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[tor-browser] branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 updated: fixup! Bug 25658: Replace security slider with security level UI
by gitolite role 18 Nov '22

18 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. pierov pushed a commit to branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 in repository tor-browser. The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 by this push: new b6010b1466c9 fixup! Bug 25658: Replace security slider with security level UI b6010b1466c9 is described below commit b6010b1466c962d12c457f3939bad562e5b2d6d1 Author: Pier Angelo Vendrame <pierov(a)torproject.org> AuthorDate: Fri Nov 18 16:16:32 2022 +0100 fixup! Bug 25658: Replace security slider with security level UI The preference observers were still observing the extensions.torbutton. branch, but they should observe browser.security_level. While the security level was updated, the UI was not updated correctly. --- browser/components/securitylevel/content/securityLevel.js | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/browser/components/securitylevel/content/securityLevel.js b/browser/components/securitylevel/content/securityLevel.js index aeb810169abc..e68b9c778703 100644 --- a/browser/components/securitylevel/content/securityLevel.js +++ b/browser/components/securitylevel/content/securityLevel.js @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ const SecurityLevelButton = { this._populateXUL(button); this._configUIFromPrefs(button); - this._securityPrefsBranch = Services.prefs.getBranch("extensions.torbutton."); + this._securityPrefsBranch = Services.prefs.getBranch("browser.security_level."); this._securityPrefsBranch.addObserver("", this, false); CustomizableUI.addListener(this); @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ const SecurityLevelPanel = { }, init : function() { - this._securityPrefsBranch = Services.prefs.getBranch("extensions.torbutton."); + this._securityPrefsBranch = Services.prefs.getBranch("browser.security_level."); this._securityPrefsBranch.addObserver("", this, false); }, @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ const SecurityLevelPreferences = this._configUIFromPrefs(); // register for pref chagnes - this._securityPrefsBranch = Services.prefs.getBranch("extensions.torbutton."); + this._securityPrefsBranch = Services.prefs.getBranch("browser.security_level."); this._securityPrefsBranch.addObserver("", this, false); }, -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[tor-browser] annotated tag geckoview-102.5.0esr-11.5-1-build1 created (now 1630b9fc8853)
by gitolite role 18 Nov '22

18 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. richard pushed a change to annotated tag geckoview-102.5.0esr-11.5-1-build1 in repository tor-browser. at 1630b9fc8853 (tag) tagging f0429128a50fdb80fb47147fe69d14fe84e0db8b (commit) replaces FIREFOX_102_5_0esr_RELEASE by Richard Pospesel on Fri Nov 18 14:26:45 2022 +0000 - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- Tagging build1 for 102.5.0esr-based stable -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJLBAABCAA1FiEEvnyRTMkiztnZPSO33kc2A2PzSywFAmN3ljMXHHJpY2hhcmRA dG9ycHJvamVjdC5vcmcACgkQ3kc2A2PzSyx+oQ/+JEj50kQ8E7Mv3qOGpojvIG2L 72J3YEC04wAdJoi3oQPncuaKtM0tqUIS+uM6/gOitsh+baFvoVbNu+zfRobCV6LF Q4ToaC73HTG/pHeau47TXrU2QGzf2zmX4pFLEq+3w4vGWeQR4EfhhRbhPFVvniBn 1SgCIZcjLSB4dPqhN6C2FC+S27Ro0Rg8lBCUot1XIhJ7W/mBZFp/jx8mCEnNv5b2 tlwg3WnzXUe6+jriKjrEixSfCKL8rYq9HEorvQ5kfoVL99eJKO52G2iTG74jaHPh tsbH95EqNOjIDp6s5K+CpOrvt9NomUkUTy8rVpCIixkBU/KQ6fumG6/Hv7g/aXwN 2m0FoBNgp9b6+Xq9jc45o2KebrAxeRyEqSbxPscW8N4qbtw2cdBAhBl0aqzprMJo O6agHp04CNTlbdBxiWWNz4JDUvgAWvsc6wsDqR2IX0+cu96DQ9H914vHq93Nc+Gt QyPU8K99zOIeIEltcFAfyzi7aJFwqat2tWuGewMOwUIb7ueQs5PsLkg9O6JwENjI 2Ed1tjqW5/6eXwbDQb0kYo63pD2tbcu6W64av8+D4BNpPIVqXIR35uDXUH2K6lw4 4EG4B/1+ol6XVO6gWK+eNioFW0Fnx/F9qVcgv2B3f46/sDjZTwo5OClzpEKGW++l oDHW8meKrLCyfTplmmM= =VfeC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- No new revisions were added by this update. -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[tor-browser] annotated tag tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1-build7 created (now 45bce17966ca)
by gitolite role 18 Nov '22

