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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1317802 - don't stop for SIGSYS in .gdbinit; r=jld
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit 08e00435a6657b00a06f7650276944d9b36ee36d Author: Nathan Froyd <froydnj(a)mozilla.com> Date: Wed Nov 16 01:13:22 2016 -0500 Bug 1317802 - don't stop for SIGSYS in .gdbinit; r=jld The sandboxing code generates this signal nowadays, which makes debugging with tools like rr quite frustrating. DONTBUILD because NPOTB --- .gdbinit | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/.gdbinit b/.gdbinit index dd9a005f67a1..08f1fc0f2011 100644 --- a/.gdbinit +++ b/.gdbinit @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ handle SIGPIPE noprint nostop pass # sandboxing code on older kernels. handle SIG38 noprint nostop pass handle SIG64 noprint nostop pass +handle SIGSYS noprint nostop pass # Show the concrete types behind nsIFoo set print object on

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1344106 - Remove Linux todos() now that Linux sandboxing is riding the trains. r=haik
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit 5b224c4272f4752dea577c92f41b2f651778e975 Author: Haik Aftandilian <haftandilian(a)mozilla.com> Date: Fri Mar 3 09:50:29 2017 +0100 Bug 1344106 - Remove Linux todos() now that Linux sandboxing is riding the trains. r=haik MozReview-Commit-ID: 9tI2S6fEYkD --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 0a5d00f8498861e7ea281e527b2be6b2c4e472d6 --- .../sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js | 20 -------------------- .../test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js | 22 +--------------------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js index 946f86bb9a92..7439bd46ee53 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js +++ b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_fs.js @@ -96,25 +96,11 @@ add_task(function*() { prefExists = false; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); - if (!prefExists) { - return; - } - } - ok(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); if (!prefExists) { return; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(level > 0, "content sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - info(`security.sandbox.content.level=${level}`); ok(level > 0, "content sandbox is enabled."); if (level == 0) { @@ -124,12 +110,6 @@ add_task(function*() { let isFileIOSandboxed = isContentFileIOSandboxed(level); - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(isFileIOSandboxed, "content file I/O sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - // Content sandbox enabled, but level doesn't include file I/O sandboxing. ok(isFileIOSandboxed, "content file I/O sandboxing is enabled."); if (!isFileIOSandboxed) { diff --git a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js index d56456966b8a..848b145429f2 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js +++ b/security/sandbox/test/browser_content_sandbox_syscalls.js @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ function areContentSyscallsSandboxed(level) { syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 1; break; case "Linux": - syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 2; + syscallsSandboxMinLevel = 1; break; default: Assert.ok(false, "Unknown OS"); @@ -140,25 +140,11 @@ add_task(function*() { prefExists = false; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); - if (!prefExists) { - return; - } - } - ok(prefExists, "pref security.sandbox.content.level exists"); if (!prefExists) { return; } - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(level > 0, "content sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - info(`security.sandbox.content.level=${level}`); ok(level > 0, "content sandbox is enabled."); if (level == 0) { @@ -168,12 +154,6 @@ add_task(function*() { let areSyscallsSandboxed = areContentSyscallsSandboxed(level); - // Special case Linux on !isNightly - if (isLinux() && !isNightly()) { - todo(areSyscallsSandboxed, "content syscall sandbox enabled for !nightly."); - return; - } - // Content sandbox enabled, but level doesn't include syscall sandboxing. ok(areSyscallsSandboxed, "content syscall sandboxing is enabled."); if (!areSyscallsSandboxed) {

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1374281. r=jld
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit 722a1a652291a27657ed1a0b7eefd134519daa8f Author: Gian-Carlo Pascutto <gcp(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon Jun 19 20:07:38 2017 +0200 Bug 1374281. r=jld MozReview-Commit-ID: Ko5m5i4Wkd6 --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 3076315ef3639a89f752addbb01d5d08a9c2db75 --- security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp index a31d1fc6684a..d79656c3407f 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp @@ -360,6 +360,10 @@ AllowOpen(int aReqFlags, int aPerms) if (aReqFlags & O_CREAT) { needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_CREATE; } + // Linux allows O_TRUNC even with O_RDONLY + if (aReqFlags & O_TRUNC) { + needed |= SandboxBroker::MAY_WRITE; + } return (aPerms & needed) == needed; }

