- tor-relays - lists.torproject.org

Exit Node Questions
by tdukes＠palmettoshopper.com 02 Apr '22

02 Apr '22

Just a couple questions regarding exit node setup: 1) what exactly do I add to my in-addr.arpa zone file? 2) how do I implement a 'reduced exit policy'? Is that something that needs to be added to the torrc file? Thanks

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Help needed to get obfs4proxy 0.0.13-1 into Ubuntu focal-backports
by wurstsemmel 01 Apr '22

01 Apr '22

Dear Community, Dear Bridge Operators, an updated obfs4proxy package was pushed to Debian bullseye-backports about 2 weeks ago and solves a security issue and a partial incompatibility between Tor browser and bridges [1, 2, 3]. See also the E-Mail from meskio [4]. The new version, 0.0.13-1, will be available in Ubunutu jammy, planned to be released in April as 22.04 LTS. I would like to get this version into focal-backports, as focal (20.04 LTS) is a popular system. For this reason, I filed a bug with Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/obfs4proxy/+bug/1967003 Anyone who has experience with Ubuntu packages and backports is very welcome to help. Thank you and kind regards, wurstsemmel [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-team/2022-January/00… [2] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/40804 [3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/obfs… [4] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2022-March/020447.html

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Appears things are working again.
by tdukes＠palmettoshopper.com 31 Mar '22

31 Mar '22

Had been using a docker container with not much luck so I switched to using the tor files for centos 8. Working so far. I'm now in the relay search. Not sure or why its saying I'd be better suited for an exit. Fingers crossed!

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Bridge lifecycle expectations
by Just a Pleb 30 Mar '22

30 Mar '22

Hi All, I have three lifecycle questions: 1) How long is typical (or what factors are involved ) before the bridge address is given out to users. 2) How do I know when the bridge is burned (identified and blocked) 3) When it is burned and I build a new one on an other address should I copy the key with the config to maintain "trust" continuity or is that neutral or bad for bridges? As a little context I've run relays before and just started up an obfs4proxy Bridge (well 10days ago). https://bridges.torproject.org/status?id=<MY_BRIDGE_ID> says it's good, logs look good but I've yet to see any real traffic, just the same 8 German node that I presume are Tor infrastructure checking status. $ cat bridge-stats bridge-stats-end 2022-03-22 18:44:43 (86400 s) bridge-ips de=8 bridge-ip-versions v4=8,v6=0 bridge-ip-transports <OR>=8,obfs4=8 every day is the same (other than bridge-stats-end) Thanks, A. Pleb

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BadMiddle Nodes Loadbalancing Re: How to reduce tor CPU load on a single bridge?
by Jonas Friedli 26 Mar '22