18 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. richard pushed a change to annotated tag tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1-build7 in repository tor-browser. at 45bce17966ca (tag) tagging 6a37f72692301b7a8375e6ed8885d4494a057708 (commit) replaces tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1-build6 by Richard Pospesel on Fri Nov 18 13:15:42 2022 +0000 - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- Tagging build7 for 91.13esr-based stable -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJLBAABCAA1FiEEvnyRTMkiztnZPSO33kc2A2PzSywFAmN3hZIXHHJpY2hhcmRA dG9ycHJvamVjdC5vcmcACgkQ3kc2A2PzSyyiIA//dFjDylXFK7dGUhBm725dnJJf Gi8iOTLGK2DFp2aqIdjsDOcmYS9C0gqBy7KMaOeRiMEZoKq94yNtnCV2pqWBoADS TJ77JdJR1gd/C/r3CQCG3VqP0Eg2zpJLe6LWszgihKYQhLODUHoltFPcdUgfzEN0 nMQeXSrS/ppK7oxxRyVCKIw3U3585LtItpidoA/3sHU1wX1amu61wl5mrqOJNIFv 5DOq9CjDxxld954pwzwfUzB1rndodVnfd8L9zF2DB4TaSgzHzusd9UR/dzeUAvj/ xHP7BeoifrS0ZN525R3zUR6IpT183kp9HgGFfHcQxpq0Af2Hzd4ntbwMjU36QrQD GKAkzOuVOeb0hejIcCx80wMCH7+Y5X6AFfAJisqlqQ1t9PnFCj/djZQg0m9vAwzR unVFMFtZ4b2hN+P7TX6E+CQJY/PnZxcTp5CreFeQ8gDFPgxV7goDKuZPbdetVMRi c1VpZzsS1Ge+rGKANfbRfwLwmnR0kkjxvjc9SsmLWLzr3o5UGsa5vIRpDdzbqynR TesMKNfuEjIlAxGmHaMZPcCpaNiSrp+2V/jCuXTsyyaj9wgkFr6DG6/M1maSv/zu ZR0ZIeHGwVEVuzL65Ju0ZyyqwoNyTBEzoNgnnCAiEh2Cq2HYMmvuHAfcIych4G6q h/YxAWKzVLWRbCavAV0= =pG9j -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- No new revisions were added by this update. -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[tor-browser] branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 updated: fixup! Bug 10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core
by gitolite role 18 Nov '22

18 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. richard pushed a commit to branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 in repository tor-browser. The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 by this push: new 6a37f7269230 fixup! Bug 10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core 6a37f7269230 is described below commit 6a37f72692301b7a8375e6ed8885d4494a057708 Author: Richard Pospesel <richard(a)torproject.org> AuthorDate: Fri Nov 18 12:41:08 2022 +0000 fixup! Bug 10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core --- toolkit/torproject/torbutton | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/toolkit/torproject/torbutton b/toolkit/torproject/torbutton index 0df64d3b8ae1..86cdbafdffdb 160000 --- a/toolkit/torproject/torbutton +++ b/toolkit/torproject/torbutton @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 0df64d3b8ae159484115d2a6ca89826e8ef147b6 +Subproject commit 86cdbafdffdb5e8552f664b33e7668a8492fa2df -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[tor-browser] branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 updated (147bc200fb10 -> 3ab6903a6ec4)
by gitolite role 18 Nov '22

