September 2022 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

recommended way to run 0.4.7 on armhf?
by ilf 25 Nov '23

25 Nov '23

What's the recommended way to run 0.4.7 on armhf? > The package repository [deb.torproject.org] does not offer 32-bit ARM > architecture (armhf) images (yet). https://support.torproject.org/apt/tor-deb-repo/ Debian has 0.4.7 in bullseye-backports. But Raspbian doesn't have bullseye-backports: http://raspbian.raspberrypi.org/raspbian/dists/ -- ilf If you upload your address book to "the cloud", I don't want to be in it.

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How to reduce tor CPU load on a single bridge?
by David Fifield 19 Dec '22

19 Dec '22

The main Snowflake bridge (https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/5481936581E23D2D178105D44DB6…) is starting to become overloaded, because of a recent substantial increase in users. I think the host has sufficient CPU and memory headroom, and pluggable transport process (that receies WebSocket connections and forwards them to tor) is scaling across multiple cores. But the tor process is constantly using 100% of one CPU core, and I suspect that the tor process has become a bottleneck. Here are issues about a recent CPU upgrade on the bridge, and observations about the proportion of CPU used by different processes: https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowfl… https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowfl… I have the impression that tor cannot use more than one CPU core—is that correct? If so, what can be done to permit a bridge to scale beyond 1×100% CPU? We can fairly easily scale the Snowflake-specific components around the tor process, but ultimately, a tor client process expects to connect to a bridge having a certain fingerprint, and that is the part I don't know how to easily scale. * Surely it's not possible to run multiple instances of tor with the same fingerprint? Or is it? Does the answer change if all instances are on the same IP address? If the OR ports are never used? * OnionBalance does not help with this, correct? * Are there configuration options we could set to increase parallelism? * Is migrating to a host with better single-core performance the only immediate option for scaling the tor process? Separate from the topic of scaling a single bridge, here is a past issue with thoughts on scaling beyond one bridge. it looks as though there are not ways to do it that do not require changes to the way tor handles its Bridge lines. https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowfl… * Using multiple snowflake Bridge lines does not work well, despite that we could arrange to have the Snowflake proxy connect the user to the expected bridge, because tor will try to connect to all of them, not choose one at random. * Removing the fingerprint from the snowflake Bridge line in Tor Browser would permit the Snowflake proxies to round-robin clients over several bridges, but then the first hop would be unauthenticated (at the Tor layer). It would be nice if it were possible to specify a small set of permitted bridge fingerprints.

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relayor v22.0.0-rc is released
by nusenu 03 Dec '22

03 Dec '22

Hi, relayor v22.0.0-rc is released. relayor is an ansible role that helps you with running tor relays with minimal effort (automate everything). https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor#main-benefits-for-a-tor-relay-ope… Changes since relayor v21.2.0-rc: * MetricsPort support improvements: * generate nginx reverse server config for remote prometheus scraping on the relay (we do not install nginx) * generate htpasswd file for HTTP basic auth of MetricsPort on the relay * debian/ubuntu: support new alpha repos (branch name is no longer included in the repo name). * FreeBSD 12.3 is supported kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io

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Tor 0.4.6.x is unsupported, please upgrade
by Georg Koppen 09 Oct '22

09 Oct '22

Hello! To repeat what recently[1] got brought up: it's time to get relays upgraded in case they are running the EOL 0.4.6.x Tor series. We'll start reaching out to operators with valid contact information this week and plan to reject relays which are still on 0.4.6.x in about 5 weeks from now on at the end of September. You can follow along that process in our bug tracker[2] if you want. For the general processes around dealing with EOL relays in the Tor network see my mail from last October[3]. Feedback and improvements are welcome, as always. Georg [1] https://twitter.com/torproject/status/1557392816250441728 [2] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/252 [3] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-October/019862.html

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many connections
by Sandro Auerbach 09 Oct '22

