- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

"Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close"
by tor 18 Oct '17

18 Oct '17

Hi, I'm troubleshooting a Linux relay where the Tor service is having problems. External monitoring alerts indicate both the ORPort and DirPort are unreachable (TCP connection timeout). I can ssh in and the Tor service is still running. The node seems to have increased memory usage at this point but there's no evidence of OOM. I restart the Tor service, monitoring says all is good again, and things seem fine for a bit, until the cycle repeats hours later. I'm still investigating, but one thing I immediately noticed was hundreds of these lines in the logs: [warn] circuit_mark_for_close_(): Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close at ../src/or/onion.c:238 (first at ../src/or/command.c:579) (on Tor 0.2.9.11 ) I found https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20059 but it's marked as fixed with a backport to 0.2.9. Any thoughts?

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vsif.ca relays: MyFamily configuration
by nusenu 18 Oct '17

18 Oct '17

Hello Vancouver Society for Internet Freedom, thanks for running tor relays. Unfortunately you are in a position that can potentially harm tor users if you do not set MyFamily (torrc) on all your relays. Please have a look at your MyFamily configuration. https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/endtoend-correlation-groups#vsif-suppor… You are also running an outdated version of tor that is no longer recommended: https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/vsif%20version:0.2.9.10 some more background: https://hackernoon.com/some-tor-relays-you-might-want-to-avoid-5901597ad821 Let us know if you need help with configuring MyFamily. thanks, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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Used TLS implementations by relays
by nusenu 15 Oct '17

15 Oct '17

Hi, are there any TLS libraries other than - openssl - libressl that are actively used by current tor relays? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_TLS_implementations#Overview thanks, nusenu -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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Hashed password behaviour
by Geoff Down 15 Oct '17

15 Oct '17

Hello all, what sort of crazy bug would make Tor give different hashes for the same password? $ tor --hash-password hello 16:735E6FA5355D4146606AFE25B61B411DF419878C99705164D038FC99BC $ tor --hash-password hello 16:8201E7D35BB8CACB60BF8947B49A3480BA1A17E77EDA8BE45790746884 $ tor --version Tor version 0.3.1.7 (git-6babd3d9ba9318b3). (on OSX 10.4). GD

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Using ContactInfo to publish additional relay properties in a standardized way (opt-in)
by nusenu 15 Oct '17

15 Oct '17

Status: WIP please send your comments until 2017-10-27 I'm writing this with the following motivation: - make it easier for current and future relay operators to find (rarely used) hosters for tor relays by increasing the information sharing between relay operators. -> help the tor network grow - improve geo- and autonomous system diversity on the tor network (more diverse is better) - collect additional (self-reported) relay metrics (for things like atlas [1] and OrNetStats [2]) https://atlas.torproject.org https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats exmples: How many - use tor's Sandbox? - run in OfflineMasterMode? - make use of KIST? - do auto-updates? This data could provide tor developers with information on how well tested/how much used new features (like Sandboxes) are before changing defaults. - improve the ability to contact relay operators (automatically) - make provided information machine readable - provide the foundation for an automated contactInfo verification bot mutually verified email addresses (and other contact options) could be displayed differently on atlas.torproject.org - make t-shirt delivery easier since contact information is potentially already verified - increase the ability to detect undeclared relay groups / make hiding relay groups harder - make hosting costs visible - potentially detect relay operators impersonating other operators by using their email address Should 10% cw fraction and at least 50 operators use any of the defined fields I'll ask irl (atlas maintainer) to get that specific field added to atlas (separately from the contactinfo string). Example ContactInfo String -------------------------- email:user[]example-operator.com hoster:https://example-hoster.com uplinkbw:100 trafficacct:unmetered cost:10 virtualization:xen Considerations ---------------- - increases exposure of relay operators The machine readable information could be used by spammers and to target relay operators. Operators concerned about this can omit contact information but it should not be hard to create a new email address for the purpose. - more information makes targeted exploitation easier / more silent Attackers could use the additional information provided in these fields to specifically target only vulnerable systems. Operators concerned about sharing configuration information should omit this type of information, but can share other information. - increased descriptor size and directory traffic The contactinfo field size could potentially grow because of this specification. This should be mitigated with the use of directory data compression and diffs available since tor 0.3.1. - ContactInfo size constraints According to the manual [2] there is no explicit ContactInfo size limit but there is a descriptor size limit. The max. descriptor size is 20000 bytes [3]. The family size and exit policy are two other relevant inputs. [2] https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#ContactInfo [3] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n364 List of information fields ---------------------------- I started to collect possible fields here: https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Shareing-Specification#de… looking forward to your feedback, nusenu Document location: https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Shareing-Specification -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_