18 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. pierov pushed a change to branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 in repository tor-browser. from 147bc200fb10 Bug 1797336 - Apply expat CVE-2022-43680 fix. r=mccr8, a=dmeehan new 5d0ba5832874 fixup! Bug 40125: Expose Security Level pref in GeckoView new 784face8ff8e fixup! Bug 40562: Added Tor-related preferences to 000-tor-browser.js new 295f8a0f74c7 fixup! Bug 25658: Replace security slider with security level UI new 3ab6903a6ec4 fixup! Bug 10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core The 4 revisions listed above as "new" are entirely new to this repository and will be described in separate emails. The revisions listed as "add" were already present in the repository and have only been added to this reference. Summary of changes: browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 14 +++++++------- browser/components/securitylevel/content/securityLevel.js | 4 ++-- .../java/org/mozilla/geckoview/GeckoRuntimeSettings.java | 2 +- toolkit/torproject/torbutton | 2 +- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[torbutton] branch maint-11.5 updated: Bug 41460: Migrate preferences to the name we will user for 12.0.
by gitolite role 18 Nov '22

18 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. pierov pushed a commit to branch maint-11.5 in repository torbutton. The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/maint-11.5 by this push: new 86cdbafd Bug 41460: Migrate preferences to the name we will user for 12.0. 86cdbafd is described below commit 86cdbafdffdb5e8552f664b33e7668a8492fa2df Author: Pier Angelo Vendrame <pierov(a)torproject.org> AuthorDate: Thu Nov 17 17:51:58 2022 +0100 Bug 41460: Migrate preferences to the name we will user for 12.0. We are forcing users to pass by 11.5.8, so, instead of adding migration code in 12.0 and keep it for a long time, we just add it to 11.5. --- chrome/content/preferences-mobile.js | 10 ++++----- chrome/content/torbutton.js | 8 +++---- components/startup-observer.js | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ modules/noscript-control.js | 10 ++++----- modules/security-prefs.js | 18 ++++++++-------- 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/chrome/content/preferences-mobile.js b/chrome/content/preferences-mobile.js index fa79dce8..4b357e72 100644 --- a/chrome/content/preferences-mobile.js +++ b/chrome/content/preferences-mobile.js @@ -39,19 +39,19 @@ function torbutton_set_slider(sliderValue) { torbutton_save_security_settings(); } -// Read prefs 'extensions.torbutton.security_slider' and -// 'extensions.torbutton.security_custom', and initialize the UI. +// Read prefs 'browser.security_level.security_slider' and +// 'browser.security_level.security_custom', and initialize the UI. function torbutton_init_security_ui() { torbutton_set_slider(prefSettingToSliderPosition( - getIntPref("extensions.torbutton.security_slider"))); + getIntPref("browser.security_level.security_slider"))); torbutton_set_learn_more_links(); } // Write the two prefs from the current settings. function torbutton_save_security_settings() { - setIntPref("extensions.torbutton.security_slider", + setIntPref("browser.security_level.security_slider", sliderPositionToPrefSetting(state.slider)); - setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.security_custom", state.custom); + setBoolPref("browser.security_level.security_custom", state.custom); } // We follow the way we treat the links to the Tor Browser User Manual on the diff --git a/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/chrome/content/torbutton.js index 2f6ff1ee..d2c2d2b7 100644 --- a/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ torbutton_new_identity = async function() { newIdentityInProgress = true; - let shouldConfirm = m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.confirm_newnym"); + let shouldConfirm = m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("browser.new_identity.confirm_newnym"); if (shouldConfirm) { let prompts = Services.prompt; @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ torbutton_new_identity = async function() { let confirmed = (prompts.confirmEx(null, "", message, flags, null, null, null, askAgainText, askAgain) == 0); - m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.confirm_newnym", !askAgain.value); + m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref("browser.new_identity.confirm_newnym", !askAgain.value); if (confirmed) { await torbutton_do_new_identity(); @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ async function torbutton_do_new_identity() { torbutton_log(3, "New Identity: Clearing HTTP Auth"); - if (m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.clear_http_auth")) { + if (m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("browser.new_identity.clear_http_auth")) { var auth = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/http-auth-manager;1"]. getService(Ci.nsIHttpAuthManager); auth.clearAll(); @@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ function torbutton_update_fingerprinting_prefs() { // This function closes all XUL browser windows except this one. For this // window, it closes all existing tabs and creates one about:blank tab. function torbutton_close_tabs_on_new_identity() { - if (!m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.close_newnym")) { + if (!m_tb_prefs.getBoolPref("browser.new_identity.close_newnym")) { torbutton_log(3, "Not closing tabs"); return; } diff --git a/components/startup-observer.js b/components/startup-observer.js index f9697987..bf89b9b9 100644 --- a/components/startup-observer.js +++ b/components/startup-observer.js @@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ StartupObserver.prototype = { // but only for hackish reasons. this._prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.startup", true); + this.updatePreferences(); + // We need to listen for NoScript before it starts. NoScriptControl.initialize(); @@ -205,6 +207,45 @@ StartupObserver.prototype = { Services.prefs.savePrefFile(null); }, + updatePreferences: function() { + // tor-browser#41460: Prepare 11.5.8 for 12.0 + const kUpdatePrefName = "extensions.torbutton.pref_fixup_for_12"; + if(Services.prefs.getBoolPref(kUpdatePrefName, false)) { + return; + } + const migrate = (oldName, newName, getter, setter) => { + oldName = `extensions.torbutton.