09 Oct '22

Hello, After changing my server, the connections settled between 6000-8000 incoming connections in the first 2 weeks of the warm-up period. (Guard/non exit) Since it seems that many relays have been overloaded in the last few weeks, I think a big DDOS is running again. Yesterday I tried to reduce the bandwidth a bit.I've just looked again and see over 26800 incoming connections. Is this even possible or is it more of a bug in the system?30 minutes later still 22000 connections... Have you observed something similar? Many greetings Sandro

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bridge distribution
by potlatch 28 Sep '22

28 Sep '22

[0] FB45183DD82D572CA2B2641C1AB0EB0D8CE7B858 Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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bridge distribution
by potlatch 24 Sep '22

24 Sep '22

People, I have a bridge [0] with a bridge distribution mechanism of "non". It's been that way since May 2022. What gives? Should I remove it from the network as unless> potlatch Sent with [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/) secure email.

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Best practices for the hosting provider of Tor exit nodes?
by Isaac Grover, Aileron I.T. 15 Sep '22

15 Sep '22

Good afternoon, As I'm reaching out to hosting providers worldwide to see if hosting Tor exit nodes is within their ToS and AUP, most hosting providers are requesting hardware specifications and bandwidth requirements; however, I would like to point them to a resource showing best practices for the hosting provider, and maybe one that shows expectations of the Tor exit node operator as well - for example SWIP'ing the IP address(es) to the exit node operator - so that the hosting provider knows what the exit node operator expects of them, and what they should expect of the exit node operator. Does such a resource exist, and if not, what would you request/add in such a resource? Make your day great, Isaac Grover

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knock knock, police is here
by volker.mink＠gmx.de 13 Sep '22

13 Sep '22

Hi folks. On Tuesday morning police knocked on my door, performing a full house search. Some Nazis used TOR to send nazi-emails to several schools in Germany. Unfortunately their mails left one of my Exit Servers from dark- to clearweb, so an ip address, registered on my name, was the last stamp. Now im accused of Volksverhetzung (german, try to find a good translation). It means spreading bad nazi bullshit to the internet. I can take this down by showing them German Telemediengesetz §8, which protects TOR operators in Germany. Unfortunately they found some dope (yea, 420guy here) during the house search, which makes thing even more complicated. Now I am considering shutting down all my exits. I promise you guys, there is nothing more bad than a police house search in the early morning hourse. Even a burglary would be less worse. Burglars come, steal, go and you never hear again from them. Police comes, searches through all your belongings, destroys your privacy, is allowed to take ALL what they want - and they will send you bad bad letters afterwards. What are your thoughts about this? Best regards, volker

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a characteristic of recent attacks?
by Scott Bennett 01 Sep '22

01 Sep '22

The vast majority of recent surges of unusual activity on my humble relay, which I take as likely being attacks, result in large changes in the hour-to-hour statistic shown below in these lines extracted from the hourly heartbeat message groups. Aug 31 19:02:28.549 [notice] Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 15 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 14 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 5 single hop clients refused, 1706742 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Aug 31 20:02:28.546 [notice] Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 15 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 14 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 5 single hop clients refused, 1706742 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Aug 31 21:02:28.549 [notice] Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 15 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 14 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 5 single hop clients refused, 1706742 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Aug 31 22:02:28.544 [notice] Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 15 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 14 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 5 single hop clients refused, 1770970 INTRODUCE2 rejected. Aug 31 23:02:28.556 [notice] Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 16 circuits killed with too many cells, 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses, 14 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 5 single hop clients refused, 2013266 INTRODUCE2 rejected. The most recent such surge appears to have ended less than an hour ago. Note that there was no change in the count of "INTRODUCE2 rejected" for many hours leading up to the onset of unusual activity, though I've only shown three prior hours' worth. Then there is an increase of 63227 in this count during the first hour and another 41296 during the second hour. Often during these periods the input appears to be maxed out, and sometimes the output rate is still higher by several hundred KB/s. My question is, do other relay operators whose relays are being attacked see the same phenomenon? In addition, if someone knows of an effective way to turn such things aside at less cost than be simply leaving them to tor to deal with, I'd love to know about it, too, though I suspect there may be no such method. Thanks in advance for any relevant information! Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *xor* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************

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