- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

DigitalOcean starting Exit node crackdown
by Shawn Nock 15 May '14

15 May '14

Hello friends, As I recall, there are several exits running on DigitalOcean's infrastructure. This is presented FYI: Background: I've run an exit on DigitalOcean for about a year without issues (lost track of uptime duing heartbleed key regen). It wasn't hidden (the droplet name was 'tor-exit') and it had valid reverse DNS and the standard informational page was hosted there. At the time of droplet creation, tor exits were not prohibited by their ToS. I've mentioned to DigitalOcean staff during support tickets that it was a Tor exit. Today the exit was shutdown, the message received was this: >Hello > >We do see that you are running an exit node for the TOR network. > >Unfortunately we are unable to resume services to this droplet and ask >you that you please not run any other TOR exit nodes. > >Please get back to us as soon as possible so we can resolve this. > >Thanks >Support I sent the following response: >Hello, > >My droplet has been running for months (perhaps a year) with no >significant incidents. It is well managed, allows only a strict subset >of traffic to exit and the very few complaints that have been lodged >have been dealt with quickly and professionally (as said by your >support team). The droplet has been configured to limit the rate of >traffic below the droplet's monthly network transfer quota. > >It's well established that under US law ISPs are excluded from >liability under the safe-harbour provisions of the DCMA for any >copyright infringing traffic. More generally, the probability under US >law that an ISP would be held liable carrying user-generated traffic is >extremely low. Tor exits have been operated by Universities, Churches, >and corporations (large and small) for slightly more that 10 >years. During this time not a single criminal or civil complaint has >been brought against an operator's ISP (to my knowledge). > >While it is surely your right to operate your business in the manner of >your choosing; I politely request an explanation for your apparent >policy against Tor exit nodes. If there is some way I might change the >parameters of the exit to suit a policy against specific traffic (to >certain IP blocks, port ranges); I'd surely comply. > >Finally, in this time where repressive regimes are cracking down on >Internet traffic and persecuting their countrymen and where free access >to the internet is nearing the stature of 'human right': if your policy >is indeed a general one against all Tor exits, I urge you to reconsider >your policy. It would be a great service to tens-of-thousands of Tor >users (refugees, political activists, religious minority, abused >spouses, law enforcement, &c) to revise your policy to allow >well-maintained exits to remain on your network. > >I appreciate any attention you could give to this serious matter. -- nock(a)aphr.asia (OpenPGP: 0x6FDA11EE 3BC412E3)

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Malicious or crappily configured exit node
by u 15 May '14

15 May '14

Hello! referring to https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays, i sent this also to tor-assistances@tpo. Never got an answer though :( Now and then, I use Icedove with TorBirdy under Debian. While connecting to port 465 on my usual mailserver, using SSL, I sometimes get an SSL certificate alert. The certificate presented is not my usual certificate at all (which works without adding an exception), but one for cab.cabinethardwareparts.com, pretending to be my mailserver. [1] I've searched a bit for information on that exit node and found: http://torstatus.rueckgr.at/router_detail.php?FP=0cc9b8aa649881c39e948e70b6… This node has flags: fast, stable, guard... I tried it several times and the behaviour was repeatedly the same. Last time it happened was 10 days ago. Then again today. I'm not quite sure where to report this (that is how this e-mail ends up on tor-relays :) ), nor how to avoid this exit node. Is there a way to do that? Thanks, u. [1] http://pix.toile-libre.org/upload/original/1399232278.png screenshot of the certificate

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Re: [tor-relays] How to handle an abuse report
by tor＠t-3.net 15 May '14

15 May '14

Does the user appear to be bypassing attempts to block/ban him from the site/chat in question? If not, depending upon what you are looking at, one possible response is along the lines of: This is 2-way participation in an internet chat forum by 2 users who are at odds with one another. The quoted content may be ugly, but it does not appear to qualify as site or network abuse. Ch'Gans wrote: >Everything went well so far, until today. Someone, let's call this >person/group "A", reported an abuse to Hetzner. A TOR User, "B", is >spamming chat/forums with vociferous insults and disrespectful messages, >I got a copy of few of them and the insults from B are as bad as the >ideas defended by A, but I'm not here to judge anyone...