${oldName}`; + newName = `browser.${newName}`; + if (Services.prefs.prefHasUserValue(oldName)) { + setter(newName, getter(oldName)); + Services.prefs.clearUserPref(oldName); + } + }; + const prefs = { + close_newnym: "new_identity.close_newnym", + clear_http_auth: "new_identity.clear_http_auth", + confirm_newnym: "new_identity.confirm_newnym", + security_custom: "security_level.security_custom", + noscript_persist: "security_level.noscript_persist", + noscript_inited: "security_level.noscript_inited", + } + for (const [oldName, newName] of Object.entries(prefs)) { + migrate( + oldName, + newName, + Services.prefs.getBoolPref.bind(Services.prefs), + Services.prefs.setBoolPref.bind(Services.prefs) + ); + } + migrate( + "security_slider", + "security_level.security_slider", + Services.prefs.getIntPref.bind(Services.prefs), + Services.prefs.setIntPref.bind(Services.prefs) + ); + Services.prefs.setBoolPref(kUpdatePrefName, true); + }, + QueryInterface: ChromeUtils.generateQI([Ci.nsIClassInfo]), // method of nsIClassInfo diff --git a/modules/noscript-control.js b/modules/noscript-control.js index ea735377..397153fb 100644 --- a/modules/noscript-control.js +++ b/modules/noscript-control.js @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ var initialize = () => { sendNoScriptSettings(noscriptSettings(safetyLevel)); // __securitySliderToSafetyLevel(sliderState)__. - // Converts the "extensions.torbutton.security_slider" pref value + // Converts the "browser.security_level.security_slider" pref value // to a "safety level" value: 0 = Standard, 1 = Safer, 2 = Safest let securitySliderToSafetyLevel = sliderState => [undefined, 2, 1, 1, 0][sliderState]; @@ -184,18 +184,18 @@ var initialize = () => { let messageListener = a => { try { log(3, `Message received from NoScript: ${JSON.stringify([a])}`); - let noscriptPersist = Services.prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_persist", false); - let noscriptInited = Services.prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_inited", false); + let noscriptPersist = Services.prefs.getBoolPref("browser.security_level.noscript_persist", false); + let noscriptInited = Services.prefs.getBoolPref("browser.security_level.noscript_inited", false); // Set the noscript safety level once if we have never run noscript // before, or if we are not allowing noscript per-site settings to be // persisted between browser sessions. Otherwise make sure that the // security slider position, if changed, will rewrite the noscript // settings. - bindPref("extensions.torbutton.security_slider", + bindPref("browser.security_level.security_slider", sliderState => setNoScriptSafetyLevel(securitySliderToSafetyLevel(sliderState)), !noscriptPersist || !noscriptInited); if (!noscriptInited) { - Services.prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_inited", true); + Services.prefs.setBoolPref("browser.security_level.noscript_inited", true); } } catch (e) { log(5, e.message); diff --git a/modules/security-prefs.js b/modules/security-prefs.js index c41458fa..c3ff682e 100644 --- a/modules/security-prefs.js +++ b/modules/security-prefs.js @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ let log = (level, msg) => logger.log(level, msg); // A table of all prefs bound to the security slider, and the value // for each security setting. Note that 2-m and 3-m are identical, // corresponding to the old 2-medium-high setting. We also separately -// bind NoScript settings to the extensions.torbutton.security_slider +// bind NoScript settings to the browser.security_level.security_slider // (see noscript-control.js). const kSecuritySettings = { // Preference name : [0, 1-high 2-m 3-m 4-low] @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ const kSecuritySettings = { }; // The Security Settings prefs in question. -const kSliderPref = "extensions.torbutton.security_slider"; -const kCustomPref = "extensions.torbutton.security_custom"; -const kSliderMigration = "extensions.torbutton.security_slider_migration"; +const kSliderPref = "browser.security_level.security_slider"; +const kCustomPref = "browser.security_level.security_custom"; +const kSliderMigration = "browser.security_level.security_slider_migration"; // ### Prefs @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ var watch_security_prefs = function (onSettingChanged) { var initialized = false; // __initialize()__. -// Defines the behavior of "extensions.torbutton.security_custom", -// "extensions.torbutton.security_slider", and the security-sensitive +// Defines the behavior of "browser.security_level.security_custom", +// "browser.security_level.security_slider", and the security-sensitive // prefs declared in kSecuritySettings. var initialize = function () { // Only run once. @@ -126,9 +126,9 @@ var initialize = function () { } }); // Migrate from old medium-low (3) to new medium (2). - if (getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.security_custom") === false && - getIntPref("extensions.torbutton.security_slider") === 3) { - setIntPref("extensions.torbutton.security_slider", 2); + if (getBoolPref("browser.security_level.security_custom") === false && + getIntPref("browser.security_level.security_slider") === 3) { + setIntPref("browser.security_level.security_slider", 2); write_setting_to_prefs(2); } -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[tor-browser-bundle-testsuite] branch main updated: Bug 40064: Update tor-browser-build macos rbm target
by gitolite role 18 Nov '22

