 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-descriptor 211071855558638 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-microdesc 230618232257983 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-consensus 272676600806400 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-http 275960232411072 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-diff-apply 280371168541696 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-vrs 281200098803455 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-iptsv2 281298748667644 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-extrainfo 281456722575360 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-diff and was wondering about the bug numbers - a previous run few weeks ago gave me the numbers as seen in [1]: # 40880663 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-iptsv2 # 40880757 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-consensus # 40880890 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-extrainfo # 40885159 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-hsdescv2 # 40885224 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-http # 40888156 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-descriptor # 40897371 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-microdesc # 40955570 ./tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-vrs Now I do wonder, if the new linux kernel, a new AFL (changed from 2.39b to 2.46b recently) or what else is causing this issue ? [1] https://github.com/toralf/torutils/blob/master/fuzz.sh - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iI0EAREIADUWIQQaN2+ZSp0CbxPiTc/E6s3eAHbpTgUCWXT0GhccdG9yYWxmLmZv ZXJzdGVyQGdteC5kZQAKCRDE6s3eAHbpTiIAAP9ELskbZFoCyr7Ph/unDdPscZtg YTPdO3S3Z/mLWFemUgD/a+zVQd2BV3ZTY+x92/WAQ741VN8h4DO9ee95X+hu3+w= =pFI9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 2

PSA: Run a Tor node, lose access to Chinese IPs
by neel＠neelc.org 23 Jul '17

23 Jul '17

Today, I wanted to try to see how the Internet looks behind the Great Firewall of China. I used a public HTTP proxy list (http://spys.ru/free-proxy-list/CN/) listing Chinese proxy servers (meaning getting into Chinese censorship from the US, not bypassing it in China), and guess what? I was already blocked. Why? I suspect that I was running a Tor relay from my home connection (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/A20840A16CB658024B0D3A0E3F19A9C0E34C8…) Some Chinese websites do load, but many of those who do usually have a CDN outside the Chinese firewall. For example, I can visit AliExpress from my home computer without Tor, but I can't visit 163.com or 2345.com. While I don't care at all for Chinese websites, there are people who do. If you want to access Chinese websites AND run a Tor relay on the same IP address, you may be screwed. Surprisingly, I can sometimes visit Chinese websites over Tor, but it's about as reliable as having Comcast as your home ISP. Proof: telnet 2345.com Optimum Online 100/35 in Westchester County, NY, home computer on same connection as Tor middle node (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/A20840A16CB658024B0D3A0E3F19A9C0E34C8…) neel@megora:~ % telnet 2345.com 80 Trying 42.62.30.180... telnet: connect to address 42.62.30.180: Operation timed out telnet: Unable to connect to remote host neel@megora:~ % Verizon FiOS 50/50 in Brooklyn, NY, Tor middle node (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/D5B8C38539C509380767D4DE20DE84CF84EE8…) (this connection isn't exclusive to Tor, it's used when I am in Brooklyn as well): neel@kat:~ % telnet 2345.com 80 Trying 42.62.30.180... telnet: connect to address 42.62.30.180: Operation timed out telnet: Unable to connect to remote host neel@kat:~ % Total Server Solutions in Los Angeles, CA (via an ITL VPS), Tor exit node (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/0D8211D34F29F51D690303E319766E1B7C28B…) neel@us-west:~ % telnet 2345.com 80 Trying 42.62.30.180... telnet: connect to address 42.62.30.180: Operation timed out telnet: Unable to connect to remote host neel@us-west:~ % Vultr VPS in New Jersey, non-Tor IP used for this website: neel@newwww:~ % telnet 2345.com 80 Trying 42.62.30.180... Connected to 2345.com. Escape character is '^]'. ^] telnet> quit Connection closed. neel@newwww:~ % It seems that IP addresses used for Tor nodes are blocked by the Chinese firewall, even if the same IP address used for a Tor node is accessing a Chinese website outside of Tor. And the little bit of the Chinese Internet which can be accessed on the same IP address as a Tor node is usually on a CDN outside of the Great Firewall. Keep in mind that this article is also available on my website at this URL: https://www.neelc.org/psa-if-youre-running-a-tor-relay-and-are-accessing-a-… (https://www.neelc.org/psa-if-youre-running-a-tor-relay-and-are-accessing-a-…)

2 1

Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays
by Kenan Sulayman 22 Jul '17

