February 2016 - tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

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by torserver＠datakanja.de 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

Hello, i have been running a new relay for a short time period now and would like to bring to your attention the issues faced, that finally led me to refrain from keeping this up any longer: * Documentation was ok (on torproject.org) and the installation (using deb on ubuntu) was easy. * It took quite some time to understand the implications (opening ports in the router, hazarding security to my computers, as i was - to this date - relying on the routers firewall working) - This job of mine basically got delayed until later, when i would have learned, what is needed in that respect. * Next, i noticed a frequent (daily) behavior of the Tor server dropping traffic to around zero. Inspecting this, let me to understand, my provider was disconnecting me and reassigning a new IP on a daily basis, which took some time to propagate. Even worse: It did not propagate on its own, i needed to restart the tor service to reinitialise... * Asking in the online channel, i was guided to change my "Nickname" torrc config to match the dyndns entry corresponding to my server. * But this never made it to the directories, thus forcing me to manually restart Tor on a daily basis in order to force the changing IP address into them. * Finally, i was told, this behavior would be disruptive to the network, i therefore brought the service down for good, wasting the bandwith, i was willing to spend, for the near future. :-) * Ok, otherwise, i would have to pay additional fees to rent a server off-site with a permanent IP, but that would be giving more, than what was easily affordable, as my machine is running 24/7 and the connections open anyway. Thus Tor doesnt seem to be able to absorb the kind of bandwith, i was willing to share long time. This is leaving a sad taste on me, who is pretty much interested in privacy, anonymosity, which led me to avoid the mailing lists with a durable email-address. But just using a read-only one wouldnt allow me to post to the list. That is why i created this one temporarily, just to let you know about my experiences... NewTorKidOnTheBlock (this was the name of my Tor relay)

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Re: [tor-relays] Stable Flag Question
by stealth＠nym.mixmin.net 25 Feb '16

25 Feb '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, 25 Feb 2016 18:41:28 +0100, you wrote: > > > > On 25 Feb 2016, at 18:30, stealth(a)nym.mixmin.net wrote: > > > > Signed PGP part > > I just recently had my Stable Flag removed from my middle relay. It > > appears that my stats have gotten better over the past few days, so > > it's not clear to me why the stable flag was removed. Can someone > > explain how this flag is enabled or not enabled? > > > > Relay Name: stealth > > Fingerprint: A290A9E71ADFC2FB1C80E64EF851A4B905450105 > > Looks like some of the authorities couldn't reach your relay ("Running") last time they checked, and the majority doesn't think it's "Stable" (based on uptime). Perhaps this is because it was restarted recently. > https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health.html <https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health.html> > > Perhaps it's because you changed your address or orport on 2016-02-18. > https://onionoo.torproject.org/details?search=A290A9E71ADFC2FB1C80E64EF851A… <https://onionoo.torproject.org/details?search=A290A9E71ADFC2FB1C80E64EF851A…> > (Bug #18050 could cause this, it's fixed in master and 0.2.7, and we're considering it for 0.2.6.) > > Give it time, and enough authorities should believe your relay is stable. > > Perhaps you could consider upgrading it from 0.2.4? > > Tim Tim I have a cronjob that has this command: 0 0 * * * apt-get update -y &> /dev/null && apt-get install tor -y &> /dev/null If there is a new version of Tor and am asking that it be installed. My cronjob is not working, if it's not picking up the latest version of Tor. Can you recommend a change to my cronjob? I just installed this relay about 5 days ago and created the script two nights ago, so I'm not sure what you mean by "Perhaps it's because you changed your address or orport on 2016-02-18". I'll monitor things and see if anything changes, but I'm more concerned that my cronjob is not working. I also did a "service tor reload" to see, if anything changed and I still show 0.2.4.27 as my Tor version via the arm program. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.15 (MingW32) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJWz1U5AAoJEH1gNwhiMDZumawQAKeFuwwembr+VsMNH065yhzP +KNbFPzMM9PscX1qv5e3UBhFOI5Rk8vEJkBFxwdEjk2G4sIXD3Y/zNL3+nbTn6VF WcyzlimRNgTBlG4E5t+l3e13aZiLs/9eyUV3LsuchjeGxavno+G0/JKaiWgvrNV9 L6mkVCvRlHj2gcA3h0G4FEV/K+oSSOtD/ZfzL5jVtgS3T2iZuYPb6Z7Mc71bFuUD bgjTmYf6VavbBnqnSdfO8QI0MsNap9M5rBjqlU42J4LwBDW4oMNKjR6F1lkVYdFm 5nGZbMN2dFqSNgxvVIAzTZfNeksnTTmWkm0g3IrHlR3n3GfyC01xOHKap9NAoW6Y dO15zsYcWlYiOWkDCsx067Jn3XqEVtBJl0XERy5WZxFFFDr3Y+LHprN3aySH0bGz EfcIxKwdbpRWygDUnm8Ur22dDl2jVajun5XgQtjesodQjuHQa5oi4kB9m7t7/ThI trqJXwtB1GwQ+OWAR3d8RcjXt8O7ygJwRuk2PXlIfvY3owLOu1j11uDBrV+/HuEP sGKC+tqjEM7wS/rfAose9U7JnjVbb4iUQg3h7f7/ZmkZh1yp76ZixC3yDSAXZJfs wJQGItJcm2xPCHa/ZUhDi0qsDwLND33deJ+ihkqR+FaAn2RjvVbkVAtgZdPF5S+4 vriUnYrcvIRk1Ajx6f9a =r6HX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Stable Flag Question
by stealth＠nym.mixmin.net 25 Feb '16