18 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. boklm pushed a commit to branch main in repository tor-browser-bundle-testsuite. The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/main by this push: new df328cd Bug 40064: Update tor-browser-build macos rbm target df328cd is described below commit df328cdf5663d8b8ea26df6e2d5cdfcce324f8ee Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> AuthorDate: Thu Nov 17 21:19:57 2022 +0100 Bug 40064: Update tor-browser-build macos rbm target Following tor-browser-build#40439 and tor-browser-build#40067, the rbm target to build for macos was changed. At the same time we also change the name and directory of the macos builds, using `macos` instead of `osx-x86_64`. --- TBBTestSuite/TestSuite/TorBrowserBuild.pm | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/TBBTestSuite/TestSuite/TorBrowserBuild.pm b/TBBTestSuite/TestSuite/TorBrowserBuild.pm index c0f3861..af8a506 100644 --- a/TBBTestSuite/TestSuite/TorBrowserBuild.pm +++ b/TBBTestSuite/TestSuite/TorBrowserBuild.pm @@ -105,23 +105,23 @@ sub set_tests { publish_dir => 'nightly-windows-x86_64', }, { - name => 'torbrowser-nightly-osx-x86_64', - descr => 'build tor-browser nightly osx-x86_64', + name => 'torbrowser-nightly-macos', + descr => 'build tor-browser nightly macos (universal)', type => 'rbm_build', project => 'release', targets => [ 'noversiondir', 'nightly', - 'browser-osx-x86_64', + 'browser-macos', 'torbrowser', ], - publish_dir => 'nightly-osx-x86_64', + publish_dir => 'nightly-macos', }, { - name => 'torbrowser-incrementals-nightly-osx-x86_64', - descr => 'create incrementals for tor-browser nightly osx-x86_64', + name => 'torbrowser-incrementals-nightly-macos', + descr => 'create incrementals for tor-browser nightly macos (universal)', type => 'make_incrementals', - publish_dir => 'nightly-osx-x86_64', + publish_dir => 'nightly-macos', }, { name => 'torbrowser-nightly-android-armv7', @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ sub set_tests { targets => [ 'noversiondir', 'nightly', - 'browser-osx-x86_64', + 'browser-macos', 'basebrowser', ], publish_dir => 'basebrowser-nightly-macos', -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[tor-browser] branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 updated: Bug 1797336 - Apply expat CVE-2022-43680 fix. r=mccr8, a=dmeehan
by gitolite role 17 Nov '22

