- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Attacks to and from Tor
by Thomas Dünser 04 Oct '17

04 Oct '17

Hi everybody, I've read a few threads about attacks from exit nodes to the clear net and from the clear net to tor nodes and have several questions: -How can you recognize that the attacks to tor nodes are especially against Tor? -And how can a clear net user or better IDS easily differencing between an attacker that comes over Tor (exit node) or from a clear net host? I think this is important to categorize the situation. Thanks, Tom

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Feedback wanted: letter to my university's library
by AJ Jordan 02 Oct '17

02 Oct '17

Hey, all! I'm AJ; I've been lurking on this list for many years but have never had cause to post. I've run a Tor relay (`strugees`) on AWS for a number of years now, but haven't been able to dedicate all that much bandwidth to it due to cost concerns. However I've just started college at the University of Rochester, which obviously presents a great opportunity to set up a relay on a really great network. I'm planning to reach out to the library with the following email and would love some feedback: > Heya! > > I'm a new first-year student and I'm active in the technology > activism community. One of the things I'm very interested in is the > Tor Project (https://torproject.org) whose mission is to make it > possible to freely and anonymously use the internet, without fear of > surveillance or censorship. Tor is used by a wide variety of people > - activists, journalists, corporations, law enforcement, and > individuals - to gain free access to information and speak their > mind. Tor is able to provide this free expression by utilizing a > worldwide network of relays run by volunteers. A relay can make a > big difference on the Tor network if it's run on a connection which > is fast and has lots of bandwidth - like the University's > connection. > > I think it would be really cool if UR would donate part of its > internet resources to the Tor network. I considered directly > contacting IT, but I thought it actually made sense to talk to the > library first since the core values are actually really similar - > libraries and the Tor project both know the value and power of > unrestricted access to information and are dedicated to making > information available to anyone who wants it. > > If this is something that sounds interesting, I would love to chat > about this in person. I would also be willing to invest the time > needed to administrate the relay - I have several years of > experience doing this already, but haven't had access to the > resources the University has. > > Thanks very much! > > AJ Jordan Does anyone who's done something like this before have any tips or suggestions? Am I going about this in the best way? Cheers! AJ

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Relay uptime versus outdated Tor version
by K. Besig 02 Oct '17

02 Oct '17

One of my relays has over 416 days of uptime, which I'm very proud of, however it's running an outdated version of Tor. I should probably already know the answer, but it seems to me I would have to stop the tor service to update the relay. Would I in fact lose my uptime or would it be seamless? Thanks for the response

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bwauths doesn't reach reliable my relay
by Toralf Förster 30 Sep '17

30 Sep '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I do wonder why both longclaw and Faravahar seems since few days not to reach my relays 1AF72E8906E6C49481A791A6F8F84F8DFEBBB2BA and 6EABEBF38CE7E3DF672C4DB01383606FE3EB2215 respectively - resulting in a bw value of 20. B/c I switched to version 0.3.1.7 I do wonder if this could be the culprit ? - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iI0EAREIADUWIQQaN2+ZSp0CbxPiTc/E6s3eAHbpTgUCWcwE1BccdG9yYWxmLmZv ZXJzdGVyQGdteC5kZQAKCRDE6s3eAHbpTik4AP4ubRPDKm3jz73xGXmNAhupWarC 9pVPhRNqoD19jgpbGwD/QUnYKHIpbV4983kVMBjr9vbt2zwHRwmT0o+YMFJEVws= =NYwf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] About relay size
by Dhalgren Tor 30 Sep '17

30 Sep '17

FWIW I run a 100TB (150mbps) exit and am convinced that this size provides better quality exit connectivity than the highest ranked monster bandwidth relays. The biggest relays attract the greatest blacklist treatment due to the volume of abuse emanating from them. As a user of Tor I frequently observe connection attempts commencing with a handful of top-rated relays, only to work down to a mid-bandwidth relay such as mine before successfully completing. For this reason I would like to see the exit selection algorithm bias somewhat away from relays rated over 50000. Is annoying to wait 30 seconds for the discovery of a usable path. Hard 100mbps connections will be easier to manage than the 100TB class of service, as the latter is usually over a 1GB link with a FUP (fair use policy) associated with it and extravagant surcharges for exceeding the limit. ________________________________ >Hi Tor list, > >I'm already running a small exit node (100Mbps bandwidth) and I'm ready >to spend more money on it, so have a question for you guys : > >Is it better if I run other small ones (100Mbps too) or only 1 big exit >relay (1 Gbps) ? What's best for the network stability/security ? > >Thanks a lot > >IPonU

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Info about HW Encryption on Raspberry
by Fr33d0m4all 29 Sep '17

29 Sep '17

Hi, I have a Raspberry Pi3 that runs a Tor mid-relay and I’ve noticed that in the last weeks it reaches high temperatures (about 76°C) due to high CPU usage when Tor traffic increases. It did not reach this temperature until this summer (but it is not due to an higher environment temperature), so I don’t know if it can be related to 0.3 version. Now I’m running Tor 0.3.1.7. Should Tor 0.3.x use Raspberry Pi3 AES-NI hardware acceleration to reduce high cpu usage? Is there a way to check and enable it if disabled? # openssl speed -evp aes-256-cbc Doing aes-256-cbc for 3s on 16 size blocks: 5560204 aes-256-cbc's in 3.00s Doing aes-256-cbc for 3s on 64 size blocks: 1631984 aes-256-cbc's in 3.00s Doing aes-256-cbc for 3s on 256 size blocks: 425826 aes-256-cbc's in 3.00s Doing aes-256-cbc for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 107776 aes-256-cbc's in 3.00s Doing aes-256-cbc for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 13489 aes-256-cbc's in 3.00s OpenSSL 1.0.1t 3 May 2016 built on: Fri Jan 27 22:44:27 2017 options:bn(64,32) rc4(ptr,char) des(idx,cisc,16,long) aes(partial) blowfish(ptr) compiler: gcc -I. -I.. -I../include -fPIC -DOPENSSL_PIC -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -O2 -fstack-protector-strong -Wformat -Werror=format-security -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -Wl,-z,relro -Wa,--noexecstack -Wall -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DAES_ASM -DGHASH_ASM The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed. type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes aes-256-cbc 29654.42k 34815.66k 36337.15k 36787.54k 36833.96k Best regards, Fr33d0m4All