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Fwd: [tor-talk] Fwd: Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators
by grarpamp 15 May '14

15 May '14

to list, not me. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Mirimir <mirimir(a)riseup.net> Date: Wed, May 14, 2014 at 11:58 PM Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: [tor-relays] Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators On 05/14/2014 09:07 PM, grarpamp wrote: >> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Jeroen Massar <jeroen(a)massar.ch> wrote: <SNIP> >> <user - ovpn - torcli> -- <exit torrelay or_ip - localhost - ovpn_ip> -- world > >> That "ovpn" part on the left is easily detected by any party in the >> middle doing > > No. Understand the diagram. It is not detectable by anyone > between torcli and torrelay, because that is just normal > tor. > >> Note that you are running IP over TCP over Tor (which is over TCP). > > Of course. Unless of course, as suggested before, some operators > choose the method of binding/routing their exit over an ip different > from their OR_IP, then it would just be native tor and native TCP. > >> The performance of that will be very bad. Tor network is already >> overloaded enough as it is. > > No it won't, I've tested it, it works just fine. The only issue is the > exit ip may change. So the exit operator is expected to block > access to ovpn_ip from anything other than their associated or_ip, > and the user is expected to config their client to use only the > associated exit per whatever 'world' usage session they have in > mind. It's not supposed to be point-click easy, only possible. That's a very cool idea :) Using $5/mo VPS, there could be a large pool of exit IPs for each Tor exit. <SNIP> ----------

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Thinking about deploying a new node
by Lance Hathaway 15 May '14

15 May '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 So, every now and then, somebody asks what the best use of a node would be--bridge, relay, or exit. And yes, this is one of those requests. This would be a VPS from VPS Nodes. I checked the list of good and bad ISPs, and they don't seem to be listed. So I asked them directly how they felt about Tor, and this was the response: "While we don't specifically disallow Tor by name, it does come under the ToS as it is commonly used to launch large scale DDOS and SPAM campaigns and is therefore not allowed on our network for that reason. rDNS is provided as standard, you need to have a valid FQDN A record associated with the IP address that is assigned to your container. As far as SWIP, I would have to pass the request on to management as they are the only ones with that access." Seems pretty clear to me that they're not in favor of having an exit on their network. (I brought up the reduced exit policy and asked specifically about SWIP so that I could handle most of whatever abuse complaints come in, but they wouldn't provide anything further than this response.) That leaves bridge or standard relay. My question is, given 3TB of monthly bandwidth and a 100Mbps (shared) uplink, would it be better to run as an entry/middle node, or as an obfs3/scramblesuit bridge? (If there are other suggestions for trying to talk VPS Nodes into allowing an exit node, I'm all ears--though it may be better left with somebody with more experience talking to ISPs.) Thanks in advance, -Lance -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTdCUCAAoJEECmBqfoBgXnV2EQAKcP+K+b698oExGXuI3C5FLh YOGU6z1XQy6C/ERkcNxqTfSbqF/5Izm1ey+1qzr41keVUQ1CKkPgGWbgz/plnCbu ZJf3riJrYucg27RHCSioz3ZBt8NV7d8msRrJAVsUoZy90MyghxYTXH6faGBrLNdw tUnhT9IhSp2C46/JBlPa02FM3Aa4JXggnuhxmUNzpCsNun12D+U3AXefStOjo2GC a9CnXFxxmvHURm7CRlXm7VDMyXZYtWWvBny3ndXhAwdp1EXJ67cjcxdml7PNRYqD 6OOWbfc70i6f8f5YhFFvcsLBlxBaTFTLBWz3J7SQPbVk6W8x8Av3rSvfky7wGyW7 qdbB1UI2FvsIVVCzr8e5bZxjxxUIABMm3Dpg5P+d0y7m7Gts9QhfLtgDMDZHwTYO bbsaDjJO7hUlFFd029PPW6PkH1dSD6pIjkE78ZAX57+5ZBk6JeMhOl8uWeqvbkbz KlOJJ34w0dVLCYiSF+q/BT2tlRMYVjUnQpbWHoxIZNcqBF4bzHdh0O5p/Fg0LSwD GFMOeRpMIDe6oJhU9xo/rdEVjIUGA9rRCBalT2N9fD3XhMQRGm4z/4e41A+YOE61 00BqybYG3Cof87QGqvZEv7zg8w0iU1n2LT52MvpfnQC15QoDvq8GA8C4wAoNpdQv Te15KnmiIweVAXjZBzZ1 =PeIP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Any Tor/Linux coaches in Sydney?
by I 14 May '14

14 May '14

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How to handle an abuse report
by Ch'Gans 14 May '14