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Relay DDoS attack?
by Peter Rogers 14 Oct '17

14 Oct '17

Hi! I've been running a Tor non-exit node at my business for a few months now. So far it's been great! Except yesterday when I noticed my internet was at a crawl. I traced the problem back to a large number of inbound connections that completely overwhelmed my little router. (4096 connections, the configured limit) All the connections were being made to my tor relay from outside IPs. The tor log file was filling with this: Oct 13 14:21:29.000 [warn] assign_to_cpuworker failed. Ignoring. Oct 13 14:21:29.000 [warn] assign_to_cpuworker failed. Ignoring. Oct 13 14:21:30.000 [warn] Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. [1779 similar message(s) suppressed in last 60 seconds] I shutdown the relay, then eventually disconnected my internal network from the router hoping the traffic would slow. It continued for maybe another 2-3 hours until I finally unplugged the router and left for the weekend. I was able to capture some of the traffic and found most of it originated from other tor (non-exit) relay nodes. In a 5 minute sample there was some 170,000 syn packets sent by some 4000+ unique IPs. I used a script to check the collected IPs against the list of known tor nodes and they're almost all tor (non-exit) relays. Hopefully it auto-fixes itself when I'm back at work Monday morning. But mostly I'm curious to know what's going on. Anybody encounter a situation like this?

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hi-jacking an onion address
by Toralf Förster 14 Oct '17

14 Oct '17

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spurios warning about using the nickname instead of the key
by Toralf Förster 12 Oct '17

12 Oct '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I'm wondering why I suddenly got at both of my 2 Tor exit relays (0.3.2.2.-alpha, running at the same machine) the following message: /tmp/notice2.log:Oct 07 22:41:58.000 [warn] You specified a relay "zwiebeltoralf2" by name, but nicknames can be used by any relay, not just the one you meant. To make sure you get the same relay in the future, refer to it by key, as "$6EABEBF38CE7E3DF672C4DB01383606FE3EB2215". /tmp/notice.log:Oct 07 22:39:53.000 [warn] You specified a relay "zwiebeltoralf" by name, but nicknames can be used by any relay, not just the one you meant. To make sure you get the same relay in the future, refer to it by key, as "$1AF72E8906E6C49481A791A6F8F84F8DFEBBB2BA". when I queried the Tor status via a home-brewed Python script [1]. I do assume that the message is related to line 90 ot that script: flags = controller.get_network_status(relay=srv.nickname).flags Because I'm using the script few times per day I do wonder why this happens today for the first time at all (IIRC) and just only once. [1] https://github.com/toralf/torutils/blob/master/info.py - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iI0EAREIADUWIQQaN2+ZSp0CbxPiTc/E6s3eAHbpTgUCWdk/PxccdG9yYWxmLmZv ZXJzdGVyQGdteC5kZQAKCRDE6s3eAHbpTpf8APwO30SS3Sbn1OhzOpFoJocdhj4k 7h/h6s5c0asDdwWkfwD/aaZpaP/ds9l4N9rivQSGW40Rv1Deqhuj/5fPtVizHeE= =8w5x -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Revert back to a stable build of Tor from an alpha
by Jacki M 12 Oct '17

12 Oct '17

How do I revert back to a stable build of Tor from an alpha? Im running Tor 0.3.2.2-alpha and need to revert back to Tor 0.3.1.7. Im running Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS.

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(no subject)
by Laty Luck 11 Oct '17

11 Oct '17

help

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