26 Mar '22

Hi Gary, wait, your Relays are BadMiddle Nodes! It breaks at least all onion features. Thanks for trying to saturate the connection by balancing the single-core tor bottleneck. But think of any client try to establish RendezvousPoints or IntroductionPoints or fetch HsDir with one of your tor instances that all have same descriptor and look same to outside. It will result into fail the connection! 1. a_tor_client => HAProxy server tornode41 192.168.0.41:9001 => RendezvousCookie 46B9FA5B onionservice => HAProxy server tornode51 192.168.0.41:9001 => RendezvousCookie 46B9FA5B 2. tornode51 does not know cookies of tornode41 will: [WARN] Rejecting RENDEZVOUS1 cell with unrecognized rendezvous cookie 46B9FA5B. Didn't recognize cell, but circ stops here circuit_receive_relay_cell (forward) failed This Loadbalancing setup is only valid and usefull for Bridges or ExitNode relay roles. Not for any that have MiddlePropability consensusweigths. just FYI > David, Roger, et al., > > I just got back from holidays and really enjoyed this thread! > > I run my Loadbalanced Tor Relay as a Guard/Middle Relay, very similar to David's topology diagram, without the Snoflake-Server proxy. I'm using Nginx (which forks a child process per core) instead of HAProxy. My Backend Tor Relay Nodes are running on several, different Physical Servers; thus, I'm using Private Address Space instead of Loopback Address Space. > > In this configuration, I discovered that I had to configure Nginix/HAProxy to use Transparent Streaming Mode, use Source IP Address Sticky Sessions (Pinning), configure the Loadbalancer to send the Backend Tor Relay Nodes' traffic back to Nginx/HAProxy (Kernel & IPTables), configure all Backend Tor Relay Nodes to use a copy of the same .tordb (I wasn't able to get the Backend Tor Relay Nodes working with the same .tordb (over NFS) without the DirectoryAuthorities complaining), and configure the Backend Tor Relay Nodes to use the same DirectoryAuthority (to ensure each Backend Tor Relay Node sends Meta-Data to the same DirectoryAuthority). Moreover, I've enabled logging to a central Syslog Server for each Backend Tor Relay Node and created a number of Shell Scripts to help remotely manage each Backend Tor Relay Node. > > Here are some sample configurations for reference. > > Nginx Config: > > upstream orport_tornodes { > #least_conn; > hash $remote_addr consistent; > #server 192.168.0.1:9001 weight=1 max_fails=1 fail_timeout=10s; > #server 192.168.0.1:9001 down; > server 192.168.0.11:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; > server 192.168.0.21:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; > #server 192.168.0.31:9001 weight=4 max_fails=3 fail_timeout=300s; > server 192.168.0.41:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; > server 192.168.0.51:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; > #zone orport_torfarm 64k; > > > HAProxy Config (Alternate): > > frontend tornodes > # Log to global config > log global > > # Bind to port 443 on a specified interface > bind 0.0.0.0:9001 transparent > > # We're proxying TCP here... > mode tcp > > default_backend orport_tornodes > > # Simple TCP source consistent over several servers using the specified > # source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip > backend orport_tornodes > > balance source > hash-type consistent > #server tornode1 192.168.0.1:9001 check disabled > #server tornode11 192.168.0.11:9001 source 192.168.0.1 > server tornode11 192.168.0.11:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip check disabled > server tornode21 192.168.0.21:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip check disabled > #server tornode31 192.168.0.31:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip check disabled > server tornode41 192.168.0.41:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip check disabled > server tornode51 192.168.0.51:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip check disabled > > > Linux Kernel & IPTables Config: > > modprobe xt_socket > modprobe xt_TPROXY > > echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward; cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward > echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_nonlocal_bind; cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_nonlocal_bind > echo 15000 64000 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range; cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range > > ip rule del fwmark 1 lookup 100 2>/dev/null # Ensure Duplicate Rule is not Created > ip rule add fwmark 1 lookup 100 # ip rule show > ip route add local 0.0.0.0/0 dev lo table 100 # ip route show table wan0; ip route show table 100 > > iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 9001 -j ACCEPT > iptables -t mangle -N TOR > iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp -m socket -j TOR > iptables -t mangle -A TOR -j MARK --set-mark 1 > iptables -t mangle -A TOR -j ACCEPT > #iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp -s 192.168.0.0/24 --sport 9001 -j MARK --set-xmark 0x1/0xffffffff > #iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 9001 -j TPROXY --tproxy-mark 0x1/0x1 --on-port 9001 --on-ip 127.0.0.1 > > > Backend Tor Relay Node Configs: > > # cat /tmp/torrc > Nickname xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > ORPort xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:9001 NoListen > ORPort 192.168.0.11:9001 NoAdvertise > SocksPort 9050 > SocksPort 192.168.0.11:9050 > ControlPort 9051 > DirAuthority longclaw orport=443 no-v2 v3ident=23D15D965BC35114467363C165C4F724B64B4F66 199.58.81.140:80 74A910646BCEEFBCD2E874FC1DC997430F968145 > FallbackDir 193.23.244.244:80 orport=443 id=7BE683E65D48141321C5ED92F075C55364AC7123 > DirCache 0 > ExitRelay 0 > MaxMemInQueues 192 MB > GeoIPFile /opt/share/tor/geoip > Log notice file /tmp/torlog > Log notice syslog > VirtualAddrNetwork 10.192.0.0/10 > AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 > TransPort 192.168.0.11:9040 > DNSPort 192.168.0.11:9053 > RunAsDaemon 1 > DataDirectory /tmp/tor/torrc.d/.tordb > AvoidDiskWrites 1 > User tor > ContactInfo tor-operator at your-emailaddress-domain > > # cat /tmp/torrc > Nickname xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > ORPort xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:9001 NoListen > ORPort 192.168.0.41:9001 NoAdvertise > SocksPort 9050 > SocksPort 192.168.0.41:9050 > ControlPort 9051 > DirAuthority longclaw orport=443 no-v2 v3ident=23D15D965BC35114467363C165C4F724B64B4F66 199.58.81.140:80 74A910646BCEEFBCD2E874FC1DC997430F968145 > FallbackDir 193.23.244.244:80 orport=443 id=7BE683E65D48141321C5ED92F075C55364AC7123 > DirCache 0 > ExitRelay 0 > MaxMemInQueues 192 MB > GeoIPFile /opt/share/tor/geoip > Log notice file /tmp/torlog > Log notice syslog > VirtualAddrNetwork 10.192.0.0/10 > AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 > TransPort 192.168.0.41:9040 > DNSPort 192.168.0.41:9053 > RunAsDaemon 1 > DataDirectory /tmp/tor/torrc.d/.tordb > AvoidDiskWrites 1 > User tor > ContactInfo tor-operator at your-emailaddress-domain > > > Shell Scripts to Remotely Manage Tor Relay Nodes: > > # cat /usr/sbin/stat-tor-nodes > #!