25 Feb '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I just recently had my Stable Flag removed from my middle relay. It appears that my stats have gotten better over the past few days, so it's not clear to me why the stable flag was removed. Can someone explain how this flag is enabled or not enabled? Relay Name: stealth Fingerprint: A290A9E71ADFC2FB1C80E64EF851A4B905450105 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.15 (MingW32) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJWzzIwAAoJEH1gNwhiMDZu82oP+wWsR+7M8pOqNtF+lJZ15sGk 7sBPulmb57s1wwBmpbbvCtIalPwRffAOsB3ilwJyohlXAuLWWS6Aeo/s94CHVzE5 V9t2ZUIWvx0nEd8csrGBNJ+AfMDt1KwdJF1gFr+efFhXAbH2ARdQZgKGv6Mye5cf 161OLW+a8hRT3+i9+AeTdYLLz40QSCuWIuspaoPGcORE5LFykhrx63cI/XYnJRJW LsnW3EKitXJw1jib+Bh5afegB2PimzGpA6vMcWRSEiufYkgN+ndfN0lGQyYgji2y /h+FDdYovUGGnt5EBy33Z3Ch4YRYbci95QDzXEMsgxiBesBMZNoz5cbjO7WjOTl/ rh3kfMamMswI+mSZqwU1Wp9xIyBQwJB86KOKdSoaAjA/8nbxiAB8ImY/AOfCyRN3 faQ7SKbV/b3PbAVMXHa1WorJ1wy0xgvru6UTUljE83qZVsmenmgENwn3nz8t3Gqs fRTuDzV3ysEq8o/os41Md914oGFknZRVa7undami9WGmNqtJ0Ck5zPHxOmiQm2nX FSuUUvNvl4hDv+54ZHhD9nPT/LdQY7wQmegJ+I6YM9//Ab2ccZoyGcXzjQMXqkiw 9EPBDen7bSMW2+YJWG0H6emlj0t7VPmkf5jW6/q7YlWV/ak/jwtYa6TqpTRtKgoq /3xpaM9q+XiHFQsS53Me =3iAz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers
by Tristan 25 Feb '16