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1337162 - Enable the Linux content sandbox for non-Nightly builds. r=ted
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit 8bf9587a88239cdac723a5b1c37ef46a90a49c21 Author: Gian-Carlo Pascutto <gcp(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon Feb 27 18:01:33 2017 +0100 Bug 1337162 - Enable the Linux content sandbox for non-Nightly builds. r=ted MozReview-Commit-ID: 65aPquHzyfP --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 017080e3ae33289bb0b6a790027f9d02c380d47b --- old-configure.in | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/old-configure.in b/old-configure.in index 620e38b40eaa..24fb1f5fc5cc 100644 --- a/old-configure.in +++ b/old-configure.in @@ -3997,14 +3997,14 @@ if test -n "$gonkdir"; then MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX fi -case "$OS_TARGET:$NIGHTLY_BUILD" in -WINNT:*) +case "$OS_TARGET" in +WINNT) MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX ;; -Darwin:*) +Darwin) MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX ;; -Linux:1) +Linux) case $CPU_ARCH in x86_64|x86) MOZ_CONTENT_SANDBOX=$MOZ_SANDBOX

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1386279 - Renovate Linux sandbox file broker handling of access(). r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit 018cc6d1fd6751a21bb46aa1b9afc7ca96a42c8c Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Tue Aug 8 18:02:31 2017 -0600 Bug 1386279 - Renovate Linux sandbox file broker handling of access(). r=gcp 1. X_OK is now allowed, and is limited only by the MAY_ACCESS permission. 2. The actual access() syscall is now used, if access is granted by the broker policy. This fixed bug 1382246, which explains the background. MozReview-Commit-ID: 926429PlBnL --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 6ae54c4c25e1389fa3af75b0bdf727323448294a --- security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp | 14 ++------------ security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp | 15 +++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp index d79656c3407f..56215b89b232 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/broker/SandboxBroker.cpp @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ AllowOperation(int aReqFlags, int aPerms) static bool AllowAccess(int aReqFlags, int aPerms) { - if (aReqFlags & ~(R_OK|W_OK|F_OK)) { + if (aReqFlags & ~(R_OK|W_OK|X_OK|F_OK)) { return false; } int needed = 0; @@ -569,17 +569,7 @@ SandboxBroker::ThreadMain(void) case SANDBOX_FILE_ACCESS: if (permissive || AllowAccess(req.mFlags, perms)) { - // This can't use access() itself because that uses the ruid - // and not the euid. In theory faccessat() with AT_EACCESS - // would work, but Linux doesn't actually implement the - // flags != 0 case; glibc has a hack which doesn't even work - // in this case so it'll ignore the flag, and Bionic just - // passes through the syscall and always ignores the flags. - // - // Instead, because we've already checked the requested - // r/w/x bits against the policy, just return success if the - // file exists and hope that's close enough. - if (stat(pathBuf, (struct stat*)&respBuf) == 0) { + if (access(pathBuf, req.mFlags) == 0) { resp.mError = 0; } else { resp.mError = -errno; diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp index a311e181a9b1..bf5e58acbc40 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/gtest/TestBroker.cpp @@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ SandboxBrokerTest::GetPolicy() const policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, "/tmp", AddAlways); policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_CREATE, "/tmp/blublu", AddAlways); policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_CREATE, "/tmp/blublublu", AddAlways); + // This should be non-writable by the user running the test: + policy->AddPath(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, "/etc", AddAlways); return Move(policy); } @@ -206,6 +208,14 @@ TEST_F(SandboxBrokerTest, Access) EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/proc/self", R_OK)); EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/proc/self/stat", F_OK)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/tmp", X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/tmp", R_OK|X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/tmp", R_OK|W_OK|X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/proc/self", X_OK)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, Access("/etc", R_OK|X_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/etc", W_OK)); } TEST_F(SandboxBrokerTest, Stat) @@ -257,10 +267,7 @@ TEST_F(SandboxBrokerTest, Chmod) close(fd); // Set read only. SandboxBroker enforces 0600 mode flags. ASSERT_EQ(0, Chmod("/tmp/blublu", S_IRUSR)); - // SandboxBroker doesn't use real access(), it just checks against - // the policy. So it can't see the change in permisions here. - // This won't work: - // EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/tmp/blublu", W_OK)); + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, Access("/tmp/blublu", W_OK)); statstruct realStat; EXPECT_EQ(0, statsyscall("/tmp/blublu", &realStat)); EXPECT_EQ((mode_t)S_IRUSR, realStat.st_mode & 0777);