22 Jul '17

Thanks for your input, Tim. You are correct that I have not taken into account the IPs which are not in the consensus. My exit nodes are regularly attacked -- what caught my attention was not the fact that an extra gigabit of traffic was flowing in, but rather the way it was (*and still is*, on one node) flowing in. The patterns of the traffic seem unusual, because they are precisely timed windows of traffic: 30 seconds of a about gigabit of traffic, 5 minutes (exactly 302 ± 3 seconds, that is) pause, 15 seconds of a about gigabit of traffic, 3 minutes (181 ± 1 seconds) pause, 60 seconds of a gigabit of traffic, 10 minutes (604 ± 2 seconds). This went on for 8 hours on apx1, apx2 is seeing this still. I'm very sure that there is a reasonable explanation for this, but I can't see the reason any client would behave like this. -- Kenan > > On 22 Jul 2017, at 08:00, Matt Traudt <sirmatt at ksu.edu> wrote: > > > > Now, to my observations and the post that was referred to: > > > > /I clearly failed to clarify/ that the "suspicious" traffic which caught > > my interest was about non-Tor IPs entering the network through my exits. > How do you work out what a non-Tor IP is? > > As pastly nicely put it: /> will never be used as a guard by > > well-behaved tor clients./ > Exits won't be used as long-term Guards, but they will be used as > Entry nodes (or receive connections that look like client connections) > from: > * clients via bridges > * clients with UseEntryGuards disabled, including: > * Single Onion Services (to intro and rend nodes) > * Tor2web (to HSDir, intro and rend nodes) > * clients using them as directory guards or fallback directory mirrors, > * bandwidth authorities, > * Tor relays that aren't in the consensus(es) you're using to work out > what a "non-Tor IP" is, > * Tor relays that have an OutboundBindAddress* option, or a route, that > binds to an IP address they're not advertising in their descriptor. > (Some of these categories might be excluded by position weights, I > haven't checked them all in detail.) > > My observations were made using a utility I built using nDPI and sysdig > > (kernel module). > > > > That is, I have observed about a gigabit of traffic entering my exit > > nodes originating /from non-Tor IPs/, causing connections to be > > initiated to middle nodes. > The most likely scenarios responsible for this volume of traffic are: > * clients with UseEntryGuards disabled, including: > * Tor2web (to a rend node using Tor2webRendezvousPoints) > * Tor relays that aren't in the consensus(es) you're using to work out > what a "non-Tor IP" is, > * Tor relays that have an OutboundBindAddress* option, or a route, that > binds to an IP address they're not advertising in their descriptor. > > I have not claimed evidence to "prove" confirmation attacks. I have > > merely observed nearly a gigabit (on multiple nodes, that is) of inbound > > traffic entering the network through my exit nodes, which does not seem > > very reasonable to do unless the goal is attack hidden services. > Proving an attack would be hard: we'd have to rule out all the > exceptional cases I listed above one-by-one. And check the process used > to identify Tor and non-Tor IPs. > T > -- > Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) > teor2345 at gmail dot com > PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B > ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n > xmpp: teor at torproject dot org > ------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays
by 0dayshoppingspree＠tutanota.com 22 Jul '17

22 Jul '17

Hello A few users have detected suspicious activity around certain Relays in the network. There could be Time Confirmation Attacks happening currently on the Live Tor Network. If any Tor dev see this, Please Start Checking The US Relays in the network. -- Securely sent with Tutanota. Claim your encrypted mailbox today! https://tutanota.com

3 3

Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 78, Issue 20
by Charlie Luna 22 Jul '17

22 Jul '17

what you feel is wrong are the U.S. Feds (FBI, NSA, etc.) enacting their influence on the Tor network and trying to capture all traffic because the DOJ just announced the take down of AlphaBay on Tor. It's not a good time for anything right now. > On Jul 21, 2017, at 5:17 PM, tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org wrote: > > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: tor-relays Digest, Vol 78, Issue 19 > (0dayshoppingspree(a)tutanota.com) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2017 02:17:07 +0200 (CEST) > From: <0dayshoppingspree(a)tutanota.com> > To: <tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 78, Issue 19 > Message-ID: <KpbduUO--3-0(a)tutanota.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Hello. > > I apologize for leaving some of the relevant information out on the 1st email. The relay operator did contact me but im not him. > > Ive seen it from the client side, where all my relays starting with a US bridge automatically connects to 1 or both other nodes which are also in the US. Ive had all 3 of them, Guard Middle and Exit All US Ips over and over and over again. > > Changing bridges only works if the bridge is changed to a non-US IP. As soon as i change the bridge to 1 that hits a US Ip it automatically gives me a middle or exit or both in the US. > > Later in the day i was contacted by a HS operator who said they had also witness strange relay behavior in the last 2 or 3 days. He subsequently has shut down his HS. > > Ive studied Tor for the last 5 years and have been an active penetration tester in the community for the last 2 years. Something feels wrong but i just cant put my finger on it. > > Thank You For Your Time > 0Day > > -- > Securely sent with Tutanota. Claim your encrypted mailbox today! > https://tutanota.com > > 21. Jul 2017 18:00 by tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: > > >> Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to >> > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays >> (> 0dayshoppingspree(a)tutanota.com> ) >> 2. Re: Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays (Matt Traudt) >> 3. Re: 100K circuit request per minute for hours killed my relay >> (Arisbe) >> 4. Re: Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays (Matt Traudt) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 18:12:25 +0200 (CEST) >> From: <> 0dayshoppingspree(a)tutanota.com> > >> To: <> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> > >> Subject: [tor-relays] Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays >> Message-ID: <> Kp_uyMv--3-0(a)tutanota.com> > >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >> >> Hello >> >> A few users have detected suspicious activity around certain Relays in the network. There could be Time Confirmation Attacks happening currently on the Live Tor Network. >> >> If any Tor dev see this, Please Start Checking The US Relays in the network. >> -- >> Securely sent with Tutanota. Claim your encrypted mailbox today! >> https://tutanota.com >>