17 Nov '22

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. richard pushed a commit to branch tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 in repository tor-browser. The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/tor-browser-91.13.0esr-11.5-1 by this push: new 147bc200fb10 Bug 1797336 - Apply expat CVE-2022-43680 fix. r=mccr8, a=dmeehan 147bc200fb10 is described below commit 147bc200fb10ad3dcdee20bd6caa81163789a5b7 Author: Peter Van der Beken <peterv(a)propagandism.org> AuthorDate: Sun Oct 30 19:12:03 2022 +0000 Bug 1797336 - Apply expat CVE-2022-43680 fix. r=mccr8, a=dmeehan Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D160676 --- parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c b/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c index 05d5f0221e47..239f4fe281a7 100644 --- a/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c +++ b/parser/expat/lib/xmlparse.c @@ -1005,6 +1005,14 @@ parserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName, parserInit(parser, encodingName); if (encodingName && !protocolEncodingName) { + if (dtd) { + // We need to stop the upcoming call to XML_ParserFree from happily + // destroying parser->m_dtd because the DTD is shared with the parent + // parser and the only guard that keeps XML_ParserFree from destroying + // parser->m_dtd is parser->m_isParamEntity but it will be set to + // XML_TRUE only later in XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate (or not at all). + parser->m_dtd = NULL; + } XML_ParserFree(parser); return NULL; } -- To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact the administrator of this repository.

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[Git][tpo/applications/android-components][android-components-102.0.14-12.0-1] Close #12926: Use external flag when opening fallback URL
by Richard Pospesel (＠richard) 17 Nov '22

17 Nov '22

Richard Pospesel pushed to branch android-components-102.0.14-12.0-1 at The Tor Project / Applications / android-components Commits: 67e3c6ae by Roger Yang at 2022-11-17T19:40:29+00:00 Close #12926: Use external flag when opening fallback URL - - - - - 2 changed files: - components/browser/engine-gecko/src/main/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSession.kt - components/browser/engine-gecko/src/test/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSessionTest.kt Changes: ===================================== components/browser/engine-gecko/src/main/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSession.kt ===================================== @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ class GeckoEngineSession( )?.apply { when (this) { is InterceptionResponse.Content -> loadData(data, mimeType, encoding) - is InterceptionResponse.Url -> loadUrl(url) + is InterceptionResponse.Url -> loadUrl(url, flags = LoadUrlFlags.external()) is InterceptionResponse.AppIntent -> { notifyObservers { onLaunchIntentRequest(url = url, appIntent = appIntent) ===================================== components/browser/engine-gecko/src/test/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSessionTest.kt ===================================== @@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ class GeckoEngineSessionTest { assertEquals("sample:about", interceptorCalledWithUri) verify(geckoSession).load( - GeckoSession.Loader().uri("https://mozilla.org") + GeckoSession.Loader().uri("https://mozilla.org").flags(LoadUrlFlags.EXTERNAL), ) } View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/android-components/-/commit/… -- View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/android-components/-/commit/… You're receiving this email because of your account on gitlab.torproject.org.

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[Git][tpo/applications/android-components][android-components-102.0.14-11.5-1] Close #12926: Use external flag when opening fallback URL
by Richard Pospesel (＠richard) 17 Nov '22

17 Nov '22

Richard Pospesel pushed to branch android-components-102.0.14-11.5-1 at The Tor Project / Applications / android-components Commits: 9e3ea7c9 by Roger Yang at 2022-11-17T17:48:35+00:00 Close #12926: Use external flag when opening fallback URL - - - - - 2 changed files: - components/browser/engine-gecko/src/main/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSession.kt - components/browser/engine-gecko/src/test/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSessionTest.kt Changes: ===================================== components/browser/engine-gecko/src/main/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSession.kt ===================================== @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ class GeckoEngineSession( )?.apply { when (this) { is InterceptionResponse.Content -> loadData(data, mimeType, encoding) - is InterceptionResponse.Url -> loadUrl(url) + is InterceptionResponse.Url -> loadUrl(url, flags = LoadUrlFlags.external()) is InterceptionResponse.AppIntent -> { notifyObservers { onLaunchIntentRequest(url = url, appIntent = appIntent) ===================================== components/browser/engine-gecko/src/test/java/mozilla/components/browser/engine/gecko/GeckoEngineSessionTest.kt ===================================== @@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ class GeckoEngineSessionTest { assertEquals("sample:about", interceptorCalledWithUri) verify(geckoSession).load( - GeckoSession.Loader().uri("https://mozilla.org") + GeckoSession.Loader().uri("https://mozilla.org").flags(LoadUrlFlags.EXTERNAL), ) } View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/android-components/-/commit/… -- View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/android-components/-/commit/… You're receiving this email because of your account on gitlab.torproject.org.

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