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1286865 - Step 0: Turn off crash-on-seccomp-fail by default on non-nightly. r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit e3693eef06cadfc24d50abe34ae1bedf0385c3f8 Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Fri Jan 27 14:25:50 2017 -0700 Bug 1286865 - Step 0: Turn off crash-on-seccomp-fail by default on non-nightly. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: 1It6HNizbAc --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 1e96f11904abf2c38c5b4e50de7609ddc86cdd8a --- security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp index 7f1182be9972..b4e65a1745df 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/Sandbox.cpp @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ int gSeccompTsyncBroadcastSignum = 0; namespace mozilla { +static bool gSandboxCrashOnError = false; + // This is initialized by SandboxSetCrashFunc(). SandboxCrashFunc gSandboxCrashFunc; @@ -148,15 +150,18 @@ SigSysHandler(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) // TODO, someday when this is enabled on MIPS: include the two extra // args in the error message. SANDBOX_LOG_ERROR("seccomp sandbox violation: pid %d, syscall %d," - " args %d %d %d %d %d %d. Killing process.", + " args %d %d %d %d %d %d.%s", pid, syscall_nr, - args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5]); + args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5], + gSandboxCrashOnError ? " Killing process." : ""); - // Bug 1017393: record syscall number somewhere useful. - info->si_addr = reinterpret_cast<void*>(syscall_nr); + if (gSandboxCrashOnError) { + // Bug 1017393: record syscall number somewhere useful. + info->si_addr = reinterpret_cast<void*>(syscall_nr); - gSandboxCrashFunc(nr, info, &savedCtx); - _exit(127); + gSandboxCrashFunc(nr, info, &savedCtx); + _exit(127); + } } /** @@ -515,6 +520,21 @@ SandboxEarlyInit(GeckoProcessType aType) } MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(IsSingleThreaded()); + // Set gSandboxCrashOnError if appropriate. This doesn't need to + // happen this early, but for now it's here so that I don't need to + // add NSPR dependencies for PR_GetEnv. + // + // This also means that users with "unexpected threads" setups won't + // crash even on nightly. +#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD + gSandboxCrashOnError = true; +#endif + if (const char* envVar = getenv("MOZ_SANDBOX_CRASH_ON_ERROR")) { + if (envVar[0]) { + gSandboxCrashOnError = envVar[0] != '0'; + } + } + // Which kinds of resource isolation (of those that need to be set // up at this point) can be used by this process? bool canChroot = false;

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1355274 - Polyfill SOCK_DGRAM socketpairs with SOCK_SEQPACKET, for libasyncns. r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit d63e9b803e99682fc561e60c81cbe7b793b7b70f Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Tue Apr 11 20:55:34 2017 -0600 Bug 1355274 - Polyfill SOCK_DGRAM socketpairs with SOCK_SEQPACKET, for libasyncns. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: 2DeklSGsjUV --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 8a202c23dc9a3ddede49b08ce1e0792dfb40bdbf --- security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp index 7e1771a62665..5ddd58029e85 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp @@ -496,6 +496,16 @@ class ContentSandboxPolicy : public SandboxPolicyCommon { return 0; } + static intptr_t SocketpairDatagramTrap(ArgsRef aArgs, void* aux) { + auto fds = reinterpret_cast<int*>(aArgs.args[3]); + // Return sequential packet sockets instead of the expected + // datagram sockets; see bug 1355274 for details. + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, fds) != 0) { + return -errno; + } + return 0; + } + public: explicit ContentSandboxPolicy(SandboxBrokerClient* aBroker):mBroker(aBroker) { } virtual ~ContentSandboxPolicy() { } @@ -508,6 +518,7 @@ public: switch(aCall) { case SYS_RECVFROM: case SYS_SENDTO: + case SYS_SENDMMSG: // libresolv via libasyncns; see bug 1355274 return Some(Allow()); case SYS_SOCKETPAIR: { @@ -517,9 +528,12 @@ public: return Some(Allow()); } Arg<int> domain(0), type(1); - return Some(If(AllOf(domain == AF_UNIX, - AnyOf(type == SOCK_STREAM, type == SOCK_SEQPACKET)), - Allow()) + return Some(If(domain == AF_UNIX, + Switch(type) + .Case(SOCK_STREAM, Allow()) + .Case(SOCK_SEQPACKET, Allow()) + .Case(SOCK_DGRAM, Trap(SocketpairDatagramTrap, nullptr)) + .Default(InvalidSyscall())) .Else(InvalidSyscall())); }