25 Feb '16

According to the Tor manual, IPV4 DNS queries are cached by default, but the UseIVP4Cache option says this: NOTE: This option, along UseIPv6Cache and UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably won’t help performance as much as you might expect. Use with care! Not sure if it's on by default, or if I should turn it on. On Feb 25, 2016 10:09 AM, "Elrippo" <elrippo(a)elrippoisland.net> wrote: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Are you caching the DNS queries? Am 25. Februar 2016 13:47:04 MEZ, schrieb Steve Snyder < swsnyder(a)snydernet.net>: >The OpenNIC servers may not be appropriate for use by a high-speed Tor >exit relay. > >I run an OpenNIC DNS server, and my VPS vendor insisted that I >rate-limit the server to avoid it being used as a DDOS vector. I'm >guessing that this is not an uncommon position to take for public DNS >servers. > >The OpenNIC servers you select for use may be perfectly fine for your >level of use but don't assume it is automatically true. > > >On 02/24/2016 10:49 PM, Tristan wrote: >> They are default for Pulse Servers. >> >> Anyway, thanks elrippo for that link to the Open NIC Project! I've >added >> their DNS servers to my exit relay, and I no longer see any log >errors >> about failing nameservers! >_______________________________________________ >tor-relays mailing list >tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays - -- We don't bubble you, we don't spoof you ;) Keep your data encrypted! 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Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers
by Nick Mathewson 25 Feb '16

25 Feb '16

Hi, all! While looking into a bug report, I noticed that an exit node was using one of Google's well-known public DNS servers for its own DNS server. No disrespect to the operators of Google's fine public DNS service, but my sense is that using it for a Tor exit node might not be the greatest idea for users' privacy, having one DNS provider that gets to see so many requests. It's probably a better idea to have your own local cacheing DNS server. Would anybody like to share a guide about how to set one of those up safely and migrate correctly? best wishes, -- Nick

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CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats
by nusenu 23 Feb '16

23 Feb '16

Hi, if we assume for simplicity that every relay running Linux that has not rebooted since 2016-02-16 is vulnerable to CVE-2015-7547, than these are the current stats (optimistic, because we assume that everyone that rebooted did also update). Vulnerable relays: +------------+------------------+-----------------+ | cwfraction | guardprobability | exitprobability | +------------+------------------+-----------------+ | 0.586 | 0.639 | 0.518 | +------------+------------------+-----------------+ (1=100%) Apply patches and reboot. Debian https://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3481 RHEL/CentOS https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0176.html Ubuntu http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-2900-1/

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does the Tor network scale well ?
by Toralf Förster 22 Feb '16