/bin/sh > uptime-all-nodes; memfree-all-nodes; netstat-tor-nodes > > # cat /usr/sbin/uptime-all-nodes > #!/bin/sh > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; uptime' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; uptime' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; uptime' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; uptime' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; uptime' > > # cat /usr/sbin/memfree-all-nodes > #!/bin/sh > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; grep MemFree /proc/meminfo' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; grep MemFree /proc/meminfo' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; grep MemFree /proc/meminfo' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; grep MemFree /proc/meminfo' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; grep MemFree /proc/meminfo' > > # cat /usr/sbin/netstat-tor-nodes > #!/bin/sh > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep -i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep -i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep -i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep -i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep -i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l' > > # cat /jffs/sbin/ps-tor-nodes > #!/bin/sh > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' > > # cat /usr/sbin/killall-tor-nodes > #!/bin/sh > read -r -p "Are you sure? [y/N] " input > case "$input" in > [yY]) > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'killall tor' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'killall tor' > #/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'killall tor' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'killall tor' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'killall tor' > return 0 > ;; > *) > return 1 > ;; > esac > > # cat /usr/sbin/restart-tor-nodes > #!/bin/sh > read -r -p "Are you sure? [y/N] " input > case "$input" in > [yY]) > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc --quiet' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc --quiet' > #/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc --quiet' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc --quiet' > /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc --quiet' > return 0 > ;; > *) > return 1 > ;; > esac > > I've been meaning to put together a tutorial on Loadbalancing Tor Relays, but haven't found the time as of yet. Perhaps, this will help, until I am able to find the time. > > I appreciate your knowledge sharing and for furthering the topic of Loadbalancing Tor Relays; especially, with regard to Bridging and Exit Relays. > > Keep up the Great Work! > > Respectfully, > > > Gary > On Tuesday, January 4, 2022, 09:57:52 PM MST, Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org> wrote: > > [I'm about to go off-line for some days, so I am sending my current > suboptimally-organized reply, which I hope is better than waiting another > week to respond :)] > > On Thu, Dec 30, 2021 at 10:42:51PM -0700, David Fifield wrote: > > Let's make a distinction between the "frontend" snowflake-server > > pluggable transport process, and the "backend" tor process. These don't > > necessarily have to be 1:1; either one could be run in multiple > > instances. Currently, the "backend" tor is the limiting factor, because > > it uses only 1 CPU core. The "frontend" snowflake-server can scale to > > multiple cores in a single process and is comparatively unrestrained. > > Excellent point, and yes this simplifies. Great. > > > I believe that the "pinning" of a client session to particular tor > > instance will work automatically by the fact that snowflake-server keeps > > an outgoing connection alive (i.e., through the load balancer) as long > > as a KCP session exists. > >[...] > > But before starting the second instance the first time, copy keys from > > the first instance: > > Hm. It looks promising! But we might still have a Tor-side problem > remaining. I think it boils down to how long the KCP sessions last. > > The details on how exactly these bridge instances will diverge over time: > > The keys directory will start out the same, but after four weeks > (DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS, used to be one week but in Tor > 0.3.1.1-alpha, proposal 274, we bumped it up to four weeks) each > bridge will rotate its onion key (the one clients use for circuit-level > crypto). That is, each instance will generate its own fresh onion key. > > The two bridge instances actually haven't diverged completely at that > point, since Tor remembers the previous onion key (i.e. the onion key > from the previous period) and is willing to receive create cells that > use it for one further week (DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS). So it > is after 5 weeks that the original (shared) onion key will no longer work. > > Where this matters is (after this 5 weeks have passed) if the client > connects to the bridge, fetches and caches the bridge descriptor of > instance A, and then later it connects to the bridge again and gets > passed to instance B. In this case, the create cell that the client > generates will use the onion key for instance A, and instance B won't > know how to decrypt it so it will send a destroy cell back. > > If this is an issue, we can definitely work around it, by e.g. disabling > the onion key rotation on the bridges, or setting up a periodic rsync+hup > between the bridges, or teaching clients to use createfast cells in this > situation (this type of circuit crypto doesn't use the onion key at all, > and just relies on TLS for security -- which can only be done for the > first hop of the circuit but that's the one we're talking about here). > > But before we think about workarounds, maybe we don't need one: how long > does "the KCP session" last? > > Tor clients try to fetch a fresh bridge descriptor every three-ish > hours, and once they fetch a bridge descriptor from their "current" > bridge instance, they should know the onion key that it wants to use. So > it is that up-to-three-hour window where I think things could go wrong. > And that timeframe sounds promising. > > (I also want to double-check that clients don't try to use the onion > key from the current cached descriptor while fetching the updated > descriptor. That could become an ugly bug in the wrong circumstances, > and would be something we want to fix if it's happening.) > > Here's how you can simulate a pair of bridge instances that have diverged > after five weeks, so you can test how things would work with them: > > Copy the keys directory as before, but "rm secret_onion_key*" in the > keys directory on n-1 of the instances, before starting them.) > > Thanks! > --Roger >