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1358647 - Disallow bind/listen/accept for Linux content processes. r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit 45459c3c090384c1632ac5c2aa4323ed6df656ce Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Tue Apr 25 19:29:32 2017 -0600 Bug 1358647 - Disallow bind/listen/accept for Linux content processes. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: Cz9MKxOJnsS --HG-- extra : rebase_source : d3ab7ff9020066d5fe9ac3121c88c85b9fde6224 --- security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp index 018e9c64446c..f1520aa29e15 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp @@ -531,10 +531,6 @@ public: case SYS_SEND: case SYS_SOCKET: // DANGEROUS case SYS_CONNECT: // DANGEROUS - case SYS_ACCEPT: - case SYS_ACCEPT4: - case SYS_BIND: - case SYS_LISTEN: case SYS_GETSOCKOPT: case SYS_SETSOCKOPT: case SYS_GETSOCKNAME:

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1361238 - Re-allow accept4, used by accessibility. r=gcp
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit 9a694d0d0cda658157ec2f86e68db0e72b556e04 Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon May 1 21:51:11 2017 -0600 Bug 1361238 - Re-allow accept4, used by accessibility. r=gcp MozReview-Commit-ID: 3M3T3bkx4nP --HG-- extra : rebase_source : b67332889615ae34cc67737da361f21ae545aeb4 --- security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp index f1520aa29e15..7e1771a62665 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp @@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ public: case SYS_SEND: case SYS_SOCKET: // DANGEROUS case SYS_CONNECT: // DANGEROUS + case SYS_ACCEPT4: // Used by a11y; see bug 1361238 case SYS_GETSOCKOPT: case SYS_SETSOCKOPT: case SYS_GETSOCKNAME:

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2] Bug 1320085 - Allow the getrlimit-equivalent subset of prlimit64. r=tedd
by gk＠torproject.org 21 Sep '17

21 Sep '17

commit bf2b5cefbaddca978d5c5eca3b54f0f0af5c8d32 Author: Jed Davis <jld(a)mozilla.com> Date: Mon Nov 28 12:05:28 2016 -0700 Bug 1320085 - Allow the getrlimit-equivalent subset of prlimit64. r=tedd This applies only to content processes, where we already allow getrlimit (but not setrlimit). The rule added here does not allow using prlimit64 to set any resource limits or interact with any other process. MozReview-Commit-ID: nMry3t6QPj --HG-- extra : rebase_source : ecf792077a672ab1f2c5edf9fbeb915a0d8dd30e --- security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp index f8db9dc802ea..018e9c64446c 100644 --- a/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp +++ b/security/sandbox/linux/SandboxFilter.cpp @@ -735,6 +735,18 @@ public: CASES_FOR_getresgid: return Allow(); + case __NR_prlimit64: { + // Allow only the getrlimit() use case. (glibc seems to use + // only pid 0 to indicate the current process; pid == getpid() + // is equivalent and could also be allowed if needed.) + Arg<pid_t> pid(0); + // This is really a const struct ::rlimit*, but Arg<> doesn't + // work with pointers, only integer types. + Arg<uintptr_t> new_limit(2); + return If(AllOf(pid == 0, new_limit == 0), Allow()) + .Else(InvalidSyscall()); + } + case __NR_umask: case __NR_kill: case __NR_wait4:

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