22 Feb '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Given the numbers of https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/index.php there are about 40 Tor exits which covers 1/3 of the whole bandwidth of all exit relays. I do wonder if under-weighting the big relays in favour of many smaller relays would make it harder for an adversary to de-anonymize the traffic ? Bandwidth (KB/s) percent cumulated IP Address Hostname 0.00% 37188 1.52% 1.52% 197.231.221.211 exit1.ipredator.se 33608 1.38% 2.90% 94.242.246.24 orion.enn.lu 30720 1.26% 4.16% 77.247.181.166 77.247.181.166 30720 1.26% 5.42% 77.247.181.164 rainbowwarrior.torservers.net 30294 1.24% 6.66% 94.242.246.23 destiny.enn.lu 28732 1.18% 7.84% 176.126.252.11 chulak.enn.lu 28721 1.18% 9.02% 185.65.135.227 torproxy02.31173.se 26364 1.08% 10.10% 85.248.227.164 tollana.enn.lu 25927 1.06% 11.16% 176.126.252.12 aurora.enn.lu 22973 0.94% 12.10% 89.234.157.254 marylou.nos-oignons.net 22579 0.93% 13.03% 85.248.227.163 ori.enn.lu 22551 0.92% 13.95% 192.42.116.16 tor-exit.hartvoorinternetvrijheid.nl 21765 0.89% 14.84% 5.79.68.161 Relay-J.tor-exit.network 21280 0.87% 15.72% 93.115.95.204 lh28409.voxility.net 20768 0.85% 16.57% 5.79.68.161 Relay-J.tor-exit.network 20413 0.84% 17.40% 176.61.147.146 176.61.147.146 19993 0.82% 18.22% 65.19.167.130 65.19.167.130 19966 0.82% 19.04% 207.244.70.35 207.244.70.35 19689 0.81% 19.85% 195.154.56.44 tor-exit.gansta93.com 19685 0.81% 20.66% 46.166.170.6 tor-exit-2.netdive.xyz 19662 0.81% 21.46% 171.25.193.132 tor-exit6-readme.dfri.se 19253 0.79% 22.25% 77.247.181.165 politkovskaja.torservers.net 18905 0.77% 23.03% 89.234.157.254 marylou.nos-oignons.net 18319 0.75% 23.78% 93.115.95.206 lh28409.voxility.net 18066 0.74% 24.52% 142.4.213.25 heaven.tor.ninja 18033 0.74% 25.26% 62.210.129.246 relay1.tor.openinternet.io 17932 0.73% 25.99% 188.138.9.49 atlantic480.us.unmetered.com 17904 0.73% 26.72% 65.19.167.132 65.19.167.132 17695 0.73% 27.45% 109.163.234.5 hessel3.torservers.net 17507 0.72% 28.17% 46.165.230.5 tor-exit.dhalgren.org 17171 0.70% 28.87% 194.150.168.95 kaputte.li 16262 0.67% 29.54% 79.172.193.32 toreador.webenlet.hu 14726 0.60% 30.14% 109.163.234.2 hessel0.torservers.net 14637 0.60% 30.74% 85.214.98.239 h2343030.stratoserver.net 14181 0.58% 31.32% 171.25.193.78 tor-exit4-readme.dfri.se 14164 0.58% 31.90% 193.171.202.146 tor2e.ins.tor.net.eu.org 14022 0.57% 32.48% 188.214.129.85 hst-188-214-129-85.balticservers.eu 13987 0.57% 33.05% 171.25.193.131 tor-exit7-readme.dfri.se 13962 0.57% 33.62% 193.90.12.86 tor-1.multisec.no - -- Toralf PGP: C4EACDDE 0076E94E, OTR: 420E74C8 30246EE7 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iF4EAREKAAYFAlbLd4QACgkQxOrN3gB26U43/AD+NDFTPFv2XJiq1WetnsYKl7/i P/M5OTj7Vzmmr17GnV4A/3s4/TEVya5OPjXUTl7IRdBRldSuvZ8X06i++TbdSOCK =CxqX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[WARN]Failing because we have 4063 connections already. Please read doc/TUNING for guidance
by tor-admin＠torland.me 21 Feb '16

21 Feb '16

Hi all, since I upgraded the torland relay from 2.6.7 to 0.2.7.6 I get the following warnings: 09:20:30 [WARN] Failing because we have 4063 connections already. Please read doc/TUNING for guidance. [101144347 similar message(s) suppressed in last 21600 seconds] Google only spits out https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16929 which does not help me. I don't find the mentioned branch bug16929 in git. Can someone please advise what has to be done to avoid the warning, or point me where I find can the file "doc/TUNING". Thanks torland

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routing script
by Markus Koch 19 Feb '16

19 Feb '16

Hi, after having four entry/middle nodes online I would like to help out with an exit node. Unfortunately you will get in a lot of trouble in Germany for hosting an exit node. I spoke with an VPN provider and they are okay with routing tor traffic over their VPN as long I have exit rulez etc. The only thing I need is a routing script for Debian to route all the Tor traffic over the VPN. Anyone can help me out with this? Markus

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Mexico ISP blocking authority nodes and preventing exit relays.
by Ricardo Malagon Jerez 18 Feb '16

18 Feb '16

I don't know how and why, but since January is impossible to have an exit relay in Telmex ISP. And is harder to reach authority nodes. Someone wrote about this, but is mid February and is the same. Tor 2.8 alpha works pretty good with the authority fallback measures, but I can't implement the exit relay or publish the relay.

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