14 May '14

Hi all, Since 3 weeks, I'm running a TOR exit node [1] on a server I rent from Hetzner (A German hosting company), after reading about using Hetzner to run a TOR node, I decided to go for the "restricted" mode to avoid any stupid copywrong issue (That is, I allowed only a limited set of ports, which sadly excludes p2p). Everything went well so far, until today. Someone, let's call this person/group "A", reported an abuse to Hetzner. A TOR User, "B", is spamming chat/forums with vociferous insults and disrespectful messages, I got a copy of few of them and the insults from B are as bad as the ideas defended by A, but I'm not here to judge anyone... From A's timezone, it happened from the 9th of May, 8:20PM to the 10th of May, 2:30 AM. Given the nature of the TOR network, I assumed that it is very unlikely that stupid-B will use my server's IP to insult stupid-A any time soon... or is it? Now, I have to report to Hetzner, I will tell them that I'm running a TOR exit node in "restricted" mode, but how can I defend myself, I am not sure that my "restricted node" and "given the nature of the TOR network" arguments will convinced them the Hetzner dudes. Could anyone gives advice, feedback or stories on how to deal with this situation? Best regards, Chris [1] https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/18B6EBAF10814335242ECA5705A04AAD29774… -- QtCreator/qmakeparser.cpp:42 ////////// Parser /////////// #define fL1S(s) QString::fromLatin1(s) namespace { // MSVC2010 doesn't seem to know the semantics of "static" ...

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Linux CVE-2014-0196
by zwiebel＠quantentunnel.de 13 May '14

13 May '14

Hi I received a notice from a server provider to immediatly update/upgrade/reboot if I would use Debian. It's the CVE-2014-0196 issue. I did and it came up with Wheezy 3.2.57-3+deb7u1 which should be fine. How relevant is this issue? Felix ==========---------- - - - - - - - - - - ----------========== -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) mQENBFL/5VoBCAC8l2gGmuy2hZf866dDkwzOvMkyJlfnFZU6T5LWe4uPIx0a8R1U cmj/Vut2yUCaJgvFpdOVA3mmXC58zoDeiW7Um6q6otD6BR2hXdgyBTAgqkQ0BsYx epb4UXBz/u3TJmv655fBnXeDgCB8L5BIkcsmX6EoBNUs6a3TPMhX3UXOtEKLXJeZ 2QtoDxwXqHNSmW7jLq+qkpriVDqxDTFv+muZRE+Zn/6PZpEASvpSdVdT/1giEMUL QQFIP6cBPY2GYIaNCO1dYRj9ebM7ewWjCiOiOw6/eylxan8vfFntgaPU3J7W2wJp RiRtUIjT+TDycVyNk7gy4wV2Rj8+58+Krk1tABEBAAG0IEZlbGl4IDx6d2llYmVs QHF1YW50ZW50dW5uZWwuZGU+iQE5BBMBAgAjBQJS/+VaAhsPBwsJCAcDAgEGFQgC CQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQC2jb92rYqyMGxQf/d9oJf0qpgXZaUmcqujQ3DVsc uvYOnK2MJCpDIvvZYdQTcnG2jz8/na1ZyfAGeKhYZ18ypONwSQYthC17L5GHQ2H3 Pg/H0GARtx4aJR5TtIKnhPR8yYdlikCuTBb5QSFJUUtEz91SqDW7EXNbMC4RRSEd BWWirADCJWitoR3JCC13r+CF6TCFDluClAht/t56f7prBzARVYWmlbgYD2yx4Uzs FOl0vvhW2o9dpVaLZ6mSHAyNzefCFcNumRUxqa+V6nY94dd8BV8xH0lOd1xaMtZW HuxIU9Sbh13OlJyBAvVffVBL+4sEOpc8XB6Yl/pmyjEjUSvC7lP3T+Ix9Mnk/A== =kfXw -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Tor bridges on borrowed ports
by kzhm＠mailtor.net 09 May '14

09 May '14

Hello, assuming I have a friend, Bob. He has two IP addresses and wants to contribute to the tor network. He doesn't want to operate an exit, relay or bridge himself, though. I offer him to operate the bridges on my hardware and he's magically forwarding the required ports from his machines IPs to my machine so I do the relaying part of the bridging game. Bridge users benefit from the additional IP addresses that have to be blacklisted. I'm looking for a way to implement this. I could only think of *) inetd + nc *) dark iptables nat magic *) some sort of ip-over-ip tunnels which would all be kind of hacky, require installation of addition software and would probably have sideeffects on tors bridge stats. Can I announce an address that isn't directly mine? Can I use my address for outbound traffic to the next relay or do I need to use the "bridge address" for that? Is there a flaw in there? Is somebody already doing that? I'm putting this up for discussion. If I can get this working for Bob I could probably get access to some subnets from Charlie and Dave.. Waiting for input. Truly yours, Alice.

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About running an Exit node
by Pika ohc 08 May '14

08 May '14

Hi there, I was considering to run an Exit node with my own pc, however, i have some questions about exit node. 1. How can I know if there is a client specifying me as an exit node and the traffic is sent from the client to me directly(where my exit node is the first node and also the last node for the client.)? 2. If i found some clients trying to do something bad by using the method mentiond in 1., how can I stop him? Is iptables or anything else can help me to block such clients? Hope there's someone can answer me. Thank you!

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