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NTor
by Sebastian Urbach 29 Sep '17

29 Sep '17

Dear List, I just noticed an increase from 670k to 8.8 million NTor handshakes. CPU load reached the limit and Consensus Weight dropped. Something is going around ... https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/4198BD138E5E11B15B05C826B427148CED7D9… -- Sincerely yours / M.f.G. / Sincères salutations Sebastian Urbach --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Those who surrender freedom for security will not have, nor do they deserve, either one. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790)

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No Gaurd
by Kurt Besig 29 Sep '17

29 Sep '17

https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E65D300F11E1DB12C534B0146BDAB6972F1A8… Relay looks pretty stable to me, I'm re-visiting the lack of guard status... ideas?

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MaxMemInQueues defends against 375000 circuits in 9 secs
by Felix 29 Sep '17

29 Sep '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi everybody Another circuit storm, right ? - ---- MaxMemInQueues 2 GB - ---- 2017-09-26_17-55-00: PID JID USERNAME THR PRI NICE SIZE RES STATE C TIME CPU COMMAND 84847 2 256 6 20 0 484M 427M uwait 0 907:02 11.77% tor 2017-09-26_18-59-00: PID JID USERNAME THR PRI NICE SIZE RES STATE C TIME CPU COMMAND 84847 2 256 6 20 0 2437M 2380M uwait 0 917:03 18.26% tor - ---- On Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5 Sep 26 18:24:37.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 4 days 18:59 hours, with 13714 circuits open. I've sent 2459.48 GB and received 2422.58 GB. Sep 26 18:24:37.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time: 4635/4635 TAP, 113271/113271 NTor. Sep 26 18:24:37.000 [notice] Since startup, we have initiated 0 v1 connections, 0 v2 connections, 3 v3 connections, and 214559 v4 connections; and received 886 v1 connections, 24624 v2 connections, 60722 v3 connections, and 354411 v4 connections. Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] We're low on memory. Killing circuits with over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by MaxMemInQueues.) Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] Removed 106528 bytes by killing 14408 circuits; 0 circuits remain alive. Also killed 0 non-linked directory connections. Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] We're low on memory. Killing circuits with over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by MaxMemInQueues.) Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] Removed 528 bytes by killing 7 circuits; 0 circuits remain alive. Also killed 0 non-linked directory connections. ... ************************************************************************ **************** 2500 x removed some bytes by killing between single and 300 circuits (constantly increasing sawtoothy, average 150 circuits) average 150 circuits x 2500 = 375000 circuits avoided in 9 seconds ************************************************************************ **************** ... Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [notice] We're low on memory. Killing circuits with over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by MaxMemInQueues.) Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [notice] Removed 4624 bytes by killing 115 circuits; 0 circuits remain alive. Also killed 1 non-linked directory connections. [] https:// lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-July/012624.html - -- Cheers, Felix -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJZyqCOAAoJEF1W24InZUQd/eAQAIK7IDNbnR+E1uTpvVwimUCJ jrSPr5sCXu8t4ly0Tci/tg7mCGTd9xKJvJgUHLei7pd6UmdDJvwajrX08tE/iBC/ uJPLEr69OBBqDICf7E+Y4oQGRz4ICY/4IGeb7lU/My6TzT00gHcs0/0tuww1actm P06uobAeRx+56GCg9hGopLavSOIHsR0bFC3k5kqin79qx40XwNuN6xkFCDni/fHW EO9GazD2iE4zJ3+1lIJsIzaA7fgu+Ack2GcLpaPKMNMwX3DagG/A619HsddOoBfH EFV2ZOhnR9XWytgIfPX4e/gErTHvWPshm0qaO4PzxwAlAoSKygvz497O1HZ3AlM+ fcn+C/fkfCcU2PYVPXKV3vDzupiZ17OJGfRNtAy1EqFLCK6q7xQAp1e3JuRJZBDO 3E/18FJM7JXCUz5StxwB+oAu9LGib50vXbtAOtuLwfX4OC3Nl0Fc/gw0ueYwWIPu QvsU0WNelwaUo3wWs47fJsMsJqjpt0Uywh8yvK809xvqogUFiQBF2ynIp5QzfaJ0 or/7axRHXglkxVaF+q84GFG8LAaspurGauQQFtzUdzl/ljWC963PyrGiOr0kCj/R OIc3TDSDYopFTllXeeVu2bysW7PrzL3vu5rcOHbbVAnUoRukA4Hh6qJFQuTk+Ndb tT8G8jk1QJjRqH/IaTLg =r7/i -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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IPonU tor relays: MyFamily configuration
by nusenu 28 Sep '17

28 Sep '17

Hello IPonU Relay Operator, thanks for running relays. Since you recently became a tor exit operator you are now in a position that can potentially harm tor users if you do not set your MyFamily on all your relays. Please have a look at you MyFamily configuration. https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/endtoend-correlation-groups some more background: https://hackernoon.com/some-tor-relays-you-might-want-to-avoid-5901597ad821 Let us know if you need help with configuring MyFamily. thanks, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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