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Bridges not being distributed
by Spydar007 25 Mar '22

25 Mar '22

Hello, I notice (almost) all bridges are showing their distributor mechanism as None on Tor Metrics.[1] There are also hardly any in the latest pool assignments file from CollecTor.[2] Curious as to why? Is this a change that needs fixing on a bridge operators end, or simply BridgeDB not reporting properly? [1] https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/type:bridge%20 [2] https://metrics.torproject.org/collector/recent/bridge-pool-assignments/

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update obfs4proxy if you run a bridge
by meskio 23 Mar '22

23 Mar '22

Hello, TL;RD: if you are a bridge operator please update obfs4proxy to a version>=0.0.12. There is a new version of obfs4proxy (>=0.0.12) which fixes a security issue[0]. Tor Browser has already updated to the new version, which reduces a bit the security problem, but introduces a partial incompatibility between versions[1]. Because of that updating to the latest version greatly will help bridge users. If you use debian you can find the latest version bullseye-backports[2]. If you use docker there is a new version of the official docker image that you can upgrade to[3]. Thank you for running bridges, let me know if you need any help upgrading it. [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-team/2022-January/00… [1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/40804 [2] https://packages.debian.org/stable-backports/obfs4proxy [3] https://hub.docker.com/layers/thetorproject/obfs4-bridge/0.11/images/sha256… -- meskio | https://meskio.net/ -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- My contact info: https://meskio.net/crypto.txt -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Nos vamos a Croatan.

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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge lifecycle expectations
by Just a Pleb 23 Mar '22

23 Mar '22

Hi meskio, Thanks for the detailed response. My bridge has been assigned to telegram so that explains why it's not active yet. Watching per country stats makes sense for determining where the bridge has been blocked. Also good to know the bridge state should be fully disposed when recycling rather than preserved for reputational purposes. Follow up question on running bridges and relays. If the consensus is I should pick Relays xor Bridges to run I will but I'm not fully convinced that's the right trade off for capacity -vs- security given "good actors" wouldn't attack the traffic and bad actors wouldn't obey the injunction the only extra security impact I see is limiting damage from "good actor who get compromised" which is *some* obviously... Thanks

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Ports blocked
by tdukes＠palmettoshopper.com 23 Mar '22

23 Mar '22

Looks like my ISP has shut me down. The ports I were using are now blocked. I checked them with an online port checker. I tried.

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Snowflake vs bridge on home connection on a Raspberry Pi 4
by Cristian Consonni 22 Mar '22

22 Mar '22

Hi all, I have a fiber connection at home and I would like to run a bridge or standalone Snowflake proxy on a dedicated Raspberry Pi 4. I have been reading some threads [1][2] from this list about the topic, but it is not completely clear to me what would be the best choice. The requirements [3] for running a bridge are 24/7 connectivity and the ability to expose TCP ports; however, I have read that it is also preferred that you have a static IP to run a bridge (in the page about the recent campaign about bridges, having a static IP was listed as a requirement [4]). In principle my home connection has a dynamic IP, but I have been logging my IP address for the last few days and it seems quite stable (it has not changed for the last 4 days). What's the best choice? Can I run both? Best, Cristian [1]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2022-February/020298.html [2]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2022-February/020355.html [3]: https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/ [4]: https://blog.torproject.org/run-a-bridge-campaign/

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