1 0

Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 78, Issue 19
by 0dayshoppingspree＠tutanota.com 22 Jul '17

22 Jul '17

Hello. I apologize for leaving some of the relevant information out on the 1st email. The relay operator did contact me but im not him. Ive seen it from the client side, where all my relays starting with a US bridge automatically connects to 1 or both other nodes which are also in the US. Ive had all 3 of them, Guard Middle and Exit All US Ips over and over and over again. Changing bridges only works if the bridge is changed to a non-US IP. As soon as i change the bridge to 1 that hits a US Ip it automatically gives me a middle or exit or both in the US. Later in the day i was contacted by a HS operator who said they had also witness strange relay behavior in the last 2 or 3 days. He subsequently has shut down his HS. Ive studied Tor for the last 5 years and have been an active penetration tester in the community for the last 2 years. Something feels wrong but i just cant put my finger on it. Thank You For Your Time 0Day -- Securely sent with Tutanota. Claim your encrypted mailbox today! https://tutanota.com 21. Jul 2017 18:00 by tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org: > Send tor-relays mailing list submissions to > > tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > tor-relays-owner(a)lists.torproject.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of tor-relays digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays > (> 0dayshoppingspree(a)tutanota.com> ) > 2. Re: Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays (Matt Traudt) > 3. Re: 100K circuit request per minute for hours killed my relay > (Arisbe) > 4. Re: Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays (Matt Traudt) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2017 18:12:25 +0200 (CEST) > From: <> 0dayshoppingspree(a)tutanota.com> > > To: <> tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org> > > Subject: [tor-relays] Traffic Confimration Attacks/ Bad Relays > Message-ID: <> Kp_uyMv--3-0(a)tutanota.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Hello > > A few users have detected suspicious activity around certain Relays in the network. There could be Time Confirmation Attacks happening currently on the Live Tor Network. > > If any Tor dev see this, Please Start Checking The US Relays in the network. > -- > Securely sent with Tutanota. Claim your encrypted mailbox today! > https://tutanota.com >

1 0

Necto.onion relays (Necto4 etc)
by Geoff Down 21 Jul '17

21 Jul '17

Dear operator of relays Necto4 etc. Please remove OpenDNS filtering of any sort from your exit relays. Note that abuse-team(a)necto.onion (as per your port 80 page) is not a routeable email address. GD -- http://www.fastmail.com - IMAP accessible web-mail

1 0

*.old files in ./keys are too new
by Toralf Förster 19 Jul '17

19 Jul '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I do wonder, why the *.old files are newer than their counterparts: - -rw------- 1 tor tor 887 Jul 15 21:51 secret_onion_key - -rw------- 1 tor tor 96 Jul 15 21:51 secret_onion_key_ntor - -rw------- 1 tor tor 96 Jun 17 21:30 secret_onion_key_ntor.old - -rw------- 1 tor tor 887 Jun 17 21:30 secret_onion_key.old - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iI0EAREIADUWIQQaN2+ZSp0CbxPiTc/E6s3eAHbpTgUCWW+pNRccdG9yYWxmLmZv ZXJzdGVyQGdteC5kZQAKCRDE6s3eAHbpTsBLAP91Hst68PmoK3y6e5v3xBrKqNjD CW0a9Qn6vDj7O0EsFQD8DmPvK2xgIO6N4G2vsR+Beb5Py+CZoX93PtPBz/xVxNM= =nECn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

Strange log in a middle relay "Gateway Time-out"
by Petrusko 18 Jul '17

18 Jul '17

Hey! Got a strange log from outer space, on a middle relay... :s [log] Jul 17 04:31:24.000 [warn] Received http status code 504 ("Gateway Time-out") from server '154.35.175.225:80' while fetching "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z". I'll try again soon. [/log] Tor version 0.3.0.9 (git-100816d92ab5664d) on a Debian 8 Jessie. I don't remember seeing this before ! If it can help... -- Petrusko C0BF 2184 4A77 4A18 90E9 F72C B3CA E665 EBE2